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Abstract 
This thesis is a history of the research and development (R&D) programme of the 
health department for England and Wales, 1961 to 1986. It is a study of the 
development of the British ‘health research state’, showing how the department’s 
programme was shaped not just by health policy but also by science policy; non-
government actors; and the requirement for co-existence with the Medical 
Research Council (MRC).  
A longitudinal analysis shows that the departmental R&D budget underwent rapid 
growth from a near zero-base in 1961, rising to a real-terms peak in 1976. Growth 
rates during this initial period outstripped those for total civil R&D. After 1976, the 
departmental R&D budget began to decline when adjusted for inflation, with a step 
decrease in 1981. This pattern of meteoric rise followed by decline can be 
attributed in part to the ‘Rothschild reforms’ in national science policy and their 
subsequent reversal - an occurrence unique to the health domain. These events, 
which related to biomedical research only, were overlain onto a longer-term rise 
and reversal in health and personal social services research (HPSSR), which had 
separate, earlier origins and differing drivers. The nature of the different streams of 
research and their governing dynamics are elucidated.  
Evidence is drawn from interviews, archives, official publications and secondary 
sources. An analytical framework draws on political, institutional and social 
epistemology theory to consider power and interest in the health research state, 
organisational responses, and governing assumptions about research utilisation. For 
biomedical research, structural interests and the power of the medical profession 
are shown to be central to the course of events. HPSSR was caught up in the 
resulting turbulence, but not to the extent of complete derailment and the 
Department became an important patron of HPSSR during this period. 
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Preface 
 
The interpretation of historical events is influenced by the starting place of the 
investigator, who brings to any subject a set of previously formed assumptions and 
prejudices. It may, therefore, be helpful if I briefly explain my interest in the subject 
of this thesis. In 2005, I became director of one of the National Health Service 
research and development (R&D) programmes.1 I was appointed to this position 
from a background in health care management, not from research as would have 
been more conventional. As an outsider, coming new to the world of research 
commissioning, I was struck by the way in which this activity was bound by certain 
conventions and doctrines.  Some of these, such as the rituals of peer review, were in 
no way unique to health-related research. Others, such as the doctrine of ‘needs-led, 
science added’, together with the elaborate organisational procedures that 
accompanied this, appeared more peculiar to the NHS R&D programme. 
As somebody whose first academic training was in history, I became curious 
about the origins of this distinctive world. This curiosity was fuelled by events 
during my term of office (2005 to 2008), which happened to coincide with a spell of 
disturbance to the British system for publicly-funded health research. The first signs 
of this were the publication, in 2005, by the Department of Health of Best Research 
for Best Health, a ‘new national health research strategy’. This positioned the 
Department and the NHS as key players in delivering the government’s science and 
innovation strategy. The twin goals of health and wealth would be pursued through 
new organisational arrangements, creating ‘a virtual body’ within the Department of 
Health, to be known as the National Institute for Health Research (NIHR). In the 
Department’s version of history, the NHS R&D strategy of 1991is the foundation 
event. Even at the time of its publication, this strategy was claimed as ‘the first stage 
                                                             
1. The Service Delivery and Organisation programme (SDO), which became NIHR-SDO in 
2006. 
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in the creation of an R&D programme and infrastructure in the NHS’.1 The 2005 
strategy reinforced this creation myth. We are told that before 1991 ‘research in the 
NHS was conducted in a piecemeal fashion with no strategy or clear leadership’.2 In 
the official narrative, a procession of incremental policy initiatives then follows, 
with the creation of NIHR as their apotheosis. This is Whig history, in which the 
situation before 1991 is largely ignored, other than to present it as primordial chaos. 
Best Research for Best Health was followed in 2006 by a review of health 
research funding, commissioned by the Treasury and chaired by Sir David Cooksey, 
industrialist and venture-capitalist. 3  Cooksey paid more attention to history than the 
Department. In his report, events long pre-dating the NHS R&D Strategy are invoked 
to explain barriers to the translation of research into improved health care, which are 
said to be peculiar to the UK.  The ‘Haldane Principle’, originating in the aftermath 
of the First World War, is said to have ‘largely defined how research has been 
supported’ and is described as a ‘cultural barrier’ to the translation of research into 
practice. The ‘Rothschild Report’ of 1971 is portrayed as a reform attempt that failed 
because the Department of Health ‘did not have the expertise or resources it now has 
to play the demanding role of informed customer of health research’.4 Events dating 
back many decades are thus ascribed continuing relevance in the twenty-first 
century. This pointed towards the existence of a longer and richer back-story to the 
NHS R&D strategy than the Department’s version of history acknowledged.  
I referred to some of these historical events in an article published soon after I left 
office.5 I later felt that this was somewhat superficial and incubated an ambition to 
undertake a more complete and rigorous investigation into the history of the 
Department’s R&D programme. This thesis is the fulfilment of that ambition. What I 
encountered in the sources was a much richer and more dramatic history than I 
                                                             
1.  Department of Health. Research for Health. A Research and Development Strategy for 
the NHS (London: DHSS, 1991). 
2.  Department of Health. Best Research for Best Health. A New National Health Research 
Strategy (London: DHSS, 2005), 38. 
3.   David Cooksey, A Review of UK Health Research Funding (London: HMSO, 2006). 
4.   Ibid. 36. 
5.  Stephen M. Davies, "Setting the research agenda for health services management: who 
decides?" Evidence and Policy 6, no.1 (2010): 103-113. 
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anticipated. It is a story that is relevant to some major themes in contemporary 
history. The growth of the state and the moving frontier between state and civil 
society is evident. The struggle for power and resources between interest groups 
within the state apparatus figures large. The influence of medical elites in the health 
research state speaks to the idea of the professionalised state and to wider themes of 
expertise, power and authority. Competing ideologies about science policy and the 
governance of publicly-funded science run like fault lines through the history, as do 
different models of knowledge production and utilisation. The growing complexity 
of health care systems, and the contribution of R&D in shaping the response of the 
state to this phenomenon, emerges as a further theme. More prosaically, the history 
also speaks to the challenge of implementing strategic change in public 
administration. 
Although these themes remain pertinent today, I have sought to avoid the 
interpretation of past events through the lens of current issues. However, tension on 
the frontier between the Department of Health and the research councils will 
probably reoccur at some future date. An understanding of the past may be of some 
value if, and when, it does.
15 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Science, and the possibilities for society which it opens up, is the great 
growing point of our civilisation. In the past fourteen years since the war 
scientific knowledge and its application have advanced on every front, 
and the speed of advance is yearly increasing. With science today the 
possibilities are almost infinite: it is no longer true to say that "the sky 
is the limit”.1 
 
As the 1960s dawned, British society was suffused with optimism about the 
potential contribution of science and technology to society. The belief that science 
should be planned, rather than led by curiosity, was one aspect of a wider ‘planning 
fervour’.2 ‘Science policy’, by which governments seek to steer science towards 
social goals, was fashionable. Between the general elections of 1959 and 1964, 
science and technology acquired an unprecedented prominence in British politics. 
Conservative Prime Minister Harold Macmillan appointed a Minister for Science and 
Technology in 1959. Promises to mobilise science for the modernisation of society 
helped Harold Wilson win the leadership of the Labour Party and the 1964 election. 
The apparatus of the state for publicly-funded research and development (R&D) was 
overhauled by both parties and spending grew.3 Science and technology were so 
salient that the period between 1959 and the early 1970s has been dubbed ‘the 
technocratic moment’ in British history.4 The state was favourably positioned to play 
an interventionist role, because science and technology were substantially 
nationalised activities. Government was a major funder of R&D through the research 
councils, the Department for Scientific and Industrial Research (DSIR), the National 
Research Development Corporation, civil and service government departments and 
the University Grants Committee. Government departments and nationalised 
industries were also significant providers of R&D through in-house research 
                                                             
1.  Baron Taylor of Harlow (Stephen Taylor) opening a House of Lords debate on ‘Science in 
Civil Life’, 9 December 1959, HL Deb vol. 220 c177 
2.  Glen O'Hara, From Dreams to Disillusionment. Economic and Social Planning in 1960s 
Britain (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007). 
3.  Norman J. Vig, Science and Technology in British Politics (Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1968). 
4.  David Edgerton, Warfare State (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006). 
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establishments. The ‘Gibbs-Zuckerman’ report of 1961 identifies 270 of such 
establishments, employing 10,270 qualified scientists and engineers. Government 
R&D was still defence-dominated, employing 70 percent of this workforce, although 
this proportion began to fall after 1960 as resources were diverted towards civil 
purposes. A further 6,700 scientists were employed through the research councils.1 
Amongst the civil departments, the Ministry of Health (MH) is conspicuous by its 
near absence from Gibbs-Zuckerman.  No research establishments are itemised in the 
report for the Ministry which, in truth, is barely mentioned at all. Its research 
interests are given as relating solely to ‘public health’ and the only in-house capacity 
listed is a small ‘organisation and methods’ team.  Responsibility for ‘curative and 
preventive’ health research is assigned to the Medical Research Council (MRC). The 
report mentions that the Ministry of Health is responsible for ‘development’ but goes 
on to add: ‘commercial firms and the medical profession are also much concerned 
with these activities, on which the MRC may be called to advise’.2  This chapter 
begins with a quotation from Lord Taylor, a doctor turned politician, who saw great 
promise in the new scientific field of ‘health promotion’. Through the development 
of this field, he anticipated, science would speak to policy. But Taylor made no 
mention of any role for the Ministry of Health. 
The science of health promotion is only just beginning…I must say that it 
is a pleasure to note that the work of the Medical Research Council in this 
field is a growing point, which I hope the Minister for Science will watch 
and fertilise, tend and stimulate.3  
The Ministry’s low profile in R&D was the mirror image of the position occupied 
by the MRC, which claimed a mandate for the full spectrum of research related to 
human health.4 The Council’s goal, since its foundation in 1920, had been control 
over all aspects of medical research in the United Kingdom. Under the new 
circumstances created by the establishment of the NHS, the respective 
responsibilities of Ministry and Council for clinical research had been re-visited by a 
                                                             
1. Office of the Minister for Science, The Management and Control of Research and 
Development (London: HMSO, 1961), 20. 
2.  Ibid. 15 
3.   HL Deb. vol.220 c.180 
4.  Cmd. 8876, Report of the Medical Research Council for the year 1951-52. Committee of 
Privy Council for Medical Research (London: HMSO, 1953), 5. 
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joint working party, which reported in 1953.1  The report of this working party 
accepted, without qualification, the hegemonic claims of the MRC. Consequently, 
the Ministry transferred control of the handful of clinical research units based in the 
NHS, together with funding, to the Council in 1954. Not only was the Ministry 
lacking in in-house research capacity in 1961, it had also ceded the field of clinical 
research to the MRC. 
During the decade and a half that followed, this position was transformed. The 
health department re-positioned itself, becoming a major player in the world of 
government R&D. By 1973, the Department of Health and Social Security (DHSS) 
held a budget of £13.3 million for R&D. Growth in the DHSS R&D budget had been 
explosive, outstripping average growth rates for all civil departments. Consequently, 
the Department’s share of the publicly-funded civil R&D budget grew from 0.13 
percent in 1961/2 to 3.8 percent in 1972/3. Further growth followed as funds for the 
commissioning of biomedical research were transferred from the MRC under the 
‘Rothschild reforms’, an initiative of national science policy. By 1976, the R&D 
budget of the Department was at its peak and approaching that of the MRC. 
Thereafter it began to fall after allowing for inflation. The MRC remained 
unreconciled to the Rothschild reforms and between 1977 and 1980 campaigned for 
the return of the funds transferred. This campaign eventually succeeded, and the 
Department’s entire budget for biomedical research was returned to the Council in 
1981. Thereafter, the departmental R&D budget entered a period of slow but steady 
real terms decline. 
The picture over a quarter of a century thus appears as one of a meteoric ascent 
followed by steady decline. This becomes even more evident when the budget data 
are corrected for inflation (chart 1.1). The start year, 1961, represents a baseline 
when R&D activity at the Ministry of Health was de minimis. This was also when the 
Ministry took its first steps to build organisational capacity for R&D. The end year, 
1986, has been chosen because it saw a significant reorganisation in the 
Department’s R&D apparatus, involving a reduction in capacity and in the status of 
the Chief Scientist. Beyond this point, events become more of a prelude to the 1988 
                                                             
1.   Medical Research Council and Ministry of Health and Department of Health for Scotland. 
Clinical Research in Relation to the National Health Service (London: HMSO, 1953). 
Known as ‘The Cohen Report’ after the working party Chairman, Sir Henry Cohen. 
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report of the House of Lords’ Select Committee on Science and Technology, which 
was highly critical of the Department’s R&D policy.1 The politics of this Committee, 
and its influence over the NHS R&D Strategy of 1991, are substantial topics in 
themselves and ones for which archival records are not yet available, reinforcing the 
decision to end this study in 1986. 
Chart 1.1 R&D Budgets (constant price base): Ministry of Health/Department of 
Health and Social Security and the Medical Research Council 1962 to 1986.  
 
Sources: Supply Estimates 1961/62 to 1981/82; Cabinet Office Annual Reviews of 
Government Funded R&D 1981/82 onwards. See appendix A for details of sources and 
methodology. Note: Years are financial years ending 31 March, e.g. 1962 is 1st April 1961 to 
31st March 1962. Adjusted to constant 1986 prices using retail price index. 
Aims and structure 
The aim of this study is to produce a historical analysis of organisation and policy 
that accounts for the beginnings, rise and subsequent decline of the Department of 
Health’s R&D programme between 1961 and 1986, including consideration of the 
pre-history of the programme in the 1950s. No longer-duration account of the 
                                                             
1.  House of Lords. Priorities in Medical Research. 3rd Report of the House of Lords Select 
Committee on Science and Technology 1987-88 Session (London: HMSO, 1988). 
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programme that is based on primary research has previously been published. The 
objective is to fill this gap in the literature.  
The thesis is structured as follows. It begins with a literature review (chapter 2) 
before moving on to describe methodology and set out an analytical framework with 
three themes (chapter 3). A longitudinal quantitative analysis of the Department’s 
R&D allocations for the period 1961 to 1986 then follows (chapter 4). This exercise 
establishes the scale and scope of the programme and supports the development of 
periodisation. It also provides some preliminary characterisation through 
disaggregation of funding streams.  
Thereafter the structure is broadly chronological. A chapter on the pre-history of 
the programme and the context from which it emerged (chapter 5) examines the 
period up to 1965. This is followed by a chapter on organisation before the 
implementation of the Rothschild reforms, which begins in 1961 and ends in 1973 
(chapter 6). There is then an interlude in the chronology for a further, qualitative 
exploration of the main streams of research (chapter 7). The intention here is to more 
fully characterise the programme, building on the statistical analysis in chapter 4.  
The next two chapters return to the chronology, each examining relatively short 
periods in some detail. The first looks at the implementation of the Rothschild 
reforms at the DHSS between 1971 and 1973 (chapter 8). This is followed by an 
investigation of the partial reversal of these reforms between 1978 and 1981, ending 
with the return of biomedical research funds (chapter 9). Events between these two 
critical junctures, from 1973 to 1978, are outlined briefly at the start of the chapter 
but not revisited in any detail. This approach avoids duplication with the work of 
Maurice Kogan and colleagues and is justified further in the literature review and 
these two chapters.  
The final chronological chapter looks at the programme between 1982 and 1986 
(chapter 10). The 1980s have been largely passed over as a sterile era, overshadowed 
by the damning critique of the Select Committee at the end of the decade. This 
chapter casts some light on this neglected period and finds continuity, overshadowed 
by shrinking funding and an unfavourable political climate. It ends with yet another 
reorganisation of the research management function.  
20 
 
Two chapters then follow by way of conclusion. The first takes an overarching 
view on the mechanisms used by the department to make research useful and to 
promote its use (chapter 11). The last chapter offers an interpretation of the whole 
quarter century, structured within the three analytical themes (chapter 12). 
Terminology 
There are two areas where terminology might cause confusion. Potential sources 
of confusion, and the conventions used in mitigation, are identified here.  
Government Departments. The Ministry of Health (MH) merged with the 
Ministry of Social Security to create the Department of Health and Social Security 
(DHSS) in 1968. In 1988 there was de-merger, from which the Department of Health 
(DH) emerged. ‘The Ministry’ is used when dealing with events before 1968. ‘The 
Department’ is used when dealing with events thereafter and for any discussion that 
straddles 1968. ‘The departmental programme’ refers to the R&D programme of the 
MH/DHSS. R&D policy was devolved to the Scottish Home and Health Department 
(SHHD) and, to a lesser extent, to the Welsh Office (WO). This thesis is concerned 
with policy for England and Wales, but there are some places where a UK-wide 
perspective is needed. So, for example, in managing biomedical research 
commissioning the DHSS acted as the lead for all the health departments because the 
MRC was, and remains, a UK-wide body. In this context, ‘the health departments’ 
means not just the DHSS but also SHHD and WO. 
Research and Development. There is no catch-all description for the type of 
research funded by the Department between 1961 and 1985. The closest term in use 
today would be health services research (HSR). However, this excludes clinical 
research, supplies and equipment research and development, building and 
engineering research and development and social security research – all of which 
were elements of the departmental programme during this period.  Until about 1970, 
the Department used the term ‘health and welfare research’ to describe the scope of 
its interests. Confusingly, this term was used in two ways. Sometimes it was used to 
describe research into all aspects of public health and the NHS. On other occasions, 
it was used in the much narrower sense of research into the ‘health and welfare’ 
services provided by local authorities before 1974. After about 1970, the Department 
settled on the term ‘health and personal social services research’ (HPSSR) to 
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describe its mainstream interests. However, this still excluded social security 
research, biomedical research including clinical research, and some other specialist 
R&D. When, in the late 1970s, the Department contemplated a larger role for the 
research councils, distinctions were made between HSR and social research, 
following the demarcation between MRC and Social Science Research Council 
(SSRC). There is, thus, no all-encompassing descriptor for the full spectrum of 
departmental interests. The convention followed in this thesis is to use the terms 
most applicable to the specific context. This approach is sometimes rather 
cumbersome and requires occasional additional explanation. Its merit is that it avoids 
any inference of a homogeneity which never existed
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2. Literature Review 
 
The conditions and methods of health-related research have changed 
beyond recognition since the conception of the National Insurance Fund 
in Edwardian days. By contrast, the basic questions and tensions 
regarding the optimal support of such research have proved remarkably 
timeless. They include the balance between the control and freedom of 
researchers; between competing scientific fields; between the influence 
of scientists, policy makers and patients; and between healthcare 
providers’ role as hosts of research and efficient players in the market.1 
 
This chapter presents a review of the published literature relevant to the history of 
the departmental R&D programme. It begins with writing that is directly concerned 
with the Department’s organisation and policy for research and development over a 
longer duration, covering as a minimum the whole of the period between 1961 and 
1986. This is historical writing, in that its primary concern is to record and interpret 
the past, but it is also mostly writing by participants, rather than historians. The 
review then turns to retrospective writing, dealing with shorter periods of up to a 
decade or so. This is even more dominated by participants. Proximity to the events 
described means that some of this material might equally be treated as primary 
sources. However, the texts discussed all include some retrospective interpretation 
and so are included in this review.  
Having considered the literature that deals with the programme directly, the 
review then moves on to writing that deals with context. The treatment (or otherwise) 
of the R&D programme in historical writing about the health department, the NHS 
and the research councils is examined. The scope is then further widened by 
reviewing histories of health, science and technology policy. The powers available to 
health ministers have, since 1919, included those of undertaking and commissioning 
research. We might, therefore, reasonably expect to encounter health-related research 
as an aspect of histories of health policy. Health is only one of a number of civil 
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domains in which government funds research and British governments have sought 
to pursue cross-cutting science and technology policy since the late 1950s. It follows 
that we might also expect this topic to appear as an aspect of historical writing about 
science and technology policy. The chapter considers how far both expectations are 
met, before concluding with a discussion of some common themes and gaps in the 
literature. 
Organisation and policy for research and development 
Historical writing - longer duration 
A structured database search identified only one text directly addressing the 
history of organisation and policy for publicly-funded health research over a long 
duration, extending either side of the study period. This article, by Shergold and 
Grant, originated in a consultancy assignment by the Department of Health in the 
period immediately prior to the launch of Best Research for Best Health.1 The 
authors’ perspective is that of economically-rationalising science policy, which seeks 
to optimise returns from the investment of public monies in research. The history is 
presented as a quest for organisational arrangements and policies that can achieve 
this objective in the health domain. The authors observe that certain policy issues 
have proved strikingly persistent over the long period that the article covers, which is 
nearly a century. They do not, however, go on to offer much by way of possible 
explanations for this persistence, beyond the presence of ‘intrinsic challenges’. 
The article is ostensibly concerned with all health-related research, but discussion 
is focused almost entirely on biomedical research. Furthermore, for the period 
between the founding of the NHS in 1946 and 1988, the article focuses almost 
exclusively on to the Rothschild reforms and their subsequent reversal. The authors 
acknowledge that the Ministry of Health ‘stepped in to fill the gap’ when its research 
needs were not met by the MRC during the 1960s, but do not go on to discuss what 
this meant in practice. The biomedical focus also limits the discussion of science 
policy beyond Rothschild. Reorganisation of the research councils following the 
Trend Report of 1964 is dealt with in one sentence and the implications for the 
relationship between the MRC and the Ministry of Health are not considered. Key 
events in the development of social science research in the UK, such as the Heyworth 
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Committee Report and the creation of the Social Science Research Council (SSRC) 
in 1965, are not discussed.1  
The failure of the Rothschild reforms in the health domain is attributed to the fact 
that ‘departmental structures were insufficiently robust to allow authoritative 
decision-making within the new system’. This verdict is based on biomedical 
research and the article does not consider the adequacy of arrangements for 
commissioning other types of research. As a backdrop to the 1988 Lords Select 
Committee Report, we are told that the Department ‘focused on health services 
research and public health research with the aim of providing evidence for 
government policy-making’. The origins of this programme, it is suggested, lay in a 
1979 government review of the workings of Rothschild. This led to an agreement to 
return biomedical research funds to the MRC and, in a re-demarcation exercise, 
‘departmental funds for health and social security research were put under the direct 
control of the Chief Scientist’. The narrative here is not entirely clear, but the authors 
appear to argue that a programme of health services research, directed towards the 
policy needs of the Department, emerged in the 1980s as a response to the failure of 
the Rothschild reforms in relation to biomedical research.  
In 2013, Walter W. Holland published his ‘personal account of the development 
of health services research’(HSR).2 Holland (b. 1929) became director of the 
Department of Clinical Epidemiology and Social Medicine at St Thomas’s Medical 
School in 1964. Within this Department, he established a Social Medicine and Health 
Services Research Unit, which was the largest single recipient of departmental R&D 
funding by 1970. The output from this unit was substantial and established his 
reputation as a leading figure in British epidemiology and health services research.3  
He was one of two special advisers to the House of Lords Select Committee in 1988. 
The chronology of his career has coincided closely with that of the departmental 
programme, making him an important source and commentator. 
                                                             
1. Stuart S. Blume, “Social Science in Whitehall: Two Analytical Perspectives,” in Social 
Science Research and Government, ed. Martin Bulmer (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1987), 77-93. 
2 .  Walter W. Holland, Improving Health Services (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2013). 
3.   Jeanne Daly, Evidence-based Medicine and the Search for a Science of Clinical Care 
(Berkeley: University of California Press/Millbank Memorial Fund, 2005), 150-152.  
25 
 
Holland’s book may appear at first sight to cover much of the same ground as this 
thesis. However, his focus is the development of HSR in the UK, rather than the 
departmental programme. Sections on the history of the departmental organisation, 
which include original information from reminiscence and personal papers, are 
included principally to serve this theme. Holland strongly emphasises the HSR 
element of the programme, to the extent that the reader might assume that this was 
totality of the departmental programme. Other writing indicates that the range of the 
Department was broader than this, encompassing fields as diverse as social security, 
computing, equipment and building research. 
Like Shergold and Grant, Holland begins his historical review with the National 
Insurance Act of 1911. For the period 1962 to 1988 he draws on personal 
involvement. He illustrates the development of epidemiology and social medicine in 
the UK through examples drawn principally from the work of his unit at St 
Thomas’s. Elsewhere, Holland has described the late 1960s and early 1970s as a 
period when there was abundant funding, minimal bureaucracy and enlightened 
leadership at the Department.1 A sense of this era as a ‘golden age’ is equally evident 
in his book, yet he does not really explain why or exactly when this ended. Holland 
attributes considerable weight to individual agency in explaining the early success of 
the programme. Various individuals are identified as ‘pioneers of health services 
research’, including the first Chief Scientist, Richard Cohen.2  In contrast, later Chief 
Scientists are portrayed as lacking in the vision and values that animated the 
pioneers. The implication is that individual agency was as instrumental in the decline 
of the programme as it was in the golden age.  
The two texts discussed so far are explicitly historical and were written at some 
distance in time from the events described. A further group of texts includes 
retrospective writing about the programme written soon after the events described 
and by participants.  
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Retrospective writing – shorter duration 
The writings of Dr Richard (‘Dick’) Cohen (1907-1998) provide the most cogent 
first-hand account and insider interpretation of the origins, objectives and approach 
of the early departmental programme. Cohen was the medical lead for the 
programme, reporting to the Chief Medical Officer (CMO), George Godber (1908-
2009). He joined the Department in 1962, having previously served as Second 
Secretary at the MRC. At the very end of his career, Cohen became the first Chief 
Scientist at the DHSS for a period of six months, ending in March 1973. In 
interpreting his writing, it is essential to consider its timing in relation to this last 
appointment. In the early 1970s, the Nuffield Provincial Hospitals Trust published 
two catalogues of DHSS research under the title Portfolio for Health. Both volumes 
include introductory essays by Cohen. That in volume 1, published in 1971, gives an 
account of the emergence of the programme and its subsequent development in the 
1960s.1 Cohen traces demand for a departmental research programme back to the 
Guillebaud inquiry into the costs of the NHS (1956), which was critical of the 
Ministry of Health’s shortcomings in analytical capacity. He locates the beginning of 
the research organisation at the Department in 1961 and stresses its small scale and 
piecemeal nature at the outset. He uses a metaphor of ‘converging streams’ to 
describe the way in which originally divergent activities were brought together.  
In contrast to the retrospective nature of this essay, Cohen’s introduction to 
Portfolio for Health 2 is forward-looking and ‘heralds the more systematic and co-
ordinated arrangements for R&D that are being evolved and their new working 
relationships within and outside the DHSS’. This essay is perhaps best seen as a 
source that captures the aspirations and organisational thinking of the Department at 
the moment of implementing new R&D arrangements. Cohen was, by this time, 
Chief Scientist and it can be assumed that his main priority was to set out the 
programme for this newly created office.2 
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In retirement, Cohen published an article that offers a more distanced, 
retrospective view. This focuses on the relationship between the MRC and the 
DHSS.1 Having worked for both organisations at a senior level, this is subject matter 
for which Cohen is uniquely qualified. The article includes sections on programme 
origins, in which he stresses the broad-minded approach adopted, as expressed 
through a willingness to initiate or support ‘any sufficiently useful project or 
programme with a precise and practical relevance to the NHS’.  
Cohen’s successor as Chief Scientist was Sir Douglas Black (1913-2002), who 
held office for four years until April 1977. In an article published soon after leaving 
office, Black draws a distinction between the Department’s failings in biomedical 
research commissioning and its pre-eminence as a patron of HPSSR.2 He argues that 
engagement in the former proved a distraction from the latter. He also expresses deep 
scepticism about the attempt to integrate research into planning through the 1972/3 
reorganisation of the DHSS. This scepticism is amplified in his memoirs, where a 
chapter entitled Inside the Elephant deals with his time as Chief Scientist.3 This gives 
a sense of how Black interacted with administrators to discharge a role for which, by 
his own admission, he lacked much conviction. 
A further retrospective account of the origins of the departmental programme and 
its subsequent development under the Office of the Chief Scientist was published in 
1978 by the Nuffield Provincial Hospitals Trust. This represented the views of six 
directors of DHSS-funded units.4 An essay by one of the directors, Thomas 
Whitehead of the Wolfson Research Laboratories, Birmingham, describes the 
weakness of the Chief Scientist’s position at the Department, which he describes as 
being ‘in complete opposition to Rothschild’s concepts’. However, he does not 
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explain how this anomalous situation arose. Whitehead describes the next significant 
event after the implementation of Rothschild as being the ‘Kogan Report’ of 1975, 
which led to various changes in research management. The most significant of these 
was the strengthening of ‘research liaison groups’: a mechanism to increase the 
customer voice for R&D. The review ends on a pessimistic note, stating that 
‘attempts to establish an adequate customer organisation appear to have failed’ and 
that ‘there is no Chief Scientist’s Organisation set up in the way the Rothschild 
Report suggested’. 
The unpublished ‘Kogan Report’, to which Whitehead refers, was the work of 
Maurice Kogan (1930-2007) and Nancy Korman. Kogan had been a senior civil 
servant before becoming Professor of Government and Social Administration at 
Brunel University. Korman was embedded in the DHSS as his research assistant for 
the first phase of investigation, which ran from 1974 to 1979.1 This involved an 
extensive study of the organisation supporting the Chief Scientist.2 In a second 
phase, from 1980 to 1981, Kogan collaborated with Mary Henkel, a public policy 
researcher at Brunel who subsequently specialised in higher education. The focus in 
this later phase was the review of DHSS-funded research units instigated by the third 
Chief Scientist, Arthur Buller (b.1923).3  Data collection was extensive across both 
phases. The researchers attended large numbers of meetings as non-participant 
observers; interviewed over 200 informants; and reviewed numerous internal 
documents.4 Kogan and Henkel formally ended their engagement with the DHSS in 
April 1981, although they conducted some further interviews after this date. 
Subsequently, Kogan and Henkel synthesised the whole seven-year programme of 
investigation by the Brunel team into a summative book, which they frame as a case 
study in one government department, generalised into an analysis of the relationship 
between government and science.5 
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Kogan says that ‘from the beginning, it was agreed that we should eventually 
move from the role of consultants into the mode of independent researchers making 
our findings available to the wider scholarly public’.1 He is not specific about when 
this transition occurred, but ‘the Kogan report’, which survives in the archives, was 
clearly a consultancy output.2 Kogan’s advisory views can be discerned in his 
scholarly outputs, most conspicuously in his support for organisational structures, 
roles and process that promote interaction between policy-makers and researchers. 
The most notable examples in the context for this study are the ‘research liaison 
group’ (RLG) mechanism and ‘brokering’ roles for individuals within the DHSS 
research organisation. Such organisational innovations for ‘deliberative process’ 
became more fashionable in the early twenty-first century, being promoted by 
researchers and research commissioners alike as a means of increasing the traction of 
research outputs with decision-makers. This international trend was accompanied by 
the growth of academic interest in ‘knowledge transfer’ and by claims of a ‘new 
paradigm’ in research production and utilisation.3 The spread of such thinking 
prompted colleagues at Brunel to work with Kogan on an updated edition of the 1983 
text, published in his penultimate year. The amended text differs from the first 
edition in two ways. It further develops the theoretical arguments about the relations 
between science and government; and it updates the history of the R&D programme 
from the Rothschild era to the present day.4 However, the new edition does not 
amend any of the empirical data collected for the original studies and includes no 
further information on the period between 1981 and 1988, other than to note that 
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biomedical funds were returned to the MRC at the start of this period.1 The updated 
text thus adds little for present purposes. 
The weight of the Kogan corpus, considering the sustained engagement with the 
Department that underpins it, means that a revisiting of the period 1974 to 1981 
might add little new to what is already known about the history of the departmental 
programme. However, this body of work suffers from two significant limitations. 
First, it pays little attention to the history before 1974, which is laid out only briefly 
and with a very broad brush. The 1960s are characterised as a ‘golden age’ in 
government-science relations, when government was confident enough to ‘open 
itself up to relationships with potentially strong institutions and trust them to get on 
with their work’. This era was ended by a ‘surge of rationality’ in government, of 
which the Rothschild Report was one obvious manifestation. 2 Little attention is paid 
to events prior to 1974, including highly significant recent developments such as the 
re-organisation of the Department.3  
The second limitation relates to the return of biomedical research funds to the 
MRC in 1981 – a significant partial reversal of the Rothschild reforms. Kogan and 
Henkel provide very little detail on circumstances between the demise in 1977 of the 
Panel on Medical Research (the body originally set up to oversee biomedical 
research commissioning) and the return of funds, announced in October 1980. As 
Kogan and Henkel remained formally engaged with the Department until 1 April 
1981, it is surprising that their summative work does not cast more light on this 
aspect of the history. One possible explanation is that the researchers were, in this 
phase of engagement, focused on the process of unit review and paid comparatively 
little attention to developments in the MRC relationship.4  
In view of these limitations, the decision was made to focus on two key 
transitional periods at either end of the period 1974 to 1978. The first, covering 1971 
to 1973, deals with the response to, and implementation of, the Rothschild reforms at 
the DHSS (chapter 8). The second covers the return of funds to the MRC in the 
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context of wider developments under the third Chief Scientist (1978 to 1981), but 
without replicating the detailed study of the units review undertaken by the research 
team between 1979 and 1981(chapter 9). Both chapters begin with further discussion 
of the rationale for this approach. 
Kogan et al. make clear distinctions between the commissioning of biomedical 
research and HPSSR. For biomedical research, they conclude that the DHSS was 
unable to find a way of commissioning from the MRC that convinced any of the 
participants that the processes involved were worth the effort. They argue that the 
Department was unable to overcome ‘the impermeability and authority of a Medical 
Research Council grounded in an internalist view of science and in the notion of 
indivisibility between basic and applied research’. The MRC’s defences were 
bolstered by its established nature and high self-esteem, underpinned by the standing 
of the medical profession. The Department was unable to ‘substantiate the 
connections between biomedical science and health services problems and practice’. 
In this situation, the MRC had no interest in making a success of the Rothschild 
arrangements. 1  
In the case of HPSSR, the course of events was quite different and even less 
finalised at the time of writing. Kogan et al. argue that the Department had found an 
interactive way of connecting the research community with ‘policy customers’ 
through the RLG mechanism. They claim that Buller proposed a substantial 
reduction to the role of the RLGs after 1978, because he wanted to move to a more 
distanced customer-contractor relationship in which scientific quality was the prime 
criterion by which research was to be judged. The RLGs had no place in this scheme, 
other than to potentially dilute Buller’s desired focus on scientific merit. However, 
the RLGs survived into the late 1980s and this episode too appears unresolved in the 
summative text. 
Kogan et al. dissect out the meaning of ‘the customer’ in the context of the 
DHSS/NHS relationship. They draw a distinction between Department as a primary 
customer, procuring research for its own purposes, and as a proxy customer 
procuring research of potential benefit to the field authorities of the NHS. They 
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illuminate the role of policy liaison officers as important brokers between internal 
customers and researchers.1 
The Kogan corpus remains the most substantial body of published research on the 
DHSS R&D programme in the 1970s, but it does not stand alone. Two researchers 
from the University of Leicester, Gordon and Meadows, also undertook an intensive 
study of the dissemination of DHSS-funded research, although copies appear to have 
been lodged only with Leicester and the British Library.2 Professor Louis Moss also 
undertook a survey of internal views on research management, although this was 
never published.3 The Department did not sustain such openness to scrutiny into the 
1980s. 
There is little by way of historical writing on the 1980s. An overview of health 
research in the UK by Taylor and Teeling-Smith is mostly a description of current 
arrangements, rather than a retrospective piece.4 This was published between the 
‘partial dismantling’ of the Rothschild reforms at the DHSS and the publication of 
Priorities in Medical Research; timing that allows some perspective on the former 
events, whilst not being overshadowed by the later criticism of the Select Committee. 
This differentiates it from later writing, which tends to view the programme through 
the lens of the committee’s critique.5 This is true of an article by Nick Black, who 
identifies three concerns as building throughout the decade.6  The first was the state 
of UK medical research in this period as public funding for science shrank in real 
terms. Science budget cuts were not unique to the UK, but were pursued with 
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particular rigour as part of a wider programme of public expenditure reductions. A 
second concern was that ’the balance between science-push and service-pull had 
been lost’ and that the research agenda had become too science-led. This was 
‘symptomatic of the failure of research funding bodies to respond to the needs of 
their principal customer, the NHS’. The third concern was that findings from 
research were not being implemented. Black argues that these three concerns played 
out beyond the research community, linking to the interests of other constituencies: 
political and professional concerns about variations in clinical practice; management 
concerns about health services cost and quality; and public challenges to medical 
knowledge. This alignment of interest pushed health services research up the policy 
agenda.  
This analysis is more informed by the Select Committee report than by any 
examination of the historical evidence. As with other close-to-the-event writing by 
participants this text is as much advocacy as history. Writing in 1997, Black portrays 
the 1991 strategy as a liberating moment for health services research, but one already 
threatened by forces for counter-reformation. The battle lines are defined as those 
between progressive service-pull and reactionary science-push, with the latter firmly 
in the ascendant prior to 1988 and still controlling eighty percent of resources in 
1995. The forces of ‘service-pull’ are an alliance of health services research, 
evaluative clinical research, epidemiology, and public health research. The forces of 
reaction are those of biomedical research.  
There is little participant testimony from the 1980s. Sir Desmond Pond (1919-
1986), who succeeded Buller as Chief Scientist, died within months of his retirement 
and left no testimony about his time at the Department. Pond’s successor and the last 
Chief Scientist, Professor Francis O’Grady (1925-2015), similarly left no 
commentary, other than a letter defending the DHSS programme against the 
criticisms of the Lords Select Committee.1 Holland describes Pond’s spell as Chief 
Scientist (1982 to 1986) as ‘much less controversial’ than the term of his 
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predecessor, Arthur Buller, but has little else to say about this period, being more 
focused on the Select Committee report.1  
Organisational histories 
The Department of Health 
Any attempt to place the R&D programme within its broader organisational 
context is hampered by the absence of a general history of the Department of any 
substance. One short text does exist, authored by a senior civil servant.2 R&D is not 
mentioned in this, despite the author having worked in R&D management during the 
1970s. This omission is understandable given the brevity of the text and the frequent 
rotation of civil servants between roles. Many other aspects of health department 
activities are also omitted, and the primary focus is on the changing relationship 
between the NHS and the Department.  
Kenneth Stowe (1927-2015) wrote about the programme and his views are of 
interest because, as will be shown, he was a key actor not just as DHSS Permanent 
Secretary in the 1980s but also, a decade earlier, during the implementation of 
Rothschild. 3 After sketching out the scope of state support for health-related 
research, Stowe says that ‘tucked into this complex array of authorities, institutions, 
and resources is the frail specimen called Health Services Research, for which 
provision has been made in Department of Health budgets since the early 1950s’ (the 
last part of this statement is factually incorrect in terms of timing). In Stowe’s 
opinion, HSR ‘never seemed to develop into a significant force in the Department or 
in health care authorities or in the world of scientific research itself’. In analysing 
why this was so, he mentions the Rothschild reforms, which he describes as ‘a folly’ 
and ‘an appalling diversion of effort’.  He is also critical of HSR, which he says, 
‘often hardly merits the name science at all’ and of the assumption that research can 
be readily useful to policy-makers. His final verdict is damning: ‘I know of no 
strategic issue with which Ministers were concerned during my time as Permanent 
Secretary which was illuminated by the Health Services Research programme’. The 
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question that arises is whether Stowe’s opinion was shaped through unsatisfactory 
experience with the programme, or whether these views were formed earlier in his 
career and contributed, at key junctures, to decisions that adversely affected the 
programme. 
Sheard and Donaldson’s history of the Chief Medical Officers touches briefly on 
the departmental research programme.1 Their narrative ends with the creation of the 
post of Chief Scientist and associated committees in the early 1970s. After this, the 
discussion moves on apace to two major public health episodes in which research 
evidence played a significant role (AIDS and BSE). The sourcing of research in these 
episodes is not discussed. Godber, who presided over the ‘golden age’ as CMO, does 
not mention the R&D programme directly in his reflections on the NHS.2 Elsewhere 
he states that the only source of funding for R&D when he took up office in 1960 
was a discretionary fund available to the CMO. He comments that the sum in this 
fund, £5,000, was unchanged from that available to the first incumbent of his office, 
Sir John Simon (CMO 1855 to 1876).3  
The dominant mode of R&D activity for the Department was the commissioning 
of extra-mural research. As noted, Health was an outlier among civil departments in 
that it was almost entirely lacking in-house capacity in 1961. For most of the study 
period, only glimpses of intra-mural R&D activity can be gained from published 
material. Visitors from the USA, writing in 1968, stress the extra-mural nature of the 
programme and mention only one internal researcher group, the Social Science 
Research Unit (SSRU).4 Portfolio 1 includes a chapter on the Biomechanical 
Research and Development Unit (BRADU). Both volumes include chapters on the 
DHSS Operational Research Unit (ORU). Smee provides a systematic history of the 
Economic Adviser’s Office (EAO) and Operational Research Service (ORS) from 
1984 onwards. His book includes some outline information on the origins of these 
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two units, which were brought under combined management in 1982.1 Staff included 
economists, OR specialists and statisticians, who are described as ‘analysts’ rather 
than ‘researchers’. This is indicative of how EAO/ORS was positioned as being quite 
distinct from the R&D programme. As a further indication of this separation, Smee 
makes very little reference to the R&D programme, which he describes as working to 
timescales too protracted to be of practical use to policy-makers.2  
The Department’s relationship with HM Treasury was pivotal to all forms of 
investment. The focus in the literature is on efforts to persuade the Treasury that 
more investment was needed in service development, and especially in the renewal 
of the NHS estate. The signal event in the historiography on this aspect of NHS 
history is the Hospital Plan of 1962.3 This literature is not generally explicit about the 
connection between the case for investment in buildings and that for investment in 
R&D. An essay by Webster is one exception.4 The culture and mode of working of 
Treasury in the 1960s is illuminated by Heclo and Wildavsky’s classic study, which 
adopts the metaphor of ‘the Whitehall Village’ to capture the reliance on personal 
relationships between officials and shared culture.5 
The National Health Service 
In Webster’s official history of the NHS there is scarcely any mention of R&D. 
There is a sole reference to the establishment of a ‘Statistics and Research Unit’, 
which is bundled in with other ‘leadership initiatives’ in the late 1950s and 1960s.6 
His political history is silent on this subject.7 Organisation and policy for R&D are 
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absent from Rivett’s 50th anniversary history of the NHS.1 The supplementary 
website, which continues beyond 1998, includes a section on ‘research strategy’ but 
this is very brief and not entirely accurate.2  
The original orientation of the programme was to provide knowledge of practical 
value to the NHS. This raises the question as to how a central government 
department might liaise with a multitude of local NHS authorities to ensure that the 
research procured is both relevant and applied in practice. As the Lords Select 
Committee noted: ‘The DHSS…is not to be confused with the administration of the 
NHS, in spite of the intimacy of their relationship’.3 During the period covered by 
this thesis, the relationship between the centre and local health authorities was 
subject to major change, in the form of the 1974 reorganisation. Rudolf Klein has 
taken the long view on centre/NHS relations, arguing that the Department, has 
‘gradually but inexorably tightened its grip upon the service’ over the decades, whilst 
professing attachment to principles of localism and devolution of power.4 This is a 
strategy for ‘diffusion of blame’ whilst achieving centralisation of control. Klein’s 
focus, however, is service provision and it remains open to question whether his 
analysis can be applied to R&D. 
Klein wrote an article in response to Priorities in Medical Research in which he 
seeks to identify the routes through which health-related research is applied.5 He 
distinguishes between the application of research to governance, service and practice 
policies. Governance policies are concerned with the organization and financing of 
health care, and so will be the province of national governments in centralised 
systems. Service polices are more concerned with resource allocation and service 
configuration. Practice policies relate to the actual delivery of care to the patient.  
This scheme can be linked to Kogan’s distinction between the Department as a 
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primary customer for policy research (i.e. research more weighted towards 
governance and service policies) and as a proxy customer for the NHS (more 
concerned with service and practice policies). These distinctions suggest that ‘the 
customer’ for publicly-funded health research should not be thought of as a single 
category and that different dynamics may be at play according to the precise identity 
of the customer. 
The Research Councils 
The MRC is the other principal institutional actor in the world of publicly-funded, 
health-related research. A published history exists only for the Council’s first half-
century.1 The author, Sir Arthur Landsborough Thomson (1890-1977) worked for the 
Council for nearly forty years and was Second Secretary from 1949 until 1957. 
Thomson was a consummate MRC insider and loyalist. His writing reveals the 
Council’s mind-set in the 1960s as one of supreme self-confidence, resting upon half 
a century of organisational continuity. Austoker and Bryder’s work offers more 
critical perspectives.2 Austoker’s essay on Walter Morley Fletcher, first Secretary 
(1914 to 1933), illuminates the imperialistic style of the Council in its early decades 
as it sought control over all aspects of medical research in the UK.3  
The Social Science Research Council (SSRC) was of secondary importance for 
the Department. The sole detailed account of this organisation’s history, by Nicol, 
deals mostly with the background to its long-delayed establishment and only covers 
the period to 1968.4 The health department is notable mainly by its absence in this 
text, which otherwise documents a range of interactions with other government 
departments and with the MRC on matters related to health. Nicol provides an 
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overview of the obstacles placed in the way of the institutional development of the 
social sciences, in contrast to medical sciences. More recently, the Economic and 
Social Research Council (ESRC – as the SSRC became in 1982) published a short 
history to mark its fortieth anniversary in 2005.1  This is a whistle-stop tour of 
historical highlights. Although it includes details of selected joint programmes it 
provides no insight into how relationships with the Department of Health were 
developed.  
Welshman’s detailed case study of transmitted deprivation research programme 
does achieve this, although the programme was rather exceptional given the close 
personal interest taken by the Secretary of State, Sir Keith Joseph.2 Kogan and 
Henkel briefly discuss the Department’s engagement with the SSRC, commenting on 
the uncertainty of its authority and the incomplete process of institutionalisation in 
this period. They contrast the situation of the SSRC with that of the MRC, arguing 
that there are few parallels in this period and that social sciences research ‘challenges 
much more directly than medical sciences research simple enlightenment or 
instrumental models of the relationship between research and policy’.3  
Non-government organisations 
Two charitable foundations are prominent in the literature on the departmental 
programme: the Nuffield Provincial Hospitals Trust (NPHT) and the King Edward’s 
Hospital Fund for London (the King’s Fund). There is a highly relevant history of the 
NPHT by Gordon McLachlan, the charity’s Secretary between 1956 and 1986. 
Holland names McLachlan as one of his pioneers of health services research and 
credits him with exceptional influence.4 Prochaska’s history of the King’s Fund also 
contains much that is relevant.5 The need for both charities to re-define their role after 
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1948 is a major theme in these histories. Some writing on the non-government sector 
examines the ‘moving frontier’ between the state and civil society in the twentieth 
century.1 More recently, historians have focused on non-government organisations as 
vehicles for mass participation and the mobilisation of expertise.2 All of this has 
potential relevance to the emergence of the health research state. The challenge is to 
situate this specific topic within the specialist literature in a way that aids 
interpretation and adds to the literature. 
Policy histories 
Health policy 
Research and development is largely ignored within histories of health policy. 
Ham mentions the role of the Department’s organisation for research only in passing 
and is equivocal about its contribution to policy-making.3  Klein characterises the 
period between 1960 and early 1970s as ‘the heyday of technocratic politics in the 
NHS’, characterised by rationality in government and faith in experts, techniques and 
organisational design.4 He mentions the setting up of an Advisory Committee on 
Management Efficiency in 1959 (as does Webster) and identifies economists as 
having established themselves as ‘keepers of the faith of efficiency’ by the 1970s. He 
does not otherwise refer to the growth of extra-mural research commissioning after 
1962.  For the period 1911 to 1965, Fox identifies the growth of medical research as 
a key factor in the development of a hospital-centric policy of ‘hierarchical 
regionalism’ but barely mentions policy for research.5  
More broadly, literature on the science-policy relationship includes writing on 
specific health issues. Writing on networks illustrates how the emergence of 
scientific consensus can be as turbulent a process as that of policy formulation, and 
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how the two processes can be entwined.1 A related approach elucidates the 
contribution of a specific discipline or research tradition to policy development, 
whether through policy case studies for epidemiology or by demonstrating ‘the 
gradual encroachment of ideas’ for health services research.2  Health policy topics 
also appear as case studies in literature that is more generically concerned with the 
relationship between research and policy and as an illustrative domain in more 
general studies of research utilisation.3    
Overall, histories of health policy pay little attention to R&D and so can offer 
little insight into how the development of the departmental programme, and its 
variable fortunes, have been connected to the evolution of the health care state. One 
possible explanation is that this is simply too marginal a topic to merit the attention 
of historians whose primary focus is health policy. Another is that the development 
of the health research state has been viewed as an aspect of science and technology 
policy, not of health policy. 
Science and technology policy 
Policy for health-related research can also be situated within the context of 
national policy for science and technology. The establishment of the department’s 
R&D programme can be situated within ‘the technocratic moment’ in UK history. 
This is a phrase coined by Edgerton to characterise the period between 1959 and the 
early 1970s, when faith in the potential of science to improve peacetime society was 
at a high and when science and technology were unusually salient in British politics.4 
Edgerton documents aspirations for a shift of R&D spending from military to civil 
purposes, or from ‘warfare state’ to ‘welfare state’, and how these worked out in 
practice. He argues that science policy historiography has been over-influenced by 
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the ‘two-cultures’ debate and its accompanying ‘declinist’ narrative. Orthodox 
accounts of post-war science and technology, according to Edgerton, over-
emphasises the importance of academic research whilst neglecting development and 
innovation.1 Vig’s study of the politics of science and technology between 1959 and 
1964 includes detailed analysis of reforms to the organisation of publicly-funded 
science during this particularly intense period.2 
Duffy provides an in-depth account and analysis of the Rothschild reforms, 
explaining how these emerged from national policy and why they caused so much 
controversy. The article includes a report from an interview with Lord Rothschild, 
conducted in 1984. Rothschild blames the failure of his reforms at the DHSS on ‘the 
lower intellectual reputation of the Health Department in comparison to the MRC’. 
This meant that the Department was unable to counter the arguments advanced by 
the MRC when the latter wanted its money back.3 
There exists a genre that describes and analyses ‘the machinery of government’ 
for science.4  The edited volume of comparative essays, dealing with R&D in 
different civil domains, was popular in the 1980s and 1990s. Such essays sometimes 
include historical writing, typically quite brief and intended mostly as a backdrop to 
a discussion of current policies.5 The essay by Taylor and Teeling-Smith, discussed 
above, is placed in a volume in this genre. Writing on the historical role of specialists 
in government includes little that is specific to the medically-qualified. 6  There has 
been no systematic examination of the office of Chief Scientist and its incumbents. 
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Kogan and Henkel do include an analysis of the position in about 1980, identifying 
three separate roles. The Chief Scientist at this point was expected to be chief 
scientific adviser to the Department; manager of the departmental programme; and 
lead broker between policy leads and researchers.1 Holland provides a brief 
biographical sketch for each Chief Scientist. 2  
Conclusions 
Gaps in the literature 
This review has confirmed that no longer duration history of the departmental 
programme exists that meets all the following criteria: based on primary sources; 
written from a distanced position; and concerned with the totality of the departmental 
programme. Only the body of work published by Kogan and colleagues is based on 
extensive primary research. However, this work devotes little attention to events 
immediately before and after the team’s engagement with the Department. Two 
conclusions can be drawn. Firstly, that a long duration history is needed and will 
extend the existing body of knowledge. Secondly, that within such a history most 
value will be added to the Kogan corpus through a focus on the critical junctures as 
Rothschild was first implemented and then partially reversed at the Department of 
Health. 
Health policy and science policy 
Health research has been largely neglected within writing on health policy. There 
are two possible reasons for this, which are not mutually exclusive. The first might 
be coined the ‘Stowe critique’, as Kenneth Stowe’s writings capture this viewpoint 
most pithily. This is that that the outputs of the R&D programme were largely 
irrelevant to the business of the Department and the enterprise of R&D management 
marginal except when, on occasions, it demanded attention that would have been 
more fruitfully directed elsewhere. The second is that health research policy was 
largely directed by pan-government science and technology policy, and it is therefore 
part of that policy history. However, most writing in the science policy genre is 
neither very historical nor especially probing in its treatment of health research. 
Whatever the explanation, the main conclusion drawn is that the topic has fallen 
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between stools. It follows that there is the opportunity to write a history of the 
programme that integrates the history of health policy and science policy. 
Scale and scope 
There is a tendency in the literature to write about one stream of activity as if it 
were the totality of the programme, whether biomedical research, clinical research, 
or health services research. This tendency is challenged by the Portfolios, which 
present a very diverse programme; and yet still admit to providing less than 
comprehensive coverage. Another tendency is for divergence in the figures quoted 
for the programme budget. Consequently, it is difficult to be certain about the scope 
or scale of the programme, and how this changed over time. The conclusion drawn is 
that further work is needed to definitively establish scope and scale. 
Customers and contractors 
The concept of ‘customers’ for health research appears in various places in the 
literature and is linked to the expectation of ‘useful research’ and to the premises of 
economically rationalising science policy. Customers in this context are assumed to 
be procuring and consuming research for utilitarian reasons, rather than as an act of 
cultural patronage. The customer is sometimes treated as synonymous with the user, 
but not always. Sometimes the user is, or should be, a wider collective, such as ‘the 
NHS’ or ‘the public’. Although there is plenty of writing by researchers about the 
development of research supply, there is less that critically reflects on the role of the 
Department as a customer. Where such writing can be found it generally reflects 
upon the patronage of the Department – sometimes appreciatively and sometimes 
more critically - yet there is little attention to the active role of suppliers in 
cultivating that patronage. These observations call for an identification of customers, 
users and suppliers and an understanding of the exchanges between these three 
groups.  
Some of the literature identifies that the Department and the NHS should not be 
elided and that the former acted as a ‘proxy customer’ for the latter. Exactly how a 
vast national service, run by many semi-autonomous governing bodies, might 
organise itself as a collective customer is little examined.  The changing relationship 
between the Department and the NHS has often been analysed, but never specifically 
in relation to research and development. 
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Agency and structural forces 
Historians disagree on the relative weight of structure and individual agency, and 
have sought ways to integrate both in causal explanation.1 Some of the literature 
reviewed reveals a conviction that individual agency was central to the history of the 
departmental R&D programme. The most prominent example is Holland, with his 
pioneers of health services research and inference that much hinged on the character 
and convictions of the Chief Scientist. Webster identifies new leadership in 1960 as 
pivotal to improved fortunes for the Ministry of Health. This is consistent with Heclo 
and Wildavsky’s emphasis on the importance of personal trust and relationships in 
the Whitehall Village. Other writers lay more weight on structural forces. Kogan et 
al. invoke the growth of rationality in government; ‘multimodality’ in government 
and science; and power imbalances. Where they are drawn towards individual 
agency, as with changes introduced by the third Chief Scientist, the discussion is 
constructed as a study of the forces bearing on this office. Black identifies the 
structural forces leading to dissatisfaction with the Ministry’s R&D programme in 
the 1980s. Overall, the literature does not offer any rounded assessment of the 
relative weight of agency and structure in the development of the health research 
state.   
Change and continuity 
The header quotation for this chapter speaks of the persistence of certain basic 
questions and tensions. This review has confirmed the persistence of recurrent 
themes: the relationship between the Department and the MRC; the balance of 
control and funding between the Department and the NHS; the usefulness (or not) of 
research and the need for effective customers. Yet at the same time the review has 
identified critical junctures and discontinuities, most notably the Rothschild reforms 
and their subsequent partial demolition. Understanding the interplay between 
continuity and change will, therefore, be a key task for this thesis.
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3. Methodology and Analytical Framework  
 
The prudent use of concepts and theories of explanation borrowed and 
adapted from other humanities and social science disciplines is an 
essential pre-requisite to understanding the structures that shaped 
abstract social processes, as well as the political lives, human intention 
and actions of people in the past. For constructionists, conceptual 
interventionism does not generate false knowledge about the reality of 
the past because it is regarded as being of the provisional kind…the 
utility of the concept is tested in the evidence. 1  
 
This chapter sets out the methods used to assemble evidence and the analytical 
framework used to interpret that evidence. The study combines qualitative and 
quantitative methods, accepting that each provides different and non-competing 
representations of the same reality. Quantitative analysis serves to draw out the ‘big 
picture’ and to counter the tendency noted in the literature to focus on one strand of 
activity. Qualitative analysis adds rich detail that is not accessible through statistics 
alone. In terms of typologies of mixed methods, this can be described as a concurrent 
triangulation strategy, in which each method complements the other.2 
The analytical framework is a heuristic device. It uses working themes, derived 
inductively from the literature review, to build a structure for analysis of the 
empirical data. These themes are not definitive and it is entirely possible that another 
investigator, approaching the topic from a different perspective, might select 
different themes. The purpose is to provide a framework for the development of a 
more conclusive interpretation. As part of an argument that atheoretical modern 
history is an impossibility, because the sheer abundance of empirical evidence 
compels selectivity, Tosh recommends ‘a certain detachment on the part of historians 
towards their theories, and a readiness to change tack in the lack of evidence’.3 This 
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advice will be heeded. The use of explicit theory places this thesis in the 
‘constructionist’ approach: ‘empiricism plus concepts’. 
Qualitative methods 
Literature review 
A literature search was initially undertaken using the database HMIC (Health 
Management Information Consortium). Search terms included ‘medical’, 
‘biomedical’. ‘operational’, ‘social’ and ‘clinical’; and ‘R&D’, ‘research’, 
‘development’; and ‘policy’, ‘strategy’ and ‘management’. Although this strategy 
yielded around 1500 results hardly any of these were relevant. Most of the items 
discovered were concerned with reporting research results or only tangentially 
related, for example articles about ‘research into practice’. Although HMIC includes 
some articles dating back to 1979, coverage thins out rapidly for older material. This 
exercise demonstrated the limitations of any attempt at a systematic approach to the 
identification of relevant literature using databases. 
In view of these limitations, the search strategy became one of discovering texts 
through a mix of consultation and ‘reading out’ through references. Those consulted 
included the project supervisor and advisory panel, interested academic staff at the 
London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine and interviewees. Another 
strategy was to start with a text of known relevance and identify the subject headings 
assigned to this text in a specific library catalogue. A search was then undertaken in 
that catalogue using the same subject headings. This approach was followed 
fruitfully in the library of the London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine and 
the University Library, Cambridge. A further approach was to browse within a set of 
related items. For example, Godber donated books to the library of the clinical 
school, Cambridge, following his retirement as CMO. This collection, although not 
separately catalogued, can be reconstructed by browsing the open shelves.  
Document review 
As noted in the literature review, some publications are at once both secondary 
interpretation and primary source. The best examples of this are the two Nuffield 
Provincial Hospitals Trust Portfolios, which include both commentary on the history 
and management of the programme and catalogues of studies, including financial 
allocations.  
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The National Archives, London, provide a wealth of relevant material, some of 
which became available for the first time during this project as the thirty-year point 
was passed. The relevant records are mostly located within the Ministry of 
Health/Department of Health and Social Security MH series. Other relevant series 
include the T (Treasury) series, the BN series (Ministry of Social Security then 
DHSS), the FD series (MRC) and the CAB series (Cabinet Office). Filing and 
indexing within the MH series is not well-organised. For example, many of the 
papers relevant to the R&D programme are to be found in the MH166 ‘hospital 
construction’ series. Many individual files are described in ways that are not 
revealing of all their content. This presents an interesting, and perhaps instructive, 
contrast with the immaculately organised MRC records in the FD series. Systematic 
searching is thus a far from straightforward business and various strategies were 
employed. One was to search on a general term like ‘research and development’ or 
‘operational research’ in combination with the relevant department. This yielded 
many results which then had to be sifted through to try and establish the most 
relevant – an inexact science given the vagaries of file descriptions. Another 
productive strategy was to take a file identified as relevant and browse around this in 
the catalogue by file reference. A third strategy was to search on original Department 
file reference. This was especially helpful in finding files related to individual 
research projects, with the original file reference picked up from unpublished 
catalogues in the archives. The Douglas Black collection in the Wellcome Library 
was also searched. 
Parliamentary papers consulted included command papers, select committee 
reports, and parliamentary accounts committee reports. Ministry/Department of 
Health papers included Annual Reports, the Annual Reports/Yearbooks on Research 
and Development, Hospital Management letters and other published items. The 
Cabinet Annual Reports on Research and Development were a further important 
source. Published memoirs and obituaries, including Munk’s Roll, provide 
information on key individuals, as did recorded interviews in the Royal College of 
Physicians/Oxford Brookes University Medical Video.  
Oral History 
Oral history was used to gather information at first hand from participants. The 
protocol for the study, which dealt particularly with the oral history component, was 
49 
 
approved by the Ethics Committee of the London School of Hygiene and Tropical 
Medicine on 20 September 2012. 
Face to face or telephone interviews were held with 13 individuals with personal 
involvement in the history of the Department’s R&D programme. The selection of 
individuals for interview was partly purposive, using sources such as Who’s Who and 
enquiries of personal contacts. The initial plan was to interview a mix of civil 
servants and researchers. The latter were the easiest to trace but proved the least 
informative, not having great insight into the workings of the programme. One 
important exception is Nancy Korman, who was Kogan’s field researcher in the 
DHSS from 1974 to 1978. Former civil servants were the most informative sources 
but also hardest to trace and more reluctant to provide information, being still bound 
by their obligations under the Official Secrets Act. The vagaries of the process mean 
that the informants cannot be claimed to be a systematic sample of the various 
constituencies with an interest in the departmental programme.  
The final mix included researchers funded for multiple studies by the Department 
(2), researchers who investigated the DHSS (2), retired medical civil servants 
involved in R&D programme management at a senior level (3), retired senior civil 
servants with other roles that brought them into contact with the programme (2), 
retired senior staff of in-house research units (3) and a former management 
consultant who advised on the reorganisation of the DHSS (1). Some potential key 
informants could not be traced or declined to be interviewed and at least two (Nairne 
and Stowe) died during the project.  
All interviews were semi-structured. A ‘menu’ of questions relevant to the 
interviewee’s background was prepared in advance but the interview was allowed to 
go ‘off-piste’ if interesting new avenues emerged. The aim was to develop a more 
conversational style, which can be more effective in eliciting information that direct 
questioning.1 As a general observation, the most illuminating interviews were those 
that departed most from the pre-prepared menu as they typically involved the 
introduction of some completely new perspective or avenue of enquiry. 
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The original intention was to record interviews to archive standard, with a view to 
lodging them with the British Library. In the event, it soon became apparent that 
recording had an inhibiting effect and encouraged a tendency for interviewees to fall 
back on well-rehearsed ‘public narratives’. This is a common occurrence in elite oral 
history.1 Others became more circumspect than was helpful in the presence of a 
recording device, with former civil servants especially wary. Sensitivities increased 
markedly once discussion moved into the 1980s. In the event, six interviews were 
recorded. For the remainder, notes were written up immediately after interview and 
sent to interviewees for verification.  
Another original intention was the naming of sources and attribution of 
quotations. It was anticipated that that this would add veracity and encourage 
interviewees to engage with transcripts. The consent form offered choices for 
disclosure and all interviewees either elected to be named and quoted subject to their 
specific consent, or opted for complete anonymity with no quotations. A mix of these 
approaches is used in this thesis, depending on the consent given. The small number 
of interviewees in each category means that there is an elevated risk of deductive 
disclosure for those who opted for anonymity. For this reason, a full list of named 
interviewees is not provided. 
Draft chapters were sent to four interviewees for their comments. These chapters 
dealt with the periods in which the interviewees had been participants. In addition, a 
complete draft of the thesis was reviewed by Professor Walter Holland. A second 
meeting was held with three of these reviewers to discuss their comments, after 
which decisions were made about amendments. The other two interviewees did not 
indicate any wish for a further discussion, having no significant issues with the draft.  
Quantitative analysis 
The primary challenge encountered in the quantitative analysis lay not in the 
choice of statistical method but in the abstraction of reliable and consistent data from 
historical sources. A longitudinal analysis of R&D allocations was undertaken for the 
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whole of the period 1961 to 1986. Details of the methodology and sources used is 
included as an appendix 1. Findings are set out in detail in the following chapter.  
Sources 
No single, complete data series for R&D allocations to the health department has 
been published for the period 1961 to 1986. Construction of such a series requires the 
combination of data from more than one source. Four sources were considered for 
this purpose.  
1. The annual reports of the Ministry of Health (1961 to 1968). 
2. DHSS Annual reports on research and development (1973 to 1991) 
3. Supply estimates (all years, but with significant limitations after 1982). 
4. Cabinet Office (CO) Annual Reviews of Government Research and 
Development (1982 to 1993).1 
The last two series were identified as the most complete and reliable and so were 
used as the basis for the longitudinal analysis (see appendix 1 for a full discussion).  
The Supply Estimates represent the government’s budget and provide a detailed 
breakdown of the public expenditure authorised by Parliament through the annual 
Appropriation Act. For most of the period, a table showing the research and 
development content in the Estimates by spending department was included in the 
Memorandum by the Financial/Chief Secretary to the Treasury.2  The allocation 
heads used in the Memoranda can be cross-referenced to the full Supply Estimates 
for a more detailed breakdown.  
The form of the Estimates was simplified after 1981/2, when much detail 
disappears altogether. Critically for current purposes, this includes both the R&D 
table in the Memorandum and the detailed breakdown of departmental sub-heads in 
the Estimates. After 1981/2, the Estimates cease to provide the detail needed to 
continue the data series for departmental R&D spending, necessitating the use of CO 
reports thereafter. The CO Annual Review was published between 1983 and 1993 
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inclusive. It provides detailed analysis of government R&D spending, starting with 
data for 1981/2, so that there is one year’s overlap with the Estimates before these 
discontinue more detailed analysis. 
In summary, the Memoranda and Supply Estimates are the source used for 
departmental R&D budget for the period up to and including 1981/82; and the CO 
Annual Reviews of Government Funded R&D for 1982/83 onwards. Data for the 
Medical Research Council are also included in the analysis for comparative purposes 
and is available from the Estimates for the whole of the period 1961 to 1986 as 
research council allocations were still itemised after 1981/82. 
Only data relating to England and Wales was abstracted, as health research was 
dealt with throughout the study period by the Scottish Home and Health Department 
(SHHD) under separate organisational arrangements.1 Votes for research carried out 
or commissioned by SHHD are shown under separate headings in the Estimates 
throughout, whereas those for the Welsh Office are not for the years between 1962/3 
and 1970/1 or after 1980/1. Nor do the Cabinet Office Annual Reviews disaggregate 
England and Wales when reporting on the R&D spend of the DHSS. 
Consistency  
There are some inescapable inconsistencies in the series: because of the need to 
combine two sources to construct a complete data series; and because of changes in 
the cost base used for preparation of the Estimates. Appendix 1 describes the risks to 
reliability in detail, together with the approach taken to assess the materiality of this 
risk.  The conclusion drawn is that the inescapable inconsistency arising from the 
combination of data from the Estimates and the CO Annual Reviews is not material 
to the objectives set for the analysis.  
Price base 
Adjustment of the data series to a constant price basis is necessary, given the 
exceptionally high levels of inflation experienced in the UK during the 1970s. 
Choosing an appropriate deflator for the National Health Service is problematical 
and, in any event, NHS-specific estimates of inflation would not necessarily be valid 
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for this series given the significant involvement of non-NHS providers in research 
and development.1  In view of these considerations, and the limited choice of price 
index series available for this period, a pragmatic approach was taken and the Retail 
Price Index (RPI) was adopted as the deflator.2  The precise approach taken towards 
adjusting for inflation is set out in Appendix 1. 
Analysis at sub-head level 
The Estimates are organised into classes with up to four levels of sub-head 
analysis. The sum allocated, or the ‘vote’, for a certain purpose can thus be 
disaggregated to these various levels. Tracking data at sub-head level in the 
Estimates presents two challenges. The numbering of classes and sub-heads changes 
from time to time as do the descriptors used for data items at each level. Fortunately 
changes in both descriptors and numbering rarely occur in the same year and there is 
sufficient consistency in the original descriptors to be able to track data series 
throughout the period with confidence.  A standardised descriptor has been adopted 
for each data series to overcome instability in the original descriptors. The tables in 
Appendix 1 map these back to the Estimate classes, sub-heads and original 
descriptors. Cross referencing to the charts in chapter 4 is also included.  The Cabinet 
Office annual reviews provide a simpler disaggregation of overall spending with 
consistent use of headings and so these challenges do not arise when working with 
this source.  
The global budget for civil research  
Quantifying the overall civil R&D budget on a consistent basis over the whole 
period is problematical because of a blurred boundary between civil and military 
research, especially in the earlier years.  A full discussion of the methodological 
issues involved, and the approach taken in response to these, is included in 
Appendix 1. 
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Analytical Framework 
The analytical framework is comprised of three themes. These are related in terms 
of their subject focus, but draw on disparate theoretical traditions. The first theme is 
the health research state. This draws on political theory to examine group interests, 
power and influence. The second is organisation for health research. This looks to 
organisational theory for interpretation of organisational form, policy and practices. 
The final theme is exchanges for health research, which draws on social 
epistemological theories about research production and utilisation to specify the 
assumptions used by different actors in research commissioning. Each of these 
themes in now discussed in turn, together with its application. 
The health research state 
In developed societies, health care is of such cost, scale and complexity that it has 
been conceptualised as a discrete domain of the state: ‘the healthcare state’. 1 Health-
related research and development is also a substantial and complex endeavour and 
involves extensive government intervention. What we might think of as ‘the health 
research state’ is characterised by its own interest groups, power structures, 
networks, institutions, and dynamics.2 The health research state might be viewed as a 
sub-domain of the healthcare state or as a sub-domain of the science and technology 
state. Or it might be better thought of as a separate and distinctive domain, bridging 
the two. 
If the health research state exists, then theories of the state will be relevant to its 
analysis. 3  Health research possesses its own interest groups: politicians, civil 
servants, research commissioners, researchers, research institutions, health care 
professionals, health services providers, industry, charities, patients and the public. A 
pluralistic model, assuming a ‘neutral state’, would see the role of the state as 
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balancing these interests for the benefit of all citizens. This role would include the 
protection of weak or unorganised groups. The most obvious of such groups is the 
public, whose interests need protection in two capacities: as the ultimate funders of 
state-funded research, through taxation; and as the intended beneficiaries of health 
research. Science policy, with its economically rational narrative of maximising 
public benefit from finite public expenditure, typically assumes this model of the 
state.  
Empirical studies have demonstrated that policy is more often the outcome of the 
self-interested manoeuvring of interest groups within the state apparatus than of 
competition for influence between external groups. Consequently, the neutral state is 
now seen more as an ideal than a reality. As the role of the state has extended and its 
business become more complex, so it has been necessary to supplement the expertise 
of the generalist public administrator with that of more specialised occupational 
groups. These groups will, in varying degrees, be professionalised. Theories of ‘the 
professionalised state’ can be found in two schools: neo-pluralism and elite theory. 
Both agree on the vital role of professional-administrative elites in governance. Neo-
pluralism takes a relatively benign view of this phenomenon because it identifies 
checks and balances on professional-administrative influence in liberal democracies. 
These include professional ethics; the sub-division of government to disperse power 
and create more interactive policy-making systems; and the promotion of public 
participation.1  
Elite interpretations of the same phenomenon fall into two groups. The first sees 
the growth of specialism as a natural development of bureaucracy, necessitated by 
the increasingly complex nature of the modern world. Because of ‘bounded 
rationality’, there is a requirement to break problems down into smaller problems, 
each of which can then be assigned to a smaller sub-organisation, which can engage 
relevant specialist expertise. The professions provide accreditation and regulation of 
such expertise, relieving the state of this task. This school of thought, ‘democratic 
elitism’, converges with neo-pluralism in many respects, such as its scepticism about 
the possibility of comprehensive rational planning. It differs in that it is more 
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inclined to see professional bureaucracy as serving professional interests than as 
moderating plural interests. 
The second interpretation, radical elite theory, dismisses democratic elitism as 
little more than the rationalisation of power imbalances within society. Radical elite 
theory is more concerned with the structural distribution of power, which is 
understood to be deeper seated, less scrutinised and more intractable than the 
competition between interest groups postulated by pluralist theory.1 One of the 
concepts advanced by this school is ‘technocracy’. In a technocracy, specialists 
embedded in the state apparatus become dominant and pursue programmes that are 
motivated by their own interests and norms. Technocracy has been described by its 
critics as ‘that society in which those who govern justify themselves by appeal to 
technical experts, who in turn justify themselves by appeal to scientific forms of 
knowledge’.2 Technocrats have been charged with prioritising economic and 
technological development above social justice; with being inveterate statists; and 
with being ‘organizational and policy imperialists’.3  
These theories of the state can be applied to the evidence explored in this thesis at 
two levels: the institutional and the sub-institutional. In the 1960s, new institutional 
bases were established for publicly-funded, health-related research. The departmental 
programme was by far the most significant of these, but the health interests of the 
SSRC should not be overlooked. These new institutions extended the scale of their 
activities and fields of influence through the late 1960s and into the 1970s, co-
existing with an equally expansive MRC. This significant diversification of the 
institutional base for health research might be interpreted in neo-pluralist terms as a 
natural and desirable response to the growing demands made of the state. The 
question to be explored is whether the MRC shared this interpretation, or whether the 
Council’s behaviour can be more readily explained as a defensive response to a 
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threat to its dominance and value systems. If the evidence suggests that the latter 
explanation is more plausible, then elite theory may be more relevant.  
At the sub-institutional level, the influence of different actor groups will be 
examined. In the case of the Department, these include generalist civil servants, 
medical civil servants and civil servants drawn from other health and social care 
professions. The medical profession will be central to any application of theories of 
the professionalised state to health R&D, for two reasons. First, the development of a 
medical-administrative structure under the CMO meant that the medical profession 
enjoyed considerable influence over health policy. Second, research has been central 
to the project of enhancing the status, autonomy and authority of the medical 
profession.1 Medical dominance and authority is potentially both cause and effect of 
the profession’s engagement with research. However, a focus on medicine should not 
lead to neglect of other occupational groups or disregarding of their interests. 
Generalist civil servants were also involved with the R&D programme and may have 
sought to achieve policy objectives that were not identical to those of their medical 
colleagues. Other occupational groups, such as nurses and health services managers, 
may have engaged with the programme in pursuit of their own agendas. The 
researcher community, which was also experiencing expansion and differentiation in 
this period, seems unlikely to have been a purely responsive actor. Organised groups 
in civil society may have sought to bring patient and public perspectives to bear on 
the emerging R&D programme. If it can be shown that the Department was receptive 
to these diverse interest groups, then this will support a neo-pluralist interpretation. 
If, on the other hand, the evidence suggests that policy was shaped by a narrower 
section of interests, this will direct us back to elite theory.  
Organisation for health research 
For the Ministry of Health, the commissioning of R&D at scale was, in the 1960s, 
a novel activity. How best to organise for this new activity would not have been 
obvious. Recent writing indicates that research commissioning is characterised by 
uncertainty about the relationship between means and ends. The more the research is 
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expected to deliver useful, actionable knowledge, the greater this uncertainty. 
Challenges in achieving positive societal outcomes from applied health research arise 
both before and after a commission is placed.1 In the former, the challenge is how to 
derive the most prescient research questions from social problems; and how to 
deploy limited funding most efficiently given the abundance of such problems. Once 
research is commissioned, the challenges become those of ensuring that the research 
produced does, in fact, address the issues intended and that outputs can be translated 
into policy. There exists a literature that describes and rationalises the processes 
adopted by publicly-funded health research commissioners in response to these 
challenges.2 
Different organisational theories predict different responses to such challenges. 
Classic bureaucratic theory would predict the emergence of an organisation designed 
for task performance. Features would include a clear allocation of roles among office 
holders and explicit procedures.3 Such attributes are generally associated with 
organisations operating in a stable environment. Other theorists argue that a more 
organic organisational form may be appropriate for organisations undertaking non-
routine tasks in a more complex and fluid environment. Such organisations are 
characterised by decentralised decision-making; greater participation in decision 
making and reliance on lateral communication and co-ordination mechanisms to link 
work units.4  These mainstream organizational theories appear inadequate to describe 
public sector research commissioning organisations, which operate under ‘prevailing 
norms and unstated assumptions which shape the way that commissioned health 
services research programmes usually work’.5 To understand these idiosyncratic 
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organisations, it may be more profitable to employ institutional theory, as developed 
in the field of organisational analysis. 
Research commissioning is characterised by uncertainty between means and ends. 
It calls for professional expertise in the specification of requirements, assessment of 
proposals, and quality assurance of outputs. In the case of the departmental 
programme, commissioning was embedded within the apparatus of the state. Such 
conditions, institutional theorists predict, will shape organisational responses that are 
determined first and foremost by a quest for legitimacy. Legitimacy might be defined 
as a state in which all key stakeholders believe the organisation to be effective and its 
structures and processes appropriate to its mission. Technical performance, which 
may be hard to assess in any event, will be a secondary consideration. In practical 
terms, this means adopting the same structures and operating conventions as other 
organisations perceived as successful in the same field. Institutional theorists 
describe this behaviour as ‘mimetic isomorphism’. Conformity with field norms will 
be signalled to other interested actors through ceremonial activity, as a strategy for 
sustaining legitimacy. This explains why sameness is more evident than diversity in 
any given organisational field.1 An organisational field emerges over time through 
processes of ‘structuration’, characterised by the emergence of shared rationalizing 
myths, ceremonial norms and mimetic isomorphism. A field will be subject to a 
dominant institutional logic, ‘a set of material practices and symbolic constructions 
which constitutes its organizing principles, and which is available to organizations 
and institutions to elaborate.’ These institutional logics are ‘symbolically grounded, 
organizationally structured, politically defended and technically and materially 
constrained.’2 When, for reasons of environmental change, competing institutional 
logics are brought to bear in the same field, then the outcome will be organisational 
turbulence.3 
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Sociological institutionalism (from which institutional theory in organisational 
analysis is derived) is fundamentally sceptical about excessive reliance on rational-
actor models of organisation and favours cognitive and cultural explanations. It 
views ‘institutions’ not just in terms of tangible and codified phenomena 
(organisations, regulatory regimes, organised interest groups, state apparatus, laws, 
and so on) but also in terms of conventions and shared understandings that are so 
dominant and pervasive that they ‘acquire a rule-like status in social thought and 
action’.1 Institutionalisation is understood to be a process in which shared cognitions 
define meanings and set the boundaries for what is understood to be possible and 
acceptable in terms of organisational structures and programmes.2  
For present purposes, the insights of sociological institutionalists into formal 
structures as ‘myth and ceremony’; the acceptance that legitimacy may be placed 
above task performance in conditions of high uncertainty; and the associated idea of 
mimetic isomorphism should alert us to the possibility that the organisational 
responses of the Department for R&D may have been determined more by 
stakeholder expectations than by any concern for efficiency, as imagined by science 
policy. This, in turn, prompts us to consider the identity and range of stakeholders 
and their expectations, which leads us back to either pluralist or elitist narratives. The 
related concept of competing ‘institutional logics’, in which non-compatible 
cognitive and cultural schema compete to control the same organisational field, may 
prove useful in explaining some of the turbulence around the Rothschild Reforms 
and their destabilisation of the relationship between MRC and Department. 
Theorists of sociological institutionalism claim that its methods can illuminate 
change over widely varying time scales.3 In practice, most writing in this tradition 
focuses on micro-level studies, short timescales and incremental change, reflecting 
the interests of its practitioners, who are sociologists rather than historians. However, 
there seems no fundamental reason why sociological institutionalism should not be 
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applied to longer periods. Adoption of an explicitly historical perspective holds out 
the possibility of convergence between sociological institutionalism and another of 
the ‘new institutionalisms’, historical institutionalism. Regardless of different 
disciplinary origins, the two schools converge around temporal arguments, close 
attention to context, and an appreciation that new institutions emerge not from the 
void but from a world already replete with existing institutions. More divergently, 
historical institutionalism tends to pay more attention to the rational calculations of 
individuals in their response to institutions, rather than emphasising the deterministic 
force of shared cognitions and taken-for-granted conventions. Historical 
institutionalists pay more attention to power and its distribution in processes of 
institutional change. They have a distinctive perspective on processes of historical 
development, using concepts such as path dependency, the ‘stickiness’ of 
organisations, critical junctures and the ‘layering’ of new organisational solutions 
onto old. 1  
These concepts, which are most often used to explain institutional inertia, may 
assist in understanding the dynamics of a programme that was built up through 
‘converging streams’ of activity and subject to at least two significant discontinuities 
over the study period. They draw our attention to preceding institutions and alert us 
to the possibility that organisational responses developed in one set of conditions 
may persist even once those conditions have changed. These perspectives may assist 
in understanding the interplay between continuity and change in the history of the 
departmental R&D programme. 
Hall and Taylor argue for a ‘more open and extensive interchange’ between 
historical and sociological institutionalism. Hay and Wincott take issue with such 
attempts at ‘synthetic institutionalism’, arguing that it understates the potential of 
historical institutionalism to bring a distinctive contribution to the structure versus 
agency debate.2  To achieve its full potential, they argue, historical institutionalism 
must ‘be developed into a theory of institutional innovation, evolution and 
transformation capable of linking the subject in a creative relationship with an 
institutional environment’. ‘Strategic action’ by individual actors seeking to initiate 
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change is an important concept in this scheme, adding an element of dynamism that 
overrides the emphasis upon institutional inertia otherwise dominant in historical 
institutionalism. However, individuals’ strategic action is always constrained by their 
perceptions of what is feasible and desirable and their sense of the possible is shaped 
by their institutionalised environment. Individual judgements about context and 
appropriate strategy are always imperfect, and so outcomes are unpredictable.  
This theory might help in assessing the importance of individual agency in 
shaping the departmental R&D programme. Holland suggests considerable 
differences in strategic action and its consequences between Chief Scientists, 
distinguishing between those responsible for the golden age and those associated 
with later decline. Such differences in action may have been influenced by changing 
structural forces. Or they may have reflected variable judgements about what was 
feasible and desirable, shaped by cognitive frameworks brought from differing 
institutional backgrounds. The extent to which these judgements correctly appraised 
the malleability of the structural forces in place had a bearing on the extent to which 
different Chief Scientists achieved their strategic goals. 
Exchanges for health research 
The concept of ‘exchanges’ in research is adapted from Kogan and Henkel, who 
were influenced by the sociologist Peter Blau. Blau showed how association and 
exchanges between individuals were related to the distribution of power.1 Kogan and 
Henkel employ the term in relation to interactions between the Department as the 
customer for research, researchers and the end users of research. Different views of 
the ideal nature of such exchanges competed for dominance. Rothschild introduced a 
distanced, quasi-market model of exchange with his much-quoted dictum that ‘the 
customer says what he wants; the contractor does it (if he can); and the customer 
pays’.2 This was anathema to the MRC, which favoured a curiosity-led approach, in 
which it would be more appropriate to speak of patrons than customers. Whilst not 
subscribing to this view, Kogan nevertheless dismisses the customer-contractor 
construct as a ‘glib metaphor’ that overlooks power imbalances and assumes greater 
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coherence than exists in both government and science. Following Blau, he links 
exchanges to dependencies and examines the extent to which the interests of each 
constituency were promoted by interaction with the others.1  
The preference for distanced or non-distanced exchanges reflects differing, often 
unstated, assumptions about how research is produced and used. These have been 
made explicit, most notably in the typology developed by Weiss.2 Using Weiss’s 
terms, Rothschild’s nostrum was based on the problem-solving model of research 
utilisation. In his construct, applied research was defined by its problem-solving 
intention.  In contrast, the MRC subscribed to a knowledge-driven model. In his 
advisory capacity, Kogan offered an alternative approach – the research liaison 
group. This offered a blend of problem-solving, interactive and enlightenment 
models. Whilst not disputing the practical orientation of the Department’s 
programme, Kogan argued that interaction was more likely to produce useful 
knowledge than a distanced mode of exchange. He also saw ongoing engagement as 
serving less instrumental purposes, which elsewhere have been defined as 
‘conceptual uses of research’. 
The complex and often indirect ways in which research can have an 
impact on the knowledge, understanding and attitudes of policy-
makers and practitioners. It happens when research changes ways of 
thinking, alerting policy-makers and practitioners to an issue or 
playing a more general ‘consciousness raising role’.3 
In a further version of the deliberative model, the researcher becomes part of a 
policy network. Such networks have been identified as central to policy development 
and as a place where government and science interact in a way that changes both. 
Policy networks feature in neo-pluralist accounts as a means by which expertise can 
be co-opted by the state. Researchers join with government insiders and think-tanks 
to develop policy through interaction in a way that is issue specific. It has been 
                                                             
1.  Kogan and Henkel, Government and Research, 163-167.  
2.  Weiss, Carol H. "The many meanings of research utilization," Public Administration 
Review 39, no. 5 (1979): 426-431. 
3.   Nutley et al., Using Evidence, 36 
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observed that ‘knowledge elites are crucial sources of innovation in public policy 
making’.1 Case studies and biographical writing add flesh to this observation.2 
Differing and non-compatible models of research production and utilization may 
have been held by various actors at various times in the history of the departmental 
programme. These may not always have been made explicit, nor might the range of 
possible perspectives have been fully appreciated. This would have led to conflicting 
expectations of commissioners, users and suppliers and of the expected forms of 
exchange and dependency between them. The implication for this study is that the 
underlying assumptions about exchanges for health research should be brought to the 
surface, and the implications for the programme explored. 
                                                             
1.  Dunleavy and O’Leary, Theories of the State, 302. 
2.  Virginia Berridge (ed.), Making Health Policy: Networks in Research and Policy after 1945 
(Amsterdam and New York: Rodopi, 2005). Sally Sheard, The Passionate Economist: How 
Brian Abel-Smith Shaped Global Health and Social Welfare (Bristol, Policy Press, 2014). 
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4. Scale and Scope 
 
Broadly speaking, the Department’s role is to initiate and support 
research and development directly related to the discharge of its own 
policy and administrative responsibilities, while the Medical Research 
Council is the government agency responsible for the support of the 
advancement in proper balance of research in the whole field of medical 
science, a position which the Social Science Research Council may one 
day hold in relation to the social sciences.1 
 
Establishing the composition and balance of the programme from the literature is 
problematical. There are material inconsistences between budget figures given by 
different authors, together with opacity about sources. Some streams of research have 
been well-documented, whereas other have been largely ignored. This chapter seeks 
clarity about the scale and scope of the programme through a longitudinal 
quantitative analysis, which begins to characterize the programme and provides a 
firm foundation for subsequent chapters. 
Statutory provisions and funding 
The analysis presented in this chapter includes exchequer funding for R&D under 
the control of the Department only. It excludes R&D funded from general allocations 
to NHS authorities and under their control; and NHS research funded from non-
exchequer sources. A brief review of the statutory provisions will clarify these 
distinctions. 
When the Ministry of Health was established in 1919, the relevant Act conferred 
powers upon the Minister for ‘the initiation and direction of research’.2 These powers 
were reserved and amplified by the National Health Service Act of 1946 but ‘without 
prejudice to the duties imposed upon the Committee for Medical Research under the 
                                                             
1. MH 166/974, The content and Balance of the Research and Development Programme, 
1969. 
2.  Ministry of Health Act, 1919 (9 &10 Geo. 5 Ch.21), s.2 
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said [1919] Act’. 1 The Minister was empowered to ‘conduct, or assist by grants or 
otherwise any person to conduct, research into any matter relating to the causation, 
prevention, diagnosis or treatment of illness or mental defectiveness’. Hospital 
authorities were given the power to conduct research, but not to assist others in the 
conduct of research.2  What these provisions meant in practice was that the Minister 
could procure research either by directly employing researchers or by making grants 
to external researchers. A hospital authority had the power to undertake research if it 
could find the means to do so, but could not make grants to external bodies to do the 
same. Money for research might be found from exchequer funds and hospital 
authorities also had the freedom to fund research using ‘free-monies’, i.e. non-
exchequer funds.  
Boards of Governors had been established only for teaching hospitals (or groups 
of hospitals centred on a teaching hospital) in 1948 and had, by exception, retained 
control of their endowment funds in England and Wales. The endowment funds of 
non-teaching voluntary hospitals had been transferred in 1948 to the central Hospital 
Endowment Fund, which was under the control of the Minister.3 Ready access to 
endowment funds, combined with medical school influences, made the teaching 
hospitals favoured sites for locally initiated research in the NHS. Grants from 
independent charitable trusts and foundations were the other source of free monies. 
Any hospital authority, not just the Boards of Governors, was at liberty to receive 
such grants. 4 
Objectives 
As noted, the existing literature is inconsistent when it comes to quantification of 
resources. Cohen’s introduction to Portfolio 2, which should be an authoritative 
source, includes a table showing the ‘scale and scope’ of the programme in 1972/3, 
analysed between its various streams. However, the source of this data is not 
                                                             
1.  9&10 Geo. 6 Ch.81 s.16. The Committee for Medical Research was reconstituted as the 
Medical Research Council in 1920 
2.  ‘The hospital authorities’ includes Regional Hospital Boards, Hospital Management 
Committees and Boards of Governors. 
3.   Brian Abel-Smith, The Hospitals in England and Wales 1800-1948 (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 1964), 478-479.  
4.  MH 123/498 Financing of Medical Research at Hospitals in the National Health Service, 7 
February 1949. 
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specified, and we are not told whether the numbers are budget or outturn.1 The table 
shows a total programme in 1972/3 of £10.225 million. However, figures given by 
other authors for the total programme budget in the early 1970s range from £3 
million2 through to £3.5m million (1973)3; £6.9 million (1972/3)4; and £15 million 
(1973).5 This variation is too large to be explained by timing differences alone. A 
likely explanation is that different authors assume different elements of the 
programme to be ‘in scope’, although this cannot be said with complete certainty, 
given the opacity about sources. Another possible explanation is the underlying 
unreliability of the sources. For example, Holland appears to have drawn his data 
from the annual R&D reports of the Department. The Royal Statistical Society warns 
against using departmental reports in general and is especially sceptical about the 
reliability of DHSS data.6  Against this background, the goal was to construct an 
authoritative data series for the R&D resources controlled by the Department. This 
would address four objectives (table 4.1). 
Table 4.1: objectives and data requirements 
 Objective Data requirement  
1 To quantify the overall scale of the 
programme and identify trends and key 
junctures over the period 1961 to 1988. 
Total R&D allocations to the 
health department. 
2 To identify and quantify specific funding 
streams within the programme, as a means 
of characterising the programme and 
identifying streams for more in-depth 
investigation. 
Allocations to individual R&D 
funding streams, reconciled to 
total allocations. 
                                                             
1.  Cohen, Introduction, Portfolio 2, xii. 
2. Cohen, The health department and research. 
3.   James M. G. Wilson, "Richard Cohen: first Chief Scientist at the DHSS," Journal of the 
Royal Society of Medicine 91 (1998): 222-224. 
4.   Holland, Improving Health Services, 107. 
5.  Obituary: Richard Cohen, The Times (anon.), 3 February 1998: 21. 
6.  D. L Bosworth, R.A. Wilson and A.J. Young, “Research and Development,” Reviews of 
United Kingdom Statistical Sources. Vol. XXVII. Series editor M. C. Fleming. (London: 
Chapman and Hall for the Royal Statistical Society and the Economic and Social Research 
Council, 1993). See appendix 1 for a fuller discussion. 
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 Objective Data requirement  
3 To understand the positioning of the 
Department’s R&D programme in relation 
to the Medical Research Council. 
Total allocations to the MRC. 
4 To understand the positioning of the 
departmental R&D programme in relation 
to total allocations for publicly-funded 
civil research and development. 
Total allocations to civil R&D. 
Calculation of departmental 
R&D allocation as a proportion 
of the total civil R&D budget. 
 
Total health-related R&D budgets 
Chart 4.1 provides an analysis of the total levels of resource allocation to both the 
Department and the MRC for the period 1st April 1961 to 31st March 1986. The same 
data is shown at a constant 1986 price base in Chart 4.2. Construction of this data 
series meets the first and third objectives in table 4.1. 
Findings can be summarised as follows. In cash terms, the departmental budget 
rises on a steady upward trend from a negligible baseline in 1961/2 until 1976/7, 
after which the pace of growth slows before a final upwards kick in 1980/1, followed 
by a sharp reversal in 1981/2. Thereafter the picture is one of slower growth for the 
MRC and slow decline for DHSS. The MRC budget starts from a higher base in 
1961 but grows less rapidly than that of the Department, with some flattening off in 
the early 1970s so that the two organisations come close to converging in 1975/6. 
Thereafter, the MRC budget pulls away from that of the Department with a step 
increase between 1978/9 and 1981/2, followed by a slower rate of growth thereafter. 
Once the series is adjusted to a constant price base (chart 4.2), the overall picture 
becomes clearer. For the Department, the inverted U-shape curve shows a picture of 
rapid growth followed by contraction that was rapid in the later 1970s but slowed to 
more of a steady decline in the 1980s. The MRC curve shows a more complex 
pattern, with two inverted curves. An earlier initial peak is followed by a decline in 
the first half of the 1970s. The principal explanation for this is the transfer of funds to 
the DHSS under the Rothschild reforms. The reversal of these reforms in 1981/2 
causes the two lines to sharply diverge, creating a funding gulf even greater than that 
present in 1961
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Chart 4.1 Exchequer allocations for research and development, Ministry of Health/ Department of Health and Social Security and Medical 
Research Council: 1961/2 to 1985/6 (cash) 
Note. Financial years end 31 March in 
the year shown.  
Sources: Supply Estimates, Cabinet 
Office Annual Reports on Government 
R&D (see chapter 3 and Appendix 1) 
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Chart 4.2 Exchequer allocations for research and development, Ministry of Health/ Department of Health and Social Security and Medical 
Research Council: 1961/2 to 1985/6 (constant price base = 1986). 
 Sources - as chart 4.1 
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Principal streams  
The total departmental R&D allocation (chart 4.1) was disaggregated into its 
component funding streams. Charts 4.3 and 4.4 show these component streams in 
cash and constant price terms. The two most significant are further disaggregated 
into sub-streams (charts 4.5 and 4.6). An overview is given for each stream and sub-
stream, numbered to allow cross-referencing to the charts. This part of the analysis 
satisfies the second objective specified in table 4.1. 
1. Research funded through hospital authorities 
Under the 1946 Act, hospital authorities had the power to conduct research, but 
not to assist others so to do.1 Attribution to research and development of a proportion 
of the estimate class for the hospital service first occurs in the Memorandum of the 
Financial Secretary in 1967/8. Some allocations to R&D from the hospital vote had, 
in fact, been made since 1963/4 but the scale was too small to register in the 
Memoranda.2 The funding of R&D from the hospital vote worked through pre-
emption in the resource distribution process. Once the Department had approved a 
research project the relevant authority was instructed to charge the cost to its revenue 
account and then to make a matching addition to its estimates. This then resulted in a 
‘specific additional allocation’ to the authority for the project.3 Such allocations were 
initially made on a recurrent basis, but the Department realised that this would distort 
resource distribution over time and so switched to non-recurrent additions from 
1966/7 onwards.4  Allocations from the hospital capital account were made using the 
same mechanism where material capital expenditure was incurred as part of a 
research project.5 
Funding from the hospital allocations grew rapidly, so that by 1972/3 it stood at 
£6.55 million, making this the largest single funding stream and accounting for half 
of total R&D allocations. Thereafter this funding stream began to decline and was 
                                                             
1.  9&10 Geo. 6 Ch.81 s.16. 
2.  MH 166/255, Research funds: Commitments for 1965/6 and subsequent years. 
3.  MH 166/255, Hospital Revenue Allocations 1967/68 and 1968/69.  
4.  MH 166/255, Operational Research and Hospital Activity Analysis: Adjustment of 
Hospital Revenue Allocations, 10 September 1965.  
5. MH166/255, Capital for Research Projects, 8 March 1966.  
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overtaken by the allocation for centrally commissioned research (series 2) in mid-
decade. This decline does not necessarily mean that less research was being 
conducted by NHS authorities.  Following the 1974 reorganisation of the NHS, more 
funding was devolved to the newly-created Regional Health Authorities (RHAs).  
The transition away from historically-based allocations and towards a formulaic 
basis was accelerated by the establishment of the Resource Allocation Working party 
(RAWP) in 1975.1 RHAs were expected to make their own decisions about a range 
of matters, including locally-initiated research, and to find funding for these from 
within their recurrent allocations. Consequentially, the Department phased out its 
practice of pre-empting the NHS budget for research purposes from 1974 onwards.2 
Health Authorities continued to support research of their own volition and funded 
from their allocations after this date but the sum involved cannot be quantified from 
central sources. The DHSS Annual Reports on R&D, introduced in 1973, refer to the 
existence of research funded by the Health Authorities ‘financed from their 
Exchequer allocations and/or trust funds, in aid of their own administration’.3 
However, this funding is excluded from the financial tables of the report. Not until 
the Cabinet Office annual review of 1986/7 does the value of Health Authority 
funded research re-appear, adding £11m to the total spend reported for the DHSS. It 
can be assumed R&D commitments of between £2m and £11m were made each year 
between 1973/4 and 1986/7 by Health Authorities. This funding is excluded from 
data series 1, chart 4.3, because it was not under departmental control and not 
reported as part of the departmental budget throughout this period. Chart 4.5 shows 
series 1 disaggregated into its sub-streams. The Estimates include detailed enough 
data to support this analysis only between 1967/8 and 1973/4. 
1(i) Experimental computer projects 
The rapid growth in research funded through hospital authorities between 1968 
and 1974 was largely due to the expansion of computing research through the NHS 
Experimental Computer Programme (ECP), which was launched in 1967. ECP 
                                                             
1.  Webster, Health Services since the War, Vol. 2, 609-613. 
2.  Stephen M. Davies, "The Experimental Computer Programme: the First Computing 
Initiative for the National Health Service in England," IEEE Annals of the History of 
Computing 39, no. 2, (2017): 65-79. 
3.  Department of Health and Social Security, Annual Report on Departmental Research and 
Development (London: HMSO, 1974), 7. 
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involved an initial commitment of £14.4 million of capital and revenue support to 15 
sites, mostly teaching hospitals.1 The programme’s defining features were its 
commitment to hospital computing and the ambition of its vision for integrated 
medical and management information systems. ECP systems, it was envisioned, 
would be accessible concurrently by multiple users (‘shared-time’) and respond 
within seconds (‘real-time’). These goals would distinguish advanced hospital 
systems developed through ECP from existing computers in Regional Hospital Board 
bureaux, which were used only for routine administrative functions, such as payroll 
and collation of statistics. These were applications for which software could readily 
be adapted from other sectors and for which batch processing was adequate. In 
contrast, the ambitions of ECP required the development of novel software and user 
interfaces.2  
It quickly became evident that computers would increase the running costs of 
hospitals, rather than produce cash-releasing efficiencies. A review of NHS 
computing in 1972 devised a scheme that legitimised the phasing out of central 
financial support for ECP. 3 As central support tapered off from 1973/4 onwards, 
ECP-related costs were picked up by the Hospital Authorities through their general 
allocations. The Department continued to support a much smaller programme of 
computer research from its allocation for centrally-commissioned research (series 2 
in chart 4.3). The impact of this revised approach to ECP funding was that it rapidly 
reduced the contribution to the total R&D budget of funding from hospital 
allocations, of which it was by far the largest component.
                                                             
1.  MH 148/457, Experimental Computer Programme for the NHS. 
2.  D.A. Gledrych, “The Department's Policy and Objectives” in Medical Computing, 
Progress and Problems ed. Michael E. Abrams (London: Chatto & Windus for the British 
Computer Society, 1970), 345-352. 
3.  Department of Health and Social Security, Using Computers to Improve Health Services. 
A Review for the National Health Service. London: DHSS, 1972 (in FD 23/1471). 
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Chart 4.3 Exchequer allocations for research and development, Ministry of Health/DHSS 1961/2 to 1985/6 (cash) 
 
Note. Financial years end 31st March in the year shown. All values are in £’000s and are at original estimate prices. Sources: Memorandum by the Financial Secretary to the 
Treasury (annual) 1961/62 to 1969/70; Memorandum by the Chief Secretary to the Treasury (annual) 1970/71 to 1981/2. Cabinet Office annual reviews of government-
funded R&D thereafter. See Appendix 1. 
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Chart 4.4 Exchequer allocations for research and development, Ministry of Health/DHSS 1961/2 to 1985/6 (constant price base = 1986) 
 
Sources: as chart 4.3 
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Chart 4.5 Research funded through hospital authorities, 1967/8 to 1973/4 (cash) 
Note. Financial years end 31st March in 
the year shown. All values are in £’000s 
and are at original estimate prices. 
Sources: Memorandum by: Financial 
Secretary to the Treasury 1967/8 to 
1969/70; Chief Secretary to the Treasury 
1970/1 to 1973/4. See appendix 1 for full 
details 
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1(ii) Health services research by hospital authorities 
This funding stream supported larger health services research projects. The 
rationale for funding such studies from the hospital vote was the same as that for 
experimental computer projects: the costs involved were too great for a single 
authority to meet through normal revenue and capital allocations and there was a 
potential NHS-wide interest in the findings from research.  
Between 1964 and 1966 the Ministry of Health published catalogues of ‘hospital 
studies’ in the form of hospital management circulars, which include listings of both 
HSR projects and ‘special medical developments’ (see below).1 These reveal the 
diversity of projects, both in terms of subjects investigated and in arrangements for 
funding and delivery. The range of topics, together with orientation of research 
towards NHS needs, can be gauged from the headings in the 1966 catalogue. These 
include management, organisation, methods, attitudes and information; assessment of 
needs and care; staff; outpatient departments; and catering. 
Some projects were delivered by hospital authorities alone; many were undertaken 
in partnership with other research providers including charities, universities, medical 
schools, the MRC and private companies. Projects were sometimes funded purely 
from the hospital vote, but this source was often combined with hospital charitable 
funds or grants from external charities. Some partners, such as universities or the 
King’s Fund, might also contribute resources in kind by committing staff without 
reimbursement.  
1(iii) Special medical developments 
The funding of special medical developments provided a further opportunity for 
the Department to facilitate experimental development and evaluation of new clinical 
services through its control of financial allocations to hospital authorities. Without 
encouragement and additional financial support from the centre, such innovations 
would be too costly and speculative for individual hospital authorities to pursue on 
their own initiative. This approach was also an attempt to control the adoption of 
                                                             
1. Circulars HM(64)13, HM(65)21 and HM(66)65, all in MH166/297. Funding source is not 
detailed in these circulars but can be established for each project by cross-referencing, 
using a unique project code, to unpublished listings in MH166/255. 
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costly new treatments by imposing evaluation before general adoption.1 Services 
supported in this way included: renal transplantation; choriocarcinoma; infant cardiac 
services; leukaemia; drug addiction and laboratory automation.2 
2. Centrally commissioned health and personal social services research/social 
security research. 
Allocations under this heading were made for the centralised commissioning of 
research by the Department, acting under powers conferred by s.16 of the 1946 Act. 
This data series can be further disaggregated using detail provided in the Estimates 
up to and including 1981/82 and the financial tables in the Cabinet Office Annual 
Reviews thereafter (chart 4.6). The term ‘health and personal social services 
research’ (HPSSR) was not widely adopted until about 1968 and in the Cabinet 
Office reports it is used in a precise way that excludes building and computer 
research. However, this is the best catch-all description for the research 
commissioned by the Department from central funds. Modest allocations made for 
commissioned social security research have also been included in this series. 
2(i) Clinical research 
Clinical research involves human subjects, typically drawn from patient 
populations but also including health volunteers. The sub-category ‘clinical research’ 
in the Estimates is the allocation for the ‘locally-organised research scheme’ 
(LORS). This scheme was designed to encourage clinical research in the NHS. 3 The 
Department’s hope was that ‘Boards and committees will do all that is in their power 
to foster clinical research in their hospitals’.4 Exchequer funding for such purposes 
could be supplemented by free-monies. Some LORS projects may have been of a 
similar nature to those supported from the hospital revenue account, but they were 
funded under a different vote and without any scrutiny by the Department. They 
were also of lower value, as the scheme was originally set up with an upper grant 
limit of £1,000. 
                                                             
1.  Cohen, The Department’s Role, Portfolio 1, 15.  
2.  MH166/255, Notes from a meeting to discuss provision for special medical developments 
in 1968/69, 5 February 1968. 
3.  The origins of this scheme are discussed in chapter 5. 
4.  MH166/437, HM(57)36 National Health Service, Clinical Research 
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Chart 4.6 Exchequer allocations, Ministry of Health and Department of Health and Social Security: Centrally commissioned health and personal 
social services research/ social security research 1961/62 to 1985/6 (Cash) 
Notes: all periods are 
financial years ending 
31st March in the year 
shown. All values are in 
£’000s and are at 
estimate prices. 
Descriptions are by sub-
head (4). 
Sources: Civil Estimates 
(annual) 1961/62 to 
1969/70; Supply 
Estimates (annual) 
1970/71 to 1981/82. 
Cabinet Office Annual 
Reviews of Government 
R&D thereafter. See 
appendix 1 for full 
details. 
  
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
18
20
19
62
19
63
19
64
19
65
19
66
19
67
19
68
19
69
19
70
19
71
19
72
19
73
19
74
19
75
19
76
19
77
19
78
19
79
19
80
19
81
19
82
19
83
19
84
19
85
19
86
£ 
m
ill
io
n
s
Finanical Year
(i) Clinical research
(ii) Medical, social and operational
R&D
(iii) Building and engineering R&D
(iv) Social security research
(v) Computer-based R&D
Total
 80 
 
Between 1964/5 and 1970/1 separate sub-heads for ‘hospital clinical research’ and 
‘other clinical research’ are reported, with the latter growing to a maximum of about 
15 percent of the total. The emergence of an allocation for ‘other clinical research’ in 
1964/5 is consistent with Richard Cohen’s statement that in that year an ‘allotment of 
funds’ was made for ‘GP and local health and welfare services’.1 Internal documents 
show that allocations for clinical research followed the tripartite structure of the pre-
1974 NHS. For example, in 1965/6 an allocation of £105,000 was made for hospital-
based research, £20,000 for General Practice research and £28,000 for Local 
Authority Research.2 These sums may have been modest, but they indicate a 
commitment to develop health research beyond the medical schools and hospitals. 
This budget line had grown to over £2m per annum by 1st April 1978, on which 
date full responsibility for the scheme was devolved to Health Authorities, in line 
with the principles of ‘maximum devolution’ adopted in the 1974 reorganisation. 3  
Thereafter the size and nature of spending by Health Authorities becomes invisible in 
the central sources before re-appearing in the 1987 Cabinet Office annual review at a 
level of £11m, as discussed under series 1. The latter source does not provide 
sufficient detail to distinguish between clinical and non-clinical research. 
2(ii) Medical, social and operational R&D for health and welfare 
This sub-head first appears in the Estimates for 1963/4, when it is described as 
‘operational research by outside organisations’. Growth in this category contributes 
significantly to the second point of acceleration in the overall programme in 1970/1 
and was still accelerating in 1972/3. The appearance of this new stream of allocations 
is consistent with the account of Richard Cohen, who says that ‘approval was 
obtained from the Treasury in 1963/4 for the allocation of funds for 'operations 
research' (used here in its widest and non-technical sense) in the hospital service’.4 A 
supplementary note to the Estimates explains the intention in creating this new 
stream. 
                                                             
1.  Cohen, The Department’s Role, Portfolio 1, 7. 
2.  MH 166/255, Research Funds: Commitments for 1965/66 and subsequent years. 
3.   Department of Health and Social Security. Research and Development Report and 
Handbook (London: HMSO, 1977), 87. 
4.  Cohen, The Department’s Role, Portfolio 1, 7. 
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From 1963/64 on, provision has been made for the financing by the 
Department of approved health service studies, trials, experiments and 
research conducted by outside bodies which bear upon the need, quality 
and availability of care for patients and the efficiency of the 
organisation for providing it. A number of projects are in progress or in 
preparation. The projects generally deal with administration and non-
clinical aspects of the Health Service but in some cases both non-
clinical and clinical elements occur.1  
Both parts of the original descriptor are significant. ‘Operational research’ was used 
as shorthand for a specific discipline; but also for research into the operations of 
health services. The reference to ‘outside organisations’ indicates that this was a 
funding stream explicitly intended the commissioning of research from external 
suppliers.  
Descriptors in the Estimates for this allocation line change more frequently than 
any other. In 1965/6, the descriptor was changed to ‘health and welfare services 
research by other organisations’ and then in 1971/2, to ‘medical, social and 
operational R&D for health and welfare’ and again in 1972/3 to ‘medical, social and 
operational R&D for Health and Personal Social Services (including child care)’. In 
Chart 4.6, the descriptor has been standardised as ‘medical, social and operational 
R&D’. The Department included projects funded from this source in its list of 
hospital studies, where they are strongly represented in the category for 
‘management, organisation, methods, attitudes and information’. However, clinical 
projects were also funded from this allocation and it appears that the Department 
took a pragmatic approach towards funding HSR projects from either this source or 
from the hospital revenue allocation, presumably based on budget availability and 
the extent to which the project was locally or centrally-initiated.2 
2 (iii) Building and engineering research and development 
Growth in this funding stream, which first appears in 1965/6, contributed 
significantly to the second phase of acceleration in the overall programme. The 
                                                             
1.  H.C. Papers Civil Estimates Class V1-16 1964-65 Amending Note July 1964 (copy filed in 
MH 166/255). 
2.  MH 166/255, Research projects funded by the Department. 
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purpose of this stream is self-evident from the description. Goodman, later Chief 
Architect at the Department, gives a flavour of its practical orientation. 
Our earlier development projects have several common themes: the 
search for a universal hospital structure, the study of flexibility and 
adaptability, the study of hospital communications, the integration of 
structure and engineering services, and the satisfaction of all these 
requirements within acceptable cost limits.1 
Much of the work was undertaken by in-house professional staff in the Architecture 
and Engineering branches of the Department. For example, prompted by the planning 
of a new hospital at Greenwich the Ministry undertook a project, in partnership with 
the local hospital authorities, to refine the design briefs for pathology departments, 
operating theatres and wards. Some studies were undertaken by RHBs on their own 
initiative, although these do not appear in the listings of projects supported by the 
hospital revenue account and were presumably funded out of mainstream allocations.  
Others were jointly supported.2 There was very little use of external contractors in 
this stream of research, although some work was undertaken by the Building 
Research Station. 3  
2 (iv) Social security research 
Social security became a responsibility of the Department after the Ministries of 
Health and Social Security were combined in November 1968.  The Ministry of 
Social Security had its own research and statistics branch and DHSS became 
responsible for ongoing projects. There was a significant overlap between social 
security research and social research into the provision of health and welfare 
services. The level of spending on SSR was always modest compared to other 
streams, rising to a peak of £600,000 in 1988. The gap in the series between 1974 
and 1982 is due to reporting conventions, with the programme most likely having 
been overlooked in reporting due to its relatively low level of resourcing. 
 
                                                             
1.  H. Goodman, “Building and engineering”, in Portfolio 1, ed. McLachlan (1971): 205-211. 
2.  HM(66)65 
3.  The Building Research Station (later Establishment) was a unit of the Department for 
Scientific and Industrial Research until 1966 and the Ministry of Technology thereafter. 
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2 (v) Computer-based R&D 
Details of spending in this stream of activity can be gleaned from the 
departmental annual R&D reports from 1973 onwards. Much of the expenditure 
through this stream took the form of support for the ECP as central support was 
phased out after 1974. However, the Department also initiated new, smaller projects 
in areas such as pathology, radiotherapy and nuclear medicine.1 By the 1980s the 
Department had moved away from supporting experimental development in the field 
and was concentrating its resources on central units: Centre of Information 
Technology and Corporate Data Administration Centre.  
3. Centrally commissioned biomedical research 
A dedicated funding stream for commissioning of biomedical research was phased 
in under the Rothschild reforms over the four years starting in 1973/4. As announced 
in the 1972 White Paper, Framework for Government Research and Development, 
one quarter of the MRC budget (the proportion attributed to applied research) was 
transferred to the DHSS over four years, beginning in 1973/4. An initial transfer of 
£3 million in that year grew to £8.5 million in 1977/8. This budget line continued to 
grow thereafter in cash terms. The DHSS invested considerable effort in developing 
mechanisms for agreeing commissions with the MRC. However, it found itself in a 
largely reactive role and, acknowledging this, considerably simplified arrangements 
for commissioning from the MRC after 1977. The MRC was then able to argue that 
Rothschild had added little value and should be reversed. This argument prevailed 
and on 1 April 1981 the biomedical research budget of £14 million was transferred 
back to the MRC via the Department of Education and Science.  
4. Centrally commissioned supplies and equipment research 
A proportion of the estimate for the ‘hospital service – supplies and equipment’ is 
first attributed to R&D in the Memorandum of the Financial Secretary in 1962/3. 
Thereafter this category grows steadily, reaching a peak in 1973/4 with a budget of 
just over £2m or 12 percentof the total budget. The greater proportion comes under a 
sub-heading of ‘assessment of hospital supplies and equipment’, which included 
purchase of items where necessary. The balance falls under various headings relating 
                                                             
1.   Department of Health and Social Security, Research and Development Report and 
Handbook (London: HMSO, 1979), 20. 
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to personal aids for disabled people, for example ‘development of hearing aids by the 
GPO’. After 1971, all previous headings relating to disability aids are replaced with a 
single sub-head for the Biomechanical Research and Development Unit (BRADU). 
The purpose of the supplies and equipment programme was ‘the development of 
equipment and supplies which will improve the care of patients’. This included 
support where it was apparent that industry alone would not bear the full costs of 
development, either because these were too great or because the clinical value of a 
novel technology was unproven.  In addition, the programme sponsored the 
evaluation of existing devices. BRADU undertook development work in artificial 
limbs, prostheses and wheelchairs. Externally commissioned work was undertaken 
by a mixed economy of providers, including universities, industry and government 
research establishments. Examples of equipment developed by industry with 
departmental support include cardiac pacemakers, gamma cameras, ultrasound 
scanners, computerised tomography scanners, infusion pumps and various patient 
monitors.1 
5. Ministry of Health/Department of Health and Social Security – research salaries 
From 1971/2 onwards, the Memorandum identifies a proportion of the vote for the 
establishment costs of the Department as research related. By 1973/4, this had risen 
to £831,000, or 6 percent of the total budget. No further detail is provided in the 
Estimates and it is not entirely clear whether this sum solely represents the costs of 
staff in in-house research units or whether it also includes the costs of staff managing 
the research programme. From the sums involved, it seems most likely that it is the 
former. 
6. Research by the Public Health Laboratory Service 
The primary role of the Public Health Laboratory Service (PHLS) was routine 
specimen analysis and disease surveillance but through this work the service was 
also able to make an incidental contribution to research.2  Scientists based in the 
PHLS also sought to undertake additional, non-incidental research projects, but for 
this they had to compete alongside other institutions for funding, whether from the 
                                                             
1.  E. L. Stevens, “Medical Equipment and Supplies: Research and Development,” Portfolio 
2, 123-133. 
2.   Thomson, Half a Century, Vol.2, chapter 13. 
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Department or from elsewhere.1 The trend in this line was one of modest growth in 
the range of 3 to 5 percent of total departmental R&D budget until 1981/2, when 
there is a step increase up to around thirty percent. As this coincides with the change 
of source from Estimates to Cabinet Office annual reviews this is almost certainly the 
result of a change in reporting conventions that allowed the PHLS to describe a much 
greater share of its work as being research. 
Growth in the wider context 
The final objective for the longitudinal analysis was to place the patterns of 
growth in health-related research and development within the context of trends in 
total government spending on civil research. This will establish how far the former 
was truly exceptional, rather than simply a reflection of growth in the total civil R&D 
budget. The Wilson governments of 1964-1970 were committed to a rebalancing of 
resources from defence to civil research, so the latter must be considered as an 
explanation for the programme’s growth spurt.2 Chart 4.7 shows the R&D budget of 
the health department expressed as a percentage of the total government civil R&D 
budget and of the total NHS budget. The health departments’ share of the overall 
civil R&D budget grew from 0.1 percent in 1961/2 to a peak of 4.9 percent in 1976. 
As a share of the net NHS budget, the R&D budget rose from 0.02 percent to a peak 
of 0.57 percent in 1974.  
The R&D budget of the health department thus grew at a much faster rate than 
that of the global civil R&D budget prior to 1976. Beyond this peak, there was an 
equally steep decline to a low of 1.2 percent in 1985. Between 1962 and 1976 the 
MRC share of the civil research budget rose from 4 to just over 5 percent, which is 
another way of expressing the finding from chart 4.1 that the Department looked set 
to overtake the MRC in the immediate aftermath of Rothschild. But in the period 
after 1976 the MRC managed to sustain its share of the civil R&D budget in the 
range of 5.5 to 6 percent, in contrast to the decline of the DHSS budget. 
                                                             
1.  MH 166/255, Public Health Laboratory Service: research finance, 16 July 1965. 
2.  Edgerton, Warfare State. Richard Coopey, “Industrial policy in the white heat of the 
scientific revolution,” in The Wilson Governments 1964-1970 eds. Richard Coopey, S. 
Fielding and N. Tiratsoo, (London: Pinter Publishers, 1993), 102-122. 
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Chart 4.7 Growth in health-related research as percentage of civil research and NHS budgets 1961/2 to 1985/6 
 
Sources: Global civil R&D budget: Council for Scientific Policy Cmnd. 3007 1961/62. Memorandum of the Financial/Chief Secretary to the Treasury 1967/68 to 1980/81. 
Global budget interpolated 1962/3 to 1966/67 (see appendix 1). Cabinet Office Annual Reviews of Government R&D 1981/2 onwards. NHS Budget Harker. NHS Funding 
and Expenditure. SN/SG/724, House of Commons Library, 2012. 
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Concluding discussion 
The data reveals a picture of rise and partial reversal over a quarter of a century, 
which is most evident where allocations are presented on a constant price basis. The 
rate of growth between 1961 and 1976 was exceptional, even by the standards of an 
expansionary period for publicly-funded R&D.  The health department moved, over 
fifteen years, from insignificance and invisibility in R&D to becoming a significant 
actor among civil departments. Over the next decade, it slipped backwards. The most 
obvious explanation for this pattern is the Rothschild reforms and their subsequent 
reversal. However, these events only contribute directly to the data between 1973/4 
and 1981/2, or for less than one-third of the total data series. If the biomedical 
research commissioning stream is stripped out, the real-terms picture remains one of 
sustained growth in R&D investment until the mid-1970s, followed by steady decline 
until 1986.  Biomedical research funding never amounted to more than 36 percent of 
the total R&D budget (in 1980/1). Activities in other streams grew strongly before 
Rothschild and were maintained thereafter.  
These other streams possess two notable characteristics: they are diverse, and they 
include a heavy commitment to development as well as research. The range of R&D 
supported by the Department included: health and personal social services research; 
clinical research; social security research; experimental computer projects; supplies, 
equipment, building and engineering research and development. Expansion in the 
experimental computer programme, building and architecture research and the 
development and evaluation of medical equipment contributed significantly to the 
overall pattern of rapid growth in the decade after 1965. Most of the activity in these 
streams would fall within the current definition of experimental development, rather 
than basic or applied research. 
Systematic work drawing on knowledge gained from research and 
practical experience that is directed to producing new materials, products 
and devices; to installing new systems and services or to improving 
substantially those already produced or installed.1 
                                                             
1.  OECD. Frascati Manual. Proposed Standard for Surveys on Research and Experimental 
Development (Paris: Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, 2002). 
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The data also reveals a shift in the relationship between the Department and the 
NHS. Before 1974, the Department relied significantly on pre-emption of the 
hospital vote for the funding of research. After 1974, this practice was discontinued, 
except to fund the run-out costs of existing projects. This change in funding practice 
may have been associated with a changed interaction between the Department and 
NHS bodies for R&D commissioning. 
The quantitative analysis offers a clearer sense of periodisation than that available 
from the literature alone. The programme’s history can be divided into four periods. 
These are: pre-history and emergence (before 1965), growth in the ‘golden age’ 
(1965 to 1973), an era of instability (1973 to 1982) and an era of slow decline (1983 
to 1986). This periodisation is broadly followed in the chapters that follow, with 
some overlap where it assists the narrative. There is one exception. In dealing with 
the era of instability, close attention is paid to the critical junctures at its beginning 
and end – short periods when organisation and policy underwent notable change. The 
rationale for this, in relation to the Kogan corpus, has already been briefly discussed 
in the literature review but is set out more fully in chapter 8.  
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5. Origins: 1948 to 1965 
 
A decade or more after the creation of the NHS, there had already 
been a great deal of informal criticism of the inability of the Health 
Department to look at its own activities and the distinction was 
drawn between a commercial organization with its incentive to 
innovation and improvement and a civil service department 
adjusting and controlling the status quo rather than planning 
development in the future. Outside experts, for example in social 
medicine and medical statistics, expected research in aid of planning 
but did not perhaps fully recognize that they were the very people to 
do this.1 
 
This chapter explores why the engagement of the Ministry of Health with research 
and development was so minimal before 1960, and why this situation began to 
change over the next half-decade. It begins by examining MRC ascendency before 
1948, and the consequences of this for the Ministry. It shows how the coming of the 
National Health Service initially reinforced the dominance of the health research 
state by the MRC. It argues that this dominance was the mirror image and principal 
cause of the Department’s R&D inactivity before the early 1960s.  
This analysis of power in the health research state begs the question as to why, 
regardless of MRC dominance, the Ministry began to develop its own R&D 
programme after 1961. If the structural dominance of the MRC, together with its 
claims to control over the whole field of medical research (broadly defined), 
remained unchallenged, then what prompted the Department to begin this new 
activity, and what made this development acceptable to the MRC? It is argued that 
this altered situation was not brought about by any re-appraisal of the formal 
relationship between the two organisations, nor by any changes in national science 
policy, regardless of reform between 1959 and 1965. Instead, the origins of the 
Ministry’s programme lay in the politics of NHS investment, efficiency and control. 
From this context, a commitment to ‘operational research’ emerged that soon 
broadened into a wider engagement with service-relevant medical and social 
research. The politics of NHS investment and efficiency gave rise to calls for a 
                                                             
1.  Cohen, The Departments Role, Portfolio 1, 7. 
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greater departmental capacity for systematic investigation, including but not limited 
to R&D. Non-government organisations led the way by funding pioneering studies in 
health and personal social services and by advocating a greater departmental capacity 
for systematic investigation. This chapter thus speaks to the theme of the 
development of the health research state as a response to the political pressures 
created by rising expectations of the NHS. 
The health research state before 1965 
Ministry and MRC before the NHS 
The history of the MRC over its first half-century has been extensively 
documented.1 Only the key points are repeated here. The National Insurance Act of 
1911 created a national fund for medical research.2 The Act was worded somewhat 
ambiguously and could have been interpreted as requiring the new fund to be used 
solely for research into tuberculosis.  However, a Treasury committee decided that 
the body responsible for this new fund should be empowered to act in any field of 
medical science and across the whole of the United Kingdom. It followed that the 
Committee of Medical Research, when established in 1913, was given a national 
remit for the whole field of medical research.3  The new committee sought from the 
outset to secure a high level of scientific self-governance and a minimal level of 
accountability to government. During the reconstruction period after the First World 
War, the committee successfully resisted proposals that it should become 
accountable to either the Ministry of Health (established 1919) or the Department of 
Scientific and Industrial Research (1916). It argued that the former arrangement 
would subordinate science to the needs of a single administrative department and the 
latter would subordinate medical research to an organisation focused on the industrial 
application of research. At the root of these arguments was a view that ‘men of 
science’ should not be harnessed to the instrumentalist purposes of government, 
regardless of funding from the public purse.  
                                                             
1.  Thomson, Half a Century, Vol. 1. Austoker and Bryder, Historical Perspectives. 
2.  Section 16 (2) of the Act laid down that 1d per insured person should be set aside for 
sanatorium expenses but that the Insurance Commissioners might retain the whole or 
any part of that contribution for the benefits of research.  
3. Linda Bryder, “Tuberculosis and the MRC,” in Austoker and Bryder, Historical 
Perspectives, 1-21. 
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…a large administrative department necessarily has certain declared 
policies and urgent day-to-day requirements, both tending to create 
pressures of a kind inimical to the initiative and perspective essential for 
long-term research. In contrast, the Committee had already achieved 
independent power, in its scientific discretion, to frame and execute its 
programme for the advancement of knowledge; even a suspicion of 
bureaucratic control or political expediency would have destroyed the 
Committee's authority and have lost it the sympathetic cooperation of 
scientific men.1  
Such views prevailed because a coalition of the scientific, administrative and 
political elite was persuaded of the case for scientific self-governance. Members of 
this coalition included Robert Morant, first permanent secretary at the Ministry of 
Health and Christopher Addison, Minister of Reconstruction from 1917 and later 
first Minister for Health.2  The Committee on the Machinery of Government 
(‘Haldane Committee’) opposed the subordination of the Medical Research 
Committee to the Ministry of Health and recommended accountability to the Lord 
President of the Privy Council instead. This arrangement, which was also adopted for 
the Department of Scientific and Industrial Research, provided a semblance of 
accountability to government whilst minimising de facto political oversight. When 
the Medical Research Committee was reconstituted as the Medical Research Council 
in 1920, these oversight arrangements were retained. The arguments used to justify 
the governance arrangements for the MRC, DSIR and other research councils have 
subsequently been elevated to orthodoxy as the ‘Haldane Principle’ by defenders of 
scientific freedom.3   
The Council was, from the first, highly assertive in its claim to control over all 
aspects of medical research in the United Kingdom, however funded. The 
uncompromising insistence on this principle of its first Secretary, Walter Morley 
Fletcher (1873-1933), led to conflict with the charitable sector, the Royal Colleges 
and the Ministry of Health. The establishment of the British Empire Cancer 
Campaign in the 1920s, for example, ‘took place amongst angry arguments, 
acrimonious disputes, conflicting interests and power struggles concerning the 
                                                             
1.  Thomson, Half a Century, Vol. 1, 35 
2.  Both had also served on the Treasury committee on Tuberculosis. Morant claimed 
personal credit for ensuring that this committee recommended a broader scope of 
research and a UK-wide remit for the MRC. See Thomson Vol 1, 21. 
3.  Edgerton, David “The 'Haldane Principle' and other invented traditions in science 
policy”, History and Policy Papers online, 2 July 2009.  
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crucial question of who should control the direction of biomedical research’.1 The 
boundary between the MRC and the Ministry of Health for research activities was 
not at first formally defined but could be inferred from the Haldane Committee, 
which drew a distinction between research supervised by administrative departments 
and that undertaken for general government purposes.  The former was seen as 
properly comprising surveys and statistical work and also research into public health 
questions initiated by a range of departments and the Local Government Board. Such 
‘intelligence and research’ was not, in the view of the Haldane Committee, 
undertaken ‘entirely in the pursuit of new truth’, despite which it was acknowledged 
that ‘this element enters into each of them in some degree’. To sustain the surveying 
and statistical analysis role assigned to them, Haldane also recommended that the 
administrative departments maintain their own capacity for ‘intelligence work’. 
all Departments which have already made distinct provision for 
intelligence work should continue to do so, and that many which have not 
might do so with great advantage ; that most Departments must continue to 
provide themselves with the organisation which they need for the 
collection and collation of statistical material acquired in the course of 
their administration ; and that many Departments must retain under their 
own control a distinctive organisation for the prosecution of specific forms 
of research.2 
In practice, it proved difficult to discern the boundary between the Ministry’s 
need for ‘intelligence’ and the Council’s programme for the advancement of new 
knowledge, leading to friction between the two organisations. In an attempt to ease 
tensions, a ‘concordat’ was drawn up in 1924, setting out respective spheres of 
interest.3 The Ministry was to confine its activities to surveys and the propagation of 
existing knowledge ‘with a view to its application or applicability to practical uses’; 
population health and environmental surveys; investigations into the administrative 
work of the Ministry itself; and ‘such investigations as can best be carried out by the 
Ministry in the interests of public health administration, applied knowledge or 
medical services’. The MRC was to undertake pure and applied research in the 
                                                             
1.  Austoker, Walter Morley Fletcher. Fletcher was Secretary of the Committee and then 
Council from 1913 until his death in 1933. 
2.  Cd. 9230 Report of the Machinery of Government Committee, (Ministry of 
Reconstruction London: HMSO, 1918), para. 57. 
3.  This was formalised in 1928 when it was endorsed by the Research Co-ordination Sub-
committee of the Committee of Civil Research. 
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medical sciences. The concordat proved an imperfect remedy and the Ministry and 
Council continued to clash, for example over vaccination policy and nutrition 
research.1 The Ministry was not completely inactive in research during the inter-war 
period, publishing ‘Reports on Public Health and Medical Subjects’ between 1920 
and 1939.  This series, which ran to 90 issues, was produced by the small staff of the 
Ministry’s Central Bacteriological and Chemical Laboratories and represents an 
exception to the general picture of research inactivity in the inter-war period. 2 
Although Fletcher was a staunch supporter of basic research, he also recognised 
that clinical science was essential to his ambition for a comprehensive programme of 
medical research. Prior to 1948 the Council found itself unable to sustain clinical 
research beyond a handful of centres.3  Obstacles included the requirement for access 
to a clinical population; lack of support from the universities and medical schools; 
and the requirement that ‘whoever is in medical charge must be at the same time a 
skilful physician or surgeon and a research worker with a broad scientific outlook’. 
There was no research training available for clinicians outside a small number of 
MRC-supported units and no career track for those who did avail themselves of such 
training. Before the NHS, the consultant staff of teaching hospitals was employed on 
an honorary basis and relied on private practice for earnings, so participation in 
clinical research generally meant a reduced income. The Council considered, but 
rejected, the idea of setting up its own research hospital as a response to these 
obstacles.4 
Ministry and MRC after 1948 
The establishment of the National Health Service prompted a revisiting of the 
concordat.5 The initial conclusion, reached in 1949, was that no change was needed. 
However, growing recognition of the opportunities arising from the new service soon 
                                                             
1.  Linda Bryder, “Public health research and the MRC” and Celia Petty “Primary research 
and public health: the prioritization of nutrition research in inter-war Britain” both in 
Austoker and Bryder, 59-81 and 83-108.  
2.  Bryder, Public health research, 70. These laboratories were subsumed into the MRC-
managed Emergency Public Health Laboratory Service in 1939.  
3.   Booth, Christopher C., “Clinical research” in Austoker and Bryder, 205-241. 
4.  Thomson, Half a Century, Vol. 2, 13-18.  
5.  MH 123/498. 
 94 
 
prompted re-appraisal.1 The MRC annual report for 1951/2 includes a section on the 
advent of more propitious circumstances for clinical research.2 This begins by 
arguing that the Council had always intended to make clinical studies its primary 
focus, but that practical and ethical difficulties in accessing patients, together with 
limitations in the techniques available, had held back progress.3 In view of this, the 
Council had directed the bulk of its funding towards laboratory research in the inter-
war period. In 1939, the Council was only supporting three clinical research units. 
The first-founded and most influential of these was that directed by Thomas Lewis at 
University College Medical School. The commitment to clinical research increased 
during and immediately after the Second World War, so that by 1952 the MRC was 
funding 18 clinical research units at a cost of £375,000 a year.4 These produced a 
cadre of trained clinical investigators and established some momentum which, when 
combined with the new conditions created by the NHS, gave rise to unprecedented 
opportunities for the expansion of clinical research, as explained in the annual report. 
Thus there arose two separate and unrelated reasons for examining the 
provision for clinical research. The first was the growth of scientific 
knowledge, and the supply of trained men, had reached the stage at which 
clinical research could be developed, with confidence, on a scale 
commensurate with the need; the second that the situation arising from the 
creation of a National Health Service required the devising of new 
arrangements to provide the necessary facilities for clinical research.5 
In June 1951, the Standing Medical Advisory Committee of the Ministry of 
Health invited the MRC to enter discussions about future arrangements for clinical 
research in the NHS. These were to be taken forward by a joint sub-committee, 
including representation from the Advisory Committee for Medical Research in 
Scotland and chaired by Sir Henry Cohen (1900-1977).6 At the end of 1952, the 
Secretary of the MRC, Harold Himsworth (1905-1988), advised Treasury that the 
                                                             
1.   Thomson, Vol. 1, 72. Also MH 123/498. 
2.  Cmd. 8876, Report of the Medical Research Council for the year 1951-52, (Committee of 
Privy Council for Medical Research. London: HMSO, 1953), 3-6. 
3.  For a more critical view of the MRC’s approach to clinical research in the inter-war 
period see Bryder, "The Medical Research Council and clinical trials methodologies”. 
4. Itemised in annex to Medical Research in Relation to the National Health Service, report 
to the Advisory Council on Scientific Policy, March 1953, T227/1031. 
5.  Cmd. 8876, 5. 
6.  Eminent medical practitioner, active in the public affairs of the profession. Made Baron 
Cohen of Birkenhead in 1956.  
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sub-committee had reached agreement and was ready to make its recommendations 
to Ministers.1 He enclosed a memorandum setting out a ‘blueprint’ for the future of 
clinical research. With minimal amendment, this was published as a report, usually 
referred to as ‘the Cohen Report’, in 1953.2  The Cohen Report adopted a very broad 
definition of clinical research as encompassing not only studies with patients as their 
subjects but also population-based studies. This was consistent with the view of the 
MRC, which included epidemiology, medical statistics and social medicine in its 
definition of clinical research.3  
Throughout the report, we use the term ‘clinical research’ to imply 
research into the mechanisms and causation of disease, including its 
prevention and cure. Thus, in the sense in which we use the term it covers 
not simply research into patients in hospital but also field studies in 
epidemiology and social medicine and observations in general practice. We 
wish it to be clearly understood that these definitions apply throughout this 
document.4 
The report recommended, as a priority, the setting up of a central organisation for 
clinical research in the form of a clinical research board (CRB) of the MRC. The 
Council was to be the financial authority for centrally-organised clinical research and 
employ researchers working on the projects it funded. The report further 
recommended a scheme for decentralised research at the level of the hospital 
authorities. This was to be funded from NHS allocations or from free monies, the 
availability of which was to be considered when making allocations to hospitals. The 
decentralized scheme was intended to fund only ‘minor projects’ (costing less than 
£1,000), initiated by NHS clinicians. Local research committees, which every 
hospital authority was to set up in agreement with their associated university or 
medical school, would decide which projects to fund. The Ministry of Health was to 
submit an annual report on the decentralised scheme to the CRB.  The advice of this 
board was to be sought on the operation of the scheme and on the use of endowment 
funds for clinical research. It was envisaged that all staff of consultant grade engaged 
                                                             
1.  T 227/1031, Himsworth to Playfair, 11 December 1952. The report was addressed to the 
President of the Council, the Minister of Health and the Secretary of State for Scotland. 
See also Thomson, Vol. 2, 23-26. 
2.  Medical Research Council and Ministry of Health and Department of Health for Scotland. 
Clinical Research in Relation to the National Health Service (London: HMSO, 1953). 
3.  Cmd. 8876, 5. 
4.  MRC etc., Clinical Research in Relation to the National Health Service, para. 5. 
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in major research projects would be employed by the MRC. Staff at lower medical 
grades would be supported through the scheme.  
Treasury officials found the Cohen Report ‘excellent nutriment but rather hard... 
to swallow whole at this time’.1 The difficulty was that the CRB would require an 
initial budget estimated at £50,000 and rising to £250,000 after three or four years. 
The Treasury was taken with the idea of appropriating the endowment funds of 
Boards of Governors in England and Wales to provide a source of funding, following 
practice in Scotland. This was opposed by the Ministry of Health, which anticipated 
uproar from the teaching hospitals. Less predictably, it was also opposed by the Lord 
President, Lord Salisbury.2  Salisbury, representing MRC interests in correspondence 
with the Chancellor, predicted that such a measure would jeopardise the ‘harmonious 
relations’ with teaching hospitals that would be critical to the success of the CRB. He 
argued that any potential funding difficulty should have been anticipated and 
communicated before ‘a very high powered committee of extremely distinguished 
men’ was set to work. He went on to invoke the Council’s UK-wide remit and point 
out that the Scottish Home and Health Department had already agreed to contribute 
to the CRB.3 Treasury officials found themselves out-manoeuvred. An allocation was 
agreed for 1954/5 onwards, but only the base-line cost of £50,000 was added to the 
MRC vote, as a transfer of funds from the NHS budget was anticipated following the 
transfer of clinical research units from Ministry to MRC.4  
The Ministry raised no objections to these proposals and set about finding out 
how much clinical research was happening in the NHS by means of a survey, 
undertaken in 1954. This was the first-ever survey of clinical research in the NHS. It 
asked for returns of expenditure classified between major or minor projects, with a 
break point at £1,000 annual spend. It revealed a commitment to clinical research 
that was modest.5  Total expenditure of £527,000 was forecast for 1953/4, amounting 
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to one eighth of one percent of the hospital revenue budget for England and Wales.1 
Of this, only one third was funded from the Exchequer with the balance coming from 
endowment funds (47 percent) and other external sources (20 percent). Exchequer 
funding was concentrated in the Regional Hospital Boards. Spending from 
endowment funds was, unsurprisingly, concentrated in the teaching hospitals, 
especially in London. The survey revealed considerable variation between hospital 
authorities. The Sheffield Hospitals Board of Governors reported major scheme 
commitments of £19,000 whereas Oxford, Cambridge and Newcastle all reported nil. 
South West Regional Hospital Board reported commitments of £49,500 and North 
West Metropolitan £56,000 whereas East Anglia and South East Metropolitan 
reported nil.2 This variation reflects reliance on local initiative and the absence of a 
national policy for fostering clinical research in the NHS. 
The survey revealed that just ten NHS research units accounted for three quarters 
of total spending. This eclectic group had ‘arisen piecemeal on the initiative of 
different hospital authorities’.3 The Ministry encouraged the MRC to scrutinise the 
units, volunteering the suggestion that some might prove to be ‘a complete waste of 
money’.4 Council-appointed sub-committees undertook visits and triaged all units 
into those that should be taken over in their entirety, those that should be 
reorganised, and those that should be closed.5 A transfer of £120,000 was made from 
the NHS vote to the MRC vote in 1957/8 to allow the latter to take on the costs of 
units in the first two categories (to the extent that these were Exchequer funded - 
several also received support from local endowment funds).6  
In its response to the Cohen Report, the Ministry conceded the principle that all 
major clinical research should be under the control of the Medical Research Council. 
It also co-operated fully in the transfer of the best NHS clinical research units to 
Council management, together with associated funding. The Department’s initial 
response to the new opportunities offered by the NHS was, then, to acquiesce in 
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further reinforcement of the dominance of the health research state pursued by the 
MRC in the inter-war period. 
The politics of modernization and scientific reform 1959 to 1965 
The period between 1959 and 1965 was exceptional in the extent to which science 
and technology took centre-stage in British politics. The politics of modernization 
and scientific reform over this relatively brief period have been examined elsewhere 
and are briefly summarised here only to support some observations about their effect 
on the relationship between Ministry and MRC.1 In 1959, Lord Hailsham (1907-
2001) was appointed to the new office of Minister for Science. Hailsham was already 
Lord President of the Council, in which capacity he was the Cabinet member 
responsible for the research councils. As previously noted, this arrangement satisfied 
the requirement for political accountability that accompanies public funding, but 
without significantly impinging upon scientific self-governance in practice. 2 
Hailsham was sceptical about claims that government should – or could – direct 
science; and saw his role as one of influencing rather than directing.3 Given this 
outlook, he was tolerant of existing arrangements for the oversight of publicly-
funded research and not much inclined towards structural change. 
Other politicians favoured a more dirigiste approach to science policy. These 
included some elements within the Conservative Party, who wanted research to be 
more directed towards industrial development. Opposition to Hailsham came mostly, 
though, from the Labour Party, which provided a more natural home for those who 
saw science as an instrument of the state. Behind these conflicting political positions 
lay a deeper ideological divide, dating back to the 1930s, between advocates of 
scientific freedom and those in the Marxist and humanist traditions who were 
concerned with ‘the social relations of science’.4 As the Labour Party sought to 
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revive its fortunes after defeat in the 1959 general election, it ‘rediscovered the 
theoretical relevance of science to socialism’.1 This was accompanied by a pragmatic 
realisation that a commitment to harness science to the cause of a better society 
would appear modernising and appeal to the electorate. Against this background, 
Harold Wilson (1916-1995) chose to make science and technology a major issue in 
his 1963 campaign for election as party leader. This strategy, having proved its 
worth, was then carried forward into the general election campaign of 1964.2  
Regardless of Hailsham’s personal views, the rising cost of ‘big science’ 
stimulated growing doubts as to the adequacy of existing arrangements. In March 
1962, the Prime Minister appointed a Committee of Enquiry into the Organisation of 
Civil Science chaired by Sir Burke Trend, Cabinet Secretary. ‘The Trend Report’ 
was critical in its views of existing arrangements, concluding that: 
The agencies concerned with the promotion of civil science do not in the 
aggregate constitute a coherent and articulated pattern of 
organisation…the arrangements for co-ordinating Government’s 
scientific effort and for apportioning the available resources between 
agencies on a rational basis are insufficiently clear and precise. 3  
The committee has been described as initiating sweeping reforms.4  Holland suggests 
that Trend was a precursor of Rothschild in challenging the autonomy of the research 
councils.5 However, based on a more detailed investigation, Vig argues that the true 
nature of Trend was that of a ‘limited tidying up exercise’ and that the review 
presented no challenge of any substance to the autonomy of the research councils. 
This was because Hailsham had set pre-conditions. 
…that there be no all-pervasive Whitehall department in charge of 
science; and that the pattern of independent research councils be 
preserved. This position was based partly on convictions about the nature 
of science and partly on his beliefs as to administrative feasibility.6 
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Burke Trend (1914-1987) is described by Hennessy as ‘a natural for the discreet 
back-rooms of Whitehall’, an expert in the art of the possible in public 
administration.1  His committee’s recommendations were carefully crafted to achieve 
rationalisation whilst stopping short of fundamental reform. These recommendations 
were partially implemented before the 1964 general election and then, with some 
amendments, carried forward into the Science and Technology Act of 1965. This 
legislation included changes for the research councils which, on the face of it, 
introduced greater political accountability. The Privy Council committees, to which 
the research councils had nominally been accountable, were disbanded and 
accountability re-directed from the Lord President to the new office of Secretary of 
State for Education and Science.  Research council funding would, in future, be 
routed through the DES rather than coming directly from Treasury, as had previously 
been the case. Regardless of these changes, considerable care was taken to ensure 
that the councils retained their autonomy.  
They remained relatively free from political – or democratic – constraint 
and their members continued to be appointed by co-option or ‘after 
consultation with the President of the Royal Society’. Thus no major new 
principle was introduced by the change.2  
Two new research councils were established in 1965: the Science Research 
Council and National Environment Research Council. The Social Science Research 
Council was also created in that year, although with a different antecedence as social 
sciences research was excluded from the scope of Trend’s enquiry.3 Thus the net 
effect of Trend was to strengthen the research council system on the pre-existing 
model of scientific self-governance. Crucially, the 1965 settlement did next to 
nothing to disturb the relationship between the MRC and the Ministry of Health or to 
challenge the MRC in its modus operandi. 
Unaffected by the great shake-up, except for a mere minor expansion of 
its council, the MRC continued with policy much as before…but 
somehow it seemed less in touch than it had been previously.4  
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This reform period also saw a debate about where to draw the boundaries for 
government departments within the spectrum of education, research and innovation; 
encompassing schools, higher education, basic research, applied research, technology 
development and industrial policy. The Department of Education and Science (DES) 
was set up in 1965 to cover a large part of this spectrum. The solution to its broad 
span of responsibilities was a federal structure, with separate Ministers of State in 
charge of schools, civil science and universities. The DES was thus the first ‘super-
ministry’, establishing a model applied to health and social security in 1968.1 DES 
responsibilities did not, however, extend to technology, which was assigned to the 
new Ministry of Technology. Although this Ministry’s remit expanded dramatically 
over its brief life, it never acquired responsibility for all industrial sectors.2  Other 
government departments remained ‘sponsoring departments’ for related industries.3 
Significantly for its emerging R&D programme, the Ministry of Health was sponsor 
for the medical equipment and supplies industry. 
The politics of modernization and scientific reform between 1959 and 1965 thus 
left the relative positioning of health ministry and MRC, as laid down by the Cohen 
Report, undisturbed. The reform process did not create any new institutional 
pressures for the Council to become more attentive to the interests of the Ministry or 
the operational needs of the NHS. This state of affairs remained fundamentally 
unchallenged by national science policy until Rothschild.  
The character of the health research state before 1965 
The model of the health research adopted during the reconstruction period after 
the First World War was essentially that of the professionalised state. Government 
delegated responsibility for health-related research to the medical profession, 
providing reliable public funding in exchange for a modicum of accountability. The 
Ministry of Health was assigned surveying and statistical analysis, activities that 
would rarely satisfy scientific expectations of originality and generalisability. The 
medical profession was not, however, homogeneous. Within the profession, a 
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scientific elite, which was more closely aligned with life science than with medical 
practice, provided research leadership through the MRC.1 This scientific elite could 
mobilise the support of members of the administrative and political elite when its 
interests were threatened, as demonstrated at intervals from 1913 through to 1964. Its 
leaders favoured laboratory research, which consequently dominated the Council’s 
programme. This was presented as a practical strategy, recognising the obstacles to 
clinical research. However, Fletcher’s contempt for clinicians as scientific leaders 
suggests the existence of a deeper ideological divide, in which laboratory science and 
its practitioners were afforded higher scientific status than clinical researchers.2 
Consequently, as late as the 1950s, clinical science was still in its infancy and 
confined to a small number of MRC and NHS units. Although medical schools were 
becoming more scientific, this happened first in the pre-clinical sciences, especially 
physiology, with the diffusion of ‘scientism’ into the clinical sphere lagging.3 
For its part, the Ministry of Health also adopted the model of the professionalised 
state in its approach to research policy, which was treated as a matter for the medical 
profession and left it in the hands of the Standing Medical Advisory Committee. The 
delegation of policy to this committee is typical of the wider reliance on advisory 
bodies evident in the NHS in the 1950s.4 Such bodies provided a means of accessing 
expertise, developing policy and building consensus. The health care state in the 
1950s was still delegative and permissive, with extensive delegation to local health 
authorities, a point that will be developed further below. Within this governance 
scheme, the Ministry saw no requirement for research policy that could not be 
adequately served through delegation to the medical profession, convened into 
advisory groups, and through reliance on the profession’s primary vehicle for 
research, the MRC.  
By the later years of the 1950s, two external influences had begun to erode this 
scheme: the politics of NHS investment and the actions of actors outside 
government. Although there was no immediate revisiting of the formal relationship 
                                                             
1.  Examples of life sciences include pathology, biochemistry and biology. 
2.  Austoker, Fletcher, 29-30. 
3.  Heaman, St. Mary’s, 265-325. 
4. Charles Webster, The Health Services since the War. Volume 1, Problems of Health Care, 
the National Health Service before 1957 (London: The Stationery Office, 1988), 241-256. 
 103 
 
between Ministry and MRC, these influences did lead to changed ‘facts on the 
ground’ as the Ministry took the first steps that would lead to the emergence of its 
R&D programme over the following decade. Each of these two influences is now 
considered in turn. 
The politics of NHS investment 
Lack of research as political weakness 
The National Health Service Act 1946 conferred on the Minister of Health a duty 
to promote the establishment of a comprehensive health service. It also bestowed a 
historically-determined pattern of service provision marked by considerable local 
variation in quality and adequacy. This was the legacy of the pre-1948 system and its 
attributes: a voluntary hospital sector, shaped by the ‘caprice of charity’; 
considerable variation between local authorities in provision of health services; and 
structural constraints on effective co-ordination between the two sectors.1 The 
financial stringencies of the 1950s meant that historical inequalities remained largely 
unaltered throughout the first decade of the NHS.2 During this period, the Ministry 
fared badly in its dealings with Treasury and the share of public expenditure 
allocated to the health service fell behind other social services.3   
In explaining why this was so, historians have emphasised the political weakness 
of the Ministry of Health.4  Between 1945 and 1951 Health had been a large 
department with an influential Minister, Aneurin Bevan (1897-1960). In 1951, when 
Bevan became Minister of Labour, the Ministry of Health lost its responsibilities for 
housing and local government, half of its staff and the Minister’s seat in the cabinet.5 
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Health became a backwater for politicians and civil servants.1  Ministers came and 
went in rapid succession, with an average term in office of about eighteen months 
between 1951 and 1960. Treasury judgements about departments were built upon the 
quality of individual relationships.2 Prior to 1960 the Treasury did not regard the 
staff of the Ministry as very competent for the challenges faced.3 The outlook of 
many officials had been shaped through dealings with local government and National 
Insurance Committees before 1948. The Treasury wanted a more directive, 
interventionist approach. Instead, the high level of devolution of authority and 
localism deliberately built into NHS structures in 1948 sustained pre-existing 
tendencies towards a more distanced, regulatory style of administration.4   
Treasury scepticism was exacerbated by the Ministry’s lack of knowledge about 
how to improve the NHS and its evident deficiency in the means to acquire, appraise 
and disseminate such knowledge. This diagnosis was shared by other, more 
sympathetic, observers. The Committee of Enquiry into the Cost of the National 
Health Service (‘the Guillebaud Committee’), reporting in 1956, concluded that it 
was impossible to draw any conclusions about relative hospital efficiency in the 
absence of adequate data and without standards against which to measure 
performance.5 The Report recommended ‘the setting up of a Research and Statistics 
Department which would devote the whole of its time to statistical investigations and 
operational research in general, and would consider what information is now lacking 
to the working of the National Health Service and how this information might best be 
produced’.6  Such a department should be ‘constantly engaged in the search for facts 
and information which would enable administrators to make the right decisions for 
the future development of the Service’. It should act as a clearing house for the 
collation and dissemination of relevant knowledge to the NHS authorities.  
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Knowledge, efficiency and investment 
The technical analysis undertaken for the Guillebaud committee demonstrated that 
the level of capital investment in hospitals had fallen compared to pre-war levels, so 
that real-terms spending in 1952/3 was only one third of that in 1938/9. This, it was 
argued, fell far short of the levels needed to renew the NHS estate.1 Based on these 
findings, the committee recommended that capital expenditure be increased to £30 
million a year from 1958/9.2 Regardless of this recommendation, the ‘stringent 
regime of containment’ of NHS expenditure imposed by the Conservatives continued 
after Guillebaud.3 Treasury resistance to a programme of hospital renewal reflected 
unwillingness to accept such expenditure as investment. The Treasury wanted to see 
capital projects yielding revenue savings and was sceptical of Ministry of Health 
claims in this respect, not least because of the dearth of evidence as to what 
investment would yield most efficiency.4 
After Guillebaud, it became increasingly clear that the ability to procure and 
mobilise evidence and knowledge for planning and hospital efficiency was becoming 
a key asset in the political struggle to secure greater investment. Such capability was 
needed to counter deep-seated Treasury scepticism about the Ministry’s competence 
to use additional funds productively. The Ministry was starting from a very low 
baseline in terms of its organisation and policy for research and statistics. Before 
1958, its organisational initiatives had been limited to the establishment of a central 
organisation and methods (O&M) unit and a small statistics branch. Measures to 
improve visibility of comparative performance had been confined to the introduction 
of hospital activity analysis and standardised forms of financial reporting.5  
In 1958, the Minister of Health announced three initiatives for the strengthening 
of analytical and change management capacity within the Ministry and the NHS, 
supplemented by limited use of management consultants. The O&M capacity of the 
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Ministry was to be strengthened; the setting up of an advisory body on management 
efficiency was to be given consideration; and management consultants were to be 
engaged to undertake hospital efficiency studies.1 The focus of these initiatives was 
on the promotion of a range of management techniques with the central goal of 
improving efficiency. In so far as they led to the conclusion that enhanced research 
capacity was needed, this was only as a part of this wider focus and pointed to 
investment in ‘operational research’ rather than medical research. The philosophy of 
the advisory body on management efficiency, when it emerged in 1959, was not on 
externally commissioned studies but on the development of analytical capacity 
within the NHS.2   
In the post-war drive for improved industrial productivity, different approaches 
and disciplines proliferated. ‘Productivity science’ encompassed work study, 
organisation and methods (O&M), operational research, network analysis, systems 
analysis, ergonomics, and value engineering.3 Production engineering, materials 
handling, quality control, human relations and inter-firm comparisons have been 
identified as the preferred technique of American ‘productivity missionaries’, who 
were mobilised through the agency of the Anglo-American Productivity Council.4 In 
the Ministry of Health, interests focused exclusively on just three of these 
disciplines: O&M, work study, and operational research.  
O&M had originally emerged during war-time as a development of the Treasury’s 
‘Investigating Section’. The Select Committee on the Estimates had, in 1946, 
recommended its adoption by all government departments so as ‘to secure maximum 
efficiency in the operation of the government’s executive machinery and, by the 
application of scientific methods to organisation, to achieve economy in cost and 
labour’. This led to the setting up of an O&M unit at the Treasury which then 
spawned similar units in administrative departments, including the Ministry of 
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Health in 1956.1 O&M was concerned with organisational design and ‘the studying 
of administrative and clerical procedures and methods, of office mechanisation and 
equipment, office layouts and working conditions’.2 It had a particular focus on the 
more efficient management and communication of information and automatic data 
processing. In 1958, the Ministry of Health unit was made permanent, enlarged and 
placed under a full-time Assistant Secretary. From 1959 onwards, the Ministry 
authorised the employment of specialists by the hospital authorities. Growth came 
through local O&M units after 1961, rather than through the central unit. By 1963, 
the number of studies nationally had risen to 750.3 By 1964, around 200 trained 
personnel were employed across both the central unit and the hospital service.4  
The National Health Service Advisory Council for Management Efficiency 
(England and Wales), (ACME), was established in 1959 ‘to advise generally on 
measures for improving efficiency in the National Health Service’.5 Under the 
influence of its Chairman, Sir Frank Ewart Smith (1897-1995), ACME promoted 
work study, which combined study of how a job could be undertaken most efficiently 
with the application of techniques designed to establish the time needed for a 
qualified worker to carry out a specified job at a defined level of performance.6  
ACME did not envisage either O&M or work study as being undertaken by 
external experts. The Advisory Council’s goal was that, over time, the NHS would 
become largely self-sufficient in O&M/work study experts and that these disciplines 
would become an integral part of the hospital service.7 Under the influence of 
ACME, the Ministry awarded training contracts for O&M/Work Study Officers to 
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the King’s Fund Administrative College in 1960. The Advisory Council was 
concerned to ensure that expertise in productivity techniques would be diffused 
throughout the NHS because it believed that NHS administrators were unusually 
insular and suffered from ‘managerial inbreeding’.1  
ACME members firmly believed that suitably-trained hospital staff, rather than 
external consultants, should be employed in efficiency studies wherever possible, 
provided they could eventually return to their normal duties. This approach would 
ensure that those who undertook efficiency studies were also, wherever possible, 
responsible for implementation and that the expertise developed was retained within 
the NHS. 
If the development of management efficiency studies in the hospital 
service was to be of value it seemed important that the necessary 
organisation should become an integral part of the service. In this way 
only, would it be possible for hospital managements effectively to install 
and maintain improved methods after the investigations had been carried 
out. This would require trained staff to work as part of the management 
team rather than the temporary employment of investigators not on the 
Regional Board or Hospital Management Committee staff.2 
It followed that management consultants should be used only where there was a 
short-term deficit in capacity. By the same reasoning, ACME did not promote the 
commissioning of research from providers outside the NHS. However, the Advisory 
Council did support the recommendations of Guillebaud for greater use of 
‘operational research’, and it was with its knowledge and consent that the Ministry 
first began to commission research from external contractors: a development that is 
explored in the next chapter. 
The status of operational research (OR) as one of the three favoured efficiency 
techniques meant that its commissioning was viewed as a natural extension of the 
Ministry’s capacity-building for ‘research and statistics’ and as fully aligned with the 
quest for improved efficiency. This, in turn, meant that it was approved by the 
Treasury, which was supportive of the Ministry’s initiatives in the expectation that 
such measures would increase the chances of NHS investment yielding greater 
efficiency. It was not, however, a central plank of the Ministry’s response to 
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criticisms of its lack of analytical capacity, nor was it a priority for ACME. The 
initial focus was rather on the development of O&M and work study, which were 
categorised as ‘management services’ rather than R&D. It was from this initially 
minor role in the quest for efficiency that the departmental R&D programme 
emerged, bolstered by support from a Chief Medical Officer, Godber, who was in 
tune with progressive thinking about ‘medical care’ research.  
Health policy after 1960 
Enoch Powell (1912-1998) was appointed Minister for Health in 1960. As a 
member of the Treasury front bench team that had resigned in 1958, Powell came 
with impeccable credentials on control of public spending.1  Two other critical 
leadership appointments were made in the same year. Sir Bruce Fraser (1910-1993) 
became Permanent Secretary, moving from the Treasury where he had been 
responsible for social services. Webster comments that Fraser’s appointment 
represented a major cultural shift and ‘was an important preparatory step towards 
bringing the Ministry of Health into the Whitehall mainstream’. The transfer of other 
officials from the Treasury to the Ministry also encouraged a more harmonious 
relationship between the two organisations.2 George Godber was promoted to Chief 
Medical Officer, in which role he proved highly influential for the development of 
the R&D programme. Under this refreshed leadership team, the Ministry secured 
commitment to a longer-term hospital building programme, in the form of the 
Hospital Plan.3 As has been thoroughly documented elsewhere, this was an ambitious 
plan to replace the aging and irrationally distributed NHS estate with a network of 
modern, district general hospitals.4  
At first sight, an expansionist programme of new hospital building might appear 
inconsistent with the arrival of a minster committed to the control of public 
expenditure. The Plan included projections, agreed with Treasury, for £500 million 
of capital investment over ten years. There was no contradiction, because capital 
investment was seen by both Powell and the Treasury as a means of containing 
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growth in hospital running costs. Investment in new buildings and equipment would 
allow greater ‘throughput’ of patients, reducing unit costs. In this ‘industrial view’ 
hospital investment was thought of as a measure to promote long-term financial 
control.1 Powell was sufficiently confident of this to volunteer a cap of 2 percent on 
growth in NHS current spending.2 A further strategy for long-term cost containment 
was the promotion of community-based services, as an alternative to hospital care, as 
reflected in the subsequent publication of the less-discussed Health and Welfare 
Plan.3 Local authorities, which provided community-based health and welfare 
services prior to 1974, made returns to inform this plan. The standard was variable, 
reflecting deficiencies in information and analysis. The exercise communicated an 
expectation that all local authority health and welfare departments would, over time, 
move towards conformity with minimum standards.4  
Against this background, the necessity of obtaining better evidence about a wide 
range of issues became even more pressing. The Ministry needed to know much 
more about population needs and the optimal distribution of hospitals and 
community services to balance access and efficiency. It had to decide how to respond 
to new thinking in hospital design and new medical technologies. Its quest for 
efficiency drove interest in the evaluation of supplies, buildings and engineering. 
Control and efficiency 
The Treasury was concerned about control over NHS spending as well as the 
efficiency of the service. As one official put it to the House of Commons Select 
Committee on the Estimates, speaking of the £400 million annual running costs for 
hospitals: ‘there is no sum as large as this which is subject to so little Treasury 
control’.5 Guillebaud had been asked ‘to suggest means, whether by modifications in 
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organization or otherwise, of ensuring the most effective control and efficient use of 
such exchequer funds as may be made available’, but had not convincingly met this 
brief, to the disappointment of Treasury.1 The Select Committee on the Estimates 
pressed in 1958 for an independent enquiry into the control of public expenditure 
and, in response, the Treasury had launched its own committee of enquiry, chaired 
by Lord Plowden. This committee reported in 1961.2  The ‘Plowden Report’ led to 
the establishment of the Public Expenditure Survey Committee (PESC), which was 
to take a cross-government view of spending priorities over a five-year period, a 
departure from the previous process of annual bilateral discussion between Treasury 
and spending departments.3   
Plowden urged greater use of quantitative methods in government and the 
nationalised industries. The committee recommended the development of 
‘management services’, including statistics, costing, accountancy, operational 
research and O&M. The Treasury was to promote the adoption of these techniques 
by government departments and public services ‘both to encourage them and to help 
them in the improvement of efficiency and economy in management’.4 Particular 
attention was paid to the hospital service in this respect.5 As well as recommending 
an expansion in management services in the NHS, the report noted that ‘there may 
perhaps be scope for the use of the techniques generally described as operational 
research for a wide range of problems’.6  
Plowden further encouraged the Department to develop an armamentarium of 
investigative disciplines for the promotion of efficiency and control. As with ACME, 
the committee may have been more encouraging of management services than R&D, 
but there was sufficient support for the latter to create calls for the health research 
state to foster investigation into health services and the effectiveness of medical care. 
The state thus generated its own rationale for greater investment in health research 
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and in new types of research. However, such calls had first come from various actors 
in civil society, and it is to the role of these that the discussion now turns. 
Actors in civil society 
The calls of the Guillebaud Committee for enhanced research and statistics 
capacity at the Ministry of Health were picked up and elaborated by The Acton 
Society Trust (a think-tank with Liberal Party connections). The final report in the 
Trust’s series on Hospitals and the State, published in 1959, concluded that the 
Ministry:  
has not done enough during this initial decade to collect knowledge 
which will provide better guidance for planning in the future – a future in 
which, it is hoped, more generous provision for capital expenditure will 
be available; and...although bold strategic planning may have been 
impracticable, there have been many questions affecting the handling of 
recurrent problems on which Hospital Boards have needed advice based 
on national experience and policy…on such questions the Ministry has 
not been sufficiently helpful. 1 
In an earlier report in the same series, the Trust had explored the realities of planning 
by Regional Hospital Boards. The conclusion was that Boards were lacking 
knowledge on matters as basic as the incidence of disease and wanting guidance on 
all aspects of hospital planning, design and administration. 2  The Acton Society 
Trust acted as an advocate for greater investigative and analytical capacity. Other 
actors beyond government played the same role, including backbench MPs, the 
Royal College of Nursing, and ‘productivity missionaries’ from industry. The 
motivations and interests of these actors were diverse, but they were sufficiently 
aligned to form a loose coalition promoting productivity in the NHS. Their cause was 
eventually institutionalised by the Department through the setting-up of ACME and 
associated measures.3  
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On a more practical level, leadership came from the two charitable foundations 
that occupied a distinctive position in relation to the NHS. This was acknowledged 
by the Acton Society Trust, which argued simultaneously that the government should 
not rely on the charitable sector. 
It is interesting to speculate what knowledge there would be today on 
many important matters affecting practical hospital development if it had 
not been for the work of such institutions as the Nuffield Provincial 
Hospitals Trust, King Edward's Fund, etc. It is right to acknowledge fully 
the value of this contribution from private agencies, but it is not right for 
a national service to rely on this alone.1  
Both the charities named here were established before the NHS to support the 
voluntary hospital sector. After 1948, both had to re-define their roles. For the 
Nuffield Provincial Hospitals Trust (NPHT), in the 1950s and into the early 1960s, 
this meant compensating for the insufficiency of the state in health research. The 
King Edward’s Hospital Fund for London (King’s Fund) took a stance that was more 
aligned with that of ACME in its emphasis on practical knowledge and skills 
development in the NHS workforce.   
The Nuffield Provincial Hospitals Trust 
Of the two charities, NPHT had the most influence over the departmental R&D 
programme because its mission was, from 1948 onwards, focused on research. The 
charity had been founded and endowed by Lord Nuffield in 1939 with the aim of 
improving the co-ordination of voluntary hospitals outside London. Its original plans 
included the creation of regional and area councils to co-ordinate services. These 
plans were suspended at the request of the Ministry in 1941 and became redundant 
once government assumed responsibility for co-ordination of health services through 
the NHS. The Trust then redefined its role as making ‘a special contribution as an 
independent body, co-operating with government agencies, in the field of enquiry 
and research into practically all aspects of health services’. Its aim was to ‘seek the 
essential facts by survey and research over a fairly wide field’ and, based on 
hypotheses generated by such studies, to support innovations in health care that could 
be subject to experimental development and evaluation. The ultimate goal was ‘real 
                                                             
1.  Acton Society Trust, Creative Leadership in a State Service, 26. 
 114 
 
and useful knowledge’ that could be applied by the NHS for the improvement of 
health services. 1 
The ways in which the charity pursued this goal changed over time. During the 
1950s, the Trust convened and funded multi-disciplinary study groups. Four studies 
were completed by 1955: an investigation into the function and design of hospitals, a 
study of nursing, a costing study, and a study of ‘good general practice’. After 1955, 
the Trust maintained a small in-house operational research group, which published 
reports on sterile services between 1957 and 1962. It also maintained activities in 
architectural research and industrial health through other members of the Nuffield 
charity family, the Nuffield Foundation and Nuffield Health and Social Services 
Fund. 2  
NPHT made grants in parallel with these activities. In the 1940s, it endowed 
university chairs in social medicine at Oxford and Birmingham. Throughout the 
1950s, increasing numbers of grants were made for investigation into aspects of 
health services. Most grants in this decade were made to statutory NHS bodies: 
RHBs and local authorities. It was rare for grants to be made to Boards of Governors, 
because NHS endowment funds were available to these bodies (the exception to this 
was Oxford, where the NPHT was founded and based until 1962). University-based 
research was also funded, but on a smaller scale.  Grants were made to academic 
units that went on to become significant suppliers of HPSSR to the Department in the 
1960s and 1970s. These included the Department of Social Medicine, Birmingham; 
the Department of Clinical Medicine, Oxford; the Department of Social 
Administration, Manchester; and the Nuffield Centre for Health Services Studies, 
Leeds.3  
In 1956, the Trust consulted universities, medical schools and NHS bodies on its 
future direction. This exercise revealed a consensus view that NPHT could make the 
greatest contribution to the NHS through grant-making for health services research as 
‘there was at that time no discernible government research policy for health care’.4 
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This finding prompted greater commitment to grant-making. In-house activity was 
wound down, with the OR unit disbanded in 1962. The Trust also began to shift the 
weight of its grant-making away from the NHS and towards universities. According 
to McLachlan, ‘it was already evident…by 1960 that Health Service Research had to 
be encouraged and that the Universities were virtually the only institutions in which 
research units could be sited’. A more pragmatic rationale for supporting university-
based research was presented by the quinquennial review system of the University 
Grants Council, which provided a mechanism for continuation of funding once a 
research group was established. The Trust’s strategy was to fund health services 
research groups for up to five years in the expectation that longer-term funding 
would be secured through the quinquennial review process, assuming the group had 
used its seed-corn funding to good effect. The primary intention was not to 
strengthen university research per se but rather to increase national capacity to 
produce research that would be of value to the NHS. Consequently, ‘it became 
normal procedure in relation to grants to try and associate the hospital authorities 
with a unit in a university carrying out a particular piece of research’.1 The Ministry 
reinforced this approach by co-funding some projects with the NPHT.  
The emergence and growth of service-relevant research was thus fostered by 
NPHT grant-making. So too was university and NHS capacity to undertake such 
research. Until the early 1960s, this was an activity in which the NPHT was clearly 
compensating for state insufficiency. The Trust recognised, however, that its funding 
capacity was limited and, like the Acton Society Trust, advocated a departmental 
programme, recognizing that ‘the scale and the cost of research deemed necessary 
made it inevitable that the Government had to come strongly into the field’. The 
Trust acknowledged that government-sponsored research might ‘inhibit boldness of 
line and candour in comment’ but put this to one side, partly on the grounds of the 
scale of spending required but also because ‘no organisation can afford to dispense 
with research as part of its managerial function’.2  
In addition to in-house research, grant-making and advocacy, NPHT came to play 
a role that McLachlan described as ‘intelligence’. This was based on the conclusion 
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that ‘the best policy would be for the Trust to act more and more as an independent 
agent for the brokerage and development of ideas and for the encouragement of even 
sharper critiques of underlying concepts’.1 The intelligence role was discharged 
through the organisation of seminars and forums; through dissemination of seminar 
proceedings and research findings; and through the convening of private discussions 
between persons of influence. McLachlan memorably characterises the organisation 
as being both ‘institute and impresario’.2 His own talents as a networker and 
influencer have not been fully documented, but were evidently considerable and 
honed over three decades. Holland includes McLachlan in his honour roll of 
‘pioneers of health service research’, saying that ‘it is impossible to overestimate the 
contribution that he made to the promotion of HSR in the UK’.3 
In summary, during the 1950s NPHT compensated for state insufficiency through 
direct involvement in operational research. By the early 1960s it had withdrawn from 
this activity and was more focused on grant-making, typically using a co-funding 
model with the NHS, and its ‘intelligence role’. Initially, this was a response to the 
opportunities presented by the expansion of the University sector. Later, it also 
reflected a recognition that the Department was playing a growing role in research 
commissioning. The NPHT thus changed its preferred mode of operation as the 
health research state expanded its activities. This agility allowed the charity to most 
effectively complement the activities of the state.  
The King’s Fund 
The King’s Fund also acted in ways that supported the growth of investigative 
activity in the NHS. It did not, however, share the Trust’s conviction that 
departmental intervention in R&D was desirable. Like NPHT, the Fund had to re-
define its role after 1948. The NPHT was recently established at the birth of the NHS 
and, because of the War, had never had the opportunity to pursue its original plans. 
In contrast, the King’s Fund had been making grants to supplement the resources of 
the London voluntary hospitals for half a century. Energies in the 1950s were 
directed towards the problem of how to re-interpret this role in an era of state 
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provision. The outcome was a policy of grant-making to complement Exchequer 
funding.1 This included some funding of investigations, but only through in-house 
projects and as part of a wider programme of grant-making. 
The Fund’s annual report for 1958 sets out a cautious response to calls for an 
improvement in the research capacity of the Ministry of Health. The report 
acknowledges that ‘in the wider field of medico-social and economic problems 
affecting the country as a whole there is certainly a need for continuing research’. 
But, it goes on to argue, there remained a host of practical questions relating to 
hospital efficiency and patient care that would not best be served by the creation of a 
central research organisation.   
A great deal is being done in these fields by individual hospitals and 
related organisations, though the range of investigation is not yet as wide 
or as deep as it should be. The success of this type of enquiry depends 
upon the wisdom and experience of practising hospital officers rather 
than upon the technical ability of specialists in a central research unit or 
laboratory, and direct central control of such practical work is unlikely in 
the long run to achieve as good results as the encouragement of 
individual initiative at hospital level, and the promotion of research by 
independent organisations as well as by the Ministry. 2   
More effective methods of collating and disseminating ‘factual information’ on best 
practice were seen as more promising than central control of research. The report 
concludes that the Fund could help in two ways. The first would be to provide 
practical support to hospitals projects to improve standards of working efficiency and 
patient care. Support would be provided through the Fund’s staff colleges and its 
various advisory services and, in some cases, the provision of grants. The second 
would be the provision of a clearing-house for the collection and distribution of 
information. In another significant contrast with NPHT, it was not Fund policy to 
make grants to external bodies for research.3  
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Contrasting views of the health research state 
The actors beyond government discussed above shared a common understanding 
of the insufficiency of the state. They also shared a common commitment to 
improved health service productivity as a means of improving the scope and quality 
of services provided. Their differing approaches to achieving these goals reflected 
contrasting views about how the health research state should develop. The King’s 
Fund saw the health research state as mirroring the health care state as they knew it, 
i.e. decentralised and delivered by organisations that enjoyed a high degree of 
autonomy. In this there was a degree of projection of their ideal of the health care 
state, to which the Fund clung in the 1950s, as one in which voluntarism continued to 
play a significant role.1 A commitment to practical knowledge and the strengthening 
of analytical capacity within the NHS was compatible with this ideal. The idea of a 
strong, central state commissioning research from independent contractors was not. 
Overall, these views were shared by the members of ACME, which included several 
hospital authority representatives, although this committee proved benignly 
supportive of the Ministry’s move into the commissioning of operational research.  
In contrast, NPHT envisaged the emergence of a health research state in which the 
centre took a leading role in both undertaking and commissioning service-relevant 
research. In the absence of such leadership, the Trust funded such research itself, 
most often in partnership with the NHS. Once such leadership began to emerge, the 
Trust was content to continue working in partnership with the Ministry, as well as the 
NHS. Eventually, the departmental programme became large enough to begin 
withdrawal from grant-making, a development that will be considered later. NPHT, 
under McLachlan, appears to have taken it as axiomatic that the kind of research that 
it wanted to promote would never be central to the programme of the MRC. Its 
strategy, therefore, was to encourage the emergence of a departmental programme as 
a second centre of gravity within the health research state. 
Concluding discussion 
The evidence presented in this chapter demonstrates that the MRC was the 
dominant force in the health research state prior to 1965. The Council had 
aggressively sought hegemony since its earliest days and, in this quest, largely 
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prevailed. Consequently, there was very limited engagement in R&D by the Ministry 
of Health. The revisiting of the relationship through the Cohen review, formally 
reinforced the Council’s position and the national science policy reforms of 1959 to 
1965 did little to alter the distribution of power. To achieve and sustain its 
dominance, the MRC was consistently able to draw upon the support of a scientific 
and political elite. The same support allowed it to achieve a high level of autonomy 
from political control and scientific self-governance, despite its almost total reliance 
on public funding. In the minds of MRC insiders, all of this was justified by an 
internalist view of science, in which only the scientific community could legitimately 
influence the research agenda and evaluate research outputs. Determination of 
research priorities should be untainted by considerations of ‘usefulness’. No-one 
expresses these attitudes better than Thomson when he says of proposals to subjugate 
the MRC to the Ministry of Health in the reconstruction period. 
The Committee had already achieved independent power, in its scientific 
discretion, to frame and execute its programme for the advancement of 
knowledge; even a suspicion of bureaucratic control or political 
expediency would have destroyed the Committee’s authority and have 
lost it the sympathetic co-operation of scientific men.1 
Neo-pluralist and democratic elite theorists might view such MRC dominance as 
benign; an aspect of the professionalised state that served the public interest because 
it guaranteed standards for publicly-funded medical science and protected the 
scientific community from political interference. A more critical interpretation might 
see the MRC as an institutional vehicle for the capture of public resources by a 
medical scientific elite. This elite was invested in laboratory-based, curiosity-driven 
investigation. In this interpretation, the MRC in this period represents a highly-
developed form of professional monopoly as dominant structural interest. From this 
perspective, the battles between the MRC and the Royal Colleges appears as strife 
between segments of the dominant profession or, to use Alford’s terms, as ‘conflicts 
of interest groups within a dominant structural interest’.2 Whether a neo-pluralist or 
an elitist interpretation is preferred must ultimately rest on normative expectations of 
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the social relations of science and more practical judgements about the relevance to 
societal needs of the research councils’ outputs.  
From the late 1950s onwards, new influences began to undermine the assumptions 
upon which MRC dominance of the health research state rested. The politics of NHS 
investment and efficiency created an imperative for a more practical, service-relevant 
kind of systematic knowledge than the MRC was likely to offer, at least at the scale 
required. For some stakeholders, this meant an investment in management expertise, 
bringing the industrial productivity movement into the health care state. For others, 
most notably the NPHT, it meant the fostering of new kinds of research through grant 
making and through encouragement of government to enter the arena as a research 
commissioner. 
The pace of change before 1965 was slow, and this erosion of the basis for MRC 
dominance is more easily perceived in retrospect than in would have been at the time. 
Calls for greater analytical capacity at the Ministry of Health placed more emphasis 
on non-academic systematic investigations - statistics, accounting and productivity 
techniques – than on formal research. When bodies like the Guillebaud Committee or 
ACME used terms like ‘research and statistics’ or ‘operational research’ they did so 
in a pre-academic context. Tentative moves by the Ministry to build or sponsor 
additional capacity for research would have been interpreted as falling within its 
remit for surveys and statistical analysis. The extent to which Trend, for all its 
trappings of reform, left the scientific self-governance of the research councils 
largely undisturbed, would further have fuelled complacency.  
This chapter has focused on the formation and subsequent development of the 
health research state. Some additional discussion within the ‘exchanges’ analytical 
theme will introduce some concepts and arguments that recur in later chapters. The 
internalist perspective of the MRC led it to follow a model of research production 
and utilisation that was ‘knowledge-driven’. In this model, ‘the duties of scientists 
are to respond to a specific and vocational mission that is the collective production of 
an incremental body of disinterested knowledge’.1 New knowledge has intrinsic 
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value that can only be assessed in relation to the existing stock of knowledge. Such 
assessment can only be undertaken by scientific peers. The knowledge-driven model 
is often coupled to the linear model of research and development, in which basic 
research feeds applied science, which in turn feeds development and eventual 
practical application.1 Using this model, investment in basic science can be justified 
as the first stage in a flow from discovery through to innovation.2 Although 
committed to knowledge-driven science, the use of the linear model was potentially 
double-edged for the MRC. If medical science is supported by the state because the 
state expects tangible benefits in the form of better medical care then the state might 
reasonably conclude that a greater share of public funding should be committed to 
applied research and development, and a lesser share to basic science. But to accept 
such arguments, and re-balance its programme accordingly, risked undermining the 
authority of the MRC, which rested on the prestige of basic science. In response to 
this conundrum, the MRC developed a line of argument that was dismissive of the 
distinction between pure and applied research. Thomson is the most explicit 
spokesperson for such views as they prevailed in the 1950s and beyond. 
From time to time, the counsels of research organisations are vexed by 
considerations, usually of extraneous origin, involving a distinction 
between ‘pure’ and ‘applied’ research…Men of science themselves are 
apt to find little reality in such a distinction, and less utility in trying to 
draw it. Experience shows that the results of research promoted in the 
general pursuit of knowledge may have quite unforeseen utilitarian 
applications, possibly of immediate value; and on the other hand that the 
results of an ad hoc investigation may add to the general store of 
knowledge.3 
The MRC’s attitude towards research utilisation followed from this line of 
argument. The Council was not much interested in trying to demonstrate the practical 
benefits of specific projects or programmes, preferring to draw attention to the 
general advance of medicine and disregarding questions about how far this was 
driven by formal research and how far by other forms of systemic investigation or 
innovation. 
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Any account of achievements in clinical research is bound to be 
misleading unless the reader bears in mind that every spectacular advance 
depends on a mass of unspectacular work, all of which has been 
indispensable to the final result.1  
This outlook shaped exchanges in research which were characterised by the 
patronage of promising researchers by committees of medical scientists with 
established reputations. Grant-making was not accompanied by expectations of 
specific outcomes or even of immediate ‘usefulness’. Research questions were 
defined by researchers. This created an institutional culture which was not obviously 
compatible with the problem-driven research agenda of a government department. 
Nevertheless, the Department looked to MRC for organisational models as it began 
to build its own research organisation
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6. Before Rothschild: 1961 to 1973 
 
We did not start with a ‘masterplan’. Our approach, like that of the 
MRC in developing biomedical research, was empirical. Nor did we 
theorise in advance about the definition of health services research. We 
were prepared, for a beginning, to initiate or support any sufficiently 
useful project or programme with a precise and practical relevance to 
the operations of the NHS, that is to better care of patients or better use 
of resources, within a time scale of the next five to ten years as well as 
a limited number which could be expected to be reasonably fruitful in 
the development of research methods.1  
 
Kogan and Henkel describe the period before 1974 as the ‘golden age’ of the 
programme.2 This was an era of rapid growth in the Department’s R&D budget, 
which rose from a near-zero base in 1960 to £13.3 million, or just under four percent 
of all civil R&D spending, by 1973. The emergence of a research imperative, 
stimulated by the politics of NHS investment, has been explored in chapter five. The 
persistence of this imperative sustained growth throughout the ‘golden age’, while 
other developments in health and social care reinforced a consensus that more 
research was needed. Such developments ranged from the emergence of new medical 
technologies to heightened concern for disadvantaged and vulnerable patient groups. 
In this chapter, the focus is shifted away from external forces and towards 
institutional responses, examining how the Department organised itself and engaged 
with other actors to achieve a growth dynamic. The chapter’s principal themes are 
the elaboration of the health research state and the organisational forms and 
processes adopted. The role of the administrative medical elite at the Department is 
prominent, but the circumscribing of medical interests by generalist civil servants is 
also considered. The consequences of a rapidly growing departmental programme for 
relations with the MRC are further examined and the argument that this was not seen 
as a threat before Rothschild is developed. An examination of the Department’s 
engagement with a researcher community that was itself expanding and becoming 
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more differentiated is placed within the ‘exchanges’ theme, demonstrating the 
importance of the supply-side in shaping the programme. The identity of ‘the 
customer’, and of the role of the departmental bureaucracy in facilitating exchanges 
between researchers and the end users of research, or their proxies, are also explored.  
Organisation for research and development 
Administrative structures 
In the late 1950s, expectations of greater analytical capacity were linked to the 
politics of NHS investment. Once course was firmly set towards the Hospital Plan, 
the Treasury became even more concerned about the capabilities of the Ministry of 
Health. The Plan was to be a major exercise in comprehensive rational planning, and 
it was by no means clear that the Ministry was adequately equipped for such a task.  
In early 1961, Treasury staff undertook an inspection of staffing in the two Hospital 
Services (HS) divisions. These combined general regional with specialist national 
responsibilities. The conclusion was that ‘the two divisions are not fully equipped to 
tackle effectively the probable increase in the load of work expected to arise from the 
hospital building programme and the need to take action to promote efficiency and 
economy in the running of hospitals’.1 The Ministry was quick to exploit this 
perception, arguing that more staff were needed to develop guidance for the hospital 
authorities on building, engineering, supplies and equipment. Additional staff were 
also needed to follow up on statistical returns and develop ‘yardsticks’ for the 
comparative assessment of efficiency. A working party was looking at resource 
allocation to hospital authorities, and this required more administrative support. 
‘These activities’, the Ministry concluded, ‘together with the use of O&M in the 
hospital service, we want to bring together under one Under-Secretary, with the 
pursuit of efficiency and cost control as his primary responsibility’.2 These 
arguments were persuasive because they spoke directly to the Treasury’s twin pre-
occupations: efficiency and control. The Treasury debated the exact structure 
required because, as one official revealingly put it, ‘the quality of Ministry of Health 
staff is not good enough to allow them the luxury of lack of organisational clarity’.3 
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Regardless of some trimming of the proposed establishment, the Treasury was 
basically supportive of a new division in the hope that it would ‘get the running costs 
of hospitals under better control’.1 Against this background, the new division, 
Hospital Services 3 (HS3), was established during 1961. 
HS3, headed by Under-Secretary R. Gedling, was not allocated any regional 
responsibilities and so could focus solely on national issues. The new division was 
established with six branches. Two were committed to supplies policy and 
procurement (supplies A and B). Two more were responsible for the hospital 
building programme (A and B).  Branch C was responsible for the O&M service and 
for ‘studies of operational aspects of hospital and Regional Hospital Board work’. 
The responsibilities of a final branch (D) included ‘sponsoring and co-ordinating of 
experiments and operational research’ and ‘collation of information regarding good 
practice’. This branch would also look after the Advisory Council for Management 
Efficiency, which up to this point had lacked executive support.2 Branch D receives 
special mention in the annual report of the Ministry for 1961. 
In the course of the year a new Branch was set up at the Ministry with the 
aim of furthering good practice in the hospital sector. The aim of the 
branch is to find out and make known good management practice in each 
department of the hospital service; to keep in touch with good practice in 
industry in this country and in hospitals in other countries; to disseminate 
information; to encourage and sponsor experiments and to bring their 
results, whether successful or not, to general notice; to undertake studies 
of particular hospital activities; and to sponsor operational research 
where the best current practice does not meet the need efficiently.3 
Branch D was led by John Cornish, a Principal Executive Officer (the most senior 
grade of the executive class). Other branch heads were Assistant Secretaries, 
members of the senior administrative class. Regardless of this disparity in status, 
Cornish is credited by both Cohen and Holland as having exercised considerable 
influence over the developing R&D programme. Holland also mentions that he 
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brought practical knowledge of OR to the Department, gained through wartime 
service with The Admiralty.1  
The remit for HS3 was the hospital service, but the need for research extended to 
community-based services. This became more evident as the Ministry sought 
information from local authorities to inform the Health and Welfare Plan. In time, the 
Department came to see that ‘it was neither wise nor practicable to apply the 
boundaries of the three statutory parts of the service to research’.2 Consequently, 
R&D administration was centralised in 1966 within a newly-created Statistics and 
Research (S&R) division. This was placed under the direction of Under-Secretary 
Wolf Rudoe, previously Chief Statistician at the Board of Trade. The remit of S&R 
was as follows. 
The collection, analysis, interpretation and publication of statistics of all 
branches of the National Health Service. The control and development of 
research (other than that of a medical, architectural or engineering 
nature), Central O&M Unit studies of the administrative and operational 
aspects of hospital and other Health Service Work. The use of Computers 
in the National Health Service.3 
S&R was built around the previously existing statistics division of the Department. 
Two branches of HS3 were transferred into the new division, HS3-C (O&M) and 
HS3-D (research). Cornish remained head of the research branch, which became 
SR4. In addition, a new branch was created to deal with computer policy and 
development.4 In 1968, following the creation of the DHSS, the research 
management team of the former Ministry of Social Security was bolted onto S&R as 
a further branch.5 The inclusion of supplies and equipment in HS3 was short-lived, 
with this function moved back into a re-born Supply Division in 1964.6 
S&R was positioned as a ‘central, co-ordinating division for all research, 
including medical research’.7 It represented the fulfilment, after a ten-year interval, 
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of the Guillebaud committee’s recommendation of a central research and statistics 
department. However, S&R never acquired a comprehensive mandate for R&D. The 
lead for building and engineering research remained with the HS division. Supplies 
and equipment research also remained under separate management in the Supply 
division. Medical research was administered by SR4 but led by the medical staff of 
the Department under arrangements that are discussed in more detail below. An 
R&D Committee (R&DC) was set up in April 1967 to achieve greater co-ordination 
across these organisational boundaries. Its terms of reference include reference to 
‘the programme’, conceived of as a unitary activity. Actual administrative 
arrangements may have remained somewhat more fragmented, but the programmatic 
intent was clear. 
To advise on the content of the programme of research and development 
to be sponsored by the department and on any matters arising from its 
compilation and Development and to keep it continuously under review.1 
The establishment of HS3-D in 1961; of the S&R division in 1966; and of R&DC 
in 1967 represents the emergence and incremental development of an administrative 
bureaucracy for a co-ordinated R&D programme. But to fully explain the breadth of 
the programme in the 1960s, the role of the medical civil service must be considered. 
Medical input 
As has been shown, the origins of HS3-D lay in concerns about efficiency and 
control. Its initial remit was for operational research, related to these twin goals, and 
did not extend to medical matters. S&R was set up to work across organisational 
boundaries, yet medical research remained officially outside its purview. Medical 
leadership was the additional ingredient needed before ‘service-orientated medical 
research’ could emerge as a significant stream of commissioning.2 To appreciate why 
this was so, it is necessary to consider two closely-connected aspects of context. The 
first of these is the doctrine of clinical autonomy. The second was the existence of 
parallel medical and administrative structures in the Department. 
In the lead-up to the 1946 NHS Act, the prospect of restrictions to professional 
autonomy had been one of the principal arguments of the British Medical 
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Association against the proposed nationalisation of healthcare. To defuse this 
argument, the government agreed to abide by the principle of clinical autonomy, 
even though doctors themselves subsequently struggled to explain exactly what this 
meant in practice.1  Harrison argues that there was little challenge to the doctrine 
between 1948 and 1982 and that it co-existed with the commitment to efficiency. 
Policy statements were careful never to imply that doctors themselves needed to 
become more efficient whilst at the same time arguing that efficiency in 
administration would free up more resources for medical care.2 The pursuit of 
operational efficiency in the environment within which clinical practice took place 
was legitimate for management. In contrast, the pursuit of efficiency within clinical 
practice itself was reserved for the medical profession. Medical leadership was 
essential for any research into medical practice - not just for expertise but also for 
legitimacy. 
The medical civil service operated in parallel with the administrative service, 
reporting to the Chief Medical Officer (CMO) through its own hierarchy. Equivalent 
arrangements existed for dental and nursing staff, although with much smaller 
establishments. Parallel administrative and professional/specialist hierarchies were 
quite normal in the civil service in this period because of the career class system. The 
rigidities of this system necessitated cumbersome parallel structures to bring together 
the range of generalist and specialist knowledge needed for effective public 
administration. The convention of ‘the precedence of the lay administrator’ meant 
that responsibility for policy, financial control, and the management of departmental 
business was reserved for generalist administrator classes. The specialist classes were 
advisory, except where the management of specialist teams was involved.3  A 
parallel structure was, therefore, not remarkable in itself but the Ministry of Health 
was unusual in the size of its dominant specialist class, medicine, and the status of 
the head of this class. Under agreements originally reached in 1919, the CMO was 
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granted pay and status equal to that of the Permanent Secretary, including direct 
access to the Minister.1 Godber was firmly committed to a sizeable medical 
establishment, ensuring that the profession remained in a position to influence policy, 
whilst remaining unencumbered by administrative tasks.2 
Cohen tells us that, on the professional side, a ‘small medical research section’ 
was set up in 1962 to promote ‘service-orientated medical research’ and that in 1967 
resources for R&D were placed ‘under the joint management of the Medical 
Research Branch’ and SR4.3 Neither section nor branch appear in internal or 
published directories, which detail the medical staff only by grade prior to 1974. The 
explanation is that the medical staff were not organised into clearly defined 
organisational units like the administrative staff but were instead assigned advisory 
responsibilities within comparatively loose structures. Leadership for medical 
research was assigned to Cohen, who relied on the administrative structures under 
Cornish for administration.4 However, Cohen was not in a position of direct authority 
over Cornish, who reported to Rudoe. These working arrangements were significant 
for the development of the programme. They provided for steerage of medical 
research, located safely under the direction of the medically qualified, and for 
operational research, under the direction of administrative civil servants. However, 
because administrative and medical staff worked together it was possible to blur the 
boundaries and commission work that did not fit neatly into either category. Cohen 
refers to the existence of an informal team that drove the development of the 
programme throughout the 1960s: ‘a few people who worked closely together 
whatever their formal affiliations in the Department’.5 This team was comprised of 
Cohen himself, the most senior member, and four others. Dr James Maxwell Glover 
(‘Max’) Wilson (1913-2006) worked with Cohen on the medical side.6 In 1968, he 
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was joint author of a seminal report on screening, commissioned by the World 
Health Organisation.1 Cohen and Wilson were supported by Dr Gillian Ford, who 
joined the Ministry as a trainee medical officer in 1965.2 On the administrative side, 
the team was led by John Cornish, assisted by Chief Executive Officer Leslie Best. 
This informal team brought a catholic approach and an openness to interdisciplinary 
studies. 
The quality of leadership for research within the medical civil service, and the 
attention paid to research, depended ultimately on the Chief Medical Officer. George 
Godber persuaded Richard Cohen to move to the Department from his position as 
Second Secretary of the MRC in 1962. Cohen is described by those who knew him 
as ‘a highly literate scientist, with a reputation as a wit and a raconteur’.3 According 
to Holland, ‘Cohen was the individual who put in place the necessary organisation 
for the research programme within the Department of Health and was trusted by 
those in Government, in universities and in research councils so that the enterprise 
became successful’.4 In a similar vein, Cohen’s obituary in the Times tells us that his 
appointment as first Chief Scientist at the DHSS in 1972 was ‘the culmination of his 
achievement over ten years in developing its research programme’. If read without 
sufficient understanding of the parallel professional and administrative structures in 
place, such valedictory praise might lead us to imagine that Cohen was in sole and 
executive charge of the programme. This was not the case. Medical and non-medical 
interests were co-ordinated through the R&DC, which was chaired by F. W. 
Mottershead, the Deputy Secretary senior to Rudoe. Projects could be authorised by 
either Cohen or Rudoe (or Wilson and Cornish acting under their delegated 
authority) but in all cases such authorisation was subject to formal approval given by 
the administrative staff of S&R. The Deputy Secretary was the arbiter where 
agreement could not otherwise be reached. 5 Later, these arrangements were changed 
so that joint authorisation of projects by both Cohen and Rudoe was required in all 
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cases.1 These observations are not made to belittle Cohen’s influence but rather to 
point out that he was working within a structure that required agreement between 
medical and administrative leadership and ultimately reserved critical formal powers, 
such as the power to commitment funds, for the latter. It can be inferred, therefore, 
that Cohen drew on resources beyond pure position power to influence the emerging 
R&D programme. Prominent among these was intellectual leadership, as is evident 
from the esteem of his peers and the perspicacity of his writing. Equally important, 
perhaps, was his ability to work creatively with administrative staff for the fostering 
of cross-disciplinary, service-relevant research.  
Customers for research 
Prior to the setting up of S&R in 1967, research projects could, at least in theory, 
be initiated in any of the divisions of the Ministry of Health. The onus was on each 
division to identify and address its own knowledge requirements. Putting to one side 
any questions about how the Ministry fulfilled its role as proxy customer for the 
NHS, this arrangement appears, on the face of it, to be perfectly functional. In 
practice, there were two significant problems. The first was that the resources 
available to divisions varied greatly. The hospital service was in a privileged 
position. It had, after 1961, a dedicated bureaucratic resource for research 
commissioning in the form of HS3-D. From 1963 onwards, HS3-D controlled the use 
of the vote for ‘medical, social and operational R&D’. It was also able to top-slice 
the hospital revenue and capital budgets to fund research projects, as it did for special 
medical developments and the experimental computer programme. HS3-D, and later 
SR4, had the further advantage of flexibility in drawing on either of these votes, as 
circumstances dictated.2  In comparison, the research interest of the EC and LA 
divisions (which dealt with general practice and local authority health and welfare 
services respectively) were hindered by the lack of dedicated funding and 
administrative resources. Consequently, comparatively little research was 
commissioned in these fields.3 For example, ambitions to develop a Health Centre 
for the specific purpose of evaluation were frustrated by the withholding of capital 
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for such purposes.1 The second problem was simply that too many pressing topics 
either cut across divisional boundaries or fell between divisions.  
In principle, it is for the divisions to put forward their own proposals for 
research in support of their administrative responsibilities, but in practice 
this system has not always operated satisfactorily. Many 
problems…concern more than one division or fall between divisional 
responsibilities; some branches, under general pressure of work, award 
research a low priority. Consequently, the stimulus for projects has 
usually come from sources other than the divisions eventually assigned 
sponsorship responsibilities, and their interest has been lukewarm.2 
The principal source of stimulus for projects, other than divisions, was the ‘informal 
team’, working on a discretionary basis with limited oversight and growing budgets. 
Prior to its dissolution in 1966, ACME also endorsed research into management 
practice and hospital operations.3 The exact mix of inputs varied between projects. 
At a meeting of the R&DC in July 1967, Cohen estimated that three quarters of live 
projects had been initiated by the informal team, rather than originating with 
divisions. For this working mode, personal connections and networks were pivotal.4 
The style of working before 1967 reflected this requirement and might best be 
described as ‘enlightened patronage’.5 
From 1967 onwards, the R&DC introduced a more structured approach, codified 
in internal guidance. This sought to regulate exchanges by defining three roles within 
the health research economy: sponsor, agent and administrator.6  The ‘branch or 
division with the principal interest in the subject or service under study’ was to act as 
the sponsor. The sponsor was to consider the implications of embarking upon the 
project and decide on the action to be taken based on the research findings. This was 
an attempt to get divisions to take responsibility for identifying their research needs. 
The identification of sponsors for all projects became an imperative for the R&DC, 
                                                             
1. MH 166/974, R&DC, meeting notes, 28 Match 1968. For the wider context, see Michael 
Ryan, “Health Centre Policy in England and Wales,” British Journal of Sociology, 19, no. 
1, (1968): 34-46. 
2.  MH 166/973, Research and Development. 
3.  MH 166/255, Sponsorship within the Ministry for Research Projects, 2 December 1966. 
4.  Interview, Gillian Ford 
5.  All interviewees involved in this period immediately recognised this characterisation 
when it was put to them. 
6.  MH 199/973, Appendix to EN 68/67  
 133 
 
which assigned sponsors retrospectively to projects that had not actually been 
initiated by divisions. However, the guidance acknowledged that projects might still 
be researcher-initiated, in which case a sponsor would have to be found after the 
event. For health and welfare research, there was also a pragmatic acceptance that 
there would be a continuing role for S&R in the initiation of projects, as the divisions 
could not always be relied upon to be sufficiently pro-active.1 It follows that the mere 
identification of a sponsor in project listings cannot be assumed to represent genuine 
divisional engagement. 
The agent was defined as the researcher or research organisation undertaking the 
project. This might be an in-house resource but, given the scarcity of these in the 
health department, it would more often be ‘a university, research institute, 
professional body, or hospital or other health service authority to whom a grant is 
made’.2 The ‘administrator’ was the intermediary between sponsors and agents, 
assisting the former in the development of a research specification, managing the 
process of finding researchers, assessing proposals, overseeing progress, undertaking 
routine administration and resolving problems.  
S&R’s eagerness to identify sponsors can be related to an underlying question that 
was, by this time, beginning to weigh more heavily as final reports from early 
commissions began to flow into the Department. How was this research to be used? 
The remit of HS3-D had included ‘collation of information regarding good practice’, 
which was discharged through the production of annual catalogues of hospital 
studies. However, this was an exercise in which HS3-D was acting as little more than 
a directory provider and did not concern itself with the active dissemination of 
findings. In any event, for locally-initiated studies, these might not be made known 
to the Ministry. In the early months of S&R, Rudoe produced a paper making the 
case for a co-ordinating committee in which he refers to the fact that some of the 
early studies had revealed ‘problems that are none too easy to solve’. He goes on to 
observe that ‘if the conclusions of such studies are accepted by the Department as 
valid, how to act on them may nevertheless pose very difficult problems’. On this 
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basis, he argues that R&DC should adopt a ‘planning and forecasting’ role. This was 
needed in the absence of any other unit in the Department with planning 
responsibilities.1 This suggestion was never acted upon and the final descriptions of 
the role of S&R make no reference even to dissemination, let alone implementation.2 
Instead, the responsibility for implementation was firmly assigned to the sponsor. 
The central organisation for R&D was thus set early into a path where its primary 
focus was on research production rather than utilisation.  Responsibility for the latter 
was assigned to others – whether other divisions in the DHSS or managers and 
clinicians in the NHS. 
Suppliers of research  
Blume observes that technological innovation in medicine requires a convergence 
of interest between a health care system and suppliers of medical devices. Suppliers 
are active participants in the development of the organisational field.3 This 
observation is made in the context of medical equipment R&D, but it is equally 
applicable to HPSSR. The departmental programme was procured almost entirely 
from external suppliers before 1970. This suggests that supply-side influences are 
likely to have been particularly strong during the emergence and growth phases. 
Reliance on in-house R&D was a model widely employed in other government 
departments in the 1960s, so the Department’s preference for external suppliers was 
unusual and calls for an explanation.4 There were perfectly good arguments for the 
use of in-house units, which were put to the R&DC in 1968. In-house units were 
‘more amenable to administrative controls’ and better able to ‘obtain speedy answers 
to particular problems’. Better developed internal resources would balance the 
Department’s substantial programme of research commissioned from external 
suppliers. Despite these arguments, the committee concluded that ‘for the time being 
the Department’s research fund should be used to support extra-mural units, 
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programmes and projects, rather than departmental establishments’.1 This decision 
was partly practical. To have built up capacity from a very low base and across the 
wide range of policy domains would have been a slow process, with the requirement 
for establishment approvals from Treasury.2 The inflexibility of the career class 
structure, together with the low pay and poor career prospects for research officers, 
would have made it hard to assemble the multidisciplinary teams needed.3 A slow 
process would not have fitted with the imperative for rapid development of analytical 
capacity once the politics of investment had crystallised in the Hospital Plan. It was 
much quicker to look for external supply, whilst boosting funding by top-slicing the 
hospital vote. The one experiment in setting up an in-house unit conducted during the 
1960s, the Social Science Research Unit, did not prove to be a success. This had 
been established with only four posts, which was deemed to be too small to have an 
impact. Attempts to increase the establishment had ‘fallen foul of our manpower 
ceiling’.4 Even worse, The Department failed to recruit staff up to the original 
establishment, tiny though this was, which was attributed to the type of work 
involved. This was described as ‘mainly minor project work…of a simple fact-
finding nature’ and as ‘not conducive to the retention of senior staff of good calibre’. 
The favouring of external research reflected more than just these practical 
considerations. The Department wanted to establish the credentials of its programme 
as a funder of high quality, authoritative research and the use of external researchers 
was a strategy towards this end. Cohen says that ‘we felt that the trust of research 
workers, and outside confidence in their results, would only be won if we established 
unassailable credentials of quality and scientific independence’.5 He adds that there 
was a shortage of researchers in many relevant fields and so a further objective was 
the building of capacity in the external supplier base. The Department anticipated 
that fostering of research groups through commissions would give rise to a situation 
where ‘they could be absorbed by the universities and MRC without embarrassment’.  
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The extent to which the Department was familiar with and could draw on an 
established researcher community varied between fields. Social medicine, for 
example, could offer an established community that was well-connected to the 
medical civil service. Richard Cohen would have brought his own network when he 
joined the Department from the MRC in 1962. He comments as follows on the 
situation for service-orientated medical research.  
Fortunately, in community medicine and epidemiology, and indeed in 
medicine more generally, there existed research workers with a 
spontaneous interest in practical health service questions...In a very few 
years it proved possible to set up, in different parts of the country, a 
number of research units and long term programmes, mainly based on 
epidemiology and community medicine, with broad or more specific 
terms of reference. Under these arrangements, we were able to 
concentrate a variety and quality of thought on what research could do 
for the problems of the NHS which I do not think we could have enlisted 
so quickly in any other way.1 
Established units receiving early commissions from the Department included the 
MRC Epidemiology Unit under Archibald Cochrane; the Units of Health Services 
Evaluation and Clinical Epidemiology in Oxford, led by Richard Doll; and the MRC 
Social Medicine Unit under Jerry Morris. Other prominent figures to enjoy early 
patronage included Thomas McKeown, who had been Professor of Social Medicine 
at Birmingham since 1945. As well as these established units, the Department also 
supported ‘rising stars’. Most of these adopted terms other than ‘social medicine’ to 
describe their fields of expertise, notably ‘epidemiology’ and ‘community medicine’. 
Such choices reflect a gradual demise in the influence of social medicine as it 
became increasingly isolated from the practice of public health and focused on 
academic rigour within a narrowing paradigm.2 One of the rising stars was Walter 
Holland and the naming of his ‘Department of Clinical Epidemiology and Social 
Medicine’ was, by his own account, carefully considered. This name was designed to 
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establish medical credentials, secure medical pay grades, and position a new research 
group with a foot in both established and emerging fields.1  
‘Medical care research’ was another new term favoured by rising researchers and 
was generally used to describe ‘operations research’ into clinical practice. The 
Department supported the ‘Medical Care Research Unit’ at the University of 
Newcastle, led by D. J. Newell, as a designated unit.  Another favoured term was 
‘health services research’, which had a more organisational and less exclusively 
medical flavour. Michael D. Warren, moved from London School of Hygiene and 
Tropical Medicine to the University of Kent in 1971 to head up a new ‘Health 
Services Research Unit’, which became another of the Department’s designated 
research units.  
In mental health services research, the Department looked more to established 
researchers. This was a small field dominated by the Institute of Psychiatry, one of 
the specialist postgraduate institutes in London. Units based at the Institute and 
receiving departmental commissions included the MRC Social Psychiatry Unit, the 
Special Hospitals Research Unit and the Addiction Research Centre. Outside 
London, the major centre was Newcastle upon Tyne where the Department supported 
programmes of work by Sir Martin Roth and his collaborator David Kay.  
For non-medical research, the position was rather different. In operational and 
social research, the department lacked both expertise and networks. Although the 
medical civil service might become involved when projects touched on medical 
matters, it did not take the lead on such projects and did not, at least initially, have 
access to networks in this field. The Department had to rely instead on a combination 
of administrative leadership, medical advice and researcher initiative. John Cornish 
appears to have exercised considerable initiative, and been allowed considerable 
freedom of action, in drawing these elements together. The principal suppliers of 
operational research (OR) to the Department in the 1960s were National Coal Board 
OR Unit and some NHS bodies. The NCB unit exemplifies how OR was developed 
in the nationalised industries during the discipline’s pre-academic phase.2 The unit 
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received a stream of commissions from the Department until 1980.1 OR capacity had 
also been developed in the NHS, on the initiative of some Regional Hospital Boards. 
The most significant of these was Oxford where local influences included the support 
of the Nuffield Provincial Hospitals Trust, which was based in the city until 1962, 
and the strength of academic social medicine. The development of an OR unit was 
encouraged by the RHB Chairman, Sir George Schuster (1881 to 1982). Schuster 
was a Liberal politician who was involved in national productivity initiatives in the 
immediate post-war period. He argued for the introduction of OR throughout the 
NHS in a postscript to one of the Acton Society Trust series on Hospitals and the 
State.2 The Department commissioned the Oxford unit to study various aspects of 
patient care.  
As the Department began commissioning operational and social research in 1963 
it was faced with a limited choice of suppliers. The situation was subsequently eased 
by expansion in the social and operational researcher communities during the 1960s. 
Some of this occurred in universities as an aspect of the general growth in higher 
education. The Universities of Sussex, Keele, East Anglia, York, Newcastle, 
Lancaster and Strathclyde were all founded between 1961 and 1964 and a further 
wave of new universities followed the Robbins Report. New departments were set up 
that became long-term suppliers to the Department, for example the Social Research 
Unit at Bedford College, London. This was established in 1965 under the direction of 
Margot Jefferys, who moved to Bedford because she could not persuade the London 
School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine to establish a medical sociology unit. In 
1969, she was joined by another refugee from medical dominance, when she 
recruited the social anthropologist George Brown from the MRC Social Psychiatry 
Research Unit.3 Jefferys’ unit went on to undertake several commissions for the 
Department, including studies of health and welfare needs in the London Borough of 
Camden. For medical sociology, the path was one of differentiation to develop a new 
field within the academic community. For OR, it was more a case of a discipline that 
had established itself of a non-academic basis before becoming adopted by 
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universities. The first Chair in Operational Research in the UK was established at the 
University of Lancaster in 1963 and awarded to Patrick Rivett. Rivett’s career 
trajectory mirrored the development of OR. Before becoming an academic, he served 
in wartime with the Ordnance Board. He then directed the NCB OR unit, before 
moving on to Lancaster.1 The early 1960s also saw the establishment of new 
departments in management and organisational studies. Some researchers in these 
departments were drawn to the under-investigated NHS as an arena for their work. 
The organisational psychiatrist Elliott Jaques, who founded the School of Social 
Science at Brunel University in 1964, provides an example. Like Rivett, his 
academic career was preceded by military and industrial experience. Jacques 
established a Hospital Organisation Research Unit within the School and this became 
a designated unit (see below for a further discussion of designated units). Other 
examples could be given.  
Not all the expansion in supply came from the university sector. The 1960s were 
notable for the number of new, not-for-profit research institutions established outside 
the sector. The Institute for Operational Research provides an example. This was 
formed in 1963 as a joint venture of the Operational Research Society and the 
Tavistock Institute of Human Relations.2 Once the Institute had been discovered by 
the Department it received several commissions.  Independent institutions were 
especially important on the social research side, reflecting the slow pace of 
institutional development for the social sciences and the vitality of the ‘politics of 
expertise’ in this period.3 Examples of independent organisations founded during the 
1960s and receiving commissions from the Department include the National 
Children’s Bureau, founded in 1963 and directed by Dr Mia Kellmer-Pringle.4 The 
Bureau undertook studies into the health and welfare of children with special needs. 
The National Institute for Social Work was founded in 1961. E. M. ‘Tilda’ Goldberg, 
the Institute’s Research Director, became the Department’s main supplier of work 
into the organisation and outcomes of social work. The Institute for Social Studies in 
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Medical Care was spun out of Michael Young’s Institute of Community Studies in 
1970. Under the direction of Ann Cartwright, the Institute was awarded a steady flow 
of commissions including evaluation of a transport service in general practice; the 
acquisition and consumption of medicines, care of the dying, and the impact of birth 
control services. The Department also took an interest in the voluntary hospice 
movement and awarded commissions to Cicely Saunders for studies into end-of-life 
care.  
For supplies and equipment research, the supplier market was rather different 
because it had always been mixed, including input from universities, industry, and 
scientific and technical staff of the Department and the NHS. In many cases, the 
development of new products was critically dependent upon clinicians putting in 
time alongside their other duties and using ‘soft funding’ to advance projects.1 This 
mixed picture persisted but the 1960s also saw the emergence of military R&D 
establishments as a new source of supply. Such establishments sought diversification 
into civilian work, with variable success, as defence R&D spending began to 
decline.2 The Department commissioned medical device development work from the 
Atomic Weapons Research Establishment and the Service Electronics Research 
Laboratory. The Microbiological Research Establishment was awarded a substantial 
grant for the development of cytotoxic agents. The Atomic Energy Research 
Laboratory at Harwell was commissioned for various projects related to radiotherapy 
and medical imaging. 
Putting this overview of supply-side influences together with that of 
organisational arrangement for R&D management, a picture emerges. The emerging 
programme of the Department was subject to very strong external supply-side 
influences and highly receptive towards researcher-initiated projects. However, 
strong supplier influence is not the same as capture by suppliers. The Department 
opened itself up to a strong supplier-lead as a conscious strategy, allowing word to 
get around that central funding was available and that un-solicited proposals would 
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be considered.1 Faced with a plethora of choice about which aspects of the NHS to 
investigate, it made sense to allow researchers to do much of the spade work in 
identifying researchable topics. This was also a good strategy for identifying 
emerging talent, especially in less familiar fields. Any proposals received would still 
be screened using tests of policy-relevance, proposal quality and researcher 
reputation and the relevant researcher communities were not, in this period, so large 
that the Department would be inundated. Where a specific topic requiring research 
was identified, the Department was still, in some cases, able to place the onus on the 
research community to develop ideas and proposals, as with screening for cervical 
cancer. This was so for medical research from the outset, because the medical civil 
service possessed, or could use its networks to obtain, personal knowledge of 
researchers and their worth. It must also have become increasingly true for other 
fields over time as the Department accrued knowledge of the social, operational and 
management researcher communities. By the later 1960s, the Department was 
‘fishing in a well-stocked pond’ for both research ideas and NHS needs and the art 
was to match the two and ensure quality.2  
Given the rapid expansion and diversification of the researcher base, enlightened 
patronage was a viable and economical mode of operation. However, it did not sit 
comfortably with the rhetoric of science policy, which stressed the need for 
governments to steer research using explicit criteria, intended to maximise the social 
returns from publicly-funded research.3 The growth of departmental bureaucracy and 
concerns about research utilisation also began to put pressure on this modus operandi 
from 1968 onwards. The requirement to identify sponsors for all projects placed a 
greater onus on beginning with customer needs rather than supplier interests. 
However, these processes by no means effected a complete transformation, as 
reflected in the pragmatic acceptance that sponsors for some projects would need to 
be identified after the event, rather than being in the driving seat from the outset.  
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The institutionalisation of research supply 
In the departmental programme’s initial phase, the practice was to commission 
individual projects, often proposed by researchers. As the scale of the programme 
grew, SR4 introduced ‘programmes’ and ‘designated units’. A programme was made 
up of several related projects, which might be either contemporaneous or sequential, 
within a single theme and led by the same director. Each project was subject to 
individual approval. ‘Designated units’ were given term contracts of five to seven 
years and left with considerable latitude to undertake programmes or projects within 
a broad field agreed with the Department. Programmes of work and funding were 
subject to annual review by an advisory committee.1  
The R&DC saw the designated unit as the mature organisational model for its 
suppliers, envisaging that many holders of programme grants would attain unit status 
in due course. The committee saw several advantages in the model. Term funding 
allowed greater employment security, assisting recruitment and retention, and 
allowing a stable group of researchers to develop knowledge and skills that could be 
applied to a range of problems. The Department envisaged that designated units 
would provide standby capacity that could undertake studies of specific issues at 
short notice. Units were also expected to become centres of expert advice and ‘act as 
a focal point for knowledge of research…and its implications for policy-making’.2 
Unit policy would thus build HPSSR capacity. It would also be more economical, 
reducing the search costs involved in finding new research contractors and the 
process costs involved in assessing and monitoring individual projects. Unit policy 
would outsource the task of keeping up-to-speed with research and its implications 
for policy. The designation of units would provide continuity of supply. This was 
particularly important for operations and social research as ‘good research workers in 
these disciplines were, and still are, in short supply and can only be caught in the 
brief season in the penultimate stage of a project, when they have begun to think 
about their next project but have not committed themselves’.3 
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The Department was mindful of the need to reserve some funding for projects 
other than those originating with the designated units. A paper by SR4 (Cornish) 
argued that ‘unless we do so, we rob ourselves of new recruits for the study of our 
problems, and a source of new recruits for our work’.1 With this provision made, it 
saw the future as being one where the programme was undertaken mainly by 
designated units working in partnership with the Department. Designation was made 
initially by S&R and later by the R&DC and the process does not appear to have 
been especially onerous. For example, the Institute of Biometry and Community 
Medicine at the University of Exeter was designated in 1968. This appears to have 
come about because an adviser to the Department had been looking for a site for an 
‘experimental operational research unit to study health and welfare services’. Exeter 
was identified as potentially suitable. The co-directors of the project, J. R. Ashford (a 
statistician) and N. G. Pearson (a medical doctor) had worked together at the NCB 
pneumoconiosis research unit before moving to Exeter and embarking upon a survey 
of the local population, beginning in 1966. The large-scale data analysis 
requirements arising from this project coincided with RHB interest in 
computerisation and planning for a new hospital. Exeter became an ECP site.2 
Ashford and Pearson were already known to the Department because of their work in 
epidemiology and medical informatics, which the Department’s adviser interpreted 
as ‘operational research’. Against this background, a submission of just over four 
sides plus financial appendices was sufficient to persuade the R&DC to designate the 
Institute and award a grant of £315,000 for a period of six years.3 
By introducing designated units, the Department was following a model 
developed by the MRC. The unit concept had evolved at the MRC as an alternative 
to the direct employment of staff at the National Institute for Medical Research. The 
governing principal was that a unit was built around a chosen leader.  According to 
Thomson, ‘either the selection of the director was the initial step, or a particular man 
was in view from an early stage in the deliberations’. It followed that a unit ‘should 
cease to exist as such when the man retires or dies, or even if he moves to another 
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post unless he can take the team with him’.1 This approach was consistent with the 
MRC’s strategy of supporting individual scientists that had either established their 
reputation, or were judged to be of promise. Because the MRC rejected 
instrumentalist views of research use, it did not base its decisions on the likelihood of 
the research produced having any obvious practical application. The Council was the 
‘self-chosen backer of excellence’.2 The Department’s thinking was along the same 
lines but its instrumental view of research led it to balance assessment of the quality 
of the unit director with some sense of needing to assemble a balanced portfolio of 
relevant skills and interests. So, for example, in backing both Holland and 
Cochrane’s units for designation it noted that although both units offered similar 
competencies, it would be advisable to designate both because Holland was the 
‘young flyer’ and the Cochrane the ‘elder statesman’.3   
In 1968, 21 units were under consideration for designation. A further four units 
were classified as ‘signs propitious’. Despite this, only ten units had been designated 
by 1973. In the same year, there were 43 research groups operating under programme 
grants (later relabelled ‘period contracts’).4 During the 1970s the Department 
adopted the practice of awarding ‘rolling contracts’, i.e. contracts of no specified 
duration subject to periodic renewal, rather than term grants as a means of supporting 
units with which it wished to maintain a longer-term relationship. The key distinction 
then became that between units on rolling contracts and other units. By 1981, 34 
units were supported on rolling contracts.5 Details of units receiving long-term 
support in 1973 and 1985 are provided in appendix 3. 
The contribution of charitable foundations 
The grant-making activities of the Nuffield Provincial Hospitals Trust added to 
the dynamic of growth. As previously discussed, the Trust took advantage of the 
university funding system to build research capacity on a sustainable basis. It 
favoured a co-funding approach with both NHS authorities and the Department, and 
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sought to connect these authorities to university-based researchers. This became 
standard operating policy from 1966 onwards.1 For example, the Ministry, Wessex 
RHB and Trust jointly funded a survey of the prevalence of ‘sub-normality’ in the 
Wessex Region. This was undertaken by RHB and local authority staff in partnership 
with the University of Southampton. The expectation was that the findings from the 
survey would predict future requirements for hospital and community-based care.2 In 
another example, the evaluation of a pre-discharge ward at Dryburn Hospital, 
Durham was jointly sponsored by NPHT and the Newcastle RHB and undertaken by 
a research team drawn from the University of Durham, the RHB and the Durham 
HMC.3 
Many of the projects supported in this way were surveys, reflecting the Trust’s 
experience that service innovations ‘could not immediately be selected and designed 
because often the basic data did not exist’.4 Once the Trust was satisfied that a 
satisfactory baseline of data was available, it was prepared to proceed with the 
funding of ‘experiments and demonstrations’. The Trust also funded studies 
undertaken by RHB operational research units, notably at Oxford, Manchester and 
Newcastle, and by independent research institutes. However, its policy direction was 
such that, by the mid-1960s, the greater part of its grant-making was directed towards 
universities. Of 89 studies funded between 1963 and 1968, two-thirds were either 
solely university-based or involved a university working in partnership with an NHS 
body.5 Over the same period, the Trust funded 44 demonstration projects in hospitals 
and community services.  
The King’s Fund also stimulated the emergence of HPSSR, regardless of its 
ambivalence towards the idea of a departmental programme. The Fund is itemised in 
the catalogues of hospital studies from the mid-1960s as both sponsoring and 
undertaking studies. However, this was not sponsorship through grant-making, 
because the Fund did not make research grants to external bodies. Studies were 
supported instead through the convening of expert working groups and the provision 
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of practical support by in-house staff. As an example, the Fund sponsored a study to 
assess the place of computers in accounting for hospital costs and to establish the 
relationship between the cost of care and its quality.1 This was undertaken by a 
working party including the finance officers of four London hospitals. Another study 
looked at ‘relieving ward sisters by use of ward housekeepers’. This involved the 
nursing staff of the Whittington Hospital, London.2 The working groups were 
supported in both cases by the staff of the King’s Fund Hospital Centre. Formed in 
1963 from the Division of Hospital Facilities, the Hospital Centre provided an 
information bureau and advisory service. It collected and classified technical 
information on all aspects of hospital administration and responded to enquiries from 
all comers by drawing on this repository of knowledge.3  The Centre also undertook 
a small number of special studies and investigations. These included a study into the 
problems of cleansing and sterilization of hospital blankets; comparative testing of 
different flooring materials and floor cleaning procedures and investigations into the 
use of plastic equipment in hospitals.4 These studies were all conducted by the staff 
of the Division in collaboration with the NHS. In these ways, the Fund provided a 
stimulus to the emergence of HPSSR, regardless of its avoidance of grant aid to the 
emerging departmental programme. 
The MRC relationship  
The emergence of a departmental programme of service-relevant research appears 
to have caused little disturbance to relations with the MRC. Science policy after 
Trend had left both organisations largely free to plough their own furrows. During 
the 1960s, touching points were few. The CMO participated in the Clinical Research 
Board with ‘assessor’ status.5 The Department funded some MRC units to undertake 
research. The two organisations had a shared project in the planned development of a 
new Clinical Research Centre in an NHS Hospital. The Clinical Research Board was 
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responsible for oversight of the Locally Organised Research Scheme, as 
recommended by the Cohen Report.   
In some writing, there is a suggestion of friction between the two organisations 
during the 1960s, arising from the disinclination of the CRB to support research 
relevant to the NHS.1 Richard Cohen is dismissive of such suggestions. He argues 
that the needs of the Ministry of Health called for:  
…an orientation different from that of traditional medical research and 
there was never any question then or later of the MRC accepting 
responsibility, either alone or in partnership, for the new field as a whole, 
though individual items…might be expected to attract its interest and be 
undertaken by it on its own terms.2 
Cohen goes on to claim that the decision to set up a departmental programme was 
fully endorsed by the MRC Secretary, Himsworth, and generally welcomed by the 
Council. To deliver its new programme, the Ministry recognised that it needed to 
draw on MRC units. The Council appears to have been entirely content with this 
arrangement and, indeed, there is no reason why it should not have been as it brought 
a new stream of funding. The acceptance of departmental funding for potentially 
contentious studies might have caused difficulties for the MRC. Cochrane’s studies 
for the Department certainly caused contention with the medical profession, but in 
his memoirs, he speaks only of the support offered by both the MRC and the 
Department.3 The planned Clinical Research Centre at Northwick Park in North 
London was a joint project between the MRC, the Department and the North West 
Metropolitan Health Board. The project was intended to be the definitive response to 
the obstacles to clinical research which still lingered in the NHS.4 It was first 
approved in 1960 but did not become operational until 1970, thus requiring a long 
period of collaborative planning for a project that was cherished by all three parties. 
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One exception to this picture of harmony was the Locally Organised Research 
Scheme, which did cause some tension between the two organisations. LORS, a 
legacy of the Cohen Report, was intended to support small, locally-initiated clinical 
research projects. Regional Hospital Boards and Boards of Governors allocated 
funding through local committees. Each Board was expected to submit annual 
reports to the Ministry of Health who would ‘seek the advice for the central 
organisation for clinical research [the CRB] upon them’.1 Allocations for LORS were 
first made in 1958/9 at a modest £36,425, this figure being derived from the 1954 
survey of clinical research.2 The scheme ran into difficulty on two fronts almost 
immediately. First, it quickly became clear that the CRB had little interest in small 
scale NHS clinical research. A decision to ask for reports only once every five years 
was taken as early as 1959. Second, Boards were disappointed with their allocations 
as growth in local clinical research outstripped funding. Both the Ministry and the 
MRC appear to have omitted to communicate the workings of the system to the 
hospital authorities and the Ministry continued to ask for annual returns. 
Consequently, blame was directed towards the MRC, which was seen as the 
rationing body, but which in fact had no control over the budget.3 Some Boards even 
made requests for the approval of specific schemes directly to the CRB, to MRC 
consternation.4 The Council had no desire to get involved with small projects in the 
NHS and sought advice from Richard Cohen, who produced a discussion paper on 
the future of the scheme in March 1963. However, the matter was left unresolved and 
hospital boards were still criticising the MRC for its alleged failings in 1966.5 It was 
not until 1972 that a process was put in place to finally resolve these difficulties. This 
took the form of a joint working party between the Department and the MRC under 
the chairmanship of Sir Douglas Black, the main conclusions of which were as 
follows. 
…the need for a locally-organised research scheme is as strong now as it 
was in 1953…we recommend that it should be continued. We fully 
endorse our predecessor’s definition of its two main purposes, namely to 
foster the research spirit in medicine which is demanded by the highest 
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standards of practice and to facilitate the discovery and encouragement of 
local research talent throughout the health service.1 
The fiction that the MRC could provide oversight of the scheme was only abandoned 
at this point. The working party recommended that a single adviser from both 
Department and Council be appointed to each regional research board and that a five-
year general progress report should be considered jointly by the Chief Scientist’s 
Organisation at the Department and the CRB. 2 
The overall picture for MRC/Department relations in the 1960s, then, is one of 
operational co-operation without strategic alignment. Both organisations had more 
than enough to be getting on with in their own fields and were willing to co-operate 
where it was mutually advantageous. The MRC, despite its past hegemonic 
tendencies, appeared relaxed about the activities of the Department. These presented 
no challenge because they were not the type of research that the MRC would either 
fund or pursue itself. The doubling of the MRC’s budget over the decade doubtless 
contributed to this tolerant frame of mind. LORS became an irritant, revealing the 
MRC’s lack of genuine interest in seeking to control clinical research undertaken in 
the NHS.  
The dynamics of growth 
The evidence presented above shows how the Department created a growth 
dynamic. It began by linking the development of an R&D programme to the twin 
goals of efficiency and control. It built up a bureaucracy for research commissioning 
that had the appropriate attributes for the circumstances faced. This bureaucracy 
effectively blended administrative and medical leadership and was small enough to 
work in informal ways and be agile. It benefited from continuity of individuals in key 
positions. The style of working encouraged and harnessed researcher initiative at a 
time of expansion in the research community. A style of enlightened patronage, with 
little formal process and decisions taken by a small group, proved highly effective 
for getting the programme off the ground. This small group was not interested in 
promoting one research discipline or tradition above another but adopted a catholic 
approach in which it was prepared to support any research project so long as it was 
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well-planned, looked likely to be competently delivered and was of ‘a precise and 
practical relevance to the operations of the NHS’. The Department was prepared to 
take risks and back new ideas as part of this open-minded approach. In 1967, more 
formal arrangements were put in place to encourage divisions to take greater 
ownership of research. However, the R&DC remained small and enlightened 
patronage was not so much abandoned as placed within a more formalised 
framework. The introduction of research programmes and designated units 
streamlined commissioning processes and made it possible for the small central 
bureaucracy to support a rapid rate of growth.  
External forces also contributed to the growth dynamic. The universities, 
independent foundations and other sites of researcher activity were all undergoing 
growth in the 1960s. In this environment, the research community sought to 
differentiate itself and colonise new niches in the academic ecosystem. Emergent 
disciplines such as medical sociology, operational research and epidemiology sought 
out the Department as a new source of funding that was more sympathetic than the 
MRC. The Department encouraged the supply-side contribution by being receptive to 
researcher’s ideas and initiatives, whilst seeking to balance this with the 
identification of customers for research. It institutionalised the supply of research 
through the designation of units, outsourcing intellectual leadership to unit directors. 
The NPHT and King’s Fund made their own contribution to the growth dynamic in 
their different ways, as described.  
The R&D Committee proved effective in making representations for resources, 
continuing to make the link between R&D and efficiency. It consistently argued that 
the programme needed rapid growth so that the Department could catch up from its 
very weak starting position in research. It drew attention to the small size of the 
R&D budget as a proportion of total NHS spending. The Treasury proved receptive 
to these arguments, increasing the votes for research year on year. Steady growth in 
funding meant that the Department could respond to both researcher initiatives and 
its own perceptions of need. The mechanism of top-slicing the hospital vote for R&D 
purposes added substantially to the resources available. By the end of the decade, the 
Committee was still using the same arguments to make the case for an accelerated 
rate of growth. 
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The question was raised whether the forecast annual increase of 9 to 12 
per cent at 1968/9 prices could be justified, having regard to the growth 
rate of 3 to 3½ percent of the department’s expenditure as a whole. The 
committee were satisfied that because of the comparatively recent start of 
the R and D activity a more rapid growth than the departmental norm was 
to be expected for some time. They were also satisfied, following the 
recent review, that there was scope for more useful and rewarding 
research, much of which might be expected to bring economies.1 
Later that year SR4 supplied the Secretary of State with a briefing note making the 
economic case for greater investment in health-related research as background for a 
ministerial steering committee on economic policy. This focused on the economic 
benefits of a more efficient NHS and a stronger medical equipment industry.2 It also 
made a well-crafted submission to a ‘functional review’ of government R&D 
organised by the Cabinet Office.3 In 1970, the R&D Committee minutes record that 
the Secretary of State was ‘satisfied that the departments research and development 
programme was on the right lines and that a rate of growth of up to 10 percent a year 
would be reasonable having regard to the present level of expenditure reached’.4 The 
success of the Committee in making the case for more R&D funding is evident from 
the growth rate achieved through the late 1960s and early 1970s. 
Concluding discussion 
The previous chapter demonstrated that the MRC was the dominant structural 
interest in the health research state prior to 1960. By 1973, this was no longer the 
case. A second centre of gravity had emerged at the DHSS, with the full support of 
the Treasury. The MRC appears to have been tolerant of this development, despite its 
historic quest for dominance of medical research. At first sight, this history appears 
amenable to a neo-pluralist interpretation in which the health research state is 
elaborated to accommodate a wider range of interest groups as the business of the 
state becomes more complex. These interest groups would include health care 
professionals, in need of evidence relevant to clinical practice, and those responsible 
for the operational management of health services, including investment decisions in 
new buildings and equipment. Elaboration of the state would also serve the 
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knowledge needs of disadvantaged sectors, such as community-based health and 
welfare services. Ultimately, the interests of the public, as the funders and users of 
the NHS, would be better served by this growth and differentiation of the health 
research state. 
Against this, a more elitist interpretation can be offered. First, there is little 
evidence that the MRC’s apparent tolerance reflected any greater openness to the 
possibility of a more pluralistic health research state. A paradigm existed, as codified 
in the concordat, in which the ‘surveys and intelligence’ work of the Department was 
distinct from the science pursued by the MRC. For as long as the activities of the 
Department appeared to be confined to its assigned sphere of interest there was no 
reason for the MRC to feel threatened. The Council clung to its belief that it should 
remain the dominant interest, whilst becoming complacent about its position because 
of its non-threatening experience of ‘reform’ in science and technology policy.  The 
reforms that followed Trend, culminating in the 1965 Science and Technology Act, 
neither challenged the scientific self-governance of the research councils, nor 
provided any imperative for the MRC to become more attuned to NHS needs and 
priorities. Secure in its self-esteem after more than half a century of success 
measured by its own terms, the MRC was perceived after 1965 as more indifferent 
that the other research councils to the instrumentalist narratives of science policy.1  
Second, and returning to the theme of the professionalised state, the role of the 
medical administrative elite and its links to the medical scientific elite must be 
considered. Senior medical civil servants were drawn from the same professional, 
and often social, milieu as the leaders of the MRC and there was circulation of 
individuals between the two organisations. The most striking example is Richard 
Cohen. who worked for the MRC for fourteen years before moving to the Ministry of 
Health. Cohen was thus exceptionally well-equipped to manage the relationship with 
the MRC and to deal with boundary issues as these arose. Godber and Himsworth 
were on first-name terms and managed the institutional relationship at the most 
senior level. Influential researchers in MRC units, such as Cochrane, received grants 
from the Department and were networked in to both organisations. A harmonious 
relationship between the two was in their best interests. The maintenance of cordial 
                                                             
1. Rose and Rose, Science and Society, 113. 
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relations was helped by the personal links between senior members of the medical 
profession.1 In Alford’s terms, both medical administrators and medical researchers 
were ‘professional monopolists’ who, by co-operating, secured more public funding 
for medical research and ensured its effective delivery.  
It would be misleading, however, to portray the situation as one in which the 
professional monopolists were unconstrained. Medical power was institutionalised 
and limited in the Department through the dual medical/administrative structure. 
Members of the medical administrative elite had to influence, rather than direct, 
administrative civil servants. It follows that one set of dynamics for medical research 
could co-exist with a distinct set for non-medical research. The existence of some co-
ordinating mechanisms, the style of working and the unifying narrative of ‘precise 
and practical relevance’, were sufficient to integrate these different dynamics.   
Any attempt at a pluralistic interpretation must also consider the absence of any 
public involvement in the development of the health research state. Neither the MRC 
or the Department engaged with the public directly during this period or, indeed, at 
any time before 1986. At no stage was there any suggestion by any of the 
participants that the public might be involved in shaping policy for R&D or 
contributing to R&D prioritisation. Members of the public may have had some input 
into the shaping of individual research projects, whether as patients or as members of 
organised interest groups, such as disease-based charities. Whether this occurred was 
a matter to which the Department remained indifferent. 
The material in this chapter has also spoken to the role of civil society in the 
growth of the health research state. The emergence of the departmental programme 
coincided with an expansion of the voluntary sector in the late 1950s and 1960s. 
Many of the new charities founded in this period were mass membership charities 
specific to single issues. This phenomenon has been interpreted as a new means of 
public participation in politics, providing new channels for the mobilisation of 
                                                             
1. Cohen and Cochrane were close personal friends and Cochrane is candid about the 
importance of his personal friendships with Cohen, Max Wilson and Gordon McLachlan 
of the NPHT for his unit and career (see, for example, One Man’s Medicine, 206, 215). 
Cohen’s introduction to Cochrane’s memoirs gives a startling insight into the shared 
social background of the two men when he relays his father’s butler’s opinion that 
Cochrane was the only one of his friends with the underclothes of a gentleman (Ibid. xi). 
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expertise.1 The NPHT and King’s Fund certainly mobilised expertise, but they were 
never mass participation charities. Both enjoyed generous endowments and had no 
need for mass membership. Their governance model was elitist in the traditional 
charity sense, with trustees drawn from the ‘great and the good’ and appointing their 
own successors. A more appropriate analytical framework may be that of Finlayson, 
who, borrowing a phrase, writes of the ‘moving frontier’ between the state and the 
voluntary sector. Finlayson acknowledges that the big picture in the twentieth 
century was that of the voluntary sector first compensating for the insufficiency of 
the state, and then withdrawing by degrees as the state developed. However, he 
argues that this bare narrative is too crude and instead emphasises fluid boundaries 
between public, private and informal sectors as a continuing phenomenon.2 From this 
perspective, the history of the departmental programme in the 1960s might be viewed 
not so much as a progressive withdrawal from the field by the two charitable 
foundations, but more as a series of tactical shifts in modes of engagement. Both 
charities flexibly engaged with the evolving health research state in a way that would 
maximise returns from their resources. The returns sought were the development of 
knowledge and expertise of relevance to the health service. Such behaviour conforms 
to Prochaska’s argument that the voluntary sector has constantly re-invented itself to 
find new ways of supplementing the state.3 
Turning to organisation, what is striking is the extent to which the Department’s 
bureaucracy was shaped by its policy of commissioning extra-mural research. The 
extra-mural preference was a strategy directed towards legitimacy and ‘unassailable 
credentials’, as well as practicality. The adoption of the research unit model can be 
seen in the same light. It was partly a practical strategy for growth; but it was also a 
way of signalling that the Department was a serious patron of research that did things 
in the proper way. This can be interpreted as an example of ‘mimetic isomorphism’, 
as defined by sociological institutionalists. The departmental programme presents all 
the attributes that institutional theorists have used to predict the occurrence of 
legitimacy-seeking organisational responses, including elevated professional 
influence. However, the Department’s mimicry of the MRC was compromised by its 
                                                             
1. Hilton, Politics of Expertise. 
2. Finlayson, Moving Frontier. 
3. Prochaska, Voluntary Impulse. 
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need to adhere to its own instrumentalist rhetoric. Whereas the MRC could patronise 
‘promising men’ solely on the judgements of scientific peers, the Department had to 
temper its judgements about the quality of potential unit directors as scientists with 
an assessment of the relevance of their interests and the need to assemble a balanced 
portfolio of units. Such judgements were made by medical and administrative civil 
servants, which left the designated units vulnerable to criticism on purely scientific 
grounds, as occurred under the third Chief Scientist.   
Exchanges for health research can be considered in three axes: between the 
commissioning organisation and researchers; between researchers and the end-users 
of research; and between commissioners and end-users. The Department’s approach 
to research was explicitly and self-consciously ‘problem-driven’ in all three axes. For 
good practical reasons, officials let the researcher community exercise considerable 
initiative in identifying problems for investigation. This was an effective strategy for 
identifying problems that were amenable to research and for the identification of 
emerging talent. The informal team used deliberative process to refine proposals 
coming from researchers and to test their policy relevance. In this scheme, the 
problem was the ability and propensity of divisions to act as ‘customers’ for 
research. The solution of requiring ‘sponsors’ was imperfect in that the assignment of 
this role, especially retrospectively, was in no way guaranteed to ensure that the 
divisions really engaged with research outputs. This combination of pushy 
researchers and often-passive customers necessitated an elevated level of brokerage 
skills, discrimination and judgement in the informal team. These qualities, when 
combined with the availability of funds, led to the mode of working characterised as 
‘enlightened patronage’. 
This mode of working was agile and suitable in a period of early growth. 
However, it was not without its failings. The sponsor requirement shifted 
responsibility for research utilisation away from S&R and the R&D Committee. This 
contributed to a pattern, which emerged as early as 1968, of neglecting the challenge 
of research utilisation to focus on the lesser challenge of getting research produced. 
A few voices argued that the Department should develop some central function to 
ensure that research findings were taken forwards into the development of policy and 
planning. These arguments were disregarded in favour of the easier option of finding 
‘sponsors’ of research elsewhere in the Department and assigning to them the 
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challenge of research utilisation. The even-more difficult question of how the NHS 
was to make use of the research procured for its ultimate benefit was barely raised. 
The Department succeeded in creating a very effective dynamic for growth by the 
late 1960s and this sustained expansion in the HPSSR programme through to the 
mid-1970s. Progress was impressive, but the developing programme possessed some 
attributes that rendered it vulnerable to change in the external environment. The 
medical research stream was sustained by understandings within the medical elite 
and reliant upon key individuals, yet the overlap between the two organisations 
remained a potential source of disagreement. The designated research units 
superficially followed the MRC model, but the need to balance scientific and 
practical considerations meant that the units were vulnerable to critical review. The 
difficult problems of research utilisation were neglected and obfuscated by fictions of 
departmental sponsorship. These points of vulnerability became significant as the 
programme entered more turbulent times
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7. Streams of Research 
 
The position at the present time is that the Department initiates and 
supports research and development in the medical and social sciences 
for purposes directly relevant to the operations of the NHS and the 
Personal Social Services; in the investigation and evaluation of 
techniques, forms, and patterns of delivery of medical and social care; 
in new and improved medical equipment, supplies, and patients' 
appliances; in hospital and other health building and engineering; in 
relation to its traditional responsibilities for surveillance of the public 
health; and in aid of social security. It also supports a locally organized 
research scheme open to all parts of the service.1 
 
By 1973, the principal streams of research in the programme had been established, 
except for biomedical research which was later added through the Rothschild 
reforms. This chapter steps aside from chronological narrative to explore these 
principal streams in more detail. This will flesh out the preliminary characterisation 
of the programme obtained through quantitative analysis. Analysis of R&D votes 
alone (see chapter 4) can provide only limited visibility of the range of research 
funded within some of the larger votes, most notably that for HPSSR. A further 
purpose is to add weight to two arguments made in chapter six: that the nature of the 
research supported through the programme encouraged MRC tolerance; and that the 
programme was sufficiently diverse that its successful management required the 
integration of quite different dynamics.  
To make diversity manageable, some scheme of classification is required. The 
approach to classification in those sources offering more detail than the Estimates 
changes over time. In Portfolio 1, published in 1971, a broad-brush approach was 
used, with only five categories: ‘service developments’ and operational, medical, 
social, and supplies and equipment R&D.2 In contrast, Portfolio 2, published two 
years later, uses 23 categories based on a mix of service type and client group. This 
reflects the influence of novel approaches to planning (discussed further in chapter 
eight). In the annual ‘yearbooks’ of R&D published by the Department from 1973 
                                                             
1. Cohen, Department’s Role, 13. 
2. McLachlan, Portfolio 1, 227-228.  
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onwards, a hybrid approach is taken, with health services analysed by service type 
and personal social services by client group. Other streams, such as computer 
research, are shown as a single line. In the Cabinet Office Annual Reports on 
Government R&D, published from 1983 onwards, the client group approach is not 
used and high-level categories only are used for HPSSR. In this source, some of the 
‘other’ streams are broken down into more detail. These different approaches are 
detailed in Appendix 2. There is thus no single scheme of classification in the 
sources that can be used for the whole period 1961 to 1986.  
The approach adopted in this chapter is to take one of these schemes of 
classification and, following this scheme, to focus on the material streams of funding. 
The scheme adopted is that of Portfolio 1, with two amendments. First, the computer 
research stream, which was not included in Portfolio 1, has been added, in view of 
the sizable financial allocations involved. Second, discussion of service 
developments is subsumed into the discussion of medical research. This scheme has 
several advantages. Its coarse granularity reduces the number of streams to a 
manageable number that can be linked to discussion about researcher communities. It 
is also possible, at least in approximate terms, to reconcile this analysis back to 
funding by vote. If biomedical research is excluded, the five categories used in 
Portfolio 1 plus computer research account for over 85 percent of the programme by 
value throughout the study period. Discussion of the main streams established by 
1973 is followed by a brief discussion of new fields of activity between 1973 and 
1986 and the argument is made that these are more the differentiation of existing 
streams than the emergence of new. Regardless of the vagaries of classification, 
marked continuity can be perceived in the main streams, once these were established. 
Operational research 
From 1967 onwards, operational research (OR) was defined by the Operational 
Research Society as follows. 
Operational Research is the attack of modern science on complex 
problems arising in the direction and management of large systems of 
men, machines, materials and money in industry, business, government 
and defence. The distinctive approach is to develop a scientific model of a 
system, incorporating measurement of factors such as chance and risk, 
with which to predict and compare the outcome of alternative decisions, 
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strategies or control. The purpose is to help management determine its 
policy and actions scientifically. 1  
Kirby provides a detailed account of the rise of OR as management technique and 
academic discipline.2 A trajectory of growth from foundation to widespread influence 
and institutional presence was accomplished over little more than thirty years, ‘an 
impressive achievement for any human endeavour’.  This was associated by 
processes of institutionalisation, most importantly the foundation of the Operational 
Research Club in 1947 with 50 members; later becoming the Operational Research 
Society with 3,000 members by 1975.3 OR also became established as an academic 
discipline in the early 1960s. 
This growth trajectory is attributed to two main forces by Kirby. The first was the 
effect of wartime investment in OR followed by the demobilisation of practitioners 
back into their peacetime occupations, taking with them both expertise and 
enthusiastic conviction about the potential contribution of the discipline in the civil 
domain. The second driver was the post-war renaissance of scientific management, in 
which tradition OR was deeply rooted. This revival was stimulated by the experience 
of increased productivity, achieved through a more systematic approach to the 
analysis and design of work prompted by the exigencies of wartime, and the needs of 
reconstruction.4  Driven by these forces, OR spread from the armed services into 
large corporations and nationalised industries. Kirby demonstrates that ‘from the 
later 1950s onwards…the discipline began to be diffused into an increasing range of 
civil government activities with a notable acceleration after 1966’.5  
The health service was part of this process, although discussed only in passing by 
Kirby who focuses on other sectors. Both Guillebaud and Plowden urged greater use 
of OR in the NHS, as did ACME.6 However, the Ministry was not always entirely 
                                                             
1. This definition was adopted by the ORS in 1967 and printed on the frontispiece of every 
issue of the society’s journal, Operational Research Quarterly.  
2. Kirby, Operational Research in War and Peace. 
3. Geoff Royston, "One hundred years of Operational Research in Health - UK 1948-2048," 
Journal of the Operational Research Society 60(S1) (2009): S169-S179. 
4. Morgan Witzel, A History of Management Thought (London and New York: Routledge, 
2013), chapter 9. 
5. Kirby, Operational Research, 335. 
6. MH 137/350, Draft of second report to the Minister. 
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sure what it meant by the term or about the boundaries between OR and other forms 
of systematic investigation into operations and management. 
Discussion of operational research is bedevilled by the different ways in 
which people use the expression, and this is particularly so when research 
in health is the subject. At one extreme it is used to mean any research 
which is not basic, or laboratory research, and to encompass 'Applied 
Research' and 'Action Research', both of which suffer from the same 
verbal misuse—and at times abuse—as operational research.1 
A specific allocation in the Estimates for ‘operational research by outside 
organisations’ was introduced in 1963/4. Two years later this descriptor was changed 
to ‘health and welfare services research by other organisations’ because analysts in 
statistics, economics, and work study/O&M were also funded from this source and 
felt excluded by the description of the funding stream as being for operational 
research.2 This awkwardness came about because the Ministry used ‘operational 
research’ indiscriminately as an umbrella term for a variety of disciplines and 
management techniques. These included, but were not limited to, OR as a specific 
discipline. Richard Cohen accurately describes this strand of activity as ‘operations 
research (used…in its widest and most non-technical sense)’.3 The Department was 
receptive to any disciplinary approach that held promise of practical application and 
operations research was not limited to operational research. 
A visitor to the UK from the USA, undertaking a study tour in 1964 to investigate 
the application of ‘operations research’ to the health service, was surprised by the 
backward state of affairs, given that the wartime development of OR had been led by 
the British. 4  But, he added, ‘the need for operational research on health problems is 
now widely recognised and plans are being made for a considerable amount of such 
research in future, largely with support from the Ministry of Health’. Commissioning 
of operations research began in HS3-D and was focused on hospital efficiency and 
financial control. 
                                                             
1. J. B. Cornish and A. G. McDonald “Operational Research” in McLachlan (ed.) Portfolio 1: 
161-167. 
2. Ibid. 161. 
3. Cohen, The Department’s Role, 7. 
4. William J. Horvath, "British experience with operations research in the health services," 
Journal of Chronic Diseases 17, (1964): 779-788. 
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On what might be termed the operational front, active participation in 
research began with the formation of HS3 division, which had a general 
responsibility for the improvement of efficiency in hospitals. In the 
discharge of this commitment, the division was inevitably led to the 
promotion of research – largely projects of a fact-finding nature related to 
hospital needs, resources and practices, and later experimentation with 
new methods and techniques.1 
Once HS3-D began to commission ‘operational research’ from external providers, it 
did so in the name of the Advisory Committee for Management Efficiency.2 ACME 
was far more enthusiastic about management services than about research. This was 
because its members, and particularly its Chairman, Sir Frank Ewart Smith, adhered 
to the principle that systematic investigation should be undertaken by the same 
people who would be responsible for implementation of any change requirements 
identified through such investigation. For this reason, ACME was more interested in 
developing O&M and work study competencies in the NHS workforce than in 
fostering external research capacity. However, ACME appears to have been quite 
content for HS3-D to commission ‘operational research’ to add to the 
armamentarium of efficiency. The importance of ACME began to decline from 1963 
onwards as the Ministry built up its executive capacity, most significantly in HS3.  3 
As HS3-D grew its portfolio of commissioned studies, acquired experience, and built 
relationships with the research community, the imprimatur of ACME became less 
and less important. This happened to such an extent that the eventual dissolution of 
the Advisory Committee in 1966 had no discernible effect on the expanding 
programme of research commissioning.  
The focus of the earliest externally commissioned ‘operational research’ was 
management practice, a choice that reflected a growing interest at the Department in 
how hospital administrators behaved. There is some evidence that this originated 
with the Minister for Health himself. Chester quotes Powell as having said the 
following in a speech at the King’s Fund in November 1962. 
We have found, in the few years that we have existed as a National 
Health Service, we have been driven year by year to realise our ignorance 
of the inner secrets of hospital administration and the need for research 
                                                             
1. MH 166/973, Discussion Paper June 1967. 
2. MH 166/249, Research studies recommended by the Advisory Committee for 
Management Efficiency. The Council became a Committee in 1963. 
3. MH 137/350, enclosure to ACME(P)62. 
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into them — research in every form and at every level. It is evidence of 
that realisation that my Department is now allocating, year by year, sums 
of money specifically to research into different aspects of hospital 
administration.1 
Once the commissioning of operations and management research was established, it 
grew rapidly so that fresh visitors from the USA, touring the UK in 1968, came away 
with a different impression to that formed by Horvath. 
The great majority of studies being supported by the Ministry are in the 
field of hospital operation. Major categories are management, staff, 
outpatient departments, medical records, catering, and architectural, 
engineering and supply and equipment studies.2 
The first foray into management research came in 1963, when Professor T.E. 
(Teddy) Chester of the University of Manchester was invited to submit a proposal for 
two studies on the effectiveness of hospital management. A ‘vertical probe’ was 
required, examining the management response to hospital memoranda. A ‘horizontal 
probe’ was also required, involving a comparative analysis of senior management 
decision-making in different Hospital Management Committees.3 Chester, Professor 
of Social Administration at Manchester, was the sole university member of ACME. 
He had previously been Director of the Acton Society Trust and was a pioneer in 
NHS management education.4  Chester was not, in fact, the Ministry’s first choice 
and did not make a great success of the project. The Ministry had originally tried to 
appoint an OR practitioner for this work (Chester was a sociologist) but was thwarted 
by lack of supplier capacity. Various other university researchers were approached, 
but all were too busy with other commitments. Officials in HS3 felt that they lacked 
understanding of OR and were set upon engaging a ‘genuine operational research 
body’. They were, therefore, delighted to discover the Institute of Operational 
                                                             
1. Quoted by T.E. Chester in his foreword to Beatrice Hunter, The Administration of 
Hospital Wards (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1972), viii. See also similar 
remarks attributed to an unnamed Permanent Secretary (presumably France), speaking 
in 1965, in Institute of Operational Research, First Four Years, 7. 
2. Bierman, Health Services Research in Great Britain, 16. 
3.  MH 166/249. 
4. Stephanie Snow, "'I've never found doctors to be a difficult bunch': Doctors, managers 
and NHS reorganisations in Manchester and Salford, 1948-2007," Medical History 57, 
no.1 (2013): 65-86. 
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Research in 1964. Several commissions were awarded to the Institute in subsequent 
years.1 
Portfolio 1 shows that by 1970/1, the Department was funding 37 operational (or 
operations) research projects with a combined grant award of £509,000 and 12 
programmes with a combined value of £817,300.2 Over only seven years, and from a 
standing start, the Department had succeeded in establishing a significant programme 
of operational, operations and management research. 
Medical Research 
The legitimacy of operations research for the Department was never open to 
question. This was a field for administrators, made salient by its linkage to the 
hospital building programme and orientation towards efficiency studies. In contrast, 
the commissioning of medical research had the potential to be more contentious. The 
Cohen Report had assigned the territory, including epidemiology and social 
medicine, to the MRC. Despite this, the Ministry began to develop its programme of 
service-orientated medical research from the early 1960s onwards. The reasoning 
behind this departure, and the orientation of the Ministry’s medical research 
programme, were explained in a lunch time talk by Richard Cohen to the staff of the 
MRC in July 1967, the transcript of which survives.3  
Cohen begins by dividing the Ministry’s research programme into two categories. 
First, those activities which are so evidently the concern of an executive department 
that no further discussion was needed. ‘These’ he tells his audience ‘are in many 
ways the backbone of our programme…are what everybody expects Ministry to be 
doing and what perhaps you have most in mind when you speak of operational 
research’. Into this category he places population-based studies of the need for 
medical care, bioengineering research, studies of management and organisation, 
including information systems, and experiments in laboratory automation.4  Cohen 
                                                             
1.  Institute for Operational Research. Institute for Operational Research. The First Four 
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2. Data from Portfolio 1. 
3. FD 9/1283. 
4. This is an example of the misuse of ‘operational research’ to describe the field of 
‘operations research’. 
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then goes on to focus on a second category, where ‘problems are arising in the border 
territory between service and research where the responsibilities of the Ministry and 
the Council meet and overlap but which the two bodies look at from opposite 
viewpoints, the preoccupation of the one being to the other a stepping stone or a 
valuable by-product’. He discusses two areas where these difficulties were being 
increasingly felt. 
The first is screening of pre-symptomatic disease. Cohen gives the example of 
cytology for the detection of cancer of the cervix, a costly initiative introduced in 
1963 without much evidence as to its efficacy or acceptability. He makes the point 
that once a practice is introduced it becomes ethically and politically very difficult to 
begin randomised controlled trials for the purposes of evaluation. He gives screening 
for glaucoma as another example, pointing out that the high level of false positives 
arising from the then-available technology would mean that ophthalmology services 
would be overwhelmed with extra demand in return for marginal health gain.  
The second area is ‘trends in medical practice’. Here Cohen again refers to 
pressures to establish new services in the absence of evidence as to their likely 
efficacy and cost-effectiveness.  He discusses renal dialysis, cardiac pacemaker 
implantation and hyperbaric oxygen therapy as examples. Cohen is concerned about 
the cost of such technologies and about the tendency for medical opinion to swing 
behind their adoption based on very limited evidence. He argues for central control 
over the evaluation and introduction of new technologies, rather than ‘free 
enterprise’. The system for funding ‘special medical developments’ provided a 
means of control, imposing evaluation whilst providing central financial support for 
such technologies. So, for example, he argues that, in the case of the national roll-out 
of renal dialysis, the Department’s ability to influence the patterns and quality of 
services from central funds contributed to better outcomes than could have been 
achieved through a rash of local initiatives.  
Cohen’s exegesis of the policy dilemmas arising from screening and new medical 
developments supported his basic argument, which was designed to dispel any 
lingering doubts about the legitimacy of a departmental R&D programme. 
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The accelerating pace of medical progress, the exigencies created by a 
national health service, and the new public alertness to health matters 
consequent on the development of media of mass communication and 
education have combined to generate social pressures which have 
enormously increased the scope and urgency of an executive health 
department's dependence on research. 
The exact balance between department and researcher initiative was as variable 
for medical research as it was for operations research. Cohen estimated in 1967 that 
between half and three quarters of all medical research projects had been initiated by 
the Ministry.1 Generalisation is problematical because of the wide range of 
circumstances through which projects came about. The balance of influence between 
the Ministry, researchers and hospital authorities varied from project to project. 
External partners, such as the Nuffield Provincial Hospitals Trust, also played a 
significant role in the initiation and funding of some projects, as did local NHS 
bodies.  
The evaluation of cytology screening for cervical cancer illustrates this variation 
and shows how the networks involved were often so well developed that it is 
impossible to unpick the balance of initiative. This was a topic that Cohen saw as 
emblematic of the rationale for a Departmental programme. Although he regretted 
the decision to launch a screening programme without a strong evidence-base, he 
believed that there was still a need to evaluate the programme and establish details 
such as the optimum interval between tests. Research was undertaken by the MRC 
Epidemiology Unit in South Wales with the support of the Welsh National School of 
Medicine, Cardiff City Council, and the Welsh Hospital Board. It was led by 
Archibald Cochrane, director of the MRC unit. Cohen described the project as 
having arisen ‘spontaneously’ from ‘the Cardiff people’.2  Cochrane gives a different 
view, saying that the Department took the lead through a ‘preliminary sounding of 
senior figures in epidemiology and social medicine’, including himself. 3  The ready 
availability of a suitably experienced research group presumably made the choice of 
a supplier so obvious that the participants themselves were left with differing 
perceptions as to where the balance of initiative lay. Strong personal connections 
between the researcher and medical leadership at the Department would have further 
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added to the ease of decision-making, as would the support of other stakeholders 
such as the local NHS authorities. 
Social Research 
The Department used the term ‘social research’ to describe research by social 
scientists.  Within the health and welfare field, most Department-sponsored social 
research was concerned with the services administered by local authorities and, to a 
much lesser extent, by the executive committees.  
Community-based services offered social scientists relative ease of access to study 
populations, in contrast to hospitals, and was well-suited to the techniques favoured 
by social researchers, such as surveys. The field was largely neglected by medically-
qualified researchers, with two significant exceptions. Psychiatrists led research into 
mental health care. Medical epidemiologists were interested in community services. 
The numbers of the latter were few and their methods more positivistic and 
quantitative than those of medical sociologists. The specialist nature of these medical 
interests left a great deal of territory open for colonisation by social scientists.1 
The Medical Officers of Health (MOsH) were the medical constituency with the 
most cause to be interested in research into local authority services. Their remit was 
not comprehensive because of the divide between health and welfare services. The 
statutory basis of the latter was the National Assistance Act of 1948 (for adult 
services); and the Children’s Act of 1948 (for children’s services), rather than the 
NHS Act of 1946 which set out the MOH’s sphere of influence.2 In most local 
authorities, health and welfare services were overseen by separate committees and 
were under the separate leadership of the MOH and the Chief Welfare Officer. Only 
in a progressive minority of authorities were the two functions combined in a single 
committee and both senior offices held by a single individual.3 Consequently, 
medical involvement in welfare services was limited. But even within their sphere of 
interest, the MOsH as an occupational group were not much engaged with research. 
Although academic leaders in social medicine hoped that public health doctors would 
engage in epidemiological investigations, this remained the exception. In part, this 
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was to do with the ‘schism’ between social medicine and public health practitioners. 
At a more prosaic level, it reflected the extent to which the latter were consumed by 
the administrative aspects of their role, and isolated within local authority structures.1  
The Department tried to encourage more public health doctors, together with general 
practitioners, to participate in research through the LORS. Cohen says that funds 
were first allotted for research in each of ‘the GP and local health and welfare 
services’ in 1964/5. In the Estimates, a separate heading for ‘other clinical research’ 
(as opposed to hospital clinical research) first appears in this year.2 This budget grew 
to about 15 percent of the total clinical research budget by 1970/1, after which it is 
no longer separately itemised.  
The Ministry sent a letter to all RHBs in 1966, suggesting that they should 
encourage research into community-based services and advising them to co-opt a 
general practitioner or MOH to their research committees. Nevertheless, most Boards 
continued to spend the great majority of funds allocated under the scheme to the 
support of hospital projects.3 Consequently, only six percent of LORS-funded 
projects were led by community-based clinicians in 1972.4 This low participation 
rate was not helped by a growing distance between academic social medicine and the 
practice of community medicine.5 The out-of-hospital services field was left open for 
social researchers, with the exception of niches of medical interest. Department 
sponsorship of social scientists was particularly important, given the low take up by 
community medicine of research opportunities. The peripheral role of the MOH in 
research was one aspect of a bigger picture of missed opportunities and declining 
influence.6 
The Department was also interested in social work as a field for investigation. The 
Local Authority Social Services Act of 1970 created local authority social services 
departments and, in April 1971, these replaced welfare committees and assumed the 
                                                             
1. Jane Lewis, What Price Community Medicine? (Brighton, Wheatsheaf Books, 1986), 92.  
2.  Class VI-14 A6(3) 
3. MH 166/437, Unpublished report of the DHSS/MRC joint working party on the 
Decentralised Clinical Research Scheme in England and Wales under the Chairmanship 
of Sir Douglas Black para.7 
4. Ibid. para. 17 
5. Porter, Decline of Social Medicine. 
6. Lewis, What Price Community Medicine? 
 168 
 
personal services responsibilities of local authority health committees.1 The Seebohm 
Committee, which had recommended the creation of integrated social services 
departments, devoted a whole section of its report to the importance of research.2 
Against this background, the Department felt the need for more knowledge about the 
organisation and outcomes of social work. This was a topic of no more than 
peripheral interest to the medical profession and, again, the field was left open for 
social researchers. 
More unusually, social researchers sometimes moved into territory that might 
otherwise have been occupied by medically-qualified researchers undertaking 
‘medical care research’. This included research into hospital-based care that would 
have been categorised, under the conventions adopted in Portfolio 1, as medical if 
led by a medical doctor. An example is Margaret Stacey’s study on the welfare of 
children in hospital. Stacey went on to become Professor of Sociology at the 
University of Warwick and was a leading figure in the British Sociological 
Association’s medical sociology group.3 She approached the Ministry speculatively 
in 1963, proposing a study to be undertaken in collaboration with the Glantawe 
Hospital Management Committee. Her proposal had the backing of the Welsh Board 
of Health. The care of children in hospital was a live issue following the ‘Platt 
Report’ and the formation of the pressure group Mother Care for Children in 
Hospital. Stacey was unknown to the Ministry and so Cohen sought the opinion of 
paediatricians through his medical networks.4 The project’s findings caused 
considerable controversy because they challenged the view of the medical profession 
that parental access to children in hospital should be limited.5 The study has been 
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described as pivotal in a journey from parental exclusion to toleration and eventual 
active participation in the care of the hospitalised child. 1 
The Department was aware that social research was a developing field. Processes 
of institutionalisation for social sciences lagged far behind those for medicine.2 After 
the establishment of the Social Science Research Council (SSRC) in 1965, the 
Ministry anticipated an increase in social research and became concerned about its 
competence to commission such work. Its response was to set up an in-house unit, 
the Social Science Research Unit (SSRU). This was the only new in-house unit set 
up in the 1960s. Although established with only four staff, initial expectations were 
high. It was envisaged that SSRU would be the primary point of liaison with the 
SSRC; give advice on research policy; provide expertise on methods; and undertake 
its own programme of research.3 The unit turned out to be under-powered and its 
ineffectiveness contributed to a preference for external suppliers. 
Research into social security provided another strand of social research after the 
DHSS was created in 1968. The Ministry of Social Security (MSS) had its own 
research and statistics branch and only a few weeks prior to merger the outgoing 
Minister, Judith Hart, had split this into two separate divisions, strengthening each 
with additional staff and appointing a research  advisory panel.4 The MSS 
commissioned research into the financial circumstances of the disabled, the 
employment prospects of widows under fifty, fatherless families, the long-term 
unemployed, and take-up of benefits.5 When the two ministries combined, it became 
apparent that there was a significant overlap in research programmes. Ill-health and 
disability were significant causes of poverty and policies for income maintenance sat 
alongside policies for personal social services in maintaining welfare.  
The creation of the merged Department should give a greater impetus to 
the joint study of the needs for income maintenance and the needs, for 
health and welfare services - to what extent are these needs correlated 
and how do they interact? It should be possible to use research resources 
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more effectively, and it should be easier to plan the work in a merged 
Statistics and Research Division which should also facilitate more 
effective liaison on the Social Security side with universities and other 
outside bodies including the Social Science Research Council.1 
The research administration of the former MSS was bolted onto S&R as a separate 
branch and remained in a separate building. Discussion on organisational and 
programmatic integration continued throughout 1969 and into 1970. The social 
security research branch appears to have ploughed its own furrow throughout the pre-
Rothschild period and its budgetary allocations remained modest (see chart 4.6).  
Supplies and equipment research 
The Department had a dual responsibility for supplies and equipment research. It 
was the ‘production authority’ for the medical devices industry, which meant that it 
was responsible for encouraging the development of British products with export 
potential. It was also concerned to evaluate supplies and equipment prior to adoption 
by the NHS. Where the Department saw promise, its production authority role might 
mean positive intervention to assist manufacturers in developing a product. In its 
evaluation role, it might act to block the introduction of untried and insufficiently 
developed equipment.2 An interventionist policy was viewed as necessary because of 
the particular conditions pertaining to the medical equipment industry. This industry 
had no mass consumer market, development costs could be very high and the main 
customer in the UK was the parsimonious NHS. Before about 1980, no British 
company had made a major commitment to medical devices and the sector did not 
contain firms with the capacity for major investment in R&D.3 Medical device 
development involved a range of partners. In addition to the Department these might 
include industry, universities, government laboratories, NHS authorities, hospital 
endowment funds and independent charities.  
As with operational, medical and social research, projects could be initiated 
through a variety of channels, including the medical staff of the Department, hospital 
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authorities, industry, individual inventors and the Supply Division itself. Decisions 
about which projects to pursue were made by the Medical Supplies Research and 
Development Steering Committee. This continued to exist after the central R&D 
Committee was set up in 1967 and the participation of the Supply Division in the 
latter was more by way of information sharing than seeking direction. The dual 
administrative/medical structure also operated in supplies research, with the progress 
of each project being overseen by a dyad of project officer and medical lead. The 
Supply Division was capable of making bold investment decisions, as exemplified by 
its support for computed tomography where its intervention came at critical points in 
the development of this new technology.1 
The MRC was also interested in the development of medical equipment, but with 
a primary interest in research purposes. This work was pursued through the 
biomedical engineering division of the National Institute for Medical Research. In 
practice, the MRC’s motivation and that of the Department often converged in time. 
New technologies in medicine are often the result of the transfer of technology from 
other sectors. Development of medical devices that are authorised for routine clinical 
use frequently strengthens the capacity to undertake ‘upstream’ research, rather than 
originating in such research.2 A classic example of this is Magnetic Resonance 
Imaging (MRI) scanning, the origins of which lay in basic research on the structure 
of the atom. MRI was supported by the MRC long before it was clear that the 
technology could be integrated into routine clinical practice, because of its potential 
as an imaging tool for research. Once industry and clinicians had grasped its 
potential, then the path was set towards the development of MRI for routine clinical 
use. The adoption of MRI in routine clinical use opened-up many new possibilities 
for research through increased access to patients.3  Contrasting CT and MRI, the 
motivation and engagement point of the Department and the MRC was quite 
different in each case, but the end-point of a novel technology adopted in routine 
clinical use was the same. 
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The Supply Division ran the only in-house research unit existing prior to 1966, the 
Biomechanical Research and Development Unit (BRADU). The origins of the unit 
lay in the First World War, when Queen Mary’s Hospital, Roehampton became a 
specialist centre for fitting artificial limbs. This service was later formalised as the 
Artificial Limb Unit, which undertook R&D as well as supporting a specialist 
clinical service at Queen Mary’s.1 The re-designation of the unit as BRADU in 1967 
coincided with its move to purpose-designed new buildings on the Roehampton. 
BRADU’s focus was on research into the management of amputees and congenital 
limb disorders; and the development of artificial limbs (including powered limbs) 
and prosthetics. It served as the R&D hub for a national network of limb and 
appliance centres.2 
Computer research 
Computer research before 1973 was pursued through the Experimental Computer 
Programme (ECP), which was the first national computing initiative in the English 
NHS.3 The scale of resources committed to ECP was very substantial, rising to a 
peak of £5.5 million, or just over 40% of the total R&D budget in 1972/3. This 
funding was top-sliced from the hospital revenue vote. A computing policy and 
development branch (CPDB) was established in 1967 and attached to S&R. Despite 
the size of the financial commitment and the location of CPDB, the ECP appears to 
have been somewhat detached from the rest of the R&D programme. It was 
discussed only in passing by the R&D committee and usually omitted from its 
reports, including financial projections. Where included, it is typically covered in a 
separate appendix. CPBD, together with O&M, was moved from S&R into a new 
Automatic Data Processing and O&M division in 1970. A year later, these activities 
became part of a bigger Management Services division, headed by Under-Sectary 
Kenneth Stowe.4 Stowe took a firm management grip on ECP, which was causing 
                                                             
1. Helen Alper, A History of Queen Mary's University Hospital Roehampton (London: 
Twickenham & Roehampton Healthcare NHS Trust, 1996). 
2. D. S. McKenzie, “Biomechanical Research and Development Unit (BRADU),” in Portfolio 
for Health. The Role and Programme of the DHSS in Health Services Research ed. Gordon 
McLachlan. London: Oxford University Press, 1971: 197-203. 
3. Davies, Experimental Computer Programme.  
4. MH166/256, Establishment Notice 136/66 11 July 1966; British Civil Service Calendar and 
Imperial List, 1967 to 1972. 
 173 
 
considerable difficulties in relations with the Treasury. Prior to his involvement, 
management appears to have been left largely in the hands of CPDB, who the 
Treasury regarded as unrealistic computer enthusiasts. Governance arrangements 
were also less than convincing, with no external scrutiny at all prior to the 
establishment of the Advisory Committee on Medical Computing (ACMC) in 1969.1 
All of this suggests that the R&D programme represented little more than a flag of 
convenience for ECP, providing access to funding through the mechanism of hospital 
revenue vote top-slicing. This impression is reinforced by the approach taken 
towards evaluation of ECP. The Department’s original assumption was that each site 
would be able to assess the impact of computerisation by before-and-after 
comparison. However, this proved unrealistic because long elapsed timescales for 
projects meant that so many factors changed that it was impossible to isolate the 
impact of computerisation. The task of developing methodologies for evaluation 
proved more difficult than anticipated and project heterogeneity limited scope for 
transferability of learning. The Department was slow to react to these problems. 
Guidance on evaluation was not issued until 1972, by which time responsibility for 
ECP had moved out of S&R and into the Management Services division. Another 
four years passed before an evaluation working group was set up to provide 
consistent methods and co-ordinate findings from the various sites.2  
From this brief overview, it will be apparent that the dynamics of growth in the 
computer strand of research were completely different from those in other streams. 
Essentially, very large grants were made to a small number of NHS sites for the 
purchase, development and evaluation of computers on the basis of a ministerial 
decision. There was no equivalent to the brokering between researchers and internal 
customers undertaken by the informal team. There was no external research 
community – research was undertaken by local teams of NHS and medical school 
staff, with some practical support from CPRB. Prior to 1972, these local teams were 
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left to develop their own approach to evaluation. None of this was a winning formula 
for implementation, let alone evaluation, and the programme ran into difficulties of 
slippage and cost escalation that prompted a review as early as 1971. Given these 
observations, it could be argued that ECP was never fully part of the departmental 
R&D programme, being more of a separate endeavour operating under a flag of 
convenience. This said, it is difficult to ignore the programme given its enormous 
budget, which was counted by Treasury as being part of the Department’s R&D 
budget. Computers were clearly recognised as a key field for research and 
development and this stream re-emerged in the 1980s, once the Department had 
disentangled itself from ECP. At a basic level of organisational politics, ECP cannot 
have done much for the reputation of S&R and the programme provided a source of 
friction as the Department sought to implement Rothschild.  
Later developments 
These five principal streams, which were persistent through to 1986 and beyond, 
saw some evolution during the 1970s and 1980s. Clinical research ceased to become 
the preserve of doctors as other professions, such as nursing and speech therapy, 
became engaged in research. The Department encouraged this trend towards multi-
professional engagement. Nursing, for example, was allocated a dedicated RLG, 
which developed a stream of activity. The primary centres for this were the Nursing 
Education Research Unit at Chelsea College, London and the Department of Nursing 
at the University of Manchester. However, the scale of this ‘other professional’ 
research remained very limited compared to medical research, as is evident from the 
R&D yearbooks.1  
Economists successfully cultivated the patronage of the Department during the 
1970s, assisted by the growth of the EAO which undertook a considerable amount of 
research in-house but also drew upon external resources as required. The principal 
extra-mural centre for economic research was the University of York. Health 
economists exercised a disproportionate influence over the programme in the 1970s, 
with meetings of the Chief Scientists’ Research Committee often held in York. The 
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discipline has not been reticent about its own contribution to health and social 
security research.1 Nevertheless, the R&D yearbooks make it clear that economics 
was seen more as a methodological resource for studies in any category than as a 
separate stream.2  
In computer research, activity was curtailed from the mid-1970s onwards. In the 
aftermath of ECP, the Department passed the baton to the Regional Health 
Authorities, invoking the 1974 reorganisation mantra of ‘maximum devolution’ to 
justify this stepping back.3 In 1985, the Department described its role as providing 
financial support to those ‘bodies, mostly NHS authorities, who assume 
responsibility for projects for research into, and development of… computers in the 
management and provision of health services’.4 
Concluding discussion 
The diversity of the programme is evident from this review of its principal 
streams. The tendency in the literature to portray it as a proto-HSR programme 
understates the scale and importance of other streams of activity. Customer 
requirements, researcher communities, and the department’s networks were all quite 
dissimilar between the various streams. Dissimilarity extended to research utilisation, 
with fundamental differences in the path from knowledge to implementation 
between, say, a social research study and the experimental development of a medical 
device. The Department faced the challenge of constructing organisational 
arrangements that could accommodate such heterogeneity in a single programme. 
The combination of the informal team and the R&DC managed this effectively for 
medical, social, and operational research. Supplies research largely ploughed its own 
furrow, but was co-ordinated with health and welfare activities through the R&DC. 
Computer research was only loosely integrated. 
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Closer examination of the composition of the programme and the character of the 
principal streams further explains why the MRC did not see the emerging 
departmental programme as any threat to its structural dominance. The only element 
that might have been perceived as such was medical research. Yet in 1972/3, for 
example, medical research accounted for less than 20% of the total budget, with most 
funding committed to LORS and PHLS research. Less than 5% was allocated for 
centrally-commissioned medical research.1 Resources were directed towards topics 
that held little interest for the MRC, such as evaluation of screening programmes and 
new clinical services. The HPSSR programme was firmly directed towards the 
practical needs of the NHS and understood by the MRC to be operating within the 
boundaries agreed in the concordats and confirmed by the Cohen Report. This 
perception, together with the cohesiveness of the medical elite, sustained harmony 
until the publication of the Green Paper ‘A Framework for Government Research 
and Development’ disturbed the status quo in 1971.  
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8. Rothschild Partly Implemented: 1971 to 1973 
 
I think it has been unfortunate that, with no increase in research 
management staffing, the DHSS has to some extent been distracted by 
biomedical responsibilities from the area of research in which it had played 
an entrepreneurial role almost to the point of monopoly…The deviation of 
personal commitment into complicated arrangements for commissioning 
biomedical research can scarcely have failed to diminish the manpower 
resources available within the DHSS for fostering HPSS research.1 
 
The work of Maurice Kogan and his colleagues provides the obvious starting 
place for examination of the ‘Rothschild reforms’ at the DHSS. First-hand access to 
the Department over seven years confers considerable authority on the writings of 
this research team. Yet for all its authority, their body of work suffers from two 
limitations. First, it pays little attention to events before 1974, when the team began 
its engagement. Second, it treats the implementation of Rothschild as if it happened 
in isolation from other organisational change at the DHSS.  
Kogan and Henkel’s treatment of the historical backdrop to the situation they first 
encountered in 1974 is brief to the point of being cursory. Such discussion as there is 
deals mostly with the general growth of rationality and planning in government, 
rather than the specific history of research management.2 The pre-Rothschild era is 
characterised as an ‘individualist, perhaps charismatic, phase’ in which ‘scientists 
were discovered and units promoted by individual members of the Department, 
whose images are now more heroic than bureaucratic’.3 Organisational structures for 
R&D in the ‘golden age’ were certainly simpler than the elaborate architecture 
implemented in response to Rothschild. However, they were not so rudimentary as to 
support any suggestion that the pre-Rothschild programme was pre-bureaucratic. Nor 
was the Department backwards in adopting new thinking, as shown by its early 
adoption of the customer-contractor principle. This neglect of the historical backdrop 
means that that the transition from one set of structures and processes to another in 
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1973 is not explored. Similarly, there is no discussion of how the relationship 
between the Department and the MRC had developed prior to Rothschild, nor of how 
this stood immediately prior to Rothschild. 
Kogan and Henkel also treat the implementation of Rothschild as if this occurred 
in isolation. In fact, R&D reform coincided with a period of exceptional 
organisational change at the DHSS. The prospect of NHS reorganisation prompted 
the Department to embark upon its own restructuring, implemented in two phases 
between 1972 and 1974. This coincided with the requirement to introduce the 
Rothschild reforms in R&D management. Although these two strands of reform had 
separate origins, both were manifestations of the desire to render government more 
managerial, as espoused by the Fulton Committee in 1968 and pursued by the Heath 
government after 1970.1 Novel approaches to ‘strategic planning’, then highly 
fashionable in the private sector, were adapted as a central plank of managerialism in 
government. Fulton endorsed planning and linked it to research through the 
committee’s recommendation that all government departments should establish 
planning and research units.2 Against this background, the reform of R&D 
management was caught up in the wider reorganisation of the DHSS. Kogan and 
Henkel touch upon this connection in a short and somewhat opaque passage. They do 
not develop the discussion enough to draw any explicit conclusions about the 
consequences for the R&D organisation. 3 
As a response to these reflections on the Kogan corpus and its limitations, this 
chapter focuses on the years 1971 to 1973. It will be argued that most of the 
difficulties experienced in research management from 1973 onwards can be traced 
back to decisions made by the Department during this short but pivotal period. What 
then followed was the protracted playing-out of a difficult hand. Events between 
1971 and 1973 are examined in two parts. The first considers the ‘Rothschild 
reforms’ in national science policy and the impact of these on the relationship 
between the Department and the MRC. It shows how the medical elite managed 
affairs to limit the potential de-stabilisation introduced by Rothschild. It argues that, 
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in so doing, science policy reform was effectively neutered for biomedical research. 
The second part turns to the administrative side and places the implementation of 
Rothschild in the wider context of DHSS reorganisation. It shows how, whether by 
intent or accidentally, the Department managed to implement deeply flawed 
administrative structures for research management. It argues that it was this 
combination of medical subversion and administrative misjudgement that lay at the 
root of the difficulties experienced in operationalising Rothschild. 
A Framework for Government Research and Development  
The Green Paper, A Framework for Government Research and Development, was 
published in November 1971.1  This document bound together two reports that were 
entirely dissimilar in philosophy, style and intent. The first, on the organisation and 
management of government R&D, had been commissioned by Prime Minister Heath 
from the Central Policy Review Staff (CPRS).  Lord Victor Rothschild, Director of 
CPRS, was credited as the author. A second report on the future of the research 
council system, prepared by a working group of the Council for Scientific Policy 
(CSP) under the chairmanship of Sir Frederick Dainton, had quite separate origins 
and had been submitted to the government some six months earlier. The 
juxtaposition of these two reports was so remarkable that The Sunday Times 
described it as ‘a riotous contrast – as though the Pope and the Rev. Ian Paisley’s 
views on the right way to organise a Christian church were placed side by side in a 
single volume’.2 The ‘Dainton report’ was cautious in its recommendations for 
improved co-ordination between the research councils and couched in temperate 
language. The ‘Rothschild report’, which was brusque and iconoclastic in its tone, 
recommended the introduction of a ‘customer-contractor principle’ for all applied 
research.3 Government endorsement of this principle, in a brief introduction to the 
Green Paper, set the cat among the pigeons. The ensuing controversy has been 
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documented elsewhere.1 At the end of this controversy, a White Paper bearing the 
same title (less the indefinite article) was published in July 1972. This substantially 
confirmed commitment to the reforms proposed by Rothschild in the Green Paper, 
albeit with some softening of language.2 The archival material now available would 
allow a comprehensive re-visiting of this whole episode, but discussion here is 
confined to matters of direct relevance. 
Rothschild drew a distinction between basic and applied research. In his report, 
the latter is described as directed towards a product, process or ‘method of 
operation’. Basic research is directed towards adding to the stock of knowledge 
without any specific outcome in mind. Rothschild accepts that there is some truth in 
the argument that basic research can lead to practical applications in unplanned and 
unanticipated ways. However, he dismisses such happenstance as a proper basis for 
policy, saying that ‘the country’s needs are not so trivial as to be left to the mercies 
of a form of scientific roulette’.  Instead, he maintains, all government-funded 
applied research should be commissioned using the customer-contractor principle. In 
his most-quoted dictum, ‘the customer says what he wants; the contractor does it (if 
he can); and the customer pays’.3 In the health domain, the customer was identified 
as the DHSS and the Scottish Home and Health Department (SHHD). Rothschild 
proposed that a quarter of the MRC’s budget, some £5.6 million, should be 
transferred to the health departments in 1972/3 for the commissioning of applied 
health research. As a transitional mechanism, the health departments would be 
expected to use most of these funds to commission work from the MRC. This 
arrangement would last for only three years, after which the health departments 
would be free to commission work from any qualified provider.4  
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To administer the customer-contractor scheme, Rothschild proposed two roles in 
each government department affected. The first was the Chief Scientist (CS), who 
would lead the customer function. Rothschild was adamant that this should be more 
than a purely advisory role, rejecting the title ‘Chief Scientific Adviser’ for this 
reason. He envisaged that the CS would have an organisation, with representation in 
the different divisions of his or her government department.1  On the supply side, 
there would be a ‘controller R&D’ leading the contractor organisation. The controller 
should not report to the CS, because ‘they are engaged in quite different activities’. 
Rothschild envisaged sizeable in-house research establishments in government 
departments, which it was the controller’s job to co-ordinate. Where such resources 
were unavailable or unqualified, then the controller would lead the commissioning of 
research from external providers.2 The controller would also control funds raised 
through the ‘general research surcharge’, a ten percent levy on all research contracts 
intended to support provider-initiated investigations.  
The government ran a formal consultation on the Green Paper, lasting until the 
end of February 1972. It received 417 letters, of which 26 percent were supportive of 
Rothschild and 58 percent opposed.3  The scientific community, with medical 
scientists to the fore, orchestrated a campaign of opposition through the 
correspondence columns of The Times. The MRC also stated its case before the 
House of Commons Select Committee on Science and Technology.4 Despite this 
vocal opposition, the government was determined to press on with implementation of 
the customer-contractor principle. The background to the CPRS report lay in an 
earlier proposal by the newly-elected Heath government that the Ministry of 
Agriculture, Fisheries and Food (MAFF) should absorb the Agricultural Research 
Council (ARC). This proposal had been strongly opposed by the CSP. Prior to this, 
the transfer of all research councils into government departments had been 
contemplated by the Cabinet Office, but rejected as too politically difficult.5 These 
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moves reflected a growing conviction that the research councils had become too self-
absorbed and were neglecting societal needs.1 For all its apparent radicalism, 
Rothschild was a fall-back strategy for reining in the research councils and the 
government was not inclined towards any further compromise. Publication of the 
White Paper was delayed not by any government wavering over policy, but instead 
by haggling over money as the research councils fought a rear-guard action. This 
matter required resolution at cabinet level, but here too there was disputation, with 
battle lines drawn between ministers for the administrative departments and the 
Secretary of State for Education and Science, Margaret Thatcher. Thatcher sought to 
minimise transfer sums, pleading a threat to the viability of the research councils. 
The Chief Scientific Adviser to the government, Sir Alan Cottrell, brokered an 
acceptable compromise, but this took some months.2  
When the White Paper was finally published in July 1972 it included a 
commitment to the transfer of funds commencing in the budget year 1973/4. The 
sum involved for the DHSS was, in the event, little changed from that proposed in 
the Green Paper (in cash terms) at £5.5 million, or just under a quarter of the MRC 
annual budget.3 The White Paper stated that no transfers would be made until the 
customer departments had established their central scientific staff.4 This set 
departments an aggressive timetable of less than eight months for implementation of 
Rothschild-compliant arrangements. The customer-contractor principle remained 
central, but was now presented as ‘partnership working’.  
An essential feature of this approach is provision for continuing 
discussion and partnership between customers and contractors and with 
other interested sections of the community. These are to be extended and 
developed.5 
The White Paper accepted that many of the ideas for research would originate with 
researchers. The role of scientists in government would be increased. In the case of 
the DHSS, it was stated that the Chief Scientist ‘would be helped by a small team of 
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scientists who will work part-time in the Department’. They would ‘act as a link 
between the Department and the scientific community, so as to develop discussions 
and partnership between the two’.1 This was, in effect, a mandate for deliberative 
working, representing a significant departure from Rothschild’s preference for 
market-like exchanges. This softening reflected two influences. First, the promise of 
greater contractor involvement in shaping the research agenda. This was offered as a 
sop to the research community at a time when the government was extremely anxious 
about the possible reactions of scientists to the White Paper, fearing mass 
resignations from the research councils.2 Second, it can be seen as a response to 
recommendations made in the Fulton Committee on the greater involvement of 
specialists in policy development.3 The Prime Minister, Edward Heath (1916-2005), 
was especially keen to see progress in this last respect and saw the White Paper as an 
opportunity to clarify how this would be achieved at the DHSS.4 
The Framework presented several enticing opportunities for the DHSS. It held out 
the prospect that more money would be directed towards service-orientated medical 
research; that R&D leadership and management would be strengthened; that research 
would become more central to the working of the Department; and that a more 
integrated programme would develop. It also presented a threat. The reforms risked 
de-stabilising the relationship with the MRC, undoing the good relations that had 
been so carefully cultivated by Godber and Cohen. This was, moreover, a risk 
heightened by the approaching retirement of these two individuals. Realising the 
opportunities presented by the White Paper as a whole was a matter for both the 
administrative and professional sides of the parallel structure. But negotiation of 
arrangements for the commissioning of biomedical research and management of the 
Department’s relationship with the MRC were treated as primarily a matter for 
medical officials. This latter aspect of implementation was the least affected by the 
reorganisation of the DHSS, and is considered first, before attempting to understand 
the more complex events on the administrative side. 
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The MRC and biomedical research 
The proposed transfer of MRC funds presented an unprecedented opportunity for 
additional resources to be secured for service-orientated medical research. When 
consulted by the CPRS prior to the Green Paper’s finalisation, Richard Cohen 
proposed that half of the MRC’s total spend on public health, clinical medicine and 
social medicine combined should be transferred to the health departments. This 
amounted to £6 million, compared to the £5.6 million proposed in the Green Paper. 
Cohen identified several specific areas in which the MRC’s programme was 
inadequate in response to the scale of the issues involved, including immunisation, 
nutrition, environmental toxicology, renal dialysis and epidemiology. He argued that 
‘the exploitation by applied research of existing fundamental knowledge would pay 
the quickest dividends at the present time in improved treatment’. This ‘needed shift 
of perspective’ would be facilitated by increased DHSS influence over the MRC’s 
programmes through the power of the purse.1  
Despite the strength of these privately-expressed views, the DHSS was notably 
less assertive than other departments in seeking to maximise the funds transferred 
from the research councils.2 At one stage in the dispute over transfer sums, the 
Cabinet Office explored the possibility of cutting the transfer total for all the research 
councils to £10 million, compared to Rothschild’s proposed £29 million. This would 
have meant reducing the amount to be transferred to DHSS from 25 to 10 percent of 
the total MRC budget. The DHSS did not contest this proposed reduction, whereas 
other departments argued forcefully - and successfully - against it.3 The DHSS also 
initially proposed a slow pace for the transfer of funds, beginning in 1975. This was 
rejected by the Chief Scientific Adviser as being too protracted a timetable.4 
Ironically, given how prominent the MRC was in its opposition to the Green Paper, 
the DHSS/MRC dynamic appears to have been the least of the Cabinet Office’s 
worries. One reason for this was that the MRC had the largest budget of the three 
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research councils affected, but faced the smallest proposed transfer percentage at 25 
percent. This can be compared to the 75 percent transfer originally proposed for 
ARC. A less obvious reason is that the DHSS was the least assertive of the 
government departments in its attempts to maximise the size of its transfer sum. This 
diffidence is indicative of the Department’s eagerness not to de-stabilise the 
relationship with the MRC, or at least to do so by no more than was inescapable 
given government policy.  
The MRC’s case against the Green Paper was formally laid out in a consultation 
submission and, more forcefully, in a memorandum to the Select Committee. In both, 
the Council argued against the customer-contractor principle for biomedical research. 
The consultation response endorses Dainton’s analysis and his proposal for a new 
body to oversee the relationship between the research councils and government, 
although arguing for the latter to be watered-down to an advisory rather than an 
executive body.1 The MRC’s case against Rothschild was a mix of the ostensibly 
principled and the practical. The Council rejected the utility of the applied/basic 
science distinction in biomedical research, claiming that ‘since basic research on any 
one subject may illuminate problems in many different diseases, the piecemeal 
planning of research would be wasteful of money and manpower’. The customer-
contractor principle was ‘inappropriate for most biomedical research’ and would be 
‘less helpful in the long term in satisfying the needs of government departments than 
the proposals put forward by the Council’. The ‘Haldane Principle’ was invoked to 
argue against greater government influence. As a more immediate and practical 
consideration, these submissions argued that the proposed funds transfer would 
damage medical research in both the MRC and the universities.2 The Council’s 
objections of principle were reiterations of long-held positions, harking back to 
Thomson’s critique of the applied/basic split. As such, they were interpreted by some 
commentators as both predictable and self-serving.3 Less predictably, in a letter to 
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The Times, the Chairman of the MRC Clinical Research Board, Sir Douglas Black, 
raised a further grievance. 
If the health departments are dissatisfied with the role of the MRC they 
have conspicuously neglected the opportunity to say so in the account of 
the department’s role in research and development in…Portfolio for 
Health. A glowing tribute is there paid to the MRC, including an 
appreciation of its independent role, and exemplifying by the setting up 
of two joint research units ‘the intimate collaboration that has existed 
between the two organisations since they were set up almost 
simultaneously nearly fifty years ago’.1 
Black was a prominent critic of the Green Paper, signing critical consultation 
submissions from his unit in Manchester and appearing for the MRC before the 
Commons Select Committee. Within a few months of this active opposition he had 
been appointed as Chief Scientist designate at the DHSS, with an announcement that 
he would take up this post in April 1973. Why did the Department rush to appoint a 
prominent critic of Rothschild to take over from Cohen as Chief Scientist and to lead 
under the Rothschild system? 
A letter from the Permanent Secretary to Sir William Armstrong, head of the Civil 
Service Department, written in August 1972, makes the circumstances plain. It 
begins by saying that the Department had begun looking in earnest for the right 
person to succeed Richard Cohen ‘now that the White Paper has been published’. 
Rogers reports that the MRC and the Royal Society had been consulted and all 
agreed that the Department ‘should aim for a really top figure in the medical world’ 
who would have scientific credibility but also have a ‘strong interest in the efficient 
and effective development of the health service’ and the ‘breadth of mind’ to also 
take an interest in the personal social services. The letter then goes on to report that 
‘by happy chance’ and by ‘great good luck’ they have, through the process of 
preliminary consultation, happened upon ‘the right man’, i.e. Black. This letter is 
worth quoting at greater length, for both its tone and its substance. 
He would have been our own first choice, or equal first choice, but by a 
happy chance he was spontaneously suggested to us by John Gray 
himself and thus MRC support would be assured. We have now been 
able to canvas…five out of the six Royal College presidents available 
and all feel we could not do better. Black’s private and public attitude to 
the Rothschild proposals…was one of moderate and responsible 
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opposition but he made it clear recently at the MRC discussion of the 
White Paper that, the decision now having been taken by government, it 
was everyone’s duty to make the new arrangements work. We are sure he 
will do this wholeheartedly. George and Dick, [Godber and Cohen] who 
know him well, both say there is no one they would rather trust, and he 
has just the right temperament to strike the right balance between loyalty 
and independence.1 
The rest of the letter is mainly concerned with making the case against any 
competitive recruitment process and for appointing Black under an arrangement that 
would allow him to be paid at medical rather than civil service rates. The letter, 
which perhaps rather overplays its claims of happy chance, ends with the observation 
that ‘if this could be announced early it might go a long way towards helping the 
White Paper proposals generally’. As has previously been noted, the Cabinet Office 
was very anxious about responses to the White Paper and so the appointment of 
Black as Chief Scientist designate offered reassurance for all parties. 
Alongside his letter to The Times, Black wrote privately to Godber. Only 
Godber’s reply survives. It shows one member of the medical elite speaking 
confidentially to another as like-minded moderates, alarmed by how strident the 
public debate had become.2 The attitude of Godber towards the Rothschild reforms is 
made clear in a ‘personal and in confidence’ letter to a contact at the MRC, written in 
response to sight of the final draft MRC submission to the Green Paper consultation. 
Godber argues that the MRC is making a mistake in opposing any reform, because 
the status quo is indefensible. He goes on to say that:  
You will know that my own wish is to preserve the independence of the 
Council. I have not sought any kind of formal recognition beyond that 
which I have had in the past in dealing with the council and my personal 
relationships with the Council and its officers have been entirely happy. 
Nonetheless I believe that the Council needs to be seen to be responsive 
to Health Service needs.3  
Godber then argues that the Green Paper actually represents an opportunity for the 
MRC to obtain more resources for its programme, ‘although it is true mainly in the 
clinical and socio-medical fields’. He concludes by saying that what worries him 
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most about the whole affair is the risk of damage to the close relationships between 
the health departments and the MRC. The appointment of Black seems to have 
succeeded in calming the MRC, so that when the Chief Scientific Adviser made 
anxious enquiries about the likely reception of the MRC to the imminent White 
Paper, Godber was able to send a reassuring response. 
I just hope the research councils realise they have to make it work. As it 
happens, although one might have feared that there would be a certain 
amount of suspicion and hostility while all this has been going on, it is 
my belief that we have actually got closer to the MRC. The personalities 
involved are very congenial and I am quite sure that we can make this 
work and get the closer relationship that we need.1 
A spirit of appeasement is evident in the agreement reached between the two 
organisations for the future commissioning of biomedical research (BMR). A DHSS 
submission to the Treasury sets out in two documents how the new arrangements for 
commissioning BMR, as agreed with the MRC, would work in practice.2 This 
submission is remarkable in the extent to which it baldly re-states the MRC’s 
rejection of the validity of any distinction between basic and applied research in the 
case of BMR. It begins by arguing that the DHSS had exercised influence over the 
MRC over many years through its right to appoint observers to the Council and to the 
Clinical Research Board. It then goes on to discuss the ‘special characteristics of 
biomedical research’. These are that ‘the biological processes with which research is 
concerned are highly complex, and experience indicates that it is rarely possible to 
define the course of a research programme in advance’. Based on this familiar 
argument, the submission then invokes Dainton’s concepts of ‘strategic’ and 
‘tactical’ research and argues that ‘a very large part of biomedical research is of this 
strategic kind’. 
Strategic research is aimed at intermediate scientific objectives, provides 
items of evidence and knowledge contributing towards solution of 
practical problems and is clearly relevant in terms of practical objectives, 
but it does not attempt to reach those objectives by means of a single 
program of research planned in some detail from the start and this is not 
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to say that practical results don't emerge from strategic research but only 
that their emergence is unpredictable.1  
The submission also restates the MRC’s long-standing claim that its close links with 
the medical profession equipped it to judge the likely relevance of research and adds 
that ‘this fruitful contact with direct customers’ should not be damaged by the new 
arrangements with the DHSS. In summary, then, the preamble amounts to an 
undiluted re-statement of the MRC’s objections to Rothschild’s proposals, including 
a rejection of his categorisation of research in favour of that proposed by Dainton.  
The submission infers that the previous system was not broken and therefore did not 
need fixing.  
These preliminaries can be read as a ‘softening up’ for the detailed proposals that 
follow. Thinly veiled in the rhetoric of ‘partnership’, these essentially provide for de 
facto control of biomedical research to remain with the MRC. All the money 
transferred was to be spent with the MRC. Biomedical research paid for by the 
Department was to be managed by the MRC, apart from the locally organised 
research scheme. The Council would be ‘the final authority for scientific policy’. It 
would set up three new Boards to replace its Clinical Research and Biological 
Research Boards. Each of these new Boards ‘would be responsible for a full range of 
work within a broad clinical field, from basic clinical research to tactical, clinical and 
epidemiological research’. These boards would ‘initiate policy within their fields’ 
and control funding through grants committees.  
Both ‘specific’ and ‘broad’ commissions were envisaged. The former required 
research requirements to be defined in detail by the Department, which was 
consistent with the spirit of Rothschild. However, specific commissions would 
‘remain open in case the system for broad commissions does not work satisfactorily’.  
Broad commissions, which were envisaged as the default mode, would involve five-
year block grants for ‘sets’ of projects related to broad objectives. The individual 
projects in a ‘set’ would not be subject to approval by the Department. ‘Technically’ 
the Department could refuse to pay for work approved by an MRC Board even 
though it fell within the scope of a broad commission. However, it was noted that the 
Department had no intention of invoking such powers because ‘the essence of the 
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broad commissions is that the interests of the Departments will be best served by 
allowing the MRC to take certain decisions’. The Department also undertook to 
manage the portfolio of broad commissions in a way that would ensure ‘a reasonably 
steady level of expenditure and flow of work for the MRC’. Research policy was to 
be jointly defined ‘without discontinuities between “applied” and “fundamental” 
research, between clinical and biological research, and between research in the 
different fields of application, while taking the fullest account of priorities as seen 
from both the scientific and service points of view’.  
Overall, this submission exhibits notable consistency with the Cohen Report of 
1953 in its arguments and mindset. However, there are some points of departure that 
reflect the influence of Rothschild and the emergence of new fields of research, for 
which the Department had become the leading sponsor. The submission recognises 
the emergence of HSR as a distinct field involving a mix of medical and social 
science. Both organisations agreed that HPSSR should be controlled by the 
Department of Health, so that it could be ‘both planned and managed in the closest 
association with the policy development, management services, and planning and 
analysis work for the Departments’. There is provision for specific commissions, 
even if it is anticipated that broad commissions would become the default mode. The 
submission provides for the health departments to have greater influence over 
research policy, even if this is hedged about with detailed provisions which appear 
mainly intended to constrain this influence.  
Within the apparatus set up by the Department, the Panel for Medical Research 
(PMR) was given oversight of biomedical research commissioning.1 Kogan and 
Henkel document the frustrations experienced by this committee as it struggled to 
‘assess’ broad commissions (they do not mention specific commissions, which the 
Department had barely attempted). Their explanation for these difficulties is that the 
panel was too diffident and too diverse in its membership to develop 
recommendations leading to MRC commissions. The PMR was disbanded in 1977 
and replaced with a mechanism even broader than the broad commission, an annual 
statement of service priorities, to which the MRC would respond with a proposed 
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programme of work. The failure of the PMR to develop a meaningful role is 
portrayed as the pivotal event leading to the return of funds to the MRC. As 
elsewhere, Kogan’s analysis is fundamentally one of incompatible epistemic 
communities and of imbalances in authority between these.  
The story of the PMR exemplifies the impermeability of the authority of 
a Medical Research Council grounded in an internalist view of science, 
and in the notion of indivisibility between basic and applied research. 1 
A closer look at the remit of the PMR, as set out in the document submitted to the 
Treasury, and at its membership, suggests a simpler explanation. The PMR was, 
from the outset, given no meaningful role. This is evident from the submission to the 
Treasury, which specifies three responsibilities for the panel. First, it was to 
formulate the Department’s contribution to joint policy for biomedical research. 
Given the specifics of the MRC/DHSS agreement and the fact that this contribution 
had to be routed through the Chief Scientist’s Research Committee (CSRC) and the 
Planning Committee (discussed further below), this appears a somewhat ceremonial 
duty. Second, it was to develop specific commissions. However, only two such 
commissions were in place by 1977, reflecting a preference on both sides for broad 
commissions.2 Third, it was to undertake retrospective review of the broad 
commissions. Kogan and Henkel do not make this entirely clear, but the PMR’s role 
in defining broad commissions appears to have been confined to indirect influence 
and ‘rubber-stamping’ decisions made elsewhere.3 Given this, it is unsurprising that 
the PMR subsequently struggled to find some purpose in its existence. 
In summary, the intentions of Rothschild had, by 1973, already been subverted in 
the medical research domain. Commissioning arrangements placed control over 
DHSS-funded biomedical research largely in the hands of the MRC. Medical 
leadership under the new regime had been assigned to an MRC stalwart who, 
although a moderate, was openly sceptical about the Rothschild reforms. The PMR 
had been established but assigned no meaningful powers or duties. All this was 
achieved through discussion confined to members of the medical elite, with the 
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administrative side of the Department only being informed once agreements had 
been reached. Specifically, the principles for commissioning biomedical research 
were agreed through a convivial dialogue between Godber, Cohen, John Gray, 
Douglas Black (in his capacity as Chairman of the CRB), and Dr G. K. Matthew, 
who was later appointed Deputy Chief Scientist. 1  This group was of the view that it 
was ‘highly desirable to come to an agreement about links between officers of the 
Council and Department while the organisational situation at the Department was 
still fluid’.2   
Organisation and management for R&D 
Implementation of new administrative arrangements, in response to Rothschild, 
can be divided into two phases. In the first phase, beginning with the publication of 
the White Paper in July 1972, Richard Cohen provided leadership for the DHSS, 
with support from John Cornish. After Cohen’s retirement in March 1973, the 
implementation lead passed to the administrative side. This discontinuity had 
significant consequences for the programme, as will be shown.  
Cohen’s involvement in administrative matters was unremarkable, given his 
position as interim Chief Scientist and his personal contribution to integrated 
working during the ‘golden age’. The approach adopted was a continuation of that 
followed by the informal team, with Cohen focusing on medical research and 
Cornish on operational and social research. There was less urgency to attend to the 
implications of Rothschild for HPSSR than there was to make arrangement for 
biomedical research. No funding transfer had been proposed from the SSRC, which 
had been excluded from the scope of the Rothschild reforms on the grounds of 
immaturity. The relevance of these reforms was not immediately obvious to those 
streams that had already developed satisfactory arrangements for commissioning 
R&D, such as Supplies. As late as January 1973, a progress review meeting, chaired 
by the Permanent Secretary, heard that although there had been intensive dialogue 
with the MRC about biomedical research, there had been no discussion with either 
the MRC or the SSRC about future arrangements for HPSSR. Nor had any 
conclusions had been reached about future management of the research under the 
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control of the ‘specialist branches’ (supplies, computers, buildings, engineering and 
social security).1 A note from the last progress review attended by Cohen before his 
retirement, summarises the constraints under which he had been working and his 
aims during this first phase. It stresses the need for continuity, integration, clarity of 
roles, and the need to align the new R&D organisation with new structures in the 
reorganised NHS and DHSS. 
The new organisation had to be set up within the constraints imposed by 
the White Paper and taking account of the Department’s existing research 
organisation, the recent reorganisation of the Department and the 
forthcoming NHS reorganisation. Dr Cohen and his colleagues had the 
following aims in setting it up: that all the Departmental interests should 
be integrated; that the existing scientific machinery of the MRC and the 
SSRC should be involved but not duplicated; and that as far as possible, 
particularly where transferred funds were concerned, unified machinery 
for the whole of Great Britain should be worked out.2  
During the first quarter of 1973, leadership for implementation passed from 
Cohen to Kenneth Stowe. In the 1973 Civil Service List, Stowe is shown as Under-
Secretary heading the Computers and Management Services division. But from April 
1973 onwards he identifies himself in internal documents as head of a Computers 
and Research Division (C&R). Whatever his formal role, he was closely involved in 
the reorganisation because he was trusted by the Permanent Secretary, Sir Philip 
Rogers, as a resourceful and competent individual of a managerial bent.3 We can 
surmise that several considerations prompted this passing of the baton from medical 
to administrative leadership. Cohen was retiring imminently, and it was clear that his 
successor, Douglas Black, would be less involved in administrative matters. Cohen 
was an experienced medical civil servant, whereas Black was not. The government’s 
Chief Scientific Adviser had expressed discontent with the slow pace of 
implementation and the Permanent Secretary needed to up the pace. There was a 
pressing need to integrate R&D into the new planning systems that were central to 
the DHSS and NHS reorganisations.  
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Before considering the final structures implemented under Stowe’s leadership, it 
will be helpful to backtrack and consider three inter-related developments. The first 
of these was the reorganisation of the DHSS. The second was the positioning of 
‘planning’ as the force that would bind together the cumbersome structures created 
through reorganisation. The third was the failed attempt under Cohen’s leadership to 
integrate research led by the ‘specialist branches’ into a single, co-ordinated R&D 
programme. These developments had occurred over the preceding three years and 
were, taken together, the principal determinants of the situation inherited by Stowe in 
early 1973. 
Reorganisation of the DHSS 
The 1974 reorganisation of the NHS has been extensively documented by 
historians of the NHS. Webster chronicles its protracted gestation; the unsatisfactory 
nature of the structures created; and the mysteries of its core doctrine of ‘consensus 
management’.1 Other historians offer equally negative assessments of this first 
attempt to make the NHS more functional through structural reform.2 The preceding 
reorganisation of the DHSS has been much less widely explored. Webster deals with 
it, together with a similar exercise in Scotland, very concisely, in contrast to his 
extensive treatment of the NHS reorganisation.3 Levitt provides a brief overview, 
written soon after the event, but again focuses more on the NHS.4  In what follows, it 
is argued that the reorganisation of the DHSS had profound and negative 
consequences for the functioning of the R&D organisation in the Rothschild era. To 
understand why this was so it is necessary to understand the background to this 
initiative, and the thinking that shaped it. 
Origins and aims of the wider reorganisation 
Reorganisation of the DHSS was first proposed early in 1970 by the Permanent 
Secretary, Clifford Jarrett. The prospect of NHS reorganisation, which had already 
been under discussion for three years, was foremost in his mind as a spur to action. 
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In addition, there were ‘several areas, mainly concerned with long-term planning’ 
where the situation was causing anxiety, including S&R. Jarrett also wanted to look 
at the possibility of replacing the parallel administrative/professional hierarchy with 
integrated structures. In addition to health services, which were his primary concern, 
the review also eventually encompassed personal social services and the unresolved 
challenges of integrating health and social security.1 Jarrett’s proposal was welcomed 
by the Civil Service Department, which also readily agreed to his request that 
management consultants should be engaged to assist with the exercise.2 A review 
team, chaired by Jarrett’s successor, Rogers, and including Godber, Cohen and 
Rudoe, was formed and began to meet regularly from September 1970. 
The review team, as a matter of priority, wanted to enhance planning capabilities 
through any reorganisation. The Hospital Plan and, to a lesser extent, the Health and 
Welfare Plan have been portrayed as high-points of planning in the NHS.3 But 
attempts to implement and refine both were hampered by the Department’s limited 
planning capacity. The Treasury took advantage of this weakness to block bids for 
additional resources, slowing implementation.4 Continuing weakness was 
symptomatic of the fact that no one part of the Department was responsible for co-
ordinating planning across the whole. An impressive-sounding ‘Long-Term Planning 
Division’ had been established in 1967, but became fully and exclusively committed 
to the reorganisation of the NHS. A planning group was also inherited from the 
Ministry of Social Security, but its remit remained specific to this field. The theory 
was that planning was undertaken as an integral part of the work of all 22 divisions. 
The Department tried to make a virtue of these arrangements, describing them as 
‘flexible and empirical’.5 In reality, it appeared increasingly backward as the 
adoption of new planning techniques became emblematic of modernity in both 
private and public sectors.  
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Thinking about planning at the Department was subject to external influences. 
‘Strategic planning’ became a corporate cult in the second half of the 1960s.1 As 
adopted by the private sector, this involved central planning units administering 
elaborate planning cycles, gathering and analysing vast amounts of data. This 
approach rested upon uncritical belief in the possibility and utility of comprehensive 
rational, or ‘synoptic’, planning.2 PPBS (planning, programming, budgeting 
systems), as developed in the USA, was a further important influence. PPBS was a 
tool to improve resource allocation in the public sector. It involved the definition of 
programmes and the allocation of costs and outputs to programmes, allowing 
comparative cost-effectiveness analysis. This approach was conceptually well-
aligned with the Public Expenditure Survey Committee (PESC) system, which 
supported medium-term planning across government. PESC was introduced in 1968 
and became more prominent under the Heath government.3 The DHSS decided to 
introduce PPBS in 1970, because it was worried that it would otherwise be 
disadvantaged in the PESC process.4  
Anticipation of Rothschild  
The R&D organisation that existed before Rothschild had proved capable of 
supporting rapid growth, regardless of the need to work across organisational 
boundaries. The Department’s policies also anticipated most of Rothschild’s 
principles and recommendations. The scheme introduced by R&DC in 1967 
introduced the customer-contractor principle. The role of ‘sponsor’ is functionally 
identical to Rothschild’s ‘customer’, as is that of ‘agent’ to ‘contractor’. However, 
the Department did not anticipate Rothschild in the details of its organisational 
arrangements. It did not separate out roles equivalent to those defined by Rothschild 
as Chief Scientist and Controller R&D. The was because the DHSS did not possess 
the in-house research resources enjoyed by other government departments, and so 
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did not see the need for a Controller.1 Instead it had developed brokering and 
research management roles using a combination of the informal team (S&R and 
medical staff), specialist divisions (supplies, buildings, computers, social security), 
and the R&D committee. These roles and functions were all subsumed within the 
humble-sounding ‘administrator role’ in the Department’s scheme.  
By 1968, the R&D Committee was feeling the limitations of these arrangements 
and began to contemplate a more authoritative scientific leadership role. This was 
prompted by the growing commitment to designated research units. The committee 
realised that there were natural limits to the size of units and to the breadth of the 
work each could feasibly undertake. Consequently S&R was faced with the task of 
overseeing and co-ordinating a growing number of units. Unit directors were 
enterprising research leaders, usually at professor level, and it became increasingly 
obvious that the Department needed someone of equivalent status to oversee unit 
activity. R&DC concluded, therefore, that: 
Our first requirement is a chief research officer of professoride (sic) 
status. He should have wide experience of research into health services 
and his appointment should desirably be full time, but we might have to 
accept part time service to get the man we want. His terms of reference 
should be to develop the linking functions between research and policy-
making…, to advise the Department on its research strategy and 
programme and to co-ordinate the work of the research units supported 
financially by the Department.2 
The Department did not take this idea further, perhaps because its existing 
arrangements were just about adequate. In 1971, Rudoe and Cornish told the CPRS 
that ‘in a sense Dr Cohen was the Chief Scientist’ for medical research. For 
operational research Rudoe ‘was essentially the customer’s man’. Administrative 
help and co-ordination for the designated units was provided by Cornish ‘who, in a 
way, had some of the functions of Controller R&D’.3 Rothschild-like structural 
elements were thus present before 1971 although these were not fully and clearly 
developed in line with the emphatic prescriptions of the Framework. The customer-
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contractor principle had already been adopted and formalised. These precursors 
should have made the transition to full adoption of Rothschild-compliant research 
management arrangements relatively easy, as should the pan-government movement 
to couple research and planning more closely. 
Planning and research 
The Fulton committee recommended that every government department should 
establish a planning and research unit.1 At the Department, the connection between 
these two functions had been made as early as 1966 by Wolf Rudoe, who argued that 
commissioned research was more likely to be used for policy formulation if it was 
made available to a central planning function. His proposed solution was for the 
R&DC to assume a cross-departmental planning role. This was not taken forward at 
the time but, in 1970, Rudoe returned to these ideas. In a more receptive context, he 
became more ambitious, proposing that a new ‘information appraisal and planning 
division’ should be established. This would be responsible for appraising research 
and bringing its implications to the policy divisions; for liaising with policy divisions 
over future research requirements; and for developing in-house capacity for 
operational research. In addition, the new division would ‘be responsible for the 
overall planning of health and personal social services’.2 At the same time, Rudoe 
also proposed breaking up his own S&R division, on the more mundane basis that his 
span of control had become too large. The recently-established in-house Operational 
Research Unit (ORU) was already taking up a great deal of his time and growth was 
planned.3 Moving the research branches into a new division would enable him to 
give greater attention to the statistical work of his division. 
The bringing together of planning and research was not a foregone conclusion. A 
rival school favoured the model of a stand-alone central planning unit. The Assistant 
Secretary dedicated to the review, Ron S. Matthews, advanced well-developed 
proposals for such a unit, arguing that this ‘should not be too heavily involved with 
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research functions’.1 In December 1970, the review team approved the establishment 
of a stand-alone central planning unit.2 Yet in June 1972, when the first phase of the 
DHSS reorganisation was implemented, a ‘Planning and Research and Development 
Division’ (PRD)’ was established. S&R (briefly) ceased to exist at this point, with its 
research functions transferring to PRD, leaving a new ‘Statistics and Surveys 
Division’ as a rump.3 At this point it seemed as if the model of the planning and 
research unit had prevailed over that of the central planning unit. 
PRD was led by Under Secretary J. S. Orme and had five branches. One, under 
John Cornish was responsible for co-ordination of the overall HPSSR programme. 
Responsibilities for commissioning were split between this branch and a second, led 
by Cornish’s former deputy Leslie Best. The Central Planning Unit made up the third 
branch. A fourth branch was responsible for PPBS, Programme Analysis and review 
(PAR) and other related analytical work. The final branch was the in-house 
operational research service, led by A. G. McDonald. The work of the division could 
thus be summarised as follows: 
The Division provides support services in central planning; research and 
development; programme analysis and review (PAR); 
planning/programming/budgeting (PPB); and operational research.4 
At this point, it seemed as if Cohen’s aim of ‘taking account of the Department’s 
existing research organisation’ had been met. PRD placed research at the heart of the 
new planning processes that would shape the reorganised NHS. The new division 
represented an evolutionary development from the research components of S&R, 
maintaining branches for research management under individuals drawn from the 
informal team and tying these in with in-house research resources and new planning 
capacity. Within these new arrangements, Cohen led on medical research and 
Cornish was given the lead for SSRC liaison and for the development of personal 
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social services research.1 Cohen must have felt that he was approaching retirement 
with continuity assured and R&D strengthened. Yet only a year later, PRD had been 
broken up; its component parts-reassigned to a further wave of new Divisions; and 
Cornish re-assigned to duties unrelated to R&D.  
Establishing exactly why this happened is problematical, given the pace of events. 
The main influences appear to have been a push-back from administrators against the 
idea of a too-influential Chief Scientist and, in a second phase of reorganisation, the 
adoption of the over-elaborate organisational solutions. It is also possible that 
Stowe’s wishes were influential in moving research management into his new C&R 
division. In his resistance to integration and a powerful central R&D function, 
Stowe’s views appear typical of those civil servants responsible for the specialist 
branches. 
The specialist branches 
As has been described, the programme before Rothschild was less than fully 
integrated and relied on mechanisms such as the R&DC for co-ordination. This was 
the context for Cohen’s goal ‘that all the Departmental interests should be 
integrated’. The Rothschild reforms offered an unprecedented opportunity to realise 
this goal. However, Cohen’s and Cornish’s attempts to integrate the ‘specialist 
branches’ into the new R&D organisation revealed the capacity of specialist interests 
to frustrate rationalisation. 
Computing research provides a good illustration. As has been previously noted, 
the status of the experimental computer programme (ECP) within the programme 
was ambiguous in its early years. Although the Computer Policy and Development 
Branch (CPDB) was initially attached to S&R, ECP was only ever of peripheral 
concern to the R&D Committee and was excluded from the scope of the programme 
in Portfolio 1. Management of CPDB was transferred to a new Management Services 
Division (MS) in 1971. This was managed by Stowe and was renamed the 
Computers and Management Services Division (CMS) in 1972. Stowe led a review 
of ECP, which had run into serious difficulties with the Treasury. The Treasury 
maintained that the Department had acted beyond its delegated authority in initiating 
the programme and was apprehensive about its consequences for hospital running 
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costs. Stowe brought the programme under greater central control and trimmed it 
back just enough to appease the Treasury.1 It was only after this review that 
discussion began about ‘establishing the centrally-financed NHS computer 
programme on an R&D basis and as part of a Departmental R&D programme’.2 This 
may have been primarily intended to strengthen evaluation, but it can also be seen as 
a strategy for laundering questionable funding decisions taken in previous years. 
The task of working out how to properly integrate the ECP into the R&D 
programme was given to Cornish, who produced a draft proposal.3 This included 
statements about the advisory role of the Chief Scientist in computer research. The 
document also suggested that the Chief Scientist, as a member of the Planning 
Committee, should also take over the chair of the Advisory Committee on Medical 
Computing (ACMC) and included a recommendation that ‘the extent to which the 
MS Division may act as its own customer for R&D should be determined’. These 
recommendations provoked a hostile response from the head of CPRD, who raised 
various difficulties to argue that the exceptional circumstances of computing research 
meant that only MS could act as customer. He also objected to the idea of the Chief 
Scientist chairing ACMC, arguing that an independent chair was needed, not least so 
that his branch could ignore the committee’s advice if it did not agree with it.4 What 
underlay this reaction was a fundamental objection to the idea that the Chief Scientist 
should have any real influence over computer research.5 Stowe, in his capacity as the 
head of MS, sought a compromise in which the Chairman of the ACMC would be 
drawn from the ranks of the Chief Scientist’s external advisers. Ultimately, he 
backed White’s position, putting proposals to the ACMC that side-lined the Chief 
Scientist into a purely advisory role on matters of computing research. 
Cornish and Cohen also met with resistance on the same grounds from the 
building and engineering division.6 This explains why it was reported in early 1973 
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that more consultation was needed as to whether there should be a comprehensive 
R&D programme after all. ‘The real test’, it was noted, ‘is whether genuine R&D is 
undertaken in these areas’, suggesting that the Department was, by this stage, looking 
for grounds to justify leaving the specialist divisions to their own devices.1 
Reorganisation – final phase 
The Department was, as has been noted, keen from the outset on involving 
management consultants in the reorganisation exercise. A contract for advisory 
services was awarded to McKinsey and Company, who began work in May 1971. 
The review team was aware that the CPRS study of government R&D was under 
way, and concluded that ‘it is sensible to approach the organisation of research at this 
stage, at least in a preliminary way, in the context of the overall reorganisation of the 
Department’.2  
Review recommendations were summarised in a report published in 1972.3  From 
its style and vocabulary, which is consistent with working papers, the authors of this 
document can be assumed to be McKinsey and Co. The report recommended ‘more 
rigorous planning method’ and proposed the creation of a Planning Committee. 
We recommend a planning committee as the medium through which the 
top of the office should develop recommendations to the Secretary of 
State on national objectives and priorities in health and social services 
and in the Department’s own work.4   
This recommendation should be read alongside the guidance issued on the NHS 
reorganisation in the same year. This publication, the ‘grey book’, introduced an 
elaborate five-tier structure together with three governing principles. The first of 
these was ‘consensus management’, which was required to operate both horizontally, 
between different occupational groups, and vertically, across the tiers of the new 
structure. The second was that ‘delegation downwards should be matched with 
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accountability upwards’.1 This can be deciphered as a realistic assessment that the 
desire for greater central control had to be balanced with acceptance of a measure of 
local autonomy, given existing limitations to the Department’s intelligence and 
administrative capacity.2 The third was the centrality of planning to the operation of 
the new system. Planning, underpinned by better information, was the glue that 
would hold together these complex structures and contradictory impulses.  
The planning process, combined with selective monitoring and control, is 
the means by which decentralisation of decision-making will be 
combined with central strategic direction and control.3 
The report also recommended a move to ‘client-based’ organisation and planning. 
This recommendation was influenced by work on the implementation of PPBS, 
which had included definition of client groups.4 This exercise had not been 
straightforward, given the range of clients served by the NHS and the concentration 
of resources in hospitals, which served many client groups. The outcome was a 
hybrid system, combining planning ‘blocks’ for client-based groups, some of which 
were small, (for example, services for the mentally handicapped) with service-based 
groups (for example, acute hospitals).5 The report backed away from recommending 
the creation of integrated staff structures in favour of ‘separate but co-ordinated 
hierarchies’ and vague notions of ‘joint working’.6 Specific recommendations on 
R&D are confined to one paragraph, which reflects the Rothschild mandate and the 
creation of PRD. 
There will be an increased emphasis on research and planning. For 
example, a Chief Scientist is recommended to help customers improve 
the use of research. Also the planning committee will be established to 
guide the Department’s planning effort. And a new Planning, Operational 
Research and Research Administration Division has been established 
(composed mainly of existing branches).7  
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The summary report was underpinned by more detailed recommendations in eight 
volumes, of which number seven related to R&D. These detailed volumes cannot be 
traced and may not have survived.1 Whether originating in volume seven, or having 
been developed by officials subsequently, an elaborate new architecture for R&D 
management emerged.2  The new system required interaction between four separate 
groups of actors within the R&D organisation: policy divisions, research 
management, research contractors and the Chief Scientist. The responsibility of 
policy divisions was to act as customers and to propose objectives for the programme 
to the Planning Committee.  
It will be for the policy divisions (advised by the Chief Scientist and 
research management) to satisfy themselves – and to justify to enquirers 
– the expenditure on research and development in their subjects.3 
The role of the Chief Scientist at the DHSS had thus drifted away from supporting 
customers in the articulation of their research requirements, which was what 
Rothschild envisaged. Instead, the Chief Scientist was expected to ensure that the 
programme ‘in its separate parts, is subject to scientific scrutiny as to feasibility, 
quality and assessment of results’. Research management was given ‘ultimate 
responsibility…for securing the translation of the approved research objectives 
within…research resources’. This function was, however, to be highly fragmented 
and, critically, more fragmented than under S&R in the ‘golden age’, with the role 
spread between approximately 20 administrative units of the Department, grouped 
under six headings: supply and equipment, building and engineering, computers, 
personal social services, social security and health care services.  This outcome 
represented not just the triumph of the specialist branches in their bids to retain 
autonomy, but a move towards even greater fragmentation of control. The role of the 
research contractors requires no further explanation, other than to observe that this 
continued to include both in-house and external researchers with the former now 
somewhat strengthened by the growth of EAO and ORS. 
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These four actor groups were thus brought together in an architecture with many 
parts, all subject to the primacy of the Planning Unit.1 Even before implementation 
had begun, some within the Department began to worry about how these complex 
new arrangements would work in practice. Dr G. K. Matthew wrote a provocative 
memorandum in March 1973, starting with the observation that ‘in a year’s 
discussion, no-one has dared to make clear-cut proposals on how decisions on the 
R&D programme will really be made’.2 Matthew offered five different models, each 
with a different weighting of influence between the group actors: ‘cell dominant’; 
‘research management dominant’; ‘advisory group dominant’; ‘Chief Scientist 
dominant’; and ‘total consensus’. John Cornish was also concerned, and made the 
following observation. 
The seemingly simple Rothschild concept of four different types of 
player in the game of R&D viz: - customer, contractor, chief scientist and 
controller R&D, leads to very sophisticated relationships between the 
four when they are required to work in full partnership and yet each 
retain their own individual responsibilities for decision making; there is 
no captain.3 
Matthew and Cornish had identified a critical challenge: the new architecture 
balkanized the task of leading and managing the R&D programme. Rothschild’s 
prescriptions for strong leadership of customers and suppliers had been lost in a 
luxuriant tangle of organisational design and competing interests. The Research 
Liaison Group (RLG) was promoted as the integrating mechanism that could 
overcome this fragmentation. ‘The idea of the RLG’, wrote Stowe in June 1973, ‘is 
to secure effective collaboration of all four parties with the minimum of formality’. 
RLGs were to be structured in line with the mixed client/service group model 
adopted for the planning process. The intention was that they would eventually cover 
all aspects of the Department’s work, apart from biomedical research 
commissioning. As policy issues arose, new RLGs might be set up to determine and 
monitor research requirements.4  
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One final change cemented the inherent weakness of the new organisational 
structure. In April 1973, after less than a year of existence, the Planning and 
Research Division was broken up in a further wave of reorganisation. Its two 
research administration branches were moved into a new Computers and Research 
Division (C&R), headed by Stowe. Its remaining branches, dealing with planning 
and operational research, were moved into a new Central and Planning Services 
Division.1 This severed the day-to-day organisational link between planning and 
research, which thereafter had to rely on the RLGs; the presence of the Chief 
Scientist on the Planning Committee; and the requirement for preparation of an 
annual ‘R&D statement’ as part of the planning cycle. As part of this reorganisation, 
Cornish was moved to one of the hospital services divisions, ending his involvement 
in R&D. This represented a further loss of organisational memory, following as it did 
close upon the retirement of Cohen and Godber. The sole survivor from the ‘golden 
age’ was now Leslie Best, who headed up one of the two research branches in C&R. 
These two branches held, between them, responsibilities for R&D including policy 
development; support for the Chief Scientists; and managing contracts with the 
designated units. They also served as the default leads for HPSSR commissioning, 
but their powers of patronage and co-ordination were less than those enjoyed by 
S&R. 
From enlightened patronage to fragmented bureaucracy 
For a time, while Cohen and Cornish were still involved, it looked as if the 
programme might be held together in a way that might have enabled the continuation 
of enlightened patronage for HPSSR. With the benefit of a more authoritative role 
for scientific leadership, in the person of the Chief Scientist, then it should have been 
possible to develop a more integrated and influential programme, building on the 
successes of the first decade. With Cohen and Cornish gone, and the Department 
committed to the structures described above, this possibility evaporated. The 
Department was left with a system in which it was relying heavily upon an untested 
model of deliberative working, the RLG, to pull together the interests of the four 
actor groups. Although some RLGs were relatively successful in achieving this, 
others were not and the goal of comprehensive RLG coverage was never achieved.2  
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The Department had contrived to implement a system that was perfectly designed to 
frustrate many people by involving them in time-consuming processes, the 
distinguishing characteristic of which was highly diffused leadership and a lack of 
clarity about where authority and control resided. In theory, and as with the NHS 
reorganisation, planning was the glue that would hold all of this organisational 
complexity together. In practice, planning fell short of this expectation. 
Concluding discussion 
The Framework for Research and Development was intended to give 
administrative departments more control over R&D. Government anticipated that 
this policy would direct publicly-funded R&D more towards the practical questions 
facing public policy and services. The DHSS R&D programme had been developed 
to commission service-relevant research and had already adopted customer-
contractor principles. The White Paper represented an endorsement of the 
programme’s governing principles and presented several unprecedented 
opportunities: to increase funding for service-orientated medical research; to increase 
scientific input to policy-making; to strengthen research management; and to develop 
a fully-integrated programme. Furthermore, the reorganisation of the DHSS offered 
the opportunity to integrate research and planning. In 1972, then, the stage seemed 
set for a major step forward in the development of the health research state. The 
structural paraphernalia of Chief Scientist, committees, and commissioning 
arrangements with the MRC represented, on the face of it, modernising moves that 
would reinforce the move towards greater rationality in government. The underlying 
reality was more ambiguous.  
For biomedical research, commissioning arrangements had been put in place that 
left the locus of control with the MRC, subject only to some greater access to 
decision-making by the health departments. The role of the Chief Scientist had been 
made toothless and the office was occupied by an MRC stalwart who was openly 
sceptical about the Rothschild reforms. The consequences have been documented up 
to 1977, when the panel for medical research was disbanded, by Kogan et al. 
Subsequent events, culminating in the return of transferred funds to the MRC, are 
examined in the next chapter.  For all other types of research, a dysfunctional 
bureaucracy had been created. In 1977, a ‘management review’ of the DHSS by the 
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Civil Service Department was strongly critical of arrangements for research 
management, identifying the following problems: confusion of responsibility for 
research management; confusion of accountability; and lack of co-ordination.1 
Further change followed. It was these underlying realities of medical subversion and 
bureaucratic muddle that determined the following years of difficulty documented by 
Kogan et al. The die was already cast in 1974.  
Why did the Department implement such a dysfunctional system? The answer to 
this question is evidently not the same for BMR as it is for HPSSR. It has been 
argued that the MRC did not perceive the departmental programme as a threat to its 
structural dominance. The Green Paper radically transformed this situation, coming 
as a rude shock to research councils that had largely evaded earlier attempts to curtail 
scientific self-governance. The continuation of the MRC’s programmes was not 
seriously threatened by the proposed funding transfer. Its autonomy and belief in its 
superior authority were, and the stridency of its reaction to Rothschild must be seen 
in this light. The tone of its campaign dismayed moderate members of the medical 
elite, such as Godber and Black, who saw the reforms as an opportunity to strengthen 
socially-relevant medical research across organisational boundaries. Godber and 
Cohen had no desire to challenge the independence or structural dominance of the 
MRC, they just wanted to make it more responsive to NHS needs. They would have 
settled for influence rather than the power of the purse. The corporate rationalisers in 
this situation were the CPRS and the Cabinet Office. These external influences, 
wielding modernising science policy, threatened to destroy the shared values and 
trust-based working relationships between the senior medical staff in the two 
institutions. In this situation, the instinct of the moderate members of the medical 
elite was to close ranks and to work out leadership and commissioning arrangements 
that constructed a facade of compliance with national policy, whilst neutralising the 
underlying intentions.  
On the administrative side, the explanation for how the Department could have 
ended up with such a dysfunctional system is less obvious. There are three possible 
explanations. These are interlocking rather than mutually exclusive and all three are 
probably valid to some degree. The first is that the Department never really intended 
                                                             
1.  BN 152/9, DHSS Management Review. Report of Study 7. Planning and Control of 
Research and Development, October 1977, 83-84. 
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the outcome it achieved. Between the creation of the DHSS in 1968 and the 1974 
NHS reorganisation, it was faced with a huge agenda set by multiple policy 
initiatives, many of which called for some form of organisational change. The 
challenge of designing solutions that accommodated all of these initiatives must have 
been daunting.1 The DHSS looked to management consultants to help them manage 
their organisational challenges. It put all its eggs in one basket by appointing 
McKinsey and Co to advise on both DHSS and NHS reorganisation. The solutions 
proffered in both cases proved over-complex in practice. Design and implementation 
did not happen in a stable context. New initiatives emerged sequentially, requiring 
adjustments to the masterplan ‘in flight’. Anthony King has argued that government 
began to fail more frequently in the 1970s because the business of government 
became more difficult. In this interpretation, the Rothschild reforms at the DHSS 
may represent a case study in ‘overload’.2  
A second possible explanation looks to structural interests. One of the most 
surprising aspects of the implementation of Rothschild at the DHSS is that the 
Department ended up with arrangements for research management that were more 
fragmented, not less. The resistance of the ‘specialist branches’ to greater integration 
has been noted, but aversion to the idea of greater control of R&D by the Chief 
Scientist is likely to have been more widely encountered. In his illuminating study of 
Fulton, Garrett observes that the day-to-day business of government departments is 
really run by their divisions (or equivalent functional units), each of which is run by 
Under-Secretaries. These are the ‘anchor men’.3 These divisional leads may have 
wished to preserve or strengthen their ability to dictate the R&D agenda and so 
resisted a strengthening of central co-ordination. Stowe himself, the implementation 
leader in 1973, shared this outlook, as he demonstrated over computer research. 
A third possibility is that the rational myth of synoptic planning was allowed to 
over-determine structures. In early 1973, Stowe told colleagues that ‘since the 
management of the R &D programme is deliberately being geared into the work of 
                                                             
1  I am grateful to Nancy Korman for pointing out the sheer scale of the organisational 
challenges facing the DHSS in these years. 
2  King, Anthony. "Overload. Problems of Governing in the 1970s," Political Studies 23 no.2 
and 3, 1975: 284-296. 
3.  Garrett, Management of Government, 71. See also Kogan et al. Government’s 
Commissioning of Research, 8. 
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the planning committee it cannot really begin until arrangements to that end have 
been worked out’.1  In the Grey Book, the paramount forum was the planning 
committee. The cycles of planning in the NHS were to yield information that would 
be summarised and brought to this forum, which would then decide upon medium-
term priorities and oversee submissions to the PESC process.  R&D was expected to 
serve this process and the new organisational architecture assumed that it would 
always be problem-solving. These assumptions turned out to be unrealistic.  
This last possible explanation illustrates how the new organisation for R&D 
might be interpreted using institutional theory. It exhibited face conformity with the 
institutions promulgated by national science policy: the office of Chief Scientist; the 
customer-contractor principle; and the greater involvement of scientists in policy-
making. It likewise conformed to the myth of synoptic planning, to which structures 
for R&D management were made subservient. To serve both science and planning, 
the Department invented new institutions in the form of its committees and liaison 
groups. In this way, it demonstrated compliance with politically-favoured 
institutional logics and thereby gained legitimacy. Institutional theory posits that 
such conformity is prioritised above considerations of task performance, which are 
often surrounded by great uncertainty in any event. The history of the departmental 
R&D programme in this period conforms to this theory. 
When it came to biomedical research, the situation was complicated by the 
overlay of an older and competing institutional logic. The community represented by 
the MRC adhered to the belief that it was right for science to determine research 
priorities through the application of its own criteria. The institutional consequence 
was an elevated level of scientific self-governance. When incompatible institutional 
logics are brought together in time and place, those that are politically-supported may 
be ‘layered’ onto older logics but not displace them. The outcome is usually a period 
of organisational turbulence as competing logics contest for dominance in the arena.2  
On the theme of exchanges for health research, the fragmentation of structures at 
the Department makes generalisation difficult. The crucible within which the four 
elements of the structure were to be combined was the RLG. This forum, on the face 
                                                             
1.  MH 166/1321, Memo by Stowe, 13 February 1973. 
2.  Kitchener, Mobilizing the logic of managerialism. 
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of it, was an organisational innovation that would promote interchange between 
researchers, policy-makers and practitioners.  Kogan saw the RLGs as the answer to 
many of the Department’s problems. However, he also documents variation in 
achievements and modes of working.1 Whatever their immediate utility in the 
system, it seems likely that RLGs would have been an engine for the formation of 
new networks in research and policy. Detailed case studies of RLGs, of the sort used 
to examine the dynamics and impact of networks for policy and research, would be 
needed to test this hypothesis – a task that is beyond the reach of this thesis. 2  
At the beginning of this chapter, some limitations to the work of Kogan et al. were 
identified. The conclusion was reached that a detailed study of the years 1971 to 
1973 would add to this body of work. The material presented above shows how 
events between these years created the conditions under which the operation of the 
Rothschild system would prove difficult in practice. This adds to the Kogan analysis 
in two ways. First, and most obviously, it further explains some of the phenomena 
they document by tracing their roots in a transitional period. Second, it challenges the 
adequacy of the explanation of the failure of the Rothschild experiment as being 
ultimately due to a clash of two fundamentally incompatible epistemic communities. 
This chapter suggests alternative explanations resting on structural interest theory 
and institutional theory, together with more mundane considerations of 
‘implementation overload’. As such it adds to the findings of Kogan and his 
colleagues, fleshing out their statement that the causes of failure were ‘social, 
epistemological and institutional’. 
    
                                                             
1.  Kogan and Henkel, Government and Research, 76-90. 
2.  Berridge, Making Health Policy. The case studies in this volume are constructed around 
various policy issues. It would be interesting to attempt some case studies with RLGs as 
the unit of analysis. 
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9. Rothschild Partly Demolished: 1978 to 1981 
 
I do not believe that the DHSS has been, or can become in the 
foreseeable future, a sufficiently attentive gardener to bring the tender 
plant of health services research to full vigour. True the Department is 
interested in the fruits of health services research, but its investment via 
the present commissioning process is more likely to stunt development 
than encourage it.1 
  
The phrase ‘Rothschild partly demolished’ was coined by Kogan, Korman and 
Henkel in their monograph on the Department’s commissioning of research.2 They 
identify two aspects of partial demolition. The first, which had occurred over the 
preceding two years, is described as a ‘reduction of customer activity’. This took the 
form of less frequent meetings of RLGs and the dissolution of the Chief Scientist’s 
Research Committee. The second was the proposed return of biomedical research 
funds to the MRC, accompanied by greater reliance on the Council for health 
services research. Both developments occurred during the term of the third Chief 
Scientist, Professor Arthur Buller, who held office for three years from August 1978. 
Buller was also the driving force behind a review of all the DHSS-funded research 
units during this period; a process which is the subject of both detailed description 
and critical deconstruction by the Kogan team. 3   
Kogan et al. pay substantial attention to two of these initiatives: the reduction in 
RLG activity and the review of units. In contrast, their treatment of the return of 
biomedical funds lacks both detail and explanatory power. In their summative book, 
Kogan and Henkel argue that the MRC successfully made the case for unwinding 
this aspect of the Rothschild reforms; and that the failure of the PMR, which was 
disbanded in 1977, contributed to this outcome. However, they provide very little 
                                                             
1.  MH 166/1439, Arthur Buller, Chief Scientist DHSS to Philip Rogers, Permanent Secretary 
DHSS, 10 March 1980. 
2.   Kogan et al., Government’s Commissioning, 49. 
3.  For the process of review see Henkel and Kogan, DHSS Funded Research Units. For a 
critical deconstruction of the review process and its paradigm see Kogan, Korman and 
Henkel, Government’s Commissioning of Research, 45-53. For the summative account, 
see Kogan and Henkel, Government and Research, 96-139. 
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detail on circumstances between the demise of the PMR and public confirmation, in 
October 1980, that biomedical funds were to be returned. In the Brunel monograph 
of that year, Kogan et al. anticipate the return of funds and the linked proposal to 
place greater reliance going forward on the MRC for health services research. They 
are critical of these proposed measures, which they argue would lead to a diminution 
in the customer role for both biomedical research and HPSSR. For this publication, 
the authors were clearly overtaken by events, as illustrated by the insertion of an ‘as 
we go to press’ footnote, confirming the announcement that funds were to be 
returned to the MRC.1 Neither the first edition of the Kogan and Henkel summative 
text (1983) nor the amended edition (2006) cast any further light on this occurrence. 
There thus remains considerable scope to add to the Kogan corpus by revisiting the 
return of funds, especially given the records now open in archives. This episode is, 
therefore, the primary focus of this chapter.  
One of the ironies of the Buller era is that the Department had, even before his 
arrival, recognised the inadequacies of the system implemented in 1973. Further 
reorganisation followed, and a new and more integrated R&D organisation was 
created in 1978, reporting directly to the Chief Scientist (CS).2 This transformed the 
Office of the Chief Scientist (OCS) from an advisory to an executive function. Thus 
strengthened, the OCS achieved relative longevity, gaining capacity and competence 
until it was reduced in 1986. The year 1978 might well thus be characterised as 
‘Rothschild eventually more fully implemented’ at the DHSS. Yet it was also the 
year when new dynamics came into play that led to the partial demolition of 
Rothschild, an apparently paradoxical picture that calls for an explanation. But 
before proceeding further, a brief account of events between 1973 and 1978 is 
offered, largely summarising the more detailed account of Kogan and Henkel.  
Research management 1973 to 1978 
In the previous chapter, the research management system implemented in 1973 
was described as a ‘dysfunctional bureaucracy’ and the factors contributing to this 
sub-optimal outcome were elucidated. Picking up the story in 1974, Kogan et al. 
recognise the difficulties encountered over the following four years, describing this 
                                                             
1.  Kogan et al. Government’s Commissioning, 47 (fn.). 
2.  MH 166/1440.  
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as a period of ‘sometimes unconfident and unsystematic, sometimes too optimistic 
and centralist development’. Much of their empirical material is an elaboration of 
this theme. They agree that the 1978 re-organisation went some way towards 
rectifying various shortcomings in organisational design, and thus marked a new 
phase in the programme’s history. 1 The picture thereafter is, however, complicated 
by the new policy imperatives introduced by Buller, which will be discussed later. 
The research management structure implemented in 1973 was notable for its 
plethora of committees. It was overseen by the Chief Scientist’s Research Committee 
(CSRC), comprised of scientific advisers drawn from the research fields of interest to 
the Department, with representation weighted towards epidemiology and social 
medicine.2  The CSRC was accountable to the Planning Committee - the central 
forum ‘for the determination of policy and long-term planning’. Below the CSRC 
were two ‘intermediate’ committees: the Health Services Research Board (HSRB) 
and the Personal Social Services Research Group (PSSRG). These were expected to 
play a similar role to the CSRC within their subject areas. A Social Security 
Research Board was also envisaged, but never emerged. Two further committees 
were established as part of the new R&D organisation: the PMR and the Small 
Grants Committee (SGC), which would respond to small, researcher-initiated 
proposals. The CSRC was also expected to maintain some oversight of specialist 
research through liaison with groups like the Advisory Committee on Medical 
Computing. 3  
As was discussed in the previous chapter, this committee structure was purely 
advisory. The actual business of research management had been fragmented across 
the policy and specialist divisions. To overcome this balkanisation, research 
management, policy-leads and researchers were brought together in the RLGs. The 
connection back to the Chief Scientist was achieved by means of cross-representation 
of academic advisors from the various committees outlined above. The CSRC also 
attempted to steer the RLG system.4  
                                                             
1. Kogan et al., Government’s Commissioning, 46. 
2.  MH 166/1322, Stowe to Black, CSRC membership, 30 April 1973. 
3.  MH 166/1321, Proposed Structure for Research and Development, 6 March 1973.  
4.  Kogan and Henkel, Government and Research, 50-61. 
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It soon became apparent that this was an exceptionally cumbersome set of 
organisational structures. Kogan and Henkel devote much of their book to a 
description of the difficulties encountered in its functioning. Kogan and Korman, 
acting in consultancy mode, prepared an internal report on the same subject in 1975. 
This advised that the organisation was seen by many to be ‘over-elaborate and 
extensive for the work to be done’ and that it had proved difficult to find a 
meaningful role for advisors, especially in the case of the PMR. The various 
committees struggled to establish their distinctive roles. The RLG structure was 
incomplete and there was uncertainty about the respective roles of RLGs and 
committees. The new system for R&D also struggled to make its mark, finding itself 
‘overwhelmed’ by the rest of the Department. Kogan and Korman suggested a 
simplification of the intermediate committee structure and greater reliance upon 
RLGs. 
Of the devices created so far, the RLGs are the most promising because 
they are the only point at which detailed work on general policy and 
research policy can take place, with the main actors in the right position 
to play their roles.1 
Whether influenced by this advice, or whether in response to the untenable nature of 
the system it had created, the Department began to dismantle its committee structure 
by degrees. The PSSRG and the HSRB were disbanded in late 1975 and the PMR in 
1977.2 The CSRC was wound up in 1978. By this year, the Department had cleared 
the decks for a re-organisation intended to strengthen research management, with the 
SGC and the RLGs as the only surviving committees. 
Sir Douglas Black served as Chief Scientist from 1 April 1973 until his election as 
president of the Royal College of Physicians in April 1977. Black’s reputation now 
rests primarily on his career as a clinical researcher and on his contribution to public 
health. He is perhaps best known today for his 1980 report on health inequalities, the 
attempted suppression of which became a cause célèbre.3 Black’s legacy as Chief 
Scientist must be considered in context. The organisational structures implemented in 
                                                             
1.  MH 166/1321, The Overall Organisation of the Chief Scientist’s Research Organisation, 
Note by M. Kogan and N. Korman, July 1975.  
2.  Kogan and Henkel, Government and Research, 58-59, 65. 
3  Peter Townsend and Nick Davidson (eds.), Inequalities in Health: The Black Report 
(Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1982). 
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1973 would have devoured much of his time (Black chaired all the major R&D 
committees as well as sitting on the Planning Committee and the CRB) and yet he 
held no executive role. The dysfunctionality of the system he inherited in 1973 was 
such that he was, within little more than two years, faced with the task of negotiating 
much of its dismantling. For HPSSR, it does seem that Black dutifully tried to make 
this system serve some useful purpose despite its shortcomings, and this aspect of the 
programme continued to grow under his leadership.1  
Black’s record on biomedical research commissioning is more ambiguous. In his 
memoirs, he acknowledges that he is vulnerable to criticism for taking on the Chief 
Scientist role, given his public opposition to Rothschild, and that he might be 
accused of not really trying to make the system work.2 Elsewhere he claims that he 
did his best, but that ‘the thing was inoperable’.3 He claims that the root cause of the 
failure of the PMR was ‘the inability of anyone in the department, including myself, 
to come up with specific commissions for the MRC which would even remotely 
match the £5m of transferred funds’. He then goes on to claim that this failure drove 
the DHSS to the ‘somewhat shallow respectability’ of the broad commissions. This 
account appears somewhat disingenuous once it is appreciated that Black was 
personally involved in drawing up the agreement that set broad commissions as the 
default mode. In his private papers he notes (with inaccurate recall of exact timing) 
that ‘the transfer fund arrangement was happily abandoned around 1978 (my 
contribution being the characteristic one of showing that it didn’t work)’.4 
The verdict of Black’s successor, Buller, delivered in his presence during a 
witness seminar in 1998, was that it was ‘stretching a point’ to say that Black had 
implemented Rothschild and that he ‘avoided Rothschild in a masterly way’.5  These 
comments do not seem unreasonable in relation to biomedical research. Black had 
been among the architects of the commissioning arrangements designed to leave 
                                                             
1. Interview with Dr David Pole, London, December 2016. 
2.   Black, Recollections and Reflections, 71. 
3.  Sir Douglas Black in interview with Sir Gordon Wolstenhome, Oxford Brookes University 
Twentieth Century Medical Video Archive MSVA 023, May 1987. See also Recollections 
and Reflections, 71. 
4.  Wellcome Library Archives GC/45/C-1 Papers on Rothschild Mk 1. 
5.   L. A. Reynolds and E. M. Tansey. Clinical Research in Britain 1950-1980 (London: The 
Wellcome Trust, 2000), 54.  
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power in the hands of the MRC. As such, he was unlikely to find any cause to tamper 
with the system, however ineffectual it might have appeared from the perspective of 
pro-Rothschild science policy reform.  
Strengthened research management 
In the interregnum between Black’s departure as Chief Scientist and Buller’s 
arrival in the following year, the Department was subject to a ‘management review’. 
This was a joint exercise between the Civil Service Department (CSD) and the 
DHSS, undertaken by a team drawn from both departments. The management review 
was a precursor of the scrutiny programme later known as ‘Rayner Reviews’ and Sir 
Derek Rayner was involved, sending his apologies to the first meeting of the steering 
committee and attending the final meeting.1 The review team decided to focus on the 
separate ‘businesses’ of the Department rather than concerning itself with cross-
cutting activities, for example planning.2 Looked at from this perspective, the 
preliminary report concluded that ‘the Department had failed to establish an overall 
approach to its research expenditure’ and unearthed widespread confusion about how 
the system was supposed to work. 
Conflicting views, both internal and external, were expressed concerning 
the non-executive nature of the Chief Scientist post, his non-involvement 
in the determination of the research expenditure, and the emphasis on the 
independence of his advice. There were also doubts about whether it was 
sensible to attempt to bring together the broad spread of disparate forms 
of research, e.g. medical and social research, within the framework of a 
single budget; and whether the Chief Scientist could or should attempt to 
advise on the total range of activities.3 
Based on these findings, the review team proposed a more detailed study of R&D 
management, as part of a suite of eight follow-on studies. The R&D study report runs 
to over one hundred pages and provides a measured overview of the programme and 
its management in 1977.4 The arrangements put in place in 1973 are damned with 
                                                             
1.  BN 152/2, minutes of the management review steering committee, 16 December 1976. 
See Hennessey, Whitehall, 590 for mention of Rayner’s involvement in scrutiny reviews 
before 1979. 
2.  BN 152/2, minutes of the management review steering committee, 24 March 1977. 
3.  BN 152/2, Management Review. Preliminary Survey Report, 22. 
4.  BN 152/9, Management Review. Report of Study 7, Planning and Control of Research 
and Development, 82-99. 
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faint praise, being described as ‘a first step in the difficult process of trying to relate 
research planning to policy priorities’. The report acknowledges that subsequent 
developments had improved the position, with most credit given to the RLGs, but 
adds that ‘this development needs to continue’. Three options for the future 
management of research are identified and assessed. First, continuing with the status 
quo.  This was not recommended. The current arrangements suffered from confusion 
of responsibility, confusion of accountability and lack of co-ordination. Most, but not 
all, of those involved in research commissioning recognised these failings and 
thought that change was needed. The second option was to bring administrative 
responsibility for the HPSS, social security and biomedical research programmes 
together under the Chief Scientist. The third was to bring administrative authority for 
all R&D under the Chief Scientist. The assessment of the advantages and 
disadvantages of option three reads as science policy idealism weighed against civil 
service pragmatism. A fully integrated programme would allow the Chief Scientist to 
finally assume the authority envisaged by Rothschild. 
It gives the CS more authority in fulfilling his responsibilities for the 
relevance, effectiveness and scientific merit of the Department’s R&D 
activities. This is particularly so in helping the customer formulate his 
research objectives and have them translated into projects, and in 
promoting the systematic evaluation of research findings and their 
implementation where appropriate.1 
On the downside, the report cautioned that option three might be overambitious, 
risked disruption and had the potential to duplicate staff effort. As in 1973, the main 
source of resistance to the idea of a fully integrated programme was the specialist 
branches: building, supplies and computing.  
The three options were considered by the review steering committee in late 1977. 
The minutes state only that option three was considered ‘unrealistic at this stage’ and 
that option two was preferred.2 Implementation was deferred to allow for 
consultation with the new Chief Scientist, due to take up office in the following 
summer.  Buller was in favour of a more executive role for research management 
                                                             
1.  BN 152/9, Management Review. Report of Study, 97.  
2.  BN 152/2 Minutes of the management review steering committee, 4 November 1977. 
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and, immediately prior to his arrival, branches were transferred from other divisions 
to create a new OCS with medical and administration branches.1  
The medical branch had six staff members in 1979. The administration branch 
included leads for general R&D policy, health services research and liaison with the 
MRC, and social/social security research.2 Nursing and social work service officers 
were also assigned to support the Chief Scientist on relevant matters, but did not 
initially move into the OCS. The Social Science Research Unit was also moved into 
the OCS, initially as part of the administration branch. This unit, which had been 
moved back to the re-born Statistics and Research Division (S&R) when the ill-fated 
Planning and Research Division was broken-up, had retained its dual role as both in-
house research unit and source of expert advice for the commissioning of social 
research. It was envisaged ‘that its research functions would gradually reduce while 
its research management function was increased’.3 Arrangements for social security 
research (SSR) similarly included both in-house and commissioned research. In-
house research was shared between the Social Security Statistics Branch, the 
Economic Adviser’s Office and S&R and co-ordinated through the Social Security 
Research Policy Committee.4  The staff in S&R were also responsible for 
commissioning external research. These arrangements were left unchanged except 
that the relevant staff from S&R were transferred into the administration branch of 
the OCS. The Operational Research Unit did not become part of OCS, remaining in 
the Establishments and Personnel Division where it had been located when the 
Planning and Research Division was dismantled.  
The executive OCS represented a significant advance on earlier structures in 
integration and capacity for research commissioning. It brought HPSSR, social 
security research and biomedical research into a single organisation for research 
                                                             
1.  MH 166/1440, DMB 16(78). 
2.  Imperial Calendar and Civil Service List, 1979. 
3.  BN 9/159, Management Review. Report of Study 7, Planning and Control of Research 
and Development, 99 
4.  The Social Security Research Policy Committee was another creation of the early 1970s 
reorganisation. It had no reporting line to the Chief Scientist’s Research Committee – an 
example of the autonomy of the ‘specialist branches’ in R&D matters. Kogan and Henkel 
mention this committee only once, and in passing (p.50). See also BN 82/43, 
Organisational arrangements for the social security research programme, November 
1976. 
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management. In August 1978, Buller took command of a division that was better 
structured to drive forward the programme than any previous set of organisational 
arrangements. This looked to be ‘Rothschild more fully implemented’. 
Review of Rothschild 
Early in 1978, Dr David Owen wrote to Prime Minister Callaghan about the 
Rothschild reforms. Owen was Foreign Secretary at the time, but had been Minister 
of State for Health between 1974 and 1976. He commended the Rothschild reforms 
and said that during his time at the DHSS he had done his best to get these 
implemented ‘but it was clear that there was a great deal of resistance’. He reported 
that Lord Victor Rothschild would like to review the situation and find out exactly 
how Framework for Government Research and Development had been implemented. 
Owen was supportive of this suggestion as ‘without some further stimulus the 
Research Councils will, I fear, lapse back into old habits’.1 
The Cabinet Secretary, John Hunt, sought the opinion of the CPRS. Rothschild’s 
successor as head of CPRS, Kenneth Berrill, reminded him that the government had, 
some two years previously, given a commitment to a ‘review of Rothschild’. This 
commitment had been made to the Select Committee on Science and Technology and 
some preparatory work had already been initiated. He noted that ‘the issue is likely to 
become a live one quite early because the new Secretary of the Medical Research 
Council (Dr J. L. Gowans) is making a public issue of it and stirred the pot quite 
nicely in a recent lecture’. Berrill saw a role for the CPRS in such a study but was 
against the idea that this might be undertaken by Rothschild himself, predicting a 
major outcry: ‘the academic science world has never forgiven him, and they would 
regard his appointment as provocative and a case of someone being judge and jury’.2  
The review was undertaken during the second half of 1978 and led by Professor J. 
M. Ashworth, Chief Scientist at CPRS. Ashworth invited departments to comment 
on drafts. The DHSS took advantage of this, offering re-drafted paragraphs, which 
include the following statements. 
                                                             
1.  CAB 164/1487, Owen to PM, 7 February 1978. 
2.  CAB 164/1487, Berrill to Hunt 10 February 1978, memo by Hunt 13 February 1978. 
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The special feature of the biomedical work carried out for the Council’s 
principal customers, the Health Departments, is that the latter have had to 
depend upon the council itself for advice needed to formulate precise 
requirements in the biomedical field. The DHSS, for its part, has had to 
build up the necessary expertise to discharge its own separate functions 
for developing health and social services research. At a time of strict 
constraints on administrative and staff costs, it has not felt justified in also 
developing expertise for a full commissioning role in the biomedical area. 
It is anomalous to give a Department the responsibility for a specific part 
of a Research Council’s expenditure if the Department does not, and 
cannot reasonably, develop the expertise to exercise that responsibility 
fully. This problem arises particularly over the commissions placed by the 
Health Departments with the MRC and progress made under the new 
administrative arrangements is to be reviewed in the autumn of 1979. 1 
In a covering note, Permanent Secretary Patrick Nairne noted that this drafting 
could be ‘regarded as amendments for the purpose either of providing a more 
accurate and balanced text or of giving reasonable room for manoeuvre in the 
review of the DHSS/MRC field next year’.2 The amended text was included without 
alteration in a White Paper, published in March 1979.3 
This document concluded that although it was still too early to make a definitive 
judgement on the Rothschild reforms ‘they appear to have strengthened the 
government’s R&D machinery’. The government press release trumpeted that 
‘present system of commissioning applied research was working well’. The Lord 
Privy Seal briefed the Prime Minister that ‘essentially it concludes that the 
customer-contractor arrangements are working reasonably well and that no major 
changes are necessary’.4 The White Paper included no specific proposals for the 
commissioning of health research.  The simplification of commissioning 
arrangements for biomedical research in 1978 was portrayed as a positive 
development. The benefits of ‘administrative simplification’ were noted, together 
with a ‘more practicable means of a dialogue’ between the MRC and the health 
departments.5 The White Paper thus offered no grounds for any immediate change 
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to the arrangements between the MRC and the DHSS. However, it did include 
negative statements about the ability of the DHSS to commission biomedical 
research. In retrospect, these served as ‘sleeper’ statements as, although they 
attracted little attention at the time, they were later invoked to justify a return of 
funds to the MRC. The White Paper also included a commitment to a review of the 
DHSS/MRC relationship in the second half of 1979. 
New leadership  
By early 1979, the DHSS appeared well positioned to consolidate its post 
Rothschild arrangements. It had made substantial changes to the administrative 
structures implemented in 1973, creating an executive OCS for the first time. A 
national review of the machinery of government for R&D had concluded that current 
arrangements were working well and that no major change was needed. 
Nevertheless, within less than two years, the DHSS had not only agreed to return 
funds for biomedical research to the MRC but was also proposing to add to these 
funds from its own vote so that the Council could develop its activities in HSR. To 
understand this turnaround, it is necessary to look at the role played by three key 
individuals who represented a new generation of leadership in the MRC/DHSS 
relationship. Sir Patrick Nairne (1921-2013) took over from Sir Philip Rogers as 
Permanent Secretary in 1975. Dr James L. Gowans (b. 1924) succeeded Sir John 
Gray as MRC Secretary in 1977. Sir Douglas Black had left the DHSS in April 1977 
and was succeeded by Arthur Buller in August 1978.  As an aside, the midwife of the 
reorganisation of R&D management, Kenneth Stowe, had left the Department in 
1973 and so did not see the fruits of his labours. Stowe did not return to the DHSS 
until 1981, when he succeeded Nairne as Permanent Secretary. The background and 
outlook of these new leaders are now briefly considered to provide context for a 
discussion of events between 1978 and 1981. 
James Gowans 
James Gowans followed a career as a transplantation immunologist before 
becoming MRC Secretary in April 1977. He arrived at the MRC on a mission: to 
reverse the transfer of biomedical research funds. In Nairne’s words, ‘he made clear 
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that he wanted the transferred money back and he was very determined to get it’.1 
Gowans wrote to the Secretary of State for Social Services soon after his 
appointment to argue that the system for the commissioning of biomedical research 
was not working and that funds should be returned to the science vote. At the time, 
the Department was moving towards dismantling the Panel for Medical Research and 
the replacement of broad commissions with the annual statement of needs and 
priorities (both implemented from April 1978). The Secretary of State was thus, with 
some justification, able to argue that such a move would be premature. However, he 
gave a commitment to review the system in autumn 1979.2 Gowans made no secret 
of his ambition to secure the return of funds, as evidenced by Birrell’s comment 
about him ‘stirring the pot’ in public. At the DHSS, he quickly caused offence to 
research administration. Brian Rayner, head of one of the research branches in C&R, 
wrote a memorandum of complaint to Nairne reporting that Gowans had referred 
‘contemptuously’ to ‘bureaucratic pirouetting’ at his first meeting of the CSRC. 
Gowans was accused of ‘arrogance and insensitivity’ and of ‘a certain unworldliness’ 
in his assumption that he only had to go to Ministers or to the Select Committee on 
Science and Technology and ‘say that the MRC are so obviously best placed to 
control biomedical research that the sensible thing to do would be to hand all the 
money back to the Council’. Rayner believed this would prove a counter-productive 
strategy. This proved to be as grave a misjudgement as was his assessment of 
Gowans as unworldly.3 
Arthur Buller 
Arthur Buller was medically qualified but had moved into laboratory research at 
an early stage in his career, having concluded that he lacked aptitude for clinical 
practice and was more interested in science.4  He pursued a career in laboratory-
based research, specialising in nerves and muscles, and was Professor of Physiology 
at the University of Bristol when seconded to the Department as Chief Scientist.  
                                                             
1.  Reynolds and Tansey, 51. 
2.  MH 166/1438, Review of the revised arrangements for the commissioning of biomedical 
research by the health departments. 1979. This was the origin of the commitment to 
review included in the White Paper. 
3.  MH 166/1437, Rayner to Nairne, 9 August 1977. 
4.  Professor Arthur Buller in interview with Dr Max Blythe, Oxford Brookes University 
Twentieth Century Medical Video Archive MSVA 117/118 Vol. 1, Oxford, 20 November 
1995. 
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Buller did not have prior experience in either the management of research 
commissioning (unlike Cohen) or clinical research (unlike Black).  His clinical 
experience was also outdated, as he had left practice at an early stage in his career. 
He would not, therefore, have been in touch with the situation in the NHS. He was, 
however, a member of the MRC Council and chaired its Neurobiology and Mental 
Health Board. He moved without interruption from membership of the Council as a 
scientist to membership as DHSS Chief Scientist, although he resigned his Board 
chair once appointed to the latter role.1 Holland says that a more experienced clinical 
researcher was also considered for the post but passed over in favour of Buller 
because of the latter’s greater administrative experience. However, he does not 
appear entirely convinced by this explanation.2 It seems more likely that Buller’s 
main qualifications for the post were that he was an MRC loyalist with credentials in 
laboratory-based medical research. 
This supposition is powerfully confirmed by Buller’s personal account of his 
appointment, given in an interview recorded in 1995.3 Douglas Black was elected 
President of the Royal College of Physicians (RCP) in April 1977. The convention 
was that the new President took up office on the same day as his or her election, so 
Black was obliged to resign as Chief Scientist with immediate effect. With over-
stated self-deprecation, Buller initially explains his appointment by referring to these 
rather unusual circumstances. 
Obviously everyone was caught napping as they looked for someone who 
was doing nothing particularly important at that time. Buller’s name 
immediately sprang to their attention. I wasn’t doing anything of any 
importance to anybody but I was available.  
As Buller was Dean of the medical school in Bristol as well as Professor of 
Physiology at the time, this is a rather implausible explanation. When pressed further 
by the interviewer, Max Blythe, on where his nomination came from, he replies: 
‘I’ve no idea. It came, I’m sure, via the MRC because it’s undoubtedly true that the 
relationship between the Department and the MRC at that time was pretty poor’. He 
then gives an account of how an initial approach was made to him. 
                                                             
1.  MRC Annual Reports 1975/6 to 1977/8. 
2.   Holland, Improving Health Services, 65-66. 
3.  Professor Arthur Buller in interview with Dr Max Blythe, Vol. 3. 
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There was an MRC dinner to say goodbye to the Duke of 
Northumberland who had been the Chairman of the MRC at Syon House. 
And as a Council member I was invited, of course, as we all were and we 
had a break during dinner and we were wandering round the garden…and 
it was Henry Yellowlees, who was then the CMO, who actually 
approached me and said would I be interested in following Douglas as 
Chief Scientist. It was bolt from the blue. I had not expected it and I took 
some time to consider it but effectively everyone that I spoke to, not least 
Alec Merrison who was my Vice-Chancellor said I should have a go but 
he had a degree of self-interest because he had opposed the Rothschild 
arrangements in the beginning and knew that I was, as it were, a believer 
in the MRC and felt that the transfer of these funds back from the 
Department to DES and hence to MRC could be achieved and in a sense 
that came about.1 
It is difficult to imagine a more explicit account of elite patronage in operation. 
Buller goes on to describe lunch with Patrick Nairne as the next stage of the 
selection process. 
I think that Pat Nairne thought that we could do business…I’m sure that 
these clever men don’t see me as any threat so that, you know, it’s 
possible for them to say ‘yes, I think I could work with Arthur Buller’. 
Presumably when they are looking for colleagues they don’t want 
somebody who is going to run an opposite course to that which they 
envisage. 
In the same vein, he later describes himself as a ‘go-between’ for Nairne and 
Gowans.  
I had the great advantage of being able to see Jim Gowans more or less 
whenever I wanted and this was my scientific touchpole and I had the 
advantage of having the ear of the Permanent Secretary Pat Nairne and 
that was my touchpole in the Dept. So I was acting as a go-between and 
negotiating what was acceptable to one and what was acceptable to 
another. There was also Ashworth at that time at the Cabinet Office and 
it was the time when the review of Rothschild came out and he consulted 
me over some wording over how the Department was getting on. 
This passage indicates that Buller was the author of the amended text placed in the 
‘review of Rothschild’ White Paper. He is frank about his views on Douglas Black’s 
stewardship during this interview. He asserts that Black ‘didn’t do anything to make 
it or break it’ and that his preference was for an advisory role. On this point, he is 
                                                             
1.  Merrison was also Chairman of the Royal Commission on the NHS, which reported in 
1979. There is no sign that the view of the Commission, including its recommendation 
for an Institute of Health Services Research, had any significant influence over Buller or 
the Department. The almost complete absence of any reference to this 
recommendation in the OCS files is noteworthy. 
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rather scathing about the notion that civil servants might ever feel the need to consult 
a purely advisory Chief Scientist. 
I mean the thing is run, properly, by ministers and civil servants, in my 
day, were there to help ministers with their thoughts on matters but 
decisions rest with ministers and to think that these very senior highly 
intellectual Oxbridge double firsts in History, the Greats – you name it - 
were going to come in and ask Douglas a scientific question was 
nonsensical. 
Buller wanted the Chief Scientist to have an executive role and the OCS was 
reorganised to support such a role under his tenure, as discussed. He is, despite this 
reorganisation, dismissive of the organisation created in 1978. 
It was a few individuals, capable in their own way, but a few doctors, 
nurses and a couple of social scientists. It wasn’t a meaningful 
organisation at all. 
Elsewhere in the interview, he asserts that the Department was ‘very weak in its 
scientific liaison, collaboration, and initiation of research’ and is adamant that he did 
not have the necessary resources to discharge the role expected of the Chief Scientist. 
Buller says nothing at all in this long interview about his responsibilities for 
HPSSR. The detailed account by Henkel and Kogan of the Chief Scientist’s process 
of review gives an insight into his attitudes and approach. Buller brought to the 
process expectations of scientific method derived from laboratory research. He 
sought to separate as far as possible the question of scientific merit from that of 
policy relevance. Henkel and Kogan summarise his views as follows.  
A predominantly internalist view of science is asserted in the basic 
principle of the departmental review of units that science and relevance 
must be separately determined…just as scientific judgements ought not 
to be contaminated by the views of policy makers, so policy decisions 
should not be infiltrated by scientists. Policy makers too are to assert 
their proper role.1 
Buller’s view of ‘good science’ had been formed in the controlled world of the 
laboratory. But the science he was assessing was undertaken in the messy real world 
and in the multidisciplinary overlap between medical and social research. A 
                                                             
1.  Henkel and Kogan, DHSS Funded Research Units, 69. 
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fundamental clash of epistemologies was played out in the encounters between the 
Chief Scientist and the research community.  
Patrick Nairne 
Nairne’s position can be dealt with comparatively briefly. Buller maintains that, 
from his arrival at the DHSS onwards, Nairne shared his view that arrangements for 
R&D management were inadequate. This, he says, is because Nairne had come from 
the Ministry of Defence, where the Chief Scientist was powerful, and could see the 
impossible challenge facing the DHSS in creating a similarly effective function.1 
There is no evidence to support this contention. Nairne’s attitude towards R&D 
appears to have been pragmatic. In witness testimony given in 1998, he stresses the 
difficulties of adequately reporting on research procured through the broad 
commissions. This left the Department exposed to criticism on grounds of 
accountability.2 Ultimately, and in the face of broad opposition from within the 
Department, Nairne threw his weight behind the return of funds. The evidence 
suggests that this course of action was prompted by pragmatism rather than 
conviction. 
Difficulties of funding and accountability 
The system for commissioning biomedical research introduced in 1973 soon ran 
into difficulties. The most obvious of these was the failure of the PMR, which has 
previously been discussed. Kogan et al. provide an account of the panel’s difficulties 
and eventual disbanding, which need not be repeated here.3 These difficulties arose 
because the PMR was, from the outset, assigned no meaningful role within the 
MRC/DHSS agreement.4 Difficulties also arose in honouring the agreement that the 
DHSS would protect the MRC commission from short-term fluctuations in funding. 
The annual report of the MRC for 1976/7 states that the DHSS had imposed a ten 
percent reduction on the MRC contract for the following financial year. This, it was 
said, would ‘affect both commissioned and other research supported by the 
                                                             
1.  Video interview, Arthur Buller, 1995, vol. 3. 
2.  Reynolds and Tansey, Clinical Research, 50-52. 
3.  Kogan and Henkel, Management and Research, 62-71; Kogan et al., Government’s 
Commissioning, 20. 
4.  See chapter 8. 
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Council’.1 The overall departmental R&D budget had been subject to a £2.5 million 
cut in that year and this reduction had been allocated pro-rata to the various budget 
lines. For commissioned biomedical research, this meant a cut from £8.74 million to 
£7.86 million. This was not communicated to the MRC until October 1976, which 
was rather late for planning purposes. However, during financial year 1977/8 the 
allocation was uplifted for inflation and other technical adjustments to £10 million. 
There was, then, no reduction in cash terms in the budget, although the MRC might 
have argued that there was a real-terms reduction given high levels of inflation. In 
the event, the MRC predicted an outturn of £8.92 million for 1977/8, over a million 
pounds less than the final allocation. Not surprisingly, research management found it 
illogical that the MRC was predicting a final spend ten percent below contract value 
‘whilst still complaining vociferously about the ‘cut’ on every possible occasion’.2 
This was an awkward episode brought about by a wider crisis in public finances, 
which was eventually resolved without the MRC needing to curtail any of its 
activities. Despite this, the MRC returned to it subsequently as a source of grievance 
and as an illustration of how the Council had been left vulnerable to sudden cuts in 
the commissioning budget. It was mentioned in the 1979 White Paper as having 
created considerable difficulty and as leaving the MRC with a ‘feeling of 
insecurity’.3  
A further issue, which was more of a problem for the health departments than the 
MRC, was that of accountability. The original agreement envisaged that the health 
departments would advance funds for biomedical research to the MRC as ‘grant-in-
aid’. This was the basis on which the Council received the rest of its funding from 
the Department of Education and Science (DES). Its advantages were that any 
underspend could be carried forward by the grantee into the following financial year, 
rather than being returned to Treasury. Funding through grant-in-aid was also subject 
to less stringent audit requirements. Treasury guidance stated that ‘the extent to 
which use is made of the system of grants in aid should be as restricted as possible’. 4 
The Treasury had not agreed to the use of the system for commissioned biomedical 
                                                             
1.   Medical Research Council. Annual Report 1976/7. London: MRC, 1977, 4. 
2.  MH 166/1438, MRC Commission Funds 1977/8 and 1978/9, 18 June 1978. 
3.  Cmnd. 7499, para. 37. 
4.  MH 166/1438, Commissioned Biomedical Research, Paget to Foster, 10 October 1979. 
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research, not least because the 1972 White Paper had specifically stated that grant-in-
aid would be inappropriate.1 Instead the health departments were fully accountable 
for expenditure under the relevant vote sub-head. To discharge this accountability, 
the departments needed the MRC to provide it with detailed accounts of how the 
funds had been used, including project accounting.2  
Arrangements for commissioned research were reviewed by the government’s 
auditor, the Comptroller and Auditor General (CAG), in 1979.3 The CAG reported 
that the MRC received £41.8 million in funding from the science budget of the DES 
plus a further £10.4 million from other government departments for commissioned 
research, of which £10.1 million came from the health departments. The MRC had 
undertaken 46 specific commissions, most of which had been commissioned by the 
Health and Safety Executive. Only two, with a combined value of £110,000, had 
been commissioned by the health departments, an indication of the extent to which 
broad commissions had been treated as the default mode. The MRC, it was reported, 
took the view that the customer-contractor principle was rarely appropriate for the 
biomedical research of interest to the health departments and ‘that by transferring to 
the Departments a much larger sum than could be used on such projects, the 
Government intended that the customer/contractor principle be more broadly 
interpreted’. The CAG observed that the arrangements in place appeared to leave 
control more in the hands of the MRC as contractor than in the hands of the 
customer. In view of this, they questioned whether these arrangements could be said 
to comply with the customer/contractor principle. The MRC argued that it did 
comply, on the basis that the White Paper recognised that ‘many of the ideas for 
research and development to meet the customer’s needs came from the scientific 
staff in the contractor’s organisation’. This selective reading was hardly consistent 
with the aims of the Rothschild reforms. 
In contrast to the specific commissions, the CAG found that the MRC was 
undertaking 105 broad commissions, costing £16 million, of which £10 million came 
from the health departments. In other words, the ‘commissioned’ research was little 
more than a block grant towards broad programmes of work. Separating out the 
                                                             
1.   Cmnd. 5046, para. 52. 
2.  MH 166/1438, Paget to Caff, 24 October 1979. 
3.  Comptroller and Auditor General, Report (1979), xiv-xix. 
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departments’ contribution and accounting for it on a project-by-project basis was 
thus only possible through joint product costing, which required somewhat arbitrary 
cost allocation. This was not an activity for which the MRC demonstrated any 
enthusiasm. The CAG reported that the MRC had, in fact, introduced a project 
costing system in 1976, which would have reduced the difficulty of this task. 
However, this had not been applied to the commissioned research. The MRC’s 
explanation for this was that ‘at the project level the activity was…often poorly 
defined and did not justify the expense of a precise system of accounting’. The move 
away from broad commissions to an annual statement of needs and priorities had 
further increased the difficulty of project accounting. When challenged on how, in 
this situation, the health departments were supposed to satisfy themselves as to the 
realisation of objectives and the commensurate nature of costs, the departments 
responded with an answer that echoed MRC arguments. The CAG reported as 
follows. 
They informed me that an important aspect of biomedical research was 
that, although primary objectives are relatively easy to define, it was 
rarely possible to define in advance the course of a research programme 
in the complex biological process. Consequently, it was frequently 
difficult to make precise forecast of costs. Because ignorance of the 
physiology and pathology of human systems was still profound in many 
parts of the field, it was impossible to forecast when “bright ideas” and 
practical results might emerge from a piece of work and when a line of 
enquiry had been exhausted. 
The picture that emerges from the CAG report is one of two organisations colluding 
to ensure that the customer/contractor principle was observed in form but not in 
substance. This was the logical outcome of the agreement reached between the health 
departments and the MRC in 1973. It was this picture, revealed by the CAG to 
parliamentary scrutiny for the first time, which attracted the attention of the 
Committee of Public Accounts. 
The MRC and Health Services Research 
Arthur Buller claims that the decision to scale back research commissioning at the 
DHSS was taken after the election of a conservative government in May 1979.  
The administration then changed, and it was cut, cut, cut and there was 
no question of building anything up. It was never going to happen, so I 
found myself thrown into a situation of saying if we’re not going to build 
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up let’s get out of it almost. You haven’t got the competence here to deal 
with the commitment to the MRC, which was to commission biomedical 
research. Let’s try and negotiate a new concordat, return the money and 
get the best terms we can.1 
The election undoubtedly represented a turning point, but this account obfuscates the 
extent to which Buller had argued for a progressive withdrawal from research 
commissioning from the moment he was appointed. In making this argument, Buller 
did not initially focus on biomedical research but instead on health services research.  
In July 1978, even before his term of office formally began, Buller submitted a 
paper to the DHSS management board on the reorganisation of the Chief Scientist’s 
Organisation.2 The paper confirmed that he was supportive of the move to 
consolidate administrative responsibility for biomedical research, HPSSR and social 
security research under the authority of the Chief Scientist. Also, that he was content 
with a purely advisory role when it came to computing, building, supplies and 
equipment research. Having endorsed the review proposals to centralise research 
management in a strengthened OCS, the paper nevertheless goes on to argue that 
commissioning arrangements, ‘even under an administrative CS’ would remain 
unsatisfactory, because the load placed on those working in research management 
was ‘diffuse and excessive’. Buller saw no prospect of any rapid change in this 
situation because of poor career prospects in research management and an under-
supply of suitable staff. Given this gloomy prognosis, he recommended that  
The Medical Research Council should be encouraged to accept the 
research management role for those health and health service research 
programmes managed by DHSS.  
In September, Buller visited the MRC where he shared his opinion that much of 
the research supported by the DHSS was of ‘scandalously low quality’ and that 
‘moreover, the Department did not have the research capability to cope with it’. In 
view of this, he asked whether the MRC would be prepared to broaden its activities 
to embrace health services research (HSR) if additional funding for this purpose was 
forthcoming from the health departments. He foresaw the gradual running down of 
‘soft’ DHSS supported work and a gradual transition to the work being taken on by 
                                                             
1  Buller, video interview, 1995, vol. 3. 
2.  MH 166/1440 Proposals for Re-organisation of the Chief Scientists Organisation, 11 July 
1978. 
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the research councils. The MRC would undertake HSR with the SSRC also taking on 
some social research.1 
Buller stopped short of proposing a return of funds to the MRC initially but in his 
July paper he proposed that, as a first stage in ‘wooing the MRC’ to take on a greater 
role in HSR, the transferred funds should be made a first call on the R&D budget (i.e. 
protected from any general budget cuts) and rejected any clear-cut distinction 
between HSR and biomedical research. He believed that the MRC was 
unquestionably the organisation best-placed to pursue research across the whole 
spectrum of health-related research (whilst allowing that the SSRC would have a 
smaller role in personal social services research).  He proposed that, as the first step 
towards a greater role, the MRC should be commissioned to undertake HSR in 
several fields where the DHSS programme was acknowledged to be under-powered: 
acute care, dental health and safety of medicines. Such commissions would be placed 
under the same agreements as those pertaining to biomedical research. This proposal 
caused some disquiet for senior administrative staff in OCS, who insisted that policy 
was ‘to reduce and not to abdicate entirely, departmental responsibility’ and that ‘the 
policy would only work if the Research Councils were willing to accept the 
Department’s role in defining the needs for research’. 2  
Nairne reported on these developments to the Secretary of State, seeking his 
‘general blessing’ for the direction of policy. His memorandum recommended the 
placing of a small number of HSR commissions with the MRC, but emphasized the 
cautious pace envisaged. He wanted any such commissions to be subject to three 
conditions. First that the MRC (and the SSRC in due course) would accept ‘the 
Department’s rights as a customer’. Second that the research councils would be 
expected to participate in the RLGs. And third that ‘the Department’s accountability 
responsibilities will be safeguarded’.3 During the second half of 1978, policy was 
worked up on this basis and a proposal to commit £0.5 million from the HPSSR 
budget to MRC emerged. At this stage, this represented little more than further 
implementation of the customer/contractor principle, albeit working within the 
                                                             
1.  FD 9/4545, Notes of a meeting between Dr Buller, Dr Owen and Dr Norton on 6 
September 1978. 
2.  MH 166/1440, Management Board meeting 11 July 1978 – minutes. 
3.  MH 166/1440, Nairne to SoS (undated). 
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idiosyncratic interpretation of this applied to biomedical research. More significantly, 
two assertions became embedded in the policy discourse at this point. The first was 
that ‘there is no logical dividing point between biomedical and health services 
research’. The second was that there was an unbridgeable gap between the 
Department’s aspirations for HPSSR and its ability to manage commissioning.  
The policy proposal was circulated for comment within the policy divisions.  The 
response was, from Buller’s perspective, ‘disappointing…but not uniformly 
discouraging’. Only the dental division was supportive. Other divisions expressed 
reservations about the MRC being an appropriate body to undertake HSR and 
observed that present arrangements were satisfactory. Two of the divisions 
commented that they did not have the resources to survey the field and identify a 
comprehensive list of priorities. They were unable to meet the expectations of their 
RLGs in this respect and so did not welcome the prospect of having to deal with the 
MRC. Regardless of the tenor of these internal responses, Buller took the step of 
writing to RLG Chairmen, external advisers and other external stakeholders.1 The 
first part of this letter explains how as Chief Scientist he has been given full 
administrative authority over the main streams of research and the OCS expanded ‘to 
provide direct multi-disciplinary support for me in the exercise of my 
responsibilities’. He also confirms a continuing, central role for the RLGs in 
planning and commissioning HPSSR. Having described his strengthened 
organisation, he then turns without any apparent awareness of ‘mixed message’ to 
the ‘shortage of research staff’ in the Department. He reports that he has been 
authorised to explore an arrangement with the MRC ‘under which the Council would 
manage health services research on behalf of the Department and with funds 
provided by the Department’. He notes that this proposal is at an early stage but that 
‘if all went well I envisage that in the long run it might be possible for the DHSS to 
have most of its research needs met through the Research Councils’. 
This letter provoked alarmed and critical responses. Professor J. C. Hayward, 
Chair of the Nursing RLG, pointed out that the Department had developed real 
expertise on nursing research over the past decade and that this would be jeopardized 
by a transfer to ‘a body lacking in the first-hand knowledge and experience in the 
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management of such research’. A.J. Culyer, Reader in Economics at the University 
of York, pointed out that the MRC had no interest or expertise in social research and 
that ‘any attempt to turn the MRC into a multi-disciplinary kind of Council would 
not only change its present character (and purpose) but also probably undermine its 
authority’. Also from York, the economist Professor Alan Williams wrote that a 
transfer of HSR responsibilities to the MRC would be ‘a most retrograde step’ and 
stressed the rationale for the Department retaining independent sponsorship of 
HPSSR. The Vice-chancellor of the University of Kent, home to one of the 
designated units, wrote that ‘it looks to us as if what is being suggested would 
quickly ruin what is being achieved here’. Professor E.G. Knox, head of the 
Department of Social Medicine at the University of Birmingham, noted the mismatch 
between the strengthening of the OCS and Buller’s desire to pass responsibility for 
research management to the research councils over time. 
I am very much opposed to abandoning the Rothschild principle at a time 
when it has never really been tried, and at a time – probably the first time 
– when an organisation has been set up which might possibly make it 
work. If the new organisation abandons health services research as a 
central DHSS function, then it is no better than the organisation which it 
replaced – indeed, worse, since its actions are intentional rather than 
simply by default.1 
Buller appears to have been taken aback by the strength of hostile reaction, 
claiming that his letter was poorly drafted and had been misunderstood and inviting 
various correspondents for lunch and ‘long chats’ so that he could explain his 
position properly. He seems to have assumed that everyone in the academic 
community would share his views and to have been surprised when this turned out 
not to be the case. This suggests that he had not appreciated the extent to which the 
programme’s patronage had created its own elite, unit directors and other major 
figures in the newer field of HPSSR and allied research. This elite represented a 
counter-balance to the more established medical research elite to which Buller was 
attuned, and was vocal in support of its interests.  
To place this episode within the historiography, we might also note that it is the 
proposal to transfer HSR responsibilities to the MRC that is the primary focus of 
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dated 29 September). 
 235 
 
Kogan et al. in their discussion of ‘Rothschild partly demolished’. Their monograph 
includes a sustained critique of the proposed policy.1 This amounts to a development 
of the various arguments made by Buller’s correspondents, given weight by their 
grounding in empirical study of the commissioning process. For reasons of timing, 
the return of biomedical funds to the MRC is discussed in more provisional terms, 
although many of the arguments made about the ability of the Council to respond to 
customer’s needs are equally applicable.  
The return of biomedical research funding 
The White Paper reviewing the working of Rothschild was published in March 
1979 and included a commitment to review of the MRC/DHSS relationship. In the 
same month, Gowans, Nairne and Buller, together with representatives of the DES 
and SHHD, appeared before the Committee of Public Accounts, who wished to 
investigate the findings of the CAG.2 Gowans’ performance at this committee is 
credited by both Kogan and Nairne as having been pivotal in persuading the PAC 
and the health departments that the Rothschild arrangements should be 
fundamentally recast for biomedical research.3 The arguments used by Gowans are 
consistent with those used by the MRC to oppose the Framework for Government 
Research in 1972. These arguments were themselves, as has previously been noted, 
highly consistent with those used in the Cohen Report two decades earlier. Gowans 
began with an exposition of the ‘peculiar difficulties of biomedical research’. The 
MRC, he claimed, had ‘under its surveillance all the work right from the basic to the 
applied end’. Within this continuum, work was ‘so interwoven that it is very difficult 
to pick out projects’. According to Gowans, the nature of medical research was such 
that ‘you have to invest in good ideas and good people’ and leave them with time for 
relevant discoveries to emerge. Accordingly, the whole notion that objectives could 
be defined closely enough to place specific commissions was flawed. 
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The work is of a kind where you cannot place a specific commission to 
discover the cause of schizophrenia; what you are waiting for is the next 
good idea and the next good man, and the prime thing is to invest in that. 
This was an unapologetic defence of the approach that Rothschild had castigated as 
‘scientific roulette’. Gowans went on to repeat the argument that the government 
must have intended a loose interpretation of the customer/contractor principle when 
it went ahead and transferred funds because it did so in the face of MRC 
representations in 1972. This amounted to an ex post revisiting of government 
intentions for which there is no supporting evidence. He also repeated the argument 
that the MRC was strongly positioned to assess societal needs through the 
involvement of scientists and doctors on its boards. Finally, he argued that the 
freedom of the DHSS to use other contractors for biomedical research, if it so 
decided, left the MRC in a vulnerable position. These arguments had all been made 
before, but they were, presumably, new to members of the committee and Gowans’ 
delivery was, by all reports, persuasive. Nairne’s response was broadly positive in its 
assessment of biomedical research commissioning and he took the opportunity to put 
the record straight on the alleged ‘cuts’ in funding. He concluded with a renewed 
commitment to proceed with the promised review ‘to be sure that the basic objectives 
are being met in terms of scientific and financial accountability and is not 
excessively burdensome in bureaucratic terms’. This was, to be specific, to be a 
review of the simplified arrangements for biomedical research commissioning, 
introduced in April 1978, as promised to Gowans by the Secretary of State. 
The possibility that biomedical funds might be returned to the MRC was included 
within the scope of the review from the outset. This was talked down by officials 
when the review began in March but became an altogether more serious prospect 
once the PAC reported in September. The Committee found that the Department ‘had 
largely ceded to the MRC the customer’s normal responsibility for defining the 
objectives of commissioned research and for controlling the allocation of resources 
to it’. In the committee’s opinion, this represented a blurring of accountability. Its 
members had been persuaded by Gowans’ arguments that the health departments 
were incapable of developing competence in the commissioning of biomedical 
research. Their conclusion was unequivocal. 
We recommend that these considerations be taken into account in the 
forthcoming review of the commissioning arrangements for biomedical 
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research; and we trust that the Government will give full weight to the 
possibility of abandoning the formal commissioning arrangements in this 
field if they add nothing of substance to the guidance and advice which 
the Health Departments could, in any event, continue to provide through 
the improved arrangements for consultation and liaison with the MRC.1 
Within DHSS policy divisions, the review process revealed unanimous opposition to 
any return of funds. A summary of opinions concluded that ‘without the power of the 
purse persuasion would be the only means open to the health departments to 
influence the outcome of the competition for resources between those scientists 
pursuing basic biological studies and those seeking relatively short-term solutions 
leading to improvements on patient care’. The internal consensus was that it was still 
too early to suggest a retreat from Rothschild. The new arrangements introduced in 
1978 needed time to mature and another review might be undertaken after 3 or 4 
years. 2  
Near unanimous internal opposition presented a dilemma for Nairne.  He was 
clearly troubled by the accountability issue. He could also see that the undertakings 
given to the MRC to maintain funding levels (which he had repeated at the PAC) 
could become problematical for the Department in times of financial stringency.3 
The national science budget had been eroded by high inflation since mid-decade. 
With the recent election of a Conservative government committed to public 
expenditure reductions, acceleration in the rate of reduction was a real prospect.4 In 
these circumstances, protection of the commissioned funds would mean 
disproportionate cuts to the rest of the R&D budget. But, with memories of the ten 
percent ‘cut’ still raw, not to honour the undertaking given would have provoked 
renewed clamour from the MRC. 
As a conceivable way of mitigating the accountability problem, Nairne returned to 
the idea of making ‘grants-in-aid’ but this was abandoned once it was realised that it 
would not adequately rectify the accountability deficit. He then revived the idea of 
the MRC taking on a role in HPSSR, suggesting that a promise to return part of the 
                                                             
1.   Committee of Public Accounts. Session 1978-79. First Report of the Committee of Public 
Accounts. HC173. House of Commons (London: HMSO, 1979), para. 52. 
2.  MH 166/1438, Review of Revised Arrangements: Summary. 
3.  MH 166/1438, Nairne to Yellowlees, Buller, and others, 8 October 1979. 
4.   Wilkie, British Science and Politics, 88-97. 
 238 
 
funds could be used as a ‘bargaining chip’ in such discussions.1 This idea then 
developed into a proposal to return all the transferred funds bar £2 million, which 
would be held back for commissioning in the ‘middle ground’ between BMR and 
HSR. At this point, Buller sent a memorandum to Nairne arguing that the biomedical 
research funds should be returned in full, but be linked to an expectation that the 
MRC would take a more active role in HSR.2 For biomedical research, Buller 
restated his argument that the Department was incapable of developing the necessary 
competencies and invoked the criticism of the PAC.  For HPSSR, he returned to his 
previous argument that over the medium term ‘it would benefit the Department’s 
HPSS programme to establish clearer links with the research councils’. He argued 
that, even without the power of the purse, sufficient influence could be obtained 
through new liaison mechanisms. His specific proposal was that negotiations should 
begin to develop a new concordat with the MRC, using the prospect of the return of 
biomedical funds to obtain a commitment to HPSSR. He also anticipated a run-down 
of DHSS-funded units to release more funds for specific commissions with the MRC, 
a view expressed in advance of his programme of unit visits. On the same day that 
Buller wrote this letter, he and Nairne, together with a small number of other senior 
medical and administrative staff, met with the Secretary of State and Minister for 
Health to consider the courses of action open to the Department. Nairne offered three 
options. The first was continuation of the status quo. This was deemed 
‘unacceptable’. The second was to offer to return all or part of the biomedical funds, 
subject to agreement over new liaison mechanisms and the MRC taking on more of a 
role in HPSSR. The third was essentially a more tentative version of the second. 
Ministers opted for the second option.3 
Once this decision was taken, the DHSS began the process of notification and 
consultation with other government departments. The devolved health departments 
were content with the proposals. SHHD elected to deal directly with the MRC on 
biomedical research in future and added that, as satisfactory arrangements for 
commissioning health services research existed in Scotland, it did not wish to 
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participate in any discussion with the Council on this matter.1 The Department also 
needed the consent of the DES, the Cabinet Office, Treasury and the CSD, which 
presented greater difficulty. The Permanent Secretary of the DES, the department 
responsible for the research councils, pointed out that any return of funds would 
necessarily be to the science vote, from whence they had originally come, rather than 
to the MRC directly. Any returned funds would be subject to the normal procedures 
for allocation of that vote, which might or might not direct them to the MRC. He 
added, in a revealing comment, that ‘I doubt very much whether health services 
research is an appropriate responsibility for the science vote’.2 The CSD raised 
concerns about the ‘hiving-off’ of health services research to the MRC, which 
originated in wider policy concerns, and repeated the view that this might not be a 
suitable activity for funding from the science vote.3 To overcome this objection, 
Nairne pointed out that the commissioning of HSR research from the MRC would be 
no different from the long-established practice of commissioning such research from 
universities or other contractors. This was, of course, factually correct as the 
Department had commissioned some research from MRC units since the 1960s. 
Nairne’s position was not entirely consistent with Buller’s line that the future 
management of HPSSR should be passed to the research councils. However, Buller 
was not involved in this part of the discussion, and so this inconsistency was not 
visible. Treasury questioned why more effort wasn’t being made to improve 
commissioning arrangements, rather than abandoning them.4 Nairne had to work 
hard to overcome these various concerns, invoking the PAC report and the 1979 
White Paper, with its concessions to the ‘special status’ of biomedical research. The 
‘sleeper’ statements placed in the latter proved their worth at this time. The fact that 
commissioning under the customer-contractor principle would continue for HPSSR 
also carried weight and the CSD, with the consent of Treasury, eventually authorised 
DHSS proposals in March 1980.  
In discussion with the MRC, Gowans pushed back at the suggestion that the 
Department might retain part of the funds. This, he argued, was unnecessary and 
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would ‘impair the harmony of our relationship and prove counter-productive’.1 
Officials in the OCS also began to worry about how they would prepare specific 
commissions and realised that if they fell back onto broad commissions they would 
still face the same accountability issues, albeit for a smaller sum. Buller was also in 
favour of a complete return of funds. In the face of Gowans’ assertiveness and the 
anxieties of officials, the proposal to hold back part of the funds was quietly 
abandoned. Formal hypothecation of part of the returned funds for HSR was also 
impossible because of the position of the DES and instead there was agreement to 
‘earmark’ around £2 million of the returned funds for this purpose.2 
The intention to return biomedical research funds in full and with effect from 1 
April 1981 was announced to Parliament by the Secretary of State, Patrick Jenkin, in 
a written answer on 28 October 1980.3 It was stated that this move held no 
implications in other fields of research, for which the customer-contractor 
relationship would continue to apply. The new arrangements, including greater MRC 
commitment to HSR, were also communicated to the medical profession in a joint 
letter from Buller and Gowans.4 The sum returned was £13.9 million, which 
represented about a 20 percent uplift on the 1980/1 MRC budget.  
The exceptionalism of biomedical research  
As has been noted, no specific measures for medical research were proposed in 
the 1979 White Paper and nothing reported for the DHSS was obviously exceptional. 
Equal or greater teething difficulties were noted in the 14 non-health departments 
commissioning applied research. The impact of Rothschild on the other two research 
councils affected, ARC and NERC, had been greater than that experienced by the 
MRC, because a greater proportion of their budgets had been transferred. A 
comparative account of the development of Rothschild in ARC and NERC illustrates 
that while the working out of the customer-contractor relationship was not always 
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straightforward, in neither case did such difficulties end in a reversal like that seen at 
DHSS.1 Gummett, writing immediately prior to the biomedical reversal, focuses on 
the difficulties experienced by NERC, which had to deal not only with the 
Department of the Environment but also with MAFF, the Department of Energy and 
the Department of Trade and Industry. Of the comparatively straightforward 
DHSS/MRC relationship, he says, drawing a contrast, that after some initial 
difficulties ‘the new arrangements seem…to have settled down’.2  
Against the background of the 1979 White Paper, the subsequent decision to 
reverse Rothschild for biomedical research appeared anomalous to contemporaries. 
When consulted by the Cabinet Office, other government departments were quick to 
assert that this departure from national science policy could only be justified with 
reference to the unique nature and circumstances of biomedical research. The 
Permanent Secretary of MAFF replied that his department’s policy was to extend, 
rather than reduce, the scope of the customer-contractor principle and that it would 
‘not wish doubt to be cast on Rothschild principles generally’. Because ‘the 
considerations relating to biomedical research are peculiar to that field’, he added, 
‘there should be no difficulty in drawing the necessary distinction’.3 In a similar vein, 
the Departments of Transport and Environment, in a joint response from their 
Director General of Research, confirmed that while they had no objection to the new 
arrangements for Health, they did not want to see any precedent established. Instead 
they urged that ‘these discussions be confined to the very special relationship 
between the MRC and the Health Departments’.4 Other departments replied in a 
similar vein, insisting that Health was, and should remain, an exception.   
Concluding discussion 
The changes announced in 1980 amounted to a major re-alignment of power 
structures within the health research state. In 1971, the structural dominance of the 
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MRC was fundamentally challenged by the Framework for Government Research 
and Development. In 1979/80 the MRC successfully reasserted its claims to 
autonomy and to control over biomedical research. To achieve this, it used elite 
medical patronage to place an MRC loyalist in the office of Chief Scientist. It also 
engaged in a mix of deliberate ‘pot-stirring’, talking up of practical difficulties, and 
calculated engagement with the PAC to make its case. By so doing, it not only took 
back control of biomedical research but also acquired a new mandate for health 
services research and an expectation that it would progressively take this ground 
from the Department. The success of the MRC in making a case for the 
exceptionalism of biomedical research is a testament to the power of the medical 
profession. The frankness of Buller’s account shines a bright light on the working of 
elite patronage. Elite theory clearly has much to offer to the interpretation of these 
events.  
The contribution of institutional theory is less obvious. On the surface, 
arrangements at the DHSS conformed to various rational myths dominant in the early 
1970s: the customer/contractor relationship; research as a commodity; 
instrumentalist views of science; and the primacy of planning. The elaborate 
arrangements of 1973 allowed the Department to ‘tick the box’ for implementation 
of Rothschild, whilst claiming greater capacity for planning. However, the 
underlying realities were those of medical subversion of the customer/contractor 
relationship for biomedical research. Such a situation could only confer legitimacy if 
it was not too closely scrutinised. A further set of institutional logics were in the 
ascendant during the 1970s: furthering accountability in government - a major theme 
of the Fulton Report.1 The PAC existed to promote government accountability to 
parliament. Although not then as powerful as it has subsequently become, the PAC 
was older and more institutionalised than any other select committee and drew power 
from its ability to call on the resources of the Exchequer and Audit Department.2 
Once scrutiny had revealed the customer-contractor arrangements for biomedical 
research to be a thinly-veiled fiction, and perceived the reality that the DHSS has 
ceded control over such research to the MRC, then legitimacy was lost. 
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This analysis still leaves one question. Once the fiction was perceived, why didn’t 
government seek to rectify the situation by making the Department a more effective 
commissioner, rather than by abandoning Rothschild for biomedical research?  Why 
did the logic of accountability lead to an outcome in which resources were 
transferred back to an organisation that had consistently demonstrated its resistance 
to accountability? These questions are especially pertinent given the review of 
Rothschild White Paper of 1979, which concluded that the system was working well. 
This is where it was important for the MRC to place a Chief Scientist, Buller, who 
would preach a gospel of despair about any potential for the Department to improve 
its performance as a commissioner. This was ironic given that the Department 
strengthened the Office of the Chief Scientist upon Buller’s arrival. The other key 
strategy was repeated insistence upon the special nature of biomedical research. 
Ultimately it seems that all the actors in wider government preferred the governance 
of the research councils to continuation of the ‘blurred accountability’ evident in the 
DHSS/MRC relationship. 
Once Rothschild had been partially demolished, there remained an R&D 
organisation that looked something like that which existed in the ‘golden age’ but 
was more integrated, better resourced and led by a scientific authority figure, the 
Chief Scientist. It was also an organisation that had acquired the best part of two 
decades’ experience in commissioning HSPPR, although the extent of organisational 
learning was weakened by fragmentation between 1973 and 1978 and the constant 
rotation of officials. This organisation had not been valued by Buller whose interest 
in HPSSR was confined to ‘offloading’ it onto the research councils. But it existed 
and had the potential to further develop commissioning for the remaining streams of 
research under more sympathetic leadership. The continuation of such a role was also 
envisaged under the new concordat of 1980. The RLGs provided another important 
source of continuity. These had become the most important settings for interactions 
between policy-makers and researchers, although the extent and quality of such 
interaction was highly variable. The chairpersons of the RLGs, together with the unit 
directors, represented a reasonably forceful constituency for HPSSR, with some of 
the character of an emergent elite, providing a counter-balance to the more firmly 
established medical research elite represented by the MRC. This, then, was the 
Departmental R&D organisation going into the 1980s.  
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10. Rothschild Sustained: 1982 to 1986 
 
A year ago the report commissioned by my predecessor…was 
published. It said many valuable and useful things on which we are at 
present acting, but what attracted most attention was its critical 
comments on the scientific quality of some of the work, with the 
implication that quality control within the OCS was not good enough. 
In fact the OCS was well aware of many of the deficiencies to which 
the report drew attention and were already trying to improve matters.  I 
think our methods of quality control are about as good as they can be 
and correspond closely to the mechanisms used by the research 
councils.1 
  
The focus of this chapter is the persistence of the health and personal services 
research stream of the programme after the return of biomedical funds to the MRC in 
1981. This is worth emphasising, because some of the literature speaks as if this 
episode marked the end of the ‘Rothschild experiment’ at the DHSS.2  In fact, the 
Department continued to build its R&D commissioning function up until 1986. A 
major reason for this continuing effort was that the MRC did not exert much energy 
to develop the role in health services research that Buller so eagerly anticipated. It 
should not be imagined, however, that the 1980s were an easy period for research 
management. The departmental programme had to contend not just with a slowly 
shrinking budget, but also with a far less favourable political climate. In addition, the 
growth of in-house research units presented an increasingly effective alternative to 
commissioned research. Based on the headline data, the whole period from 1961 to 
1986 was characterised earlier as one of ‘rise and reversal’. This chapter suggests 
that for HPSSR and allied research a better characterisation might be ‘rise followed 
by constrained circumstances’. Just as growth in HPSSR research commissioning 
pre-dated growth caused by the transfer of biomedical research funding, so HPSSR 
research continued after the return of biomedical research funds.  
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A new era at DHSS 
Desmond Pond took up office as the fourth Chief Scientist in June 1982, 
relinquishing his previous role as Professor of Psychiatry at the University of 
London. The appointment of a new Chief Scientist does not appear to have been a 
competitive process, although the exact circumstances remain opaque.1 Various 
considerations may have prompted Pond’s selection. He was said to be conciliatory 
by nature and a subtle operator in professional organisations and committees.2 In 
addition, psychiatry occupied a distinctive position, having successfully cultivated 
the ‘middle ground’ between biomedical and service-orientated medical research 
since the 1960s. This can be seen in the career of researchers such as Martin Roth, 
David Kay and John and Laura Wing, all of whom received extensive funding from 
both the DHSS and MRC. Holland notes that Pond was ‘much more receptive to 
social science than his predecessor’ and a ‘peacemaker’. He was, it seems, acceptable 
to all constituencies. 
The Department also decided at this time to appoint a Deputy Chief Scientist and 
Controller of Research and Development. This was belated adoption of the 
Rothschild concept of a ‘Controller R&D’, some ten years after it was mandated by 
the Framework for Government Research and Development. The Department’s 
statement of the qualities required gives a good indication of thinking about context 
for this appointment.  
Like the Chief Scientist the DCS/R&DC should have considerable 
research experience and have the managerial, personal and diplomatic 
qualities needed to control, co-ordinate and promote research of a high 
quality, coupled with the academic qualifications and record needed to 
command the respect of the scientific community and his colleagues.3 
This position was advertised, and Professor Robin J. Cole was appointed in August 
1982. Cole, who was not medically qualified, was Professor of Developmental 
Genetics at the University of Sussex. As DCS, Cole was responsible for the day-to-
day management of the OCS, as well as deputising for the CS as required. 
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The OCS inherited by Pond had developed in its structure and staffing from the 
organisation set up for Buller in 1978. Whereas Buller complained in 1980 that he 
only had 12 staff members, there were 36 established posts by 1982. Growth had 
been achieved through the grafting on of additional professional branches for social 
services and nursing. The former included professional staff concerned with social 
work and the staff working on social sciences research more generally (the remnants 
of the SSRU). Social security research was also broken out of the administration 
branch into a dedicated branch, staffed by research officers. In its revised form, 
which was in place by 1981, OCS thus combined administrative and professional 
staff, segregated into separate branches.  An administrative branch provided cross-
division support for the four professional branches: medical research, social services 
research, nursing research and social security research. The last of these continued to 
combine in-house research with the commissioning of research from external 
providers.  
Upon Pond’s arrival, then, the OCS amounted to a maturing organisation that was 
reasonably well-equipped to operate across the range of HPSSR, apart from those 
streams that remained under the control of the ‘specialist branches’: supplies, 
building and computing. By this time, the Economic Adviser’s Unit was also 
beginning to act as a specialist commissioner of health economics research.1 The 
Department had thus made considerable progress away from the fragmented 
management arrangements in place before 1978, although it had still not achieved a 
fully integrated programme.  
Inherited policy issues 
Upon taking up office in March 1982, Pond was confronted with a range of policy 
issues needing his immediate attention. Foremost among these was the need to 
respond to a report by the Chief Scientist’s Advisory Group on departmental-funded 
units. This had been initiated by his predecessor and so was referred to within the 
Department as the ‘Buller Report’. In addition, he needed to prepare for the annual 
‘stock-take’ with the MRC, the first to be conducted under the terms of the 1980 
concordat. He was also expected to co-ordinate a response to the House of Lords 
Select Committee Report on Science and Government and to advise the Permanent 
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Secretary on Lord Victor Rothschild’s review of the SSRC.1 This all amounted to a 
substantial agenda for the new Chief Scientist.  
The portrayal by Kogan of ‘Rothschild partly demolished’ might also lead us to 
expect that Pond had to deal with the aftermath of a substantial reduction in the role 
of RLGs. In fact, this was not the case, and the picture is instead one of continuity, 
with the RLG system persisting largely unchanged through the Buller era to 1986 
and beyond. This aspect of Buller’s legacy will be examined first, before proceeding 
to consider the impact of his report on the research units. 
Research Liaison Groups 
In their 1980 monograph, Kogan et. al. write of the RLGs having ‘dramatically 
reduced their activities’. They attribute this to a reduction in the extent to which 
research management ‘spurred on the policy decisions to be active in the RLGs’ and 
to the abolition of the Chief Scientist’s Research Committee. They then proceed to 
argue that the research councils would never be able to respond as effectively to 
customers’ needs as the RLGs.2 A closer examination of events suggests that these 
arguments read too much into a temporary dip in activity and a review that was 
intended to ensure a more balanced allocation of research management resources. 
Servicing the RLGs consumed much OCS staff time, to the extent that other 
responsibilities were neglected, including support for ‘non-RLG’ areas and the 
monitoring of units. Contrary to original aspirations, the RLGs never covered more 
than about half of the Department’s responsibilities. Consequently, a range of 
supplementary mechanisms were needed to serve a similar role in those areas not 
covered. These mechanisms included professional staff attachment to non-RLG 
areas, specialist committees such as the Social Security Research Policy Committee; 
and working groups of various kinds.3  A reduction in RLG activity would release 
OCS resources for these other activities and allow a more balanced commitment.  
Proposals to reduce RLG activity were, perhaps predictably, resisted by RLG 
Chairmen who argued that ‘areas covered by RLGs are better able to commission 
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satisfactory research and to use the results than those without RLGs’. The Chairmen 
argued that a solution to the OCS resource problem lay not in a reduction of RLG 
activity but in a reduction of unit activity. 
The present substantial commitment of research funds to units 
undertaking work of little interest to DHSS illustrates the dangers of 
research commissioning without full customer and scientist 
involvement.1  
Faced with this opposition, the OCS decided against any reduction in RLG numbers 
and responsibilities.2 Instead, officials looked for measures to reduce the volume of 
research commissioned through RLGs. This was justified by the need to shift more 
resources to non-RLGs areas within an overall budget that was shrinking in real 
terms. Officials also looked to reduce the RLG load on OCS through the 
‘streamlining’ of process. New protocols were introduced to ensure more scrutiny of 
proposals by OCS and other professional staff before RLG discussion, which was to 
be limited. In addition, the financial limit for bids to the Small Grants Committee 
(SGC) was increased and the ‘bypass mechanism’ discontinued. The latter had 
diverted any bids of potential interest to the relevant RLG before they reached the 
SGC.3 The combined effect was to reduce the overall workload on RLGs and reduce 
reliance on committee deliberations. These measures were communicated by Buller 
to RLG Chairmen in November 1979 and were widely welcomed as making for a 
more workable system.4 
Kogan’s portrayal of these changes as an assault on the Rothschild system is 
therefore misplaced. On the contrary, they represented a pragmatic attempt to 
streamline working within the customer-contractor paradigm and to achieve a more 
acceptable balance between committee processes and professional input. They took 
advantage of the success of the SGC, a rare survivor among the committees 
introduced in 1973. This streamlined system was inherited by Pond in 1982. The 
RLGs were not without their critics, as will be discussed further in chapter 11, and 
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Pond was lukewarm about them in comparison to Kogan. In a personal report to 
Stowe, he describes them as being too large and subject to unstable membership.  
Meetings thus often act as educational opportunities for new staff 
members rather than the group forming a long-term cohesion that would 
enhance their ability to contribute to the relationship between research 
and policy.1 
Nevertheless, Pond made no attempt to either abolish or further reform the RLG 
system, perhaps having come to a judgement that the changes made in 1979 had 
rendered it serviceable enough and that further change was not a priority. In making 
this calculation, he would have been mindful of the more pressing need to devote 
time and attention to the research units, in the light of the Buller Report. 
The Buller Report 
The White Paper Framework for Government R&D had provided for the Chief 
Scientist at the DHSS to be aided by ‘a small team of scientists’. Their role was 
described as follows. 
Their main task will be to help identify areas for which research is 
required, to ensure that research requirements are clearly stated, and to 
review the balance of the Department’s research and development 
programme. In addition, they will act as a link between the Department 
and the scientific community so as to develop discussions and 
partnership between the two.2 
Under Black, this advisory role had been developed by the appointment of scientific 
advisers to RLGs, the Small Grants Committee (SGC) and the Chief Scientist’s 
Research Committee (CSRC). Given the number of RLGs, this gave rise to a 
substantial requirement and over 80 scientific advisers, drawn mostly from the 
academic community, were appointed.3 In addition, scientific advisers sat on 
committees beyond the purview of the Chief Scientist, such as the Advisory 
Committee on Medical Computing and specialist groups advising on supplies and 
equipment R&D. At the end of 1978, the CSRC was disbanded by Buller on the basis 
that ‘as the Chief Scientist now had administrative responsibility for the HPSS and 
Social Security research programme and budget, there was no longer a role for a 
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standing committee of external advisors’.1 Within two years, Buller was arguing that 
the Chief Scientist needed a scientific advisory group.  The role of such a group 
would be to ‘assist him in his task of assessing the size, shape and composition of the 
research base required…in the light of his current intensive review of DHSS units’. 
The group would differ from the CSRC, which had included research management 
representation, in that it would have no departmental members other than the Chief 
Scientist himself. This was to be a scientists-only club and ‘its sphere of concern 
would be matters of science and science policy’. The group, which became known as 
the Chief Scientist’s Advisory Group, or CSAG, met for the first time in July 1980. 
Its terms of reference were threefold. First, it was to specify the supplier-base needed 
to meet the Department’s future needs for R&D. Second, it was to assess the 
adequacy of the current supplier-base, including funded units, to meet the 
specification. Third, it was ‘to recommend how a more equitable match might be 
achieved having regard to the policy that, wherever practicable, responsibility for 
management by the research councils should be considered’.2 On a more practical 
level, the group was set up to assist Buller in his programme of unit review, which 
would involve a critical assessment of scientific merit. The sub-text for this exercise 
was that some lesser units should be closed to release funds for re-direction to the 
more competent research councils. 
Buller had aired his views about the ‘scandalously low quality’ of much DHSS-
funded research with the MRC within weeks of his appointment. However, Buller 
cannot be accused of having packed his advisory group with scientists who shared 
any prejudicial views he may have held. Within the constraints of size, membership 
of CSAG spanned the broad spectrum of HPSSR. Members included Jack Hayward, 
Professor of Nursing Studies at Chelsea College; Raymond Illsley, Professor of 
Medical Sociology in Aberdeen; Michael J. Power, also a social scientist; Jerry 
Morris, Director of the MRC Social Medicine Unit; John Wing, director of the MRC 
Social Psychiatry Unit and Colin Dollery, Professor of Clinical Pharmacology at the 
Royal Postgraduate Medical School. Only the last can be said with any certainty to 
have held a somewhat jaundiced view of the DHSS R&D programme. As Rock 
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Carling lecturer in 1978, he had publicly criticised the breadth of the programme, 
arguing that its resources would be better focused on large-scale epidemiological 
studies.1 Dollery wrote to Buller in early 1981 arguing that around half the current 
DHSS-funded units should be closed immediately without any loss to science. He 
was critical in equal measure of both unit directors and the ‘inept central 
management’ of the Department.2  
The actual process of review, in which CSAG played a central role, has been 
documented at length by Henkel and Kogan and need not be discussed further here.3 
The report of CSAG was submitted by Buller to the Second Permanent Secretary, Sir 
Geoffrey Otton, in December 1981. This was nearly six months after the end of his 
tenure as Chief Scientist. When CSAG was first set up, Buller and Nairne had given 
commitments to the group that their findings would be made public in due course. 
The Department felt bound by this undertaking but the staff of OCS, which at this 
point was being run by its management group in the absence of a Chief Scientist, 
were uncomfortable with the report. In part, this can be seen as symptomatic of the 
process adopted by Buller. The professional liaison staff of OCS had been excluded 
from all discussion of the scientific merit of units and from drafting – an approach 
that is consistent with Buller’s dismissive attitude towards them. However, content as 
well as process proved contentious. 
Three of the recommendations caused specific concern for the management 
group. The first was that CSAG, or some equivalent advisory group, should in future 
advise on the allocation of the HPSSR budget. This was thought to demonstrate ‘a 
quite unrealistic expectation that the academic community can become directly 
involved in the Department’s policy and management process’; and as repeating the 
sins of the CSRC. The second, which was intended to assist the researcher 
community, was that the Department should provide a tenured career structure for 
HPSS researchers as a means of developing capacity in the field. This proposal 
alarmed OCS because of its resource implications. The third recommendation was 
that ‘urgent consideration should be given to terminating some of the rolling 
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contracts’. This was based on a grading of units in which only six out of twenty-six 
were classified as ‘good’ or ‘very good’. None were rated outstanding and the 
remaining twenty were rated as moderately good or worse. Having delivered this 
judgement, the CSAG report provided guidance neither on the gaps and deficiencies 
that needed rectification nor how this might be achieved. These matters were, as 
OCS pointed out, ‘the nub of its terms of reference’.1 
The grading exercise was of concern to top officials. It was thought likely to cause 
considerable embarrassment as, by this time, over half the departmental R&D budget 
was committed to units. Otton feared that the report was likely to provoke ‘great 
agitation and insecurity among the units; anxiety to know where they stand in the 
ranking; and fear that they are due for the chop’. He was irritated by the lack of any 
evidence offered by CSAG in support of their harsh grading and by academic 
criticism of a programme that had been heavily influenced by academic advisers 
since 1973. Permanent Secretary Stowe’s verdict was that the report was ‘an 
unfortunate mixture of good sense, special pleading and ignorance about ministerial 
responsibility’.2 Buller himself seems to have been left inexplicably dismayed by the 
prospect of publication whilst feeling bound by commitments given.3 Otton decided 
that the least damaging course of action would be to issue the report quickly so as to 
distance it from the arrival of Pond, and it was published in March 1982.4 As 
expected, this provoked correspondence from the units, who took issue with its 
findings and recommendations. The proposed abolition of ‘rolling contracts’ and 
their replacement with programme grants of a maximum five-year term was a 
particular concern. 5 The Department deferred substantive engagement with the 
issues raised by saying that the matter would be dealt with by the new Chief Scientist 
once he had taken up office. CSAG was wound up in 1982 and not replaced with a 
                                                             
1.  BN 82/225/2, Report of the Chief Scientist’s Advisory Group. Commentary by OCS. 
2.  BN 82/225/2, Otton to Stowe, 12 January 1982 
3.  BN 82/225/2, Buller to Otton, 1 March 1982. 
4.  Department of Health and Social Security. The Support of Health and Personal Social 
Services Research. A Report of the Chief Scientist's Advisory Group (London: DHSS, 1982). 
Available in BN/82/225/2. 
5.  BN 82/226, Summary of comments received. 
 253 
 
new advisory group, the view being that OCS would be able to provide the necessary 
assessment of research capacity going forwards.1 
Pond as peacemaker 
Pond’s immediate action upon taking office was to send calming, non-committal 
letters to those unit directors who had made submissions on the Buller report. After 
an interval of a few months, during which he was presumably forming his views, 
Pond set about repairing relations with the units. In November 1982, he held a 
meeting with all unit directors. He began by reflecting on the turbulent nature of the 
two years that had passed since such a meeting was last held, including the lengthy 
interregnum between Chief Scientists.  Against this background, he said, it was 
‘pleasing that the research units were continuing to produce work that was highly 
valued by the Department’. He went on to assure his audience that neither he nor 
Ministers were committed to implementing the report’s recommendations and that 
OCS would not, as a matter of general policy, be replacing rolling contracts with 
programme grants. The meeting then went on to discuss a range of other matters of 
interest to the HPSSR community, such as relations with the research councils, 
training and the dissemination of findings.2  
This meeting saw a marked change of tone from the Buller era and a frank 
disavowal of many of the recommendations of CSAG. Pond was clearly not 
convinced that the criticisms in the Buller Report were entirely justified, as 
evidenced by the header quotation for this chapter. His personal views alone might 
not have been sufficient to support such a marked change of policy. By now it was 
also becoming clear that the research councils were not going to build a significant 
role in HPSSR at the pace envisaged by Buller. The MRC was moving slowly in 
developing its new commitment to HSR, so that there was little prospect of any 
significant contribution soon. Furthermore, the Council had no intention of departing 
from its strategy of investing in ‘good people’, meaning that there was no certainty 
that its future investment would match DHSS priorities.3 The SSRC had survived 
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review by Rothschild, but at the price of a £6 million cut in its budget and possessed 
limited capacity.1 The Department was thus faced with an ongoing need to 
commission HPSSR from a range of suppliers and the units provided the core of the 
supplier base.  
Turning the tanker 
Rejection of some of the CSAG’s recommendations did not equate to a desire to 
maintain the status quo. The OCS was faced with the prospect of declining real-terms 
budgets, against which the 34 units on rolling contracts represented a substantial 
commitment of open-ended duration. The OCS had also, by 1983, developed 
statements of research priorities of an unprecedented specificity, a development 
made possible by the combination of continuing RLG activity and the work of the 
OCS.2 It was evident that some of these priorities could not be addressed by existing 
units. Some units were also performing indifferently, or were vulnerable to the 
retirement of their directors. 
In this situation, the OCS triaged the units, separating them between those that 
should be given notice of closure; those that met the Department’s long to medium-
term requirements and those that required further scrutiny. The transfer of some units 
to the MRC was also considered.  The OCS management group recognised that 
‘turning the tanker’, in the sense of freeing up money from existing units and re-
allocating it to new units, would be very difficult and take several years. 3 The 
Department had backed away from the abolition of rolling contracts, as 
recommended by the CSAG. As a less drastic policy, it re-wrote some unit contracts 
so that only ‘core’ expenditure was funded on a rolling basis. The retirement of unit 
directors was taken as the opportunity to fundamentally revisit, and sometimes 
curtail, support. Despite such measures, the tanker was slow to turn and the budget 
was shrinking in real terms, further limiting toom for manoeuvre. Consequently, it 
proved stubbornly difficult to carve out the ‘free money’ needed for new initiatives. 
The Department had finally developed an OCS that could crisply identify and 
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prioritise research needs, but the financial capacity to execute new commissioning 
was severely limited.1 So, for example, for 1983/4 the Department only had 
£450,000 uncommitted and available for ‘new starts’, or just 3 percent of the total 
HPSSR budget of £15 million.2 Yet there was no reduction in demand, not least 
because the research councils were moving so slowly in developing their own 
HPSSR activity. 
The research councils and HPSSR 
Under the 1980 concordat, the MRC committed to ‘as opportunities arise, engage 
in health services research to a greater extent than at present in MRC units and by 
grant support to universities’. The aim was to increase, over time, the share of the 
national capacity for health services research provided by the MRC, in the 
expectation that the DHSS would commission an increasing proportion of its work 
from the Council. A ‘small part’ of the returned biomedical research funds were to be 
applied to HSR, addressing objectives to be identified by DHSS. The sum involved 
would rise gradually over five years to a maximum of £2 million (at 1980 prices). 
This compare to £13.9 million returned to the MRC and a total MRC budget in 
1981/2 (including the returned funds) of £102 million. In addition, the DHSS might 
provide additional funds for HSR from its own resources, through specific 
commissions.3 The new concordat thus entailed a relatively modest commitment to 
HSR by the MRC. 
As has been shown, Buller hoped for a much larger role for the MRC and had 
approached Gowans to propose this as early as September 1978. The response was 
cautious. Gowans advised that the Council did not have the advisory machinery in 
place to deal with HSR applications in the areas proposed by Buller: acute services, 
dental health, public and environmental health, and safety of medicines.  
Nevertheless, he thought that to might be possible to supplement grants committees 
and boards with relevant expertise so that they were able to respond to applications 
from researchers ‘in just the same way as we deal with applications in the biomedical 
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area’. He was less encouraging about Buller’s suggestion that the MRC might play a 
more proactive role in commissioning work, building capacity and potentially taking 
over existing DHSS-funded units.1 It was clear that the MRC did not want to see 
either the balance of its programme or its mode of working significantly disturbed by 
an increased commitment to HSR. In the discussions leading up to the concordat, the 
MRC emphasised its existing commitment to HSR in the ‘middle ground’, pointing 
to existing Council units in medical sociology, social psychiatry and epidemiology. 
The Buller report included an annex documenting the extent of existing MRC 
support for HSR.2 The CSAG interpreted this as evidence of the MRC’s suitability to 
take on a greater role in HSR. From the perspective of the MRC, this was more likely 
to have been interpreted as justification for holding a steady course, in which the 
Council slowly increased its commitment within the existing paradigm. 
The same cautious approach was evident when it came to institutional 
arrangements for HSR. The Council considered setting up a Health Services 
Research Board, which would have the advantage of being ‘a visible sign to the 
research community that the Council was taking this responsibility seriously’. 
However, against this there was the disadvantage that it was unlikely that there 
would be ‘sufficient business to make anything but an ineffective and wasteful use of 
Board members’ time’. The Council thus proposed a Health Services Research Panel 
(HSRP) with a purely advisory role. It was envisaged that this panel would meet on 
an ad-hoc basis and work mainly by correspondence. It was not envisaged that any of 
the members of the HSRP would also sit on the grant-making boards and committees 
of the MRC. This proposal was welcomed by Buller and by Henry Yellowlees, the 
Chief Medical Officer, as likely to appease the HSR community. Buller also 
accepted that there would be no health department representation on the HSRP.3  
The HSRP in this form might be interpreted as the smallest institutional 
commitment that the MRC felt it could make to demonstrate that it was serious about 
its greater commitment to HSR. Three considerations lay behind this approach. First, 
the MRC had no intention of changing its main way of working, which was to 
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respond to proposals from researchers rather than to issue calls for research on 
specific topics. This approach reflected its commitment to a knowledge-led, rather 
than problem-led, model of research production. Second, the Council feared that too 
much HSR influence on grant-making bodies would lead to funding being diverted 
away from biomedical research. Anxiety about excessive HSR influence extended to 
membership of the HSRP with initial proposals for membership being rejected by the 
board chairmen who ‘felt strongly that the first list was packed with HSR people, 
who might well give unanimous advice that boards would find difficult to override’.1 
The final consideration was that the senior staff of the MRC did not consider HSR to 
be a scientific discipline per se. They saw it as lacking a formal academic basis and 
an integrated body of theory and in need of greater scientific rigour.2  
HSR was viewed through the lens of medical interests, with epidemiology as its 
core discipline. The Council believed that HSR should be medically-led or 
undertaken in close co-operation with doctors. Community medicine was seen as the 
practitioner base for the field. The MRC showed little interest in the other strands of 
research within the broader school of HPSSR cultivated by the DHSS. Operational 
research was viewed as a matter for health authorities. Social research presented 
more of a conundrum because the MRC’s activities in the middle ground had 
extended into fields such as medical sociology. The SSRC had established a 
commitment to HPSSR through its Panel on Health and Health Policy Making, 
dating back to 1976. This brought an even more academic orientation to the field 
than the MRC, seeking to be distinguished by ‘its conceptual rather than problem-
solving approach’. It also sought ‘not to be bound by medical or administrative 
definitions of problems for research’ and rejected the ‘medical model’ of health.3  
Had the SSRC been an assertive and well-funded organisation, this very different 
orientation and philosophy would almost certainly have led to some friction at the 
boundary with the MRC. However, the SSRC was, in the early 1980s, in a weakened 
state. Its first large programme of research at the behest of the DHSS, on ‘transmitted 
deprivation’, had ended with a dissatisfied customer. The principal initiator of this 
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programme was Keith Joseph, when Secretary of State for Social Services.1 Nearly a 
decade later, Joseph’s resentment at what he saw as academic subversion of the 
programme played into his decision as Secretary of State for Education and Science 
to conduct a review of the SSRC.2 Lord Victor Rothschild undertook the review in 
the first half of 1982 and became an unlikely saviour for the SSRC.3 Given this 
existential threat, and subsequent budget reductions, the Council was not in good 
shape to undertake major new initiatives in the early 1980s. Consequently, although 
MRC/SSRC boundary issues could not be ignored, neither did they come to the 
foreground. The essential question for the MRC, which it never answered in any 
conclusive way, was articulated as follows. 
There was no doubt that many sociologists…thought that the sociologists 
could take over from the biologists (broadly defined): while in its 
extreme form this was ridiculous the immediate problem facing the MRC 
was the extent to which it should go down the road to meet the 
sociologists. (This problem remained unresolved.)4 
As has already been noted, and regardless of any expectations that Buller may 
have harboured, the administrative staff of OCS appreciated that the MRC 
involvement in HSR under the new concordat was to be limited in scale and scope. 
The Department agreed protocols with MRC officials to channel grant applications 
towards the most appropriate body and to ensure that an application turned down by 
one was not subsequently considered by the other. MRC guidance to potential 
applicants made it clear that ‘the MRC’s involvement would be on a limited scale, at 
least initially’ and that the Council’s preference would be to ‘develop in and from 
those areas of existing experience’.5 The new machinery for HSR was already in 
place by the time Pond took up office in 1981. Pond’s interventions were confined to 
questioning the lack of health department representation on the HSRP. In a response 
that is indicative of MRC anxieties one official advised colleagues that ‘Sir Desmond 
                                                             
1.  Sir Graham Hart identifies this as a rare example of a minister acting as the customer 
and driving force for a major research programme. Interview, London, March 2015. 
2.  Albert Cherns, “A policy for the social sciences?” in UK Science Policy. A Critical Review of 
Policies for Publicly Funded Research ed. Maurice Goldsmith. Harlow: Longman, 1984, 
150-188. 
3.  Flater, Pulling through. 
4.  FD 9/4558, File note by K Levy, 5 April 1982. 
5.  FD 9/4547, Health Services Research. 
 259 
 
is being used by his colleagues to increase – as they see it – their hold and control 
over the MRC’.1 
By 1984, members of HSRP were becoming increasingly frustrated about their 
purely advisory role. Its chairman, A. G. ‘Gerry’ Shaper, a clinical epidemiologist, 
persuaded the MRC that a review was needed, arguing that the panel should be given 
grant-making powers. The Council was initially unable to agree on this proposal, 
which received support from Pond, Deputy CMO Reed and Donald Acheson (later 
CMO). To resolve the impasse, Council requested a more detailed paper, including 
discussion of options. Shaper came back with a full and polished paper, which 
argued that the task of grant-making for HSR could not be undertaken within the 
existing structures of the MRC, which were all set up to deal with biomedical 
research.2 Here was an argument emanating from within the MRC that rejected the 
Buller premise that HSR and biomedical research were all part of a continuum and 
could be dealt with through the same mechanisms. The Council eventually agreed to 
reconstitute HSRP as the Health Services Research Committee (HSRC). The new 
committee was to be given a budget of £2.7 million (the original £2 million uplifted 
for inflation) for an ‘experimental period’ of three years and limited grant-making 
powers. A cautious pace prevailed even once this decision was made, with the start 
date for HSRC being set as September 1986.3  
The MRC sections of the Cabinet Office Annual Reviews of Research and 
Development between 1983 and 1986 are notable for their failure to even mention 
HSR. In contrast, the sections on the DHSS present an ongoing programme of 
commissioning in familiar streams: HPSS, social security, building and engineering, 
equipment and supplies, and information technology. The history set out above 
explains this presentation. The MRC’s commitment to HSR remained, by design, 
peripheral to the Council’s main programme and was viewed by some biomedical 
scientists as a possible ‘cuckoo in the nest’. In this situation, it is unsurprising that 
the DHSS pursued ‘business as usual’ within its well-established streams of HPSSR, 
broadly defined. Business as usual included continuing commitment to research 
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units, albeit with a greater interest in closing units where desirable, and to RLGs, 
despite their acknowledged shortcomings. This is the context in which Taylor and 
Teeling-Smith, writing in 1984, comment that ‘since the end of 1981 events have 
proved to be somewhat less dramatic than many people working in HSR feared’.1 
New challenges  
Thus far, this chapter has examined the principal issues inherited by Pond and 
Cole. During the period 1981 to 1986, further challenges were layered onto these 
‘legacy’ issues. These new challenges followed from marked changes in government 
policy after 1979. The most obvious of these was the commitment to reductions in 
public expenditure, including publicly-funded R&D. Between 1981/2 and 1986/7, 
the total civil R&D budget was projected to remain static in real terms. The DHSS 
budget was projected to suffer disproportionately large real term reductions of 30% 
over this period.2 In the event, the Department fared a little better than this, with a 
real-terms decrease of closer to 20%. Alongside these funding reductions came other 
policy changes. The government sought opportunities for the privatisation of 
government science and introduced greater scrutiny of the ‘value for money’ of 
publicly-funded research.3 Even more damaging, the programme of commissioned 
research fell into political disfavour and became less ideologically relevant. The 
outcome of these forces was a reorganisation in 1986 that downgraded the role of the 
Chief Scientist and the capacity of the OCS. 
Shrinking budgets 
The implications of reducing real terms budgets for the research units have 
previously been considered. The task of ‘turning the tanker’ was made more difficult 
by a falling tide. The minutes of a meeting of the OCS management group at the end 
of 1984 illustrate the pressures arising. Pond was engaged in special pleading for 
R&D budgets to be exempted from a general cut of 3.1 percent on DHSS budgets. 
Should these efforts prove unsuccessful, the group noted, then ‘stringent action’ 
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would be needed to keep the programme within its cash limit. Measures would 
include no starts to new projects in the following year, together with 4 percent and 3 
percent cuts in unit and existing project budgets respectively. Up to this point OCS 
had sheltered researchers from cuts, helped by project slippage, but it was 
acknowledged that this would not be possible going forwards. The management team 
worried about the effect of across-the-board cuts on the performance and 
sustainability of the units.1 To limit the impact on existing work, all bids for new 
starts were deferred until the following year, when the OCS again found itself 
engaged in a very similar discussion.2 OCS had, by this time, developed a clear 
understanding and articulation of its future research priorities3. To then find itself 
with minimal scope for commissioning new work must have been dispiriting. 
Threat of privatisation 
The DHSS was not the most promising candidate for the government’s research 
privatisation programme because of its limited commitment to in-house research. In 
response to early enquiries, the Department reported that BRADU was in the process 
of being transferred to University College London. The remnants of the SSRU were 
deemed to be unsuitable for privatisation, being too small and embedded.4 The 
operational research service was not mentioned in this response, indicating that it had 
now become identified as an integral part of the analytical capacity of the 
Department. Having separated from R&D management in 1973, this service had 
remained in the Establishments Division before being combined with the Economic 
Adviser’s Office in 1982.5  
The privatizing zeal of government was not, however, so easily deflected and in 
August 1984, Secretary of State Norman Fowler set an objective that the R&D 
requirements for HPSS should be met from outside the Department. Deputy 
Secretary Timothy Nodder was given the task of undertaking a review to determine 
how this might be achieved. This was to be a review of ‘the full range of functions 
and facilities required for the promotion, commissioning, co-ordination, execution 
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and dissemination of research and development related to the health and personal 
social services’. In other words, it was to be comprehensive and not just limited to 
OCS. The focus was on R&D into the needs for and delivery of health services. 
Customers for such research were identified as the Secretary of State and the 
recently-established NHS Management Board.1 Unit directors responded with alarm 
to this development, recognising that possible dismantling of OCS was on the agenda 
and that the transfer of functions to the research councils remained a possibility. 
Nodder’s investigations predictably identified the slow progress being made by the 
councils in HSR, together with the continuing need to maintain oversight of research 
units. Based on these findings, he concluded that departmental R&D management 
capacity should be maintained.  
Political disfavour 
Secretary of State Fowler had been irritated by the publication of several 
Department-funded studies questioning official policy and was determined to reduce 
the freedom of action of the OCS.2 The legacy of Douglas Black’s report on health 
inequalities, and continuing research on this topic, added to Conservative ministers’ 
perception of publicly-funded health research as politically problematic.3 Even more 
fundamentally, the position of the R&D programme had been undermined by 
changing orthodoxy about how the business of government should be conducted. In 
the 1960s and 1970s the programme had been able to attach itself to the veneration of 
planning. By the 1980s, planning had fallen out of fashion and performance 
management, privatisation and outsourcing had taken its place.4 The commissioned 
research programme and its supporting researcher community, which had grown up 
during a more liberal era, was not, in the main, orientated towards these concerns. 
This was a climate where the in-house analytical resource available in EAO/ORS 
could offer a more rapid and politically attuned version of ‘disciplined inquiry’ than 
might ever be attained through academic research.5 
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It was against this background that the OCS was reduced in 1986. Ironically, 
under Pond, the Department had finally attained a mature and reasonably competent 
R&D organisation, operating under Rothschild principles. With the creation of the 
DCS post the Department finally adopted the Rothschild concept of ‘Controller 
R&D’. The routine work of OCS was probably better performed than at any other 
time. Customers were systematically consulted about their needs and the finding 
collated into statements of priorities. The OCS had also made a good start in meeting 
new demands for ‘value for money’ reporting assembling extensive, if somewhat 
unsystematic, evidence to demonstrate the influence of DHSS-funded projects on 
policy and practice.1 None of these achievements counted for much in the new 
climate. Pond’s successor, Francis O’Grady, was appointed on a part-time basis. The 
OCS became the Research Management Division (RMD) and its staff were reduced 
in number. The new Deputy Chief Scientist, Jeremy Metters, advised staff that the 
Chief Scientist should not be involved in any day-to-day business, adding that ‘the 
line management responsibility for RMD falls to me’.2 A new Departmental 
Research Committee was established and given terms of reference that re-packaged 
familiar concerns. The revised research management arrangements were to assist the 
policy branches in articulating their research needs; to introduce a more ‘flexible’ 
commissioning policy (with an emphasis on using private sector contractors to 
produce research more quickly); and to maintain oversight of the research budget.3  
Concluding discussion 
This chapter has highlighted marked continuity in the HPSSR and allied streams 
of the departmental programme during the 1980s. The return of biomedical funds to 
the MRC may have been attained, but Buller’s vision of a more far-reaching counter-
reformation, in which the research councils progressively took on non-biomedical 
research, was not. For the health research state, this indicated that the emergence of a 
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second major actor was more than just a passing phenomenon. How might this 
persistence be interpreted within our analytical framework? 
Historical institutionalists pay attention to ‘institutional inertia’ and 
‘organisational stickiness’. They observe that institutions frequently persist long after 
the conditions that originally gave rise to them have ceased to exist. The related 
theory of ‘path dependency’ seeks to explain why it is unusual for institutions to 
deviate from a specific path, once established. The original form taken by institutions 
is, per this theory, only one among multiple possibilities and may be determined by 
‘conjunctures’ of ideas and circumstances at a moment in history, rather than large 
structural forces.1 Path dependency has been used to explain the persistence of 
manifestly sub-optimal policies and organisations in health care.2  
In the case of HPSSR commissioning, the mechanisms that kept the programme 
‘on path’ can be readily identified. These included: the institutionalisation of 
research supply through the unit mechanism; the use of rolling contracts; and the 
continuity provided by the RLGs and the OCS. The unit mechanism, and the use of 
rolling contracts, reflected a deeper underlying constraint, which was the need for 
capacity building in HPSSR. To build units, security of tenure was needed for core 
staff, which in turn required some security of unit income. The economics and 
institutions of the research economy, in combination with a reduced budget, meant 
that rapid changes of direction were simply impractical, as reflected in the ‘turning 
the tanker’ metaphor used by the OCS.  
These endogenous mechanisms locked the department into the path of sustained 
HPSSR commissioning. The lack of appetite on the part of the MRC for an 
accelerated commitment to HSR provided external reinforcement. The Council made 
the smallest and slowest commitment that was politically feasible within the terms of 
the new concordat. In part, this was determined by the economics of research, which 
applied to the MRC as much as they did to the Department. The MRC also had 
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commitments to units and centres that could not be swiftly cast off. But it also 
reflected cultural constraints. 
Path dependency theory was originally developed to explain the economics of 
innovation. Theorists have subsequently looked to culture to extend its application to 
political science.1 Culture, as well as economics, does appear to have played a part in 
the sustaining of the HPSSR commissioning programme. By the 1980s, there was a 
well-established researcher community that looked to the Department as the major 
patron of applied health research. The elite members of this constituency were the 
unit directors and the RLG chairs. Although not as powerful as the biomedical elite 
represented by the MRC, this group still represented enough of a ‘counter-elite’ to 
provide positive reinforcement for continuity. Within the Department, the research 
management function was now mature, and an established cadre of staff was engaged 
in brokering the relationship between internal ‘customers’ and the suppliers of 
research. These established interests provided ‘push’ for continuity. Culture also 
contributed to the lack of ‘pull’ from the MRC. Health services research was viewed 
by many on the Council as ‘alien’, and its practitioners regarded warily as a 
potentially disruptive influence. 
To use the language of path dependency, Buller sought to achieve a ‘critical 
juncture’, and a change of path, during his term as Chief Scientist. He sought not just 
the return of biomedical funds, but also to set the health research state on a path that 
would have ended with the research councils taking the lead role of HPSSR and 
allied research. A new path was successfully established for biomedical research for 
two reasons. First, because achieving this outcome really mattered to the medical 
research elite, for ideological as well as practical reasons. Second, because the 
Department’s arrangements for the commissioning of biomedical research could not 
conform to the institutional logic of accountability. Neither of these conditions 
applied to HPSSR. Instead there existed economic and cultural forces for path 
continuity, as outlined.  
In 1986, OCS capacity was reduced, and the status of the Chief Scientist 
downgraded, for political reasons. Within two years, the House of Lords Select 
Committee produced its bleak diagnosis, which prompted the 1991 NHS R&D 
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Strategy and the creation of a new set of organisation arrangements for 
commissioning research that would be relevant to the NHS. These events are beyond 
the scope of this thesis, but they point to the presence of powerful forces for a 
continuing commitment to service-relevant research, as first explored by the 
Department in the early 1960s. 
 
 267 
 
11. Making Research Useful 
 
We find that researchers identify the utility of their research 
predominantly in terms of its potential to influence professional 
practice. Departmental personnel tend to perceive utility in terms of 
implications for policy development. We suggest that Department staff 
have been placing too great an emphasis on research assimilation within 
the Department as compared with dissemination to the field. Both 
researchers and the Department are, in consequence, limited in their 
dissemination of research findings to the field level, and so to the 
professional practitioner groups for whom researchers feel their 
findings have most implications.1 
 
The Department’s research and development programme rested on an 
instrumentalist narrative. Its professed purpose was to provide problem-solving 
research, serving the policy-making needs of the Department and the operational 
needs of the NHS. This orientation, together with its preference for external research 
providers, meant that it should have been well-positioned to align itself with 
modernising science policy. Yet, as has been shown, it made heavy weather of the 
Rothschild reforms and achieved the dubious distinction of being the only 
department to suffer a partial reversal. The analysis so far has looked to power and 
interest in the health research state to explain this phenomenon. This chapter focuses 
on the mechanisms that the Department used to make its research ‘useful’ to various 
audiences, and so fits more within the theme of exchanges for health research.   
Identifying research needs 
The ex-ante challenge in making commissioned research useful is to ensure that it 
relates to areas of need for new knowledge.2 During the ‘golden age’, the Department 
gave researchers considerable latitude to identify topics for research. The informal 
team acted as brokers to connect policy-leads to researchers and was receptive to 
collaborations between researchers and NHS bodies. The grant-making practices of 
the Nuffield Provincial Hospitals Trust also promoted the latter.  
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Willingness to look to the researcher community for a lead waned as the era of 
enlightened patronage passed and as researcher participation became less 
spontaneous.1 The personal networks relied upon under Cohen and Cornish were 
replaced with more transactional relationships. At the same time, researcher 
participation in the programme became more institutionalised. The primary vehicle 
for this process was the use of advisers on committees such as the Chief Scientist’s 
Research Committee, Small Grants Committee and Research Liaison Groups.  
After 1975, the RLG emerged as the main mechanism for the identification, 
articulation and prioritisation of research needs. RLGs were also tasked with the 
review of research findings, feedback to researchers and the dissemination of 
research within the Department.2 Partial coverage, which left gaps in some areas of 
the greatest political importance, such as waiting lists, caused senior civil servants to 
regard the RLG mechanism with some impatience. 3 RLG structure and coverage 
was frozen in time, having been shaped in the early 1970s. As has been noted, 
supplementary mechanisms were needed to fill the gaps.  
Opinions on the RLGs are mixed. Kogan and Korman were enthusiasts, arguing 
for a greater role and seeing the groups as an effective mechanism for connecting 
customers to the research community.4 They interpret a reduction in RLG activity 
between 1978 and 1980 as indicative of a reduction in the Department’s commitment 
to customers. They claim that customers were broadly satisfied with the RLG 
system.5 Other evidence casts doubt on this claim. In 1977, the social researcher 
Louis Moss undertook a survey of attitudes towards research within the DHSS.6 
Moss found that RLGs were the system component that caused greatest 
dissatisfaction, being perceived as complex, slow-moving, over-large and dominated 
by conflict between academic advisers and policy customers. Rather than facilitating 
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connection with the research community, the academic advisers were viewed as a 
barrier and were a source of frustration to other participants in the RLGs, because of 
the narrowness of their academic concerns and lack of real world experience.1  They 
were thought to promote research of little practical value. 
There is a need for bringing about a dialogue between academics and the 
Department to explain the inevitable differences between academics’ 
clinical research and the more practically orientated operational research 
that should be available for policy-making. 2 
Most policy leads saw the RLGs as having suffered from what might be described 
as ‘academic drift’: the process by which knowledge that is intended to be useful 
gradually loses its ties with practice and becomes subject to self-referential academic 
criteria.3 This sense that the commissioned programme had suffered from academic 
capture led to demands for the strengthening of internal analytical capacity. The 
RLGs persisted, but against a backdrop of widespread scepticism about their ability 
to identify and articulate the right research questions. 
Dissemination 
It has been observed that, during the ‘golden age’, the Department was focused on 
R&D production and paid much less attention to dissemination and adoption of 
findings. The working assumption was that these later stages in the research 
production and utilisation process were the responsibility of policy leads. The 
primary task for the R&D organisation was thus to engage these leads in a way that 
enabled them to function as effective customers. As has been shown, this proved 
time-consuming and unreliable. Some argued for the tighter linkage of research to 
planning as a way of improving uptake. For a brief while it looked as if this had been 
achieved in the Planning and Research and Development division (PRD), but this 
organisational link was severed less than a year after it was forged. 
In 1981, Gordon and Meadows, two researchers from the University of Leicester 
published a forensic report on the Department’s dissemination practices. The authors 
comment that the ‘large and heterogeneous’ nature of the audience for commissioned 
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research meant that the Department needed to put considerable effort into 
dissemination. Despite this, the OCS rejected the researchers’ original proposal to 
include NHS bodies in their survey, instead requiring that the project’s scope be 
confined to the Department.1  Gordon and Meadows found considerable variation in 
dissemination practices even within the Department. Dialogue with researchers, in 
the form of feedback on reports, and responsibility for dissemination were both the 
responsibility of RLGs, where these existed. Considerable variation in practice was 
evident between different RLGs and even more variation in areas not covered by 
RLGs. These led the researchers to describe dissemination practice as 
‘idiosyncratic’.2  
Gordon and Meadows found that both departmental behaviours and career 
incentives encouraged researchers to dispense with their final reports and move on, 
rather than engaging in ‘multiple acts of dissemination’. Half of researchers who 
responded to the survey had never received any feedback on final reports. Of those 
who did, a third received no more than a note of appreciation.3 Academic reward 
structures encouraged narrowly-focused reports reflecting specialist academic 
interests, rather than synoptic reports aimed at a wider audience. Even more 
fundamental than these problems, though, a misalignment of incentives meant that 
the needs of practitioners in the NHS were largely ignored. 
Both researchers and DHSS personnel consider it to be a researcher’s 
responsibility to disseminate to his or her peers, whilst the Department 
assumes responsibility for its own internal dissemination to policy 
makers. No group, however, clearly accepts that it has a responsibility for 
dissemination to such extra-departmental groups as professional 
practitioners. This is a matter of considerable concern, since researchers, 
at least, identify professional practitioners as the groups for whom their 
findings have most implications. The Department can clearly encourage 
dissemination to such groups if it encourages researchers to disseminate 
to them. In addition, the Department needs to take its own initiatives to 
assist dissemination of research findings to extra-Departmental groups.4 
Such recommendations fell on deaf ears, with the Department increasingly unable to 
look beyond the needs of its own internal customers after 1973. This was 
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symptomatic of a more systemic difficulty, which was that the Department struggled 
to balance its role as a ‘proxy customer’ for the NHS with its own requirements for 
policy-making. 
The Department and the NHS  
The last Chief Scientist, Francis O’Grady, claimed in 1992 that the Lords’ Select 
Committee had misunderstood the purposes of the departmental R&D programme. 
O’Grady argued that, contrary to the committee’s assumption, the programme did not 
exist to provide useful knowledge for the NHS. Instead its purpose was to meet the 
needs of ministers.1 This drew a pointed rebuttal from the first Chief Scientist, 
Richard Cohen, in which he describes O’Grady’s statement as ‘a travesty of the 
Department’s historic responsibilities and powers’.2 Cohen was always adamant that 
the programme was committed to research ‘of a precise and practical relevance to the 
operations of the NHS’. George Godber also took issue with O’Grady’s position.  
At no time in my 34 years at the Department did I hear the view that we should 
not support research for the improvement of health care, but only for the 
advancement of ministerial policy. The advent of new knowledge must often 
shape policy rather than depend upon it. 3 
No Chief Scientist before O’Grady had argued that the programme existed solely to 
meet the needs of policy-makers and there are two possible explanations for his 
departure. The first is that it reflects tighter political control of the programme after 
1986, under which ministerial needs became paramount. The second is that it reflects 
a more fundamental and long-standing difficulty in operationalising the 
Department’s role as ‘proxy customer’ for the NHS. 
During the ‘golden age’, the R&DC devoted considerable effort to articulating its 
role, but this never included any discussion as to how it might engage with the NHS. 
‘Dissemination’ was among the functions of the Statistics and Research Division, but 
this was seen only in terms of encouraging publication and making research findings 
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known within the Department.1 Despite this rather limited vision, which reflected 
simplistic understandings of how research is taken up into policy and practice, the 
Department did at least have R&D points of contact with the NHS. Prior to 1974, the 
practice of top-slicing the hospital vote for R&D brought the Department into close 
contact with some hospital governing bodies around specific projects. Many projects 
originated ‘bottom up’ in this period, arising out of local collaboration between 
researchers and NHS bodies, often bolstered by ‘free’ monies. Under the mantra of 
‘maximum devolution’ after 1974, locally-initiated R&D became less visible from 
the centre and in some areas, such as computing research the Department was by this 
time in full flight from involvement in local projects.  
After 1973, the sheer effort required of the Department in ensuring that its internal 
policy customers were involved in research commissioning, given the byzantine 
structures adopted, left little room for thinking about the proxy customer role. The 
Department was also struggling to implement its new planning system, which in 
theory would allow R&D to provide input into NHS plans. In part, these distractions 
were the consequence of poor organisational design. But the difficulties experienced 
were also evidence that the adoption of research in policy and practice was less 
straightforward than had been assumed in the ‘golden age’. Lack of an NHS 
collective voice was a further impediment. This was only mitigated after 1983, when 
the newly created NHS Management Executive began to articulate service interests 
in R&D. However, concerns about NHS disenfranchisement persisted and were 
powerfully articulated by the House of Lords Select Committee in 1988. 
The focus after 1982 remained the engagement of internal policy customers. 
Consideration of the needs of the ‘field authorities’ in the NHS, and of clinical 
practitioners, were pushed to the periphery. Pond and Cole were aware of this 
neglect, but saw their role one of encouraging research units to develop closer links 
to Regional Health Authorities. This would encourage more HPSSR applications to 
the locally organised research scheme, which had otherwise been almost completely 
captured by clinical research.2 By 1983, Pond was briefing Stowe that ‘the NHS 
claims, with some justification, that they are the real customers in the NHS sense, 
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rather than the DHSS, and they are pressing for a greater influence on research policy 
within the Department’. Pond’s view that the most pressing requirement was not for 
more input to research from the regions but for better dissemination of research 
findings from the DHSS to the regions. He also argued for the encouragement of 
regional research units and the idea of a Regional Chief Scientist. This last 
suggestion was a precursor of the Regional Director of R&D roles created under the 
1991 NHS R&D Strategy. However, in 1983 Pond reported that ‘this idea is yet to 
find favour with the Regional Medical Officers’.1  
An independent commissioner for HPSSR? 
The disentangling of the governance level knowledge needs of the Department 
from the service and practice level needs of the NHS was always likely to be a 
problem. It could be argued that this is no more than one facet of the Department’s 
long-standing problem in distinguishing between its role as the Department of the 
English NHS and the UK Department of Health.2 As a remedy, an independent 
authority with responsibility for HPSSR has been suggested on more than one 
occasion, recurring like a leitmotif yet never acted upon. Cohen dismissed the idea of 
such a body in 1971.3 It is possible that he was responding to the views of Cornish 
who, when interviewed by the CPRS in advance of the Framework argued for a 
Health and Social Research Council to be established, to serve ‘both the medical and 
social research needs of those who were directly concerned with human health and 
welfare’. This idea was dismissed by the CPRS as impractical.4 The 1979 Royal 
Commission on the NHS later revived this idea, when it recommended the 
establishment of an Institute of Health Services Research.5 As previously noted, this 
suggestion barely registered with the OCS. The House of Lords Select Committee 
similarly proposed that a National Health Research Authority should be established 
with semi-autonomous status within the NHS as a special health authority; and that 
the bulk of the research commissioning budget be transferred to it from the 
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Department.1 Such proposals were never seriously countenanced because they 
represented too much of a threat to established structural interests. For the existing 
research councils, they offered nothing but the threat of loss of territory and funding. 
For the Department, they threatened a loss of control and patronage. 
Concluding discussion 
The common thread in this chapter is that the Department was not very successful 
at implementing the processes and structures needed to make research useful. It 
struggled to construct forms of exchange that would reliably and economically 
identify research needs and promote the take up of research into policy. It never 
really addressed the question of how to make research useful to managers and 
clinicians in the NHS. In large measure, this reflects the extent to which the 
Department was consumed by its own bureaucratic complexity and, between 1971 
and 1980, distracted by the tensions over biomedical research. As regards 
Rothschild, it is ironic that a national science policy reform intended to render 
publicly-funded research more amenable to societal influences should have 
contributed to such an introspective style of working. The Department’s 
shortcomings in this respect called the credibility of its instrumentalist narratives into 
question, and rendered it vulnerable to political attack in 1986. 
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12. Conclusions 
 
In its origin and basis the primary purpose of the Department's research 
programme, as it was conceived and developed in the 1960s and well 
into the 1970s, was to support the provision and distribution of health 
and social care in the NHS; and it was by improvements in the NHS 
that the success of the programme was expected to be judged.1 
 
This concluding chapter arrives at some over-arching conclusions, taking a view 
over the whole period between 1961 and 1986. The discussion is organised within 
the three themes of the analytic framework, testing the usefulness of the theories 
employed. 
The health research state 
Structural interests 
Before 1961, the dominance of the health research state by the MRC was 
uncontested. The MRC had operated for nearly half a century on the basis of a high 
level of scientific self-governance and autonomy. It enjoyed the support of a medical 
and political elite. These attributes rendered it secure in its own authority and 
legitimacy. In Alford’s terms, the Council reinforced and reproduced its own 
monopoly through its legitimising beliefs.2 The Cohen committee, meeting in 1952, 
subscribed to these beliefs and accepted the Council’s claims to hegemony in the 
field of medical research. It also accepted the Council’s broad definition of clinical 
research as including epidemiology, medical statistics and social medicine. Because 
of the MRC’s structural dominance, the R&D activities of the Ministry of Health 
were negligible.  
The allocation of responsibilities by the Cohen committee began to look 
unsustainable within a decade of its formulation. Under the pressure created by the 
politics of NHS investment, the Department began to develop its own capacity for 
R&D from 1961 onwards. Its programme took the form, initially, of commissioning 
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operational and management research but soon widened out to include ‘service-
orientated medical research’. The locally-organised research scheme also began to 
foster clinical research in the NHS, which grew inexorably as teaching hospitals and 
medical schools embraced scientism. The MRC did not at first see the departmental 
R&D programme as a threat to its dominance. The medical research component was 
very modest when set against MRC spending. Some of this work was, in any event, 
undertaken by MRC units, bringing a welcome new source of income. As the 1960s 
passed it also became clear that the MRC had quietly abandoned its claims to 
hegemony, which had become increasingly unrealistic as health research diversified. 
Much of the R&D sponsored by the DHSS was of little or no interest to the MRC. 
The Council was insufficiently interested in fields such as operational research, 
health services research, the experimental development of supplies and equipment, or 
computer research to want to claim these as its own. It also decided, when it came to 
it, that it really wasn’t that interested in the oversight of clinical research in the NHS 
either. New technology in fields such as imaging, pathology and microscopy, 
expanded the possibilities for mainstream medical research. The MRC wished to 
focus its efforts on laboratory research and experimental medicine, a field which 
came to be termed ‘biomedical research’. In these conditions, the R&D programme 
was able to grow in a parallel track to the MRC without stimulating any adverse 
reaction. The health research state thus began to develop a second centre of gravity, 
which expanded rapidly from the mid-1960s onwards.  
The MRC accepted the emergence of new types of health-related research, 
collectively labelled HPSSR. It also accepted that HPSSR was primarily a matter for 
the Department. However, it remained extremely protective both of its autonomy and 
of its dominance of the field that it regarded as its own, biomedical research. 
Rothschild struck a blow at both these pillars, with its proposal that a significant part 
of the Council’s programme should come under the customer-contractor principle, 
with the health departments the customer. It was this, together with Rothschild’s 
brusque dismissal of doctrines such as the indivisibility of pure and applied research, 
which provoked such a strident response from the MRC.  
The MRC lost the battle over the Green Paper, but it remained unreconciled to the 
Rothschild reforms. In the short term, it devoted its energy to dampening down the 
impact of the customer-contractor principle, by negotiating biomedical research 
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commissioning arrangements that left control substantially in its own hands. It 
returned to the attack at the end of the 1970s, aided by a Chief Scientist, Buller, who 
was an MRC placeman. Buller had little regard for the HPSSR programme of the 
Department and wished to offload this on to the research councils. On this occasion, 
the MRC won both the battle and the war, obtaining the return of biomedical funds. 
This victory came at a price, which was the requirement that the MRC should 
increase its commitment to HSR. At this point, it looked as if the health research 
state might collapse its second centre of gravity and return to a situation of MRC 
dominance across the whole field of health research (whilst also allowing for 
potential expansion of SSRC health-related activity). However, it was by now 
evident that the Council no longer aspired to such hegemony, fearing that a greater 
commitment to HSR might dilute the resources available for biomedical research and 
allow an ‘alien’ research community undue influence over its affairs. In this 
situation, the DHSS continued to commission HPSSR and remained a second centre 
of gravity into the 1980s, although this was weakened by shrinking budgets and 
political disfavour.  
The professionalised state 
It need hardly be stated that the medical profession had considerable influence 
over the development of the departmental programme. Yet, at the same time, it 
would be a mistake to overstate this influence because of the parallel structure, under 
which executive powers were reserved for the administrative class. The medical 
profession provided expertise, authority and networks. It also managed the 
relationship with the MRC. However, it neither held the purse strings nor dealt with 
the day to day tasks of research management. Medical networks were of limited 
value when it came to new fields such as operational, management and social 
research. For these fields, administrators had to develop their own networks and 
expertise. The autonomy of the ‘specialist branches’ also had the effect of limiting 
the power of the medical profession, because it fragmented the medical advisory 
role.  
During the ‘golden age’, collaboration between professional and generalist civil 
servants fostered growth across a broad spectrum of research. This was achieved by 
‘the informal team’, working across organisational boundaries. After 1967, the style 
of working became more formalised, with the creation of S&R and the R&DC. These 
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developments created greater administrative capacity, more structured co-ordination 
and a framework for the involvement of R&D ‘customers’. However, they did not 
involve a move towards an integrated hierarchy. Nor did they alter in any 
fundamental way the balance of power and influence between professionals and 
administrators.  
The Green Paper placed this pattern of collaborative working under stress. 
Between 1971 and 1973, the energies of the medical staff of the Department were 
directed towards damage limitation in the MRC relationship. This took the form of 
agreeing mechanisms for biomedical research commissioning that left de facto 
control with the MRC and ensuring the appointment of a DHSS Chief Scientist 
acceptable to the MRC. The seniority of the CMO, with his direct reporting line to 
the Secretary of State, meant that these matters could be treated as a matter for the 
medical profession to resolve. The language of ‘partnership working’ included in the 
White Paper conferred a veil of legitimacy on this accommodation of MRC interests. 
The need to appease the MRC, and the need for credibility, meant that it became 
an unquestioned assumption that the Chief Scientist would always be medically 
qualified. This was, on the face of it, further reinforcement of the role of the medical 
profession in the health research state. However, the role of the Chief Scientist had 
been made something of a hollow facade. On the biomedical side, agreements with 
the MRC meant that the role was more ceremonial and diplomatic than one involving 
real power to re-shape the Council’s programme of applied research. When it came 
to HPSSR, the Chief Scientist had influence through the authority of his office but, in 
reality, the programme was shaped through large numbers of separate interactions 
and decisions within the complex committee structures and fragmented bureaucracy 
for research management. The second Chief Scientist, Black, may have been content 
with this situation (given that he later defined his contribution as being that of 
showing that the system could not work), but it was hardly the role envisaged by 
Rothschild. 
The Chief Scientist was given an executive role in 1978. On the face of it, this 
was yet further accrual of power of the medical profession. However, the first 
executive Chief Scientist, Buller, encountered considerable resistance from his own 
administrative staff and other internal constituencies in his mission to get biomedical 
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funds returned to the MRC. He ran into similar difficulties with his plan to offload 
other work onto the research councils. It was only the intervention of the Permanent 
Secretary, motivated by concerns about accountability, which finally led to the return 
of biomedical funds. The ongoing work of HPSSR commissioning was pursued 
through collaboration between professional and administrative staff in the OCS. The 
1980s saw the increasing engagement of other professional groups, such as nurses, in 
research. After 1981, a non-medically qualified Deputy CS/Controller became 
responsible for day-to-day management of these staff and the CS became more of a 
figurehead. This was explicitly recognised in 1986, when the CS role was once again 
re-defined as advisory. The power of the medical profession was always 
counterbalanced by that of the administrative class.   
In summary, the departmental programme serves as a case study of the power of 
the medical profession in the health research state, including the limitations to that 
power. The medical profession enjoyed considerable influence over the programme, 
drawn from its authority, expertise and networks. It largely left to its own devices in 
managing the relationship with the MRC and biomedical research commissioning. 
However, the profession’s authority over HPSSR commissioning was much less 
extensive, because of the greater role of the administrative class in non-medical 
R&D. To a lesser extent, the involvement of other health care professionals also 
diluted this role. The influence of the medical profession over R&D was, at least in 
theory, at high water during the period between 1978 and 1986. Between these years, 
the Chief Scientist had an ‘executive’ role and was supported by a reasonably well-
resourced OCS. But even in this era, it proved difficult for a Chief Scientist to 
fundamentally re-shape the HPSSR programme, as Buller attempted, because of 
counter-veiling forces such as administrators, RLGs and specialist divisions. It is this 
combination of strong medical influence over in biomedical research and weaker 
influence over HPSSR that explains, in part, the mixture of change (more determined 
by BMR) and continuity (more by HPSSR) evident in the programme’s history.  
Elitism or neo-pluralism? 
Recognition of the differing degree of professional influence over BMR and 
HPSSR is directly relevant to considering which of our candidate political theories 
has most explanatory power. Elite theory seems most obviously relevant to the BMR 
stream. This emerges most nakedly in evidence of the medical profession’s shaping 
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of BMR commissioning arrangements; and its influence over the appointment of 
MRC loyalists into the role of Chief Scientist. But it can also be perceived in the 
detail of how medical projects were commissioned in the era of ‘enlightened 
patronage’. Such matters were decided by a small number of senior medical 
administrators with close professional (and sometime personal) connections across 
organisational boundaries. From the perspective of the MRC and its supporters, the 
activities of this elite were legitimate and in the public interest. Protecting excellent 
science from the instrumentalism of Rothschild was justified as being more likely to 
lead to health gains in the longer term. This stance could also be justified as a 
defence against Lysenkoism, as seen in invocation of the ‘Haldane Principle’. If this 
interpretation of medical motivation is accepted, then democratic elitism is the most 
relevant theory. 
There is an alternative interpretation, which makes it more difficult to see the use 
of professional power as benign and in the public interest. This begins by accepting 
government concerns about the non-responsiveness of the research councils to 
societal needs.  From this perspective, it looks more as if members of the medical 
profession embedded in the state acted primarily in the interests of the profession. 
These interests were in the further advancement of the medical profession’s authority 
through scientism, a project that required the capture of substantial amounts of public 
money for research. Furthermore, this project referred to a scheme of values, set by 
the research community, under which research would be lauded for its scientific 
excellence first and its social usefulness second. If this interpretation seems more 
convincing, then radical elite theory seems more relevant. 
For the HPSSR, SSR and other non-medical streams of research, elite theory is 
unconvincing. For these streams, administrators and professionals worked 
collaboratively to procure research that would be of relevance to both practitioners in 
the NHS and policy-makers. This project was subject to periodic destabilisation, 
arising from frequent reorganisation and the differing views of those members of the 
medical elite who served as Chief Scientist. The processes of research management 
may have felt laboured after 1973, but this was because multiple interest groups were 
involved. This can be seen most obviously in the RLG mechanism. For these non-
medical streams, a neo-pluralist perspective seems more applicable.  
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Organisation for research 
Legitimacy or task performance? 
Sociological institutionalists argue that organisations will often place conformity 
with sector norms above consideration of task performance. This, they argue, confers 
legitimacy in conditions where it is difficult to be certain about the relationship 
between means and ends. At various points in this thesis it has been suggested that 
this might be true of the departmental R&D programme. The adoption by the 
Department of the research unit model could be interpreted as an example of 
‘mimetic isomorphism’. It has been suggested that the Department’s interpretation of 
the customer contractor relationship for BMR placed ceremonial conformity above 
substance. This was because it didn’t want genuine control enough to make it worth 
alienating the MRC. 
Against this, the evidence has shown that the Department did try very hard to 
arrive at satisfactory organisational arrangements for performing the task of HPSSR 
research commissioning. It re-organised itself with this goal in 1961, 1967, 1972, 
1973, 1978 and 1986. Of these reorganisations, it seems reasonable to say that only 
those of 1973 and 1986 weakened its ability to commission R&D and only for the 
last does this appear to have been the aim, rather than an unintended consequence. 
Even the arrangements for BMR commissioning adopted in 1973 can be seen as 
directed towards task performance if the definition of the task is changed. Rothschild 
wanted it to be the commissioning of applied research through market-like 
exchanges. The medical elite was more interested in sustaining the ability of the 
MRC to continue working in the manner to which it was accustomed. From this 
perspective, the broad commissions performed in a way that was entirely 
satisfactory. The argument that conformity was placed above task performance does 
not really stand up in the face of these iterative attempts to arrive at the right 
organisational arrangements. 
Another way of looking at this is to use the theory of ‘competing institutional 
logics’. This may further assist in explaining the mixed picture of continuity and 
change that has already been discussed. The constant institutional logic for the 
Department was the imperative to commission useful research. This drove research 
commissioning in the golden age and, for HPSSR, continued to drive it through to 
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1986 and beyond. The logic of commissioning ‘useful’ research drove stability and 
continuity. During the golden age, medical research commissioning activities fitted 
within this scheme, alongside non-medical research. Rothschild de-stabilised this 
situation. His recommendations amounted to an attempt to mobilise a managerialist 
set of institutional myths which promoted the belief that government should further 
develop its capacity to procure research through market-like transactions. The 
reforms that followed were layered on to the longer-standing institutional myths that 
had shaped MRC structure and practice. However, the professional response was to 
‘buffer’ the pre-existing arrangement by putting in place structures and processes that 
were only loosely-coupled to the policy innovation. Later, Buller attempted what 
might be described as a reciprocal project, seeking to layer the values of the research 
councils onto the DHSS programme. This was prosecuted through his review of the 
research units using the criteria of ‘good science’ and his attempts to offload HPSSR 
onto the research councils. The response of the administrative civil service and of 
those members of the scientific community who were committed to ‘useful’ research 
was to buffer the HPSSR programme from these innovations by continuing with 
‘business as usual’ until Buller went away. The theory of ‘competing institutional 
logics’ can thus be linked to that of the professionalised state and related to the 
differing dynamics between BMR and HPSSR streams to further develop an 
explanation of the mixture of continuity and change presented by the departmental 
programme. 
Agency or structure? 
Sociological institutionalism has been criticised by Hay and Wincott as exhibiting 
‘latent structuralism’. They propose a historical institutionalist framework that allows 
us to examine the role of individual actors as both objects and agents of history. The 
idea of ‘strategic action’ is central to this approach. Actors take strategic action to 
achieve a desired outcome based on their understanding of context. However, their 
understanding of context is invariably imperfect and actors may misjudge the likely 
outcome of actions because they fail to appreciate the extent to which they are 
constrained by structural forces.  
This theory may be helpful in interpreting the role of the principal actors in this 
history. This can be illustrated with reference to Buller, to take an individual who 
appears, on the face of it, to have had considerable agency as the first Chief Scientist 
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with executive powers. Buller’s strategic actions were shaped by two core beliefs. 
First, that ‘good science’ should be the paramount criterion for any government 
research programme. Second, that the research councils would deliver the best 
science. These beliefs drove his strategy of arguing within the Department for the 
return of biomedical funds. For HPSSR, his strategic aim was to progressively 
offload onto the research councils. His strategy was to seek to persuade the MRC to 
take on a significant role in HSR and to provide financial incentives for this. In a bid 
to release funds that could be used to commission HSR from the MRC, he also 
pursued a strategy of seeking to reduce the number of DHSS-funded research units. 
Buller enjoyed considerable strategic success, not only securing the return of BMR 
funds but linking this to a new MRC obligation to develop its role in HSR. At first 
sight, then, Buller’s individual agency was pivotal to change.  
This observation must, however, be tempered by recognition of the extent to 
which his strategic action was both enabled and hindered by structural forces. Buller 
only became Chief Scientist because of the existence of elite networks and 
patronage. The return of biomedical research funds was resisted by most 
constituencies within the Department and was eventually achieved only because it 
was supported by the Permanent Secretary. Nairne’s support was driven by scrutiny 
and accountability requirements. Buller believed that the MRC could be persuaded to 
take on a greater role in HSR but he underestimated the strength of the structural 
forces bearing upon the council, whose priorities were strongly influenced by the 
biomedical research community. Buller was thus both object and agent of history. 
The same can be said of other leaders in the history, although some appear closer to 
the agent end of the spectrum (Cohen, Godber, Gowans) and others to the object end 
(Pond). 
Continuity and change 
The contrast between change in the case of biomedical research and continuity in 
the case of HPSSR is striking. This is especially true when Buller’s attempts to shift 
HPSSR towards the research councils are considered. Path dependency theory does 
seem helpful in interpreting this contrast. Both culture and economics sustained a 
departmental programme of HPSSR and allied commissioning through the Buller era 
and the 1980s. Buller was unable to divert these core streams of activity into a new 
path. In contrast, the combination of managerialism in government and the brusque 
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certainties of Rothschild were sufficient to cause a major change of path for 
biomedical research in 1973. This was a first critical juncture. The second followed 
within less than a decade, when a combination of MRC machinations and the logic of 
accountability was sufficient to cause a complete reversal of Rothschild for 
biomedical research. 
Exchanges for health research 
Models of research production 
The MRC adhered to a knowledge-driven model of research production. The 
Department was committed to a problem-driven model. In the golden age, the 
policies of ‘enlightened patronage’ and the designation of research units meant that 
the departmental programme often allowed researchers to take the lead. This could 
be mistaken for a knowledge-driven approach, especially given the elements of MRC 
mimicry involved. However, even in this period the programme was problem-driven. 
Researcher-led proposals were always subject to the test of NHS usefulness.  
The customer-contractor principle was an important construct in the institutional 
scheme of the managerial state. For the Department, the elevation of this principle to 
national science policy in the Rothschild reforms represented an affirmation of 
commissioning practices already adopted. For the MRC, it represented a fundamental 
challenge to its values. The response, as has been discussed, was that the medical 
profession closed ranks to ‘buffer’ the impact on BMR. For HPSSR, these issues 
never arose. The customer-contractor principle was always evident. The model was 
always explicitly problem-driven. The RLGs and other advisory groups were there to 
articulate and prioritise problems to be researched, as well as to review the findings 
from research.  
The customer 
The Department embraced the customer-contractor principle as supporting 
problem-driven research. However, the effort required to engage with internal 
customers seems to have left little space for thinking about how it might fulfil its role 
as a proxy customer for the NHS. This deficiency was linked to the limited attention 
paid to the dissemination and adoption of research findings. From the outset, the 
Department always seemed more concerned with the problem of commissioning new 
research than it was with the question of how to get research into policy and practice. 
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The neglect of these later stages seems to reflect the rather simplistic assumption that 
the involvement of customers in the process of research commissioning was 
sufficient. This, it was assumed, would translate into a sense of ownership that would 
mean that research findings would somehow be adopted into policy and practice 
development. Such assumptions were problematical enough even for policy 
customers within the Department.  For the NHS, the wiring to connect research 
findings back to policy and practice was simply never installed.  
The Department devoted considerable effort to engaging civil servants responsible 
for governance and service level policies in the commissioning process. Process for 
communicating the findings of research back to these individuals was formulated, 
although implementation was idiosyncratic. The question of how these individuals 
might then use any knowledge gained in their work of policy development remained 
unexamined. The Department appears to have remained in a state of blissful 
ignorance about contemporary critical thinking on the limited utility of research in 
policy making.1 Even worse, it made no provision for the communication of research 
findings to those involved in the development of service and practice level policy in 
the NHS, an omission made all the worse by the view of researchers that their policy 
was of greatest relevance to clinical practitioners. Instead, there seems to have been 
unquestioning reliance on researchers themselves taking responsibility for 
dissemination. However, there were no incentives within the academic setting for 
researchers to assume this responsibility. The net effect of the Department’s 
introspection and lack of critical thinking was that its R&D programme came to be 
seen as less relevant to the needs of the NHS as the 1980s progressed. 
The remedy for these problems was, at intervals, identified as a Health Services 
Research Council or an Institute for Health Services Research. What proponents of 
such an institutional remedy were hoping for was not just an organisation that would 
be more independent of government in setting the research agenda, but also a body 
that would be less introspective in its engagement with the NHS. The Department 
consistently side-lined such proposals, setting control above any prospects for 
making research more useful. 
                                                             
1.  Charles E. Lindblom and David K. Cohen, Usable Knowledge. (New Haven and London: 
Yale University Press, 1979). Collingridge and Reeve, Science Speaks to Power. 
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Concluding reflection 
Based on the budget data series, the history of the Department’s R&D programme 
between 1961 and 1986 has been described as one of meteoric rise followed by 
decline. The partial dismantling of Rothschild, an event unique to the DHSS/MRC 
relationship, supports this interpretation. We might also contrast the early 1970s 
optimism of the Portfolios with the bleak diagnosis of the House of Lords Select 
Committee in 1988. Our perceptions have been influenced by the work of Kogan and 
colleagues, which present the ‘Rothschild experiment’ at the DHSS as ending in 
failure. The downgrading of the Chief Scientist role in 1986, and the weakening of 
OCS, means that the history ends on a low note. 
At the most basic level, a rise-and-decline narrative is obviously valid. But if 
biomedical research is set to one side, it becomes possible to view the history 
differently. The Department developed a moderately functional set of arrangements 
for research commissioning even before Rothschild. After some trial and error, it 
succeeded in implementing arrangements for HPSSR that were consistent with 
Rothschild’s recommendations. Over the quarter century, it acted as the principal 
sponsor of HPSSR in England and Wales. As such, it was the moving force behind a 
large and diverse body of research outputs and an enhanced national capacity for 
health services research. Yet the Department’s path to achieving these laudable 
outcomes was far from straightforward, being marked by many twists and turns. In 
his political history, Webster describes the DHSS as ‘stumbling’ towards a 
comprehensive planning system ‘in its habitual erratic and indeterminate manner’.1 
Such a verdict could equally well be applied to attempts to develop organisation and 
policy for R&D. Yet it seems too simplistic to suggest that the tortuous path taken by 
the Department was due solely to habitual behaviours, limited competence, or 
administrative overload. A more convincing explanation is that the programme was 
buffeted by forces arising from its intrinsic and irreducible heterogeneity. The 
programme’s distinctive nature meant that any organisation and policy for R&D had 
to accommodate significant differences, not least in the diverse structural interests 
bearing upon different fields of research.  
                                                             
1   Webster, Political History, 79. 
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The most obvious divergence in this respect was that between biomedical research 
and HPSSR. For biomedical research, the history is undeniably one of rise and 
reversal over a relatively brief period, with the two key events being the Rothschild 
reforms and the return of funds to the MRC in 1981. The latter was an exceptional 
event, occurring against the grain of national science policy. This strand of the 
history hinges on the power of medical research elites, and their ability and readiness 
to blunt science policy reform. For HPSSR, the history is very different, with the 
pattern of rise and reversal being less stark and played out over a longer period. Here 
the Rothschild reforms were partially anticipated by the Department and became 
more embedded over time, rather than being reversed. For this strand, the DHSS 
went with the grain of science policy and greater pluralism is evident. The contrast 
between biomedical research and HPSSR, and how these two dissimilar creatures of 
the health research state were yoked together, is central to the history of organisation 
and policy for research and development at the health department.   
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Appendix 1: methodology – longitudinal analysis 
Data sources 
No single, complete data series for R&D allocations to the health department has 
been published for the period 1961 to 1986. Construction of such a series requires the 
combination of data from more than one source. Four sources of data were 
considered for this purpose.  
1. The annual reports of the Ministry of Health (1961 to 1968). 
2. Annual reports on research and development produced by the DHSS (1973 to 
1991) 
3. Supply estimates (available for all years, but with significant limitations after 
1982). 
4. Cabinet Office Annual Reviews of government research and development 
(1982 to 1993). 
Prior to 1968, some data relating to research are included in the annual reports of the 
Ministry of Health (source 1 above). However, these are fragmentary and this series 
was discontinued after the Ministry was merged into the DHSS.1 The DHSS annual 
reports on R&D (source 2), which commenced in 1973, include a detailed analysis of 
‘estimated expenditure’ for current and prior years until 1982, after which the 
analysis becomes highly summarised.2 At first sight, these reports appear the most 
promising source for construction of a longitudinal data series for R&D expenditure. 
However, caution is needed. The Royal Statistical Society cautions against over-
reliance on reports published by individual government departments because they 
suffer from lack of agreed standards and from inconsistency. This criticism is applied 
to departments in general, but the annual reports of the DHSS are singled out as 
                                                             
1.  See, for example, Cmnd. 3039. Report of the Ministry of Health for the Year Ended 31st 
December 1965 (London: HMSO, 1966). Discussion is mostly confined to the 
Organisation & Methods programme of the Ministry. No data is provided on overall 
budgets or expenditure. 
2.  The annual reports were called ‘The Annual Report on Departmental Research and 
Development’ between 1973 and 1976 after which the name was changed to ‘Research 
and Development Report and Handbook’ until 1988 when it became ‘Department of 
Health Yearbook of Research and Development’ until discontinued after 1991. All 
published by HMSO. 
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being particularly difficult to reconcile to national data.1  Comparison of the annual 
reports with sources 3 and 4 above confirms that there is inconsistency in the figures 
reported in both the total R&D spend reported and in individual budget lines. Some 
of this is probably due to the differences between budget and outturn but, as the 
annual reports do not explain their methodology, this cannot be confirmed. The 
research expenditure of the Public Health Laboratory Service is also completely 
omitted from the DHSS report, even though this accounted for around a quarter of 
the global budget in the 1980s. Other less obvious omissions may also be present. 
In view of these problems of incompleteness and unreliability, the decision was 
taken not to rely on the DHSS reports but to use instead the last two sources 
identified. Both were prepared on a cross-departmental basis by an authority that 
would have sought accuracy and consistency. Up to and including the financial year 
1981/82, the Supply Estimates, published by H.M. Treasury, were used as the source. 
The Estimates do not provide enough detail to continue the longitudinal analysis 
beyond this year, so the Cabinet Office Annual Reports on Government Research 
and Development are used as the source thereafter. 
The Supply Estimates represent the government’s budget and provide a detailed 
breakdown of the public expenditure authorised by Parliament through the annual 
Appropriation Act. For most of the period, a table showing the research and 
development content in the Estimates by spending department was included in the 
Memorandum by the Financial/Chief Secretary to the Treasury.2  The Memoranda 
can be cross-referenced to the full Supply Estimates, to obtain a more detailed 
breakdown of the allocation heads used in the former.  
The Supply Estimates themselves were published as a large and highly detailed 
document which became weightier over time as the scale and complexity of 
government spending grew. By the end of the 1970s, the Estimates had grown to 
over one thousand pages and were coming under increasing criticism as unusable by 
parliamentarians.3 In response, the form of the Estimates was considerably simplified 
                                                             
1.   Bosworth, Wilson and Young, Research and Development. See chapter 3 for a review of 
pan-government sources and chapter 5 for an assessment of departmental sources. 
2.  Financial Secretary up to and including 1969/70, Chief Secretary thereafter. 
3.   House of Commons Treasury and Civil Service Committee. The Form of the Estimates. 
Sixth Report (Session 1980-81), HMSO. HC 325, 1981.p.vi 
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after 1981/2, when much detail disappears altogether. Critically for current purposes, 
this includes both the R&D table in the Memorandum and the detailed breakdown of 
departmental sub-heads in the Estimates. After 1981/2, the Estimates cease to 
provide the detail needed to continue the data series for departmental R&D spending, 
necessitating the use of Cabinet Office reports thereafter.  
In 1982, the House of Lords Select Committee on Science and Technology 
produced a report on ‘Science and Government’1. In its response to this report, the 
Government made a commitment to the publication of annual reviews of government 
R&D activity to inform science policy and support scrutiny of this area through the 
Public Expenditure Survey Committee (PESC) process.2 The Cabinet Office was 
assigned the task of producing this review, which first appeared in 1983 and ran until 
1993.  The Cabinet Office reviews provide detailed analysis of government R&D 
spending, starting with data for 1981/2, so that there is one year’s overlap before the 
Estimates cease to provide the level of detail sought. 
In summary, the Memoranda and Supply Estimates are the source for 
departmental R&D budget for the period up to and including 1981/82 and the 
Cabinet Office Annual Reviews of Government Funded R&D are the source for 
1982/83 onwards. Data for the Medical Research Council is also included in the 
analysis for comparative purposes and this is available from the Estimates for the 
whole of the period 1961 to 1986 as research council allocations were still itemised 
after 1981/82. 
Only data relating to England and Wales was abstracted, as health research was 
dealt with throughout the study period by SHHD under separate organisational 
arrangements. After 1973, Scotland had its own Chief Scientist and Chief Scientist’s 
Organisation within SHHD but these devolved arrangements were not replicated in 
the Welsh Office. Votes for research carried out or commissioned by SHHD are 
shown under separate headings in the Estimates throughout, whereas those for the 
WO are not for the years between 1962/3 and 1970/1 or after 1980/1. Nor do the 
                                                             
1.  House of Lords Select Committee on Science and Technology. Science and Government, 
1st Report 1981-1982 Session HL (20-I), (London: HMSO, 1981). 
2.  Cmnd. 8591. Science and Government. Government Observations on the First Report of 
the House of Lords Select Committee on Science and Technology (Session 1981-82), 
(London: HMSO, 1982). 
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Cabinet Office Annual Reviews disaggregate England and Wales when reporting on 
the R&D spend of the Department of Health and Social Security. 
Consistency  
Because of the need to combine two sources to construct a complete data series; 
and because of changes in the cost base used for preparation of the Estimates; there 
are some inescapable inconsistencies in the series. To understand these and assess 
their significance it is first necessary to understand the annual Estimates cycle. 1 
The Estimates set the budget, or ‘control limit’, for each heading of departmental 
expenditure. They were negotiated between government departments and the 
Treasury and approved prospectively during the autumn session of parliament prior 
to the financial year in question. The sum approved was expressed at the prices 
current at that time and this approach is described as ‘Estimate at estimates prices’.  
In the event, the sum eventually spent, known as ‘outturn’, might differ from the 
original Estimates. Any over-spend required the voting of Supplementary Estimates. 
One cause of overspends was price inflation, which rose steeply after the oil price 
shock of 1973. From 1979/80 onwards, the government began to set the Estimates to 
include an allowance for predicted inflation and at the same time began to treat them 
as hard cash limits. This approach is referred to as ‘Estimates at outturn prices’. In 
constructing the series, the decision was taken to use original Estimates rather than 
outturn because the detailed Supply Estimates include only the original ‘Estimates at 
estimates prices’ as a prior year comparative. 
For the years after 1981/2 it is necessary, for the reasons explained, to switch to 
the Cabinet Office annual reviews of government-funded research and development 
as the data source. These report a mix of historic outturn and plan. Unfortunately, the 
data is not entirely reliable, at least in the earliest reports, as the first report in the 
series candidly admits.2 This is manifest in the restatement, sometimes more than 
once, of historic outturn figures. This practice disappears after 1985 and the figures 
stabilise. In view of this early instability, the approach adopted was to use the last 
                                                             
1.  Bosworth et al., Research and Development, 57-58. 
2.  Cabinet Office. Annual Review of Government Funded R&D, HMSO, 1983. 
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published outturn data for any year. So, for example, outturn data for 1985/6 is taken 
from the 1988 edition of the Annual Review. 
The Annual reviews also include a mix of outturn and plan figures for the MRC, 
enabling a comparison of Estimates at outturn prices and actual outturn, which is not 
possible for the Department. Comparison of Estimates and outturn for the MRC 
reveals only minor differences. A sample comparison between original Estimates and 
adjusted estimates for the Departmental budget, using the Memoranda, also indicates 
immaterial differences. The conclusion drawn is that the inescapable inconsistency 
arising from the combination of data from the Estimates and the Cabinet Office 
annual review is not material to the objectives set for the analysis.  
Price base 
Adjustment of the data series to a constant price basis is necessary, given the 
exceptionally high levels of inflation experienced in the UK during this period. 
Arriving at an appropriate deflator for the National Health Service is problematical 
and, in any event, NHS-specific estimates of inflation would not necessarily be valid 
for this series given the significant involvement of non-NHS providers in research 
and development.1   
In view of these considerations, and the limited choice of price index series 
available for this period, a pragmatic approach was taken and the Retail Price Index 
(RPI) was adopted as the deflator.2  Table A1.1 summarises the sources, data item 
and price index used for the longitudinal analysis of the departmental research and 
development budget. 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
1.  Appleby, Government Funding of the UK National Health Service.   
2.   Office for National Statistics. Economic Trends, Annual Supplement, 2005. Table 2.1  
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Table A1.1 Basis of longitudinal data series 
Period 1961/2 to 1978/9 1979/80 to 
1981/2* 
1981/2* to 1985/6 
Source Supply Estimates  
(H.M. Treasury) 
Supply Estimates  
(H.M. Treasury) 
Annual Review of 
Government R&D 
(Cabinet Office) 
Data item Estimates at 
estimates prices 
Estimates at 
outturn prices 
Outturn at outturn 
prices 
Price index RPI Q3 in the 
calendar year prior 
to the start of the 
financial year 
RPI Q3 in the 
calendar year 
during which the 
financial year 
starts 
RPI Q3 in the 
calendar year 
during which the 
financial year starts 
* overlap in 1981/2 
Analysis at sub-head level 
The Estimates are organised into classes with up to four levels of sub-head 
analysis. The sum allocated, or the ‘vote’, for a certain purpose can thus be identified 
at these various levels. The Memoranda identify the relevant class and sub-heads for 
research commitments. In some instances, the Memoranda itemise the research and 
development element of a particular vote and, in this case, provide a finer granularity 
of analysis than is available from the Supply Estimates. Elsewhere the opposite is 
true, and a lower level of sub-head analysis is available in the Supply Estimates. For 
the purposes of the analysis presented in chapter 4 the lowest level of analysis was 
sought, so both Memoranda and Supply Estimates were used together. 
Tracking data in the Estimates presents two challenges. The numbering of classes 
and sub-heads changes from time to time as do the descriptors used for data items at 
each level. Fortunately changes in both descriptors and numbering rarely occur in the 
same year and there is sufficient consistency in the original descriptors to be able to 
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track data series throughout the period with confidence.  A standardised descriptor 
has been adopted for each data series to overcome the instability and, in some cases, 
obscurity in the original descriptors. Table A1.2 maps these back to the Estimate 
classes, sub-heads and original descriptors. Cross referencing to the charts in chapter 
4 is also included.  
The Cabinet Office annual reviews provide a simpler disaggregation of overall 
spending with consistent use of headings and so these challenges do not arise when 
working with this source.  
The global budget for civil research  
Quantifying the overall civil R&D budget on a consistent basis over the whole 
period is problematical because of a blurred boundary between civil and military 
research, especially in the earlier years. Between 1960/1 and 1966/7 the allocations 
for the ‘civil’ research undertaken by the Ministry of Aviation are included in the 
Civil Estimates and this one department accounts for around three quarters of the 
total government ‘civil’ research budget in the early 1960s. However, Aviation 
supported research that had both civil and military applications, for example in 
electronics, and these two purposes cannot be disentangled given the lack of detail in 
the Estimates. Defence projects were sometimes intentionally reclassified as ‘civil’ 
against a political backdrop that included commitments from both parties to redeploy 
resources from defence to civil purposes.1 Consequently, the reported civil defence 
budget for the early 1960s includes material de facto defence elements and is 
overstated when compared with that for later years.  
This point can be illustrated by the first report of the Council for Scientific Policy 
(CSP). Perhaps mindful of the unreliability of the Estimates, the Council conducted 
its own survey and, on this basis, published a figure of £136.9 million for civil 
research spending in 1961/2. This sum includes only £19.9m for the Ministry of 
Aviation, presumably reflecting the purely civil activities of that Department.2 In 
contrast, the total research allocations reported in the civil estimates for 1961/2 are 
£289 million, including £210 million for the Ministry of Aviation and £38 million for 
                                                             
1.  Vig, Science and Technology in British Politics, 57-58. 
2.  Cmnd. 3007. Report on Science Policy. Council for Scientific Policy (London: HMSO, 
1966). 
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service departments.1  Because of the distorting effects of Aviation, the Council for 
Scientific Policy figure has been taken as the more reliable baseline for current 
purposes.2 
The Council did not use further surveys to inform its subsequent reports, but 
instead cited figures taken directly from the Memoranda, suggesting greater 
confidence that civil and defence spending had been disentangled in later periods.3  
Policy to rebalance the government R&D budget was accompanied by a more 
transparent presentation in the Estimates. From 1967/8 onwards, the R&D table in 
the Memoranda includes a sub-total for defence spending and this can be deducted 
from the total to give a more consistent estimate of civil R&D spending. In arriving 
at the data series used in chart 4.5, the figure for atomic energy research was also 
deducted, as this would also have had mixed civil/defence application, together with 
the allocations for Concorde which, for a period, were so large (around £50 million 
p.a. in the late 1960s) as to be distorting of the underlying trends. 
Between the CSP survey for 1961/2 and the more transparent presentation 
adopted in the Memoranda from 1967/8 onwards the position remains opaque, with 
the mixed civil and defence activities of the Ministry of Aviation being the main 
problem. For the years in-between, a straight-line interpolation between 1961/2 CSP 
survey figures and 1967/8 Memoranda figures was used to arrive at an approximate 
figure for the total civil R&D budget. This approach is unlikely to create any 
significant unreliability in findings as it only applies to five years, during which the 
rate of growth was relatively modest at around £10 million per annum. Thereafter the 
Memoranda, adjusted as described, can be used with reasonable confidence. 
 
                                                             
1.  HC (104) 1961-62 civil estimates and estimates for revenue departments for the year 
ending 31st March 1962 pages 18-21 
2.  The Dainton Report arrived at a figure of £139.3m for total government funding of civil 
research in 1961/62, which is provides some corroboration for this choice of baseline.  
Cmnd. 4814, 42. 
3.  Cmnd. 5117. Third report of the Council for Science Policy. Council for Scientific Policy. 
London, HMSO. 
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TABLE A1.2: Top level analysis of R&D budgets: data series mapped to Estimates 
Data Series 1 
Charts 4.1, 4.2, 4.3 
Standardised descriptor:  
Hospital-based research, including computers, by Hospital Authorities 
Level of analysis 
Source 
Year  
1 
Estimates class 
2 
Estimates class sub-head (1) 
3 
Estimates class sub-head (2) 
4 
Memoranda 
1967/68 to 1969/70 VI 
Local Government, 
Housing and Social 
Services 
VI. 11  
National Health Services 
(Hospital Services) England and 
Wales 
VI.11. A  
Hospitals advances on current 
account 
VI.11. B  
Hospitals advances on current 
account 
 
Provided in the Memoranda 
1970/71 VI 
Local Government, 
Housing and Social 
Services 
VI. 12  
National Health Services 
(Hospital Services) England 
VI. 16  
National Health Services 
(Hospital Services) Wales 
VI.12. A  
Hospitals advances on current 
account 
VI.12. B  
Hospitals advances on current 
account 
VI.16.A  
Health Services Research by 
hospitals, Special Medical 
Developments (Wales) 
 
 
Provided in the Memoranda 
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Data Series 1 
Charts 4.1, 4.2, 4.3 
Standardised descriptor:  
Hospital-based research, including computers, by Hospital Authorities 
Level of analysis 
Source 
Year  
1 
Estimates class 
2 
Estimates class sub-head (1) 
3 
Estimates class sub-head (2) 
4 
Memoranda 
1971/72 to 1973/74 VII 
Social Services 
VII. 2  
National Health Services 
(Hospital Services) England 
VII. 6 
National Health Services 
(Hospital Services)  Wales 
VII. 2. A  
Hospitals advances on current 
account 
VII. 2. B  
Hospitals advances on current 
account 
VII. 6.A  
Health Services Research by 
hospitals, Special Medical 
Developments (Wales) 
 
Provided in the Memoranda 
 
1974/75 to 1978/79 XI 
Health and Personal Social 
Services 
XI.1 
Health and Personal Social 
Services England 
 
XI.4 
Health and Personal Social 
Services Wales 
 
XI. 1. A  
Hospital developments 
including computers by health 
authorities: England  
XI. 4. A  
Hospital developments 
including computers by health 
authorities: Wales  
 
 
Not available 
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Data Series 1 
Charts 4.1, 4.2, 4.3 
Standardised descriptor:  
Hospital-based research, including computers, by Hospital Authorities 
Level of analysis 
Source 
Year  
1 
Estimates class 
2 
Estimates class sub-head (1) 
3 
Estimates class sub-head (2) 
4 
Memoranda 
1979/80  XI 
Health and Personal Social 
Services 
XI.1 
Health and Personal Social 
Services England 
XI. 1. A  
Special development capital  
Not available 
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Data Series 2 
Charts 4.1, 4.3, 4.4  
Standardised descriptor:  
Centrally commissioned health and personal social services research 
Level of analysis 
Source 
Year  
1 
Estimates class 
2 
Estimates class sub-head (1) 
3 
Estimates class sub-head (2) 
4 
Estimates class sub-head (3) 
1961/62 V 
Health, Housing and Local 
Government 
V.5  
National Health Service 
England and Wales  
V.5 D & DD 
Other expenditure 
V.5 D.2 & DD2 
Expenses in connection with 
research England and Wales 
(s16, 1946 Act) 
1962/63 to 1966/67 VI 
Local Government, 
Housing and Social 
Services 
VI. 16  
Miscellaneous Health and 
Welfare Services England and 
Wales 
VI.16. A  
Laboratory, Vaccine and 
Research Services  
VI.16. A6 
Research 
Further disaggregated at 
Estimates class sub-head (4) 
1967/68 to 1969/70 
 
VI 
Local Government, 
Housing and Social 
Services 
VI. 13  
Miscellaneous Health and 
Welfare Services England and 
Wales 
VI.13. A  
Laboratory, Vaccine and 
Research Services 
V1.13. A6 
Research 
Further disaggregated at 
Estimates class sub-head (4) 
1970/71 VI 
Local Government, 
Housing and Social 
Services 
VI. 14  
Miscellaneous Health and 
Welfare Services England  
VI. 16 
National Health Services etc 
Wales 
 
 
VI.14. A  
Laboratory, Vaccine and 
Research Services England 
VI.16. I  
Laboratory, Vaccine and 
Research Services Wales 
 
VI.14. A6 
Research 
 
VI.16. I4 
Hospital clinical research 
 
Both further disaggregated at 
Estimates class sub-head (4) 
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Data Series 2 
Charts 4.1, 4.3, 4.4  
Standardised descriptor:  
Centrally commissioned health and personal social services research 
Level of analysis 
Source 
Year  
1 
Estimates class 
2 
Estimates class sub-head (1) 
3 
Estimates class sub-head (2) 
4 
Estimates class sub-head (3) 
1971/72 to 1973/74 VII 
Social Services 
VII. 4  
Miscellaneous Health  and 
Welfare Services England  
VII. 6 
National Health Services etc 
Wales 
VII. 4. A 
Laboratory, Vaccine and 
Research Services  
VII. 6. I 
Laboratory, Vaccine and 
Research Services 
VII.4. A6 
Research (England) 
 
VII.6. I4 
Research (Wales) 
Both further disaggregated at 
Estimates class sub-head (4) 
 
 
 
 
 
1974/75 to 1979/80 XI 
Health and Personal Social 
Services 
XI.1 
Health and Personal Social 
Services England 
XI.4 
Health and Personal Social 
Services Wales 
 
 
X1.1.J 
Research England 
 
XI.4.I 
Research Wales 
X1.1.J3 
Centrally arranged R&D 
 
XI.4.I1 
Centrally commissioned 
research Welsh Office 
Both further disaggregated at 
Estimates class sub-head (4) 
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Data Series 2 
Charts 4.1, 4.3, 4.4  
Standardised descriptor:  
Centrally commissioned health and personal social services research 
Level of analysis 
Source 
Year  
1 
Estimates class 
2 
Estimates class sub-head (1) 
3 
Estimates class sub-head (2) 
4 
Estimates class sub-head (3) 
1980/81 to 1981/82  XI 
Health and Personal Social 
Services 
XI.1 
Health and Personal Social 
Services England 
 
XI.1.I 
Research1 
 
XI.1.I 
Centrally-commissioned 
research DHSS 
 Notes 
1. No research is separately itemised for Wales under sub-head XI.4 so this can be assumed to be both England and Wales. The memorandum describes this 
category as ‘Research carried out or commissioned centrally: Department of Health and Social Security’. 
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Data Series 3 
Charts 4.1, 4.2  
Standardised descriptor:  
Centrally commissioned supplies and equipment research 
Level of analysis 
Source 
Year  
1 
Estimates class 
2 
Estimates class sub-head (1) 
3 
Estimates class sub-head (2) 
4 
Memoranda or Estimates class 
sub-head (3) 
1962/63  VI 
Local Government, 
Housing and Social 
Services 
VI. 14  
National Health Services 
(Hospital, etc. Services) 
England and Wales 
VI.14. N  
Supply and repair etc. of 
artificial limbs and appliances 
etc. 
 
Part of vote as itemised in 
memoranda 
1963/64 to 1966/67 VI 
Local Government, 
Housing and Social 
Services 
VI. 14  
National Health Services 
(Hospital, etc. Services) 
England and Wales 
VI.14. K 
Hospital supplies and 
equipment 
VI.14. L 
Supply and repair etc. of 
artificial limbs and appliances 
etc. 
 
Part of vote as itemised in 
memoranda 
1967/68 to 1969/70 VI 
Local Government, 
Housing and Social 
Services 
VI. 11  
National Health Services 
(Hospital, etc., Services) 
England and Wales 
VI.11. K 
Hospital supplies and 
equipment 
VI.11. L 
Supply and repair etc. of 
artificial limbs and appliances 
etc. 
 
Part of vote as itemised in 
memoranda 
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Data Series 3 
Charts 4.1, 4.2  
Standardised descriptor:  
Centrally commissioned supplies and equipment research 
Level of analysis 
Source 
Year  
1 
Estimates class 
2 
Estimates class sub-head (1) 
3 
Estimates class sub-head (2) 
4 
Memoranda or Estimates class 
sub-head (3) 
1970/71 VI 
Local Government, 
Housing and Social 
Services 
VI. 12  
National Health Services 
(Hospital Services) England 
 
VI.12. L 
Hospital supplies and 
equipment 
VI.12. N 
Supply and repair of artificial 
limbs and appliances etc. 
Part of vote as itemised in 
memoranda 
1971/72 to 1973/74 VII 
Social Services 
VII. 2  
National Health Services 
(Hospital Services) England 
 
VII. 2.  L 
Hospital supplies and 
equipment 
VII. 2. N 
Supply and repair etc. of 
artificial limbs and appliances 
etc 
Part of vote as itemised in 
memoranda 
1974/75 to 1981/82 XI 
Health and Personal Social 
Services 
XI.1 
Health and Personal Social 
Services England 
 
 
 
X1.1. J 
Research England 
 
X1.1. J1 
Assessment and development 
of supplies and equipment 
(part of vote as itemised in 
memoranda). 
X1.1. J3 Biomechanical 
Research and Development   
Unit  
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Data Series 4 
Charts 4.1, 4.2 
Standardised descriptor:  
Ministry of Health/Department of Health and Social Security research salaries  
Level of analysis 
Source 
Year  
1 
Estimates class 
2 
Estimates class sub-head (1) 
3 
Estimates class sub-head (2) 
4 
Memoranda or Estimates class 
sub-head (3) 
1962/63  VI 
Local Government, 
Housing and Social 
Services 
VI. 12  
Ministry of Health 
VI.12. B  
General administrative 
expenses 
Provided in the Memoranda 
1970/71 VI 
Local Government, 
Housing and Social 
Services 
VI. 2 
Department of Health and 
Social Security 
VI. 2. A 
Salaries 
Provided in the Memoranda 
1971/72 to 1973/74 VII 
Social Services 
VII. 1  
Department of Health and 
Social Security 
VII. 1. A 
Salaries 
 
Provided in the Memoranda 
 
1974/75 to 1981/82 XII 
Social Security 
XII. 5 
Administration and 
miscellaneous services: 
Department of Health and 
Social Security 
XII. 24 
Administration and 
miscellaneous services: Welsh 
Office 
XII.5. A 
Administration  
 
 
XII.24. A 
Administration 
 Provided in the Memoranda 
 
 305 
 
Data Series 5 
Charts 4.1, 4.2  
Standardised descriptor:  
Public Health Laboratory Service (research)  
Level of analysis 
Source 
Year  
1 
Estimates class 
2 
Estimates class sub-head (1) 
3 
Estimates class sub-head (2) 
4 
Estimates class sub-head (3) 
1968/66 to 1969/70 
 
VI 
Local Government, 
Housing and Social 
Services 
 
VI. 13  
Miscellaneous Health and 
Welfare Services England and 
Wales 
VI.13. A  
Laboratory, Vaccine and 
Research Services 
V1.13. A1 
Public Health Laboratory 
Service (part of vote as 
itemised in memoranda)  
1970/71 VI 
Local Government, 
Housing and Social 
Services 
VI. 14  
Miscellaneous Health and 
Welfare Services England  
 
VI.14. A  
Laboratory, Vaccine and 
Research Services England 
 
VI.14. A1 
Public Health Laboratory 
Service (part of vote as 
itemised in memoranda) 
1971/72 to 1973/74 VII 
Social Services 
VII. 4  
Miscellaneous Health and 
Welfare Services England  
 
VII. 4. A 
Laboratory, Vaccine and 
Research Services  
 
VII.4. A1 
Public Health Laboratory 
Service (part of vote as 
itemised in memoranda) 
1974/75 to 1979/80 XI 
Health and Personal Social 
Services 
XI.1 
Health and Personal Social 
Services England 
 
XI. 1. E 
Laboratory, Vaccine and 
Medicines Act Services  
XI.1.E1 
Public Health Laboratory 
Service (part of vote as 
itemised in memoranda) 
1980/81  XI 
Health and Personal Social 
Services 
XI.1 
Health and Personal Social 
Services England 
XI. 1. E 
Laboratory, Vaccine and 
Medicines Act Services  
XI.1.E1 PHLS (part vote as 
itemised in memoranda) 
 
 
 306 
 
Appendix 2: schemes of classification 
 
Portfolio for Health, vol.1, 1971  
1. Medical, social and operational research. 
2. Service developments. 
3. Equipment, supplies and appliances research and development. 
 
Portfolio for Health, vol.2, 1973 
1. The mother and infant 
2. The handicapped child 
3. The deprived child 
4. The handicapped adult 
5. The deprived adult 
6. The mentally ill 
7. The addicted 
8. The elderly 
9. The physically sick 
10. Maintenance of physical health 
11. Maintenance of mental health 
12. Incidence, prevention, and treatment of specific diseases and conditions 
13. Supporting services 
14. Allocation of resources: cost studies 
15. Medical technology 
16. Social science techniques 
17. Professional education and staff recruitment, training, and conditions 
18. Management and organization of services 
19. Evaluation of services and standards of care 
20. Record and information systems 
21. NHS Experimental Computer Programme  
22. Public response and attitudes to services 
23. Decentralization of research administration 
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Research and Development Report and Handbook 1977, DHSS (Appendix 1) 
 
A. Health and Personal Social Services Research 
1. Health Services 
a. Public and Environmental Health (PHLS) 
b. Planning and Organisation 
c. Hospital Services 
d. Nursing Services 
e. Primary Health Care 
f. Personnel 
2. Personal Social Services 
a. Children 
b. Mental Health 
c. Social Handicap 
d. Local Authority Social Services 
e. Miscellaneous 
 
B. Other research programmes 
3. Research by DHSS Social Research Branch 
a. Health and Personal Social Services 
b. Social Security 
4. Social Security Research (commissioned) 
5. NHS Building and Engineering 
6. NHS Equipment, Appliances and Supplies. 
7. NHS Computer R&D 
8. Medical Research Council (commissioned biomedical) 
9. Locally Organised Research Scheme. 
 
Cabinet Office Annual Report of Government R&D, 1986, (Table 7a) 
 
1. PHLS 
2. NHS Equipment Appliances and Supplies 
3. Health and Personal Social Services 
4. Social Security 
5. NHS Information Technology R&D 
6. Building and Engineering R&D 
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Appendix 3: DHSS-funded research units 
1973: designated research units  
Unit Director(s) 
The Wolfson Research Laboratories 
Department of Clinical Chemistry 
University of Birmingham 
Professor T P Whitehead 
Health Services Organisation Research Unit 
Institute of Organisation and Social Studies 
Brunel University 
Professor E Jaques 
Health Services Organisation Research Unit 
Social Services Organisation Research Unit 
Brunel University 
Dr R W Rowbottom 
The Institute of Biometry and Community Medicine 
University of Exeter 
Professor J R Ashford 
Dr N G Pearson 
Health Services Research Unit 
University of Kent 
Professor M D Warren 
The Addiction Research Unit 
Institute of Psychiatry 
University of London 
Dr J G Edwards 
The Special Hospitals Research Unit 
Institute of Psychiatry 
University of London 
Dr T G Tennent 
The Social Medicine and Health Services Research 
Unit 
St Thomas’s Hospital Medical School 
Professor W W Holland 
The Medical Care Research Unit 
University of Newcastle upon Tyne 
Professor D J Newell 
Dr J H Walker 
The MRC/DHSS Epidemiology and Medical Care Unit 
Northwick Park Hospital 
Dr T W Meade 
Source: McLachlan (ed.), Portfolio 2, 244-250  
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1985: units and other groups on rolling contracts 
Unit Director 
Department of Epidemiology and Social Research,  
University Hospital for South Manchester 
South Manchester Health Authority 
Professor E Alwyn Smith 
Oxford Rehabilitation Research Unit, 
Nuffield Orthopaedic Centre 
Oxfordshire Health Authority 
Dr G M Cochrane and P T 
Davies 
Nuffield Orthopaedic Centre 
Oxfordshire Health Authority 
Dr A Young 
The Social Medicine and Health Services Research 
Unit,  
St Thomas’s Hospital Medical School 
West Lambeth Health Authority 
Professor W W Holland 
Health Care Evaluation Research Team 
Wessex Health Authority 
Dr A Kushlick 
Health Services Research Unit 
Department of Social Medicine 
University of Birmingham 
Professor E G Knox 
Wolfson Research Laboratories 
Department of Clinical Chemistry 
University of Birmingham 
Mr P M G Broughton 
Department of Psychiatry 
University of Birmingham 
Professor I F Brockington 
Dartington Social Research Unit 
University of Bristol 
Spencer Millham 
CASPE Research Dr I Wickings 
DHSS Special Hospitals Research Programme Dr M J MacCulloch 
Personal Social Services Research Unit 
University of Kent 
Professor Bleddyn Davies 
Nursing Education Research Unit 
Chelsea College 
University of London 
Professor Jack Hayward 
Department of Medicine 
Guy’s Hospital Medical School 
University of London 
Professor H Keen 
Thomas Coram Research Unit 
Institute of Education 
University of London 
Professor B Tizzard 
General Practice Research Unit 
Institute of Psychiatry 
University of London  
Professor M Shepherd 
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Unit Director 
Department of General Practice 
University of Manchester 
 
Professor D Metcalfe 
Hester Adrian Research Centre 
University of Manchester 
Professor C C Kiernan 
National Children’s Bureau Dr R Davie 
National Institute for Social Work Dr I Sinclair 
Health Care Research Unit 
University of Newcastle upon Tyne 
Professor D J Newell 
Blind Mobility Research Unit, 
Department of Psychology 
University of Nottingham 
Professor C I Howarth 
National Perinatal Epidemiology Unit 
University of Oxford 
Dr I Chalmers 
Department of Community Medicine and General 
Practice, 
Unit of Clinical Epidemiology 
University of Oxford 
Dr M J Goldacre 
Childhood Cancer Research Group, 
University of Oxford 
Dr G J Draper 
Oxford Orthopaedic Engineering Centre, 
University of Oxford 
J D Harris 
General Practice Research Unit 
Royal College of General Practitioners 
Dr D L Crombie 
Medical Care Research Unit 
Department of Community Medicine 
University of Sheffield 
Professor B T Williams 
Southampton Psychiatric Case Register 
Faculty of Medicine 
University of Southampton 
Professor J L Gibbons 
Nursing Practice Research University 
University of Surrey 
Professor R Crow 
Department of Social Theory and Institutions 
University College of North Wales, Bangor 
Dr G W B Grant 
Mental Handicap in Wales – Applied Research Unit 
University of Wales College of Medicine 
R Blunden 
Research Team for the Care of the Elderly 
University of Wales College of Medicine 
Dr N J Vetter 
DHSS Health Economics Research 
University of York 
Professor A K Maynard 
Social Policy Research Unit 
University of York 
Professor J Bradshaw 
Source: DHSS Handbook of Research and Development 1985, 63-77. 
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Appendix 4: research liaison groups 1985 
DHSS Research Liaison Groups (RLGs) and analogous committee as at 1 June 1985. Reproduced 
from DHSS Handbook of Research and Development 1985 (London: HMSO), Appendix 4. 
Qualifications detailed and naming conventions retained to show professional and gender mix. 
Children’s RLG (Health) 
Chairman:  Firth, Mrs J M 
Scientific Advisers: Cartwright, Dr Ann, BSc PhD 
   Catterall, Dr R D, MRCS FRCP CBE 
   Culyer, Professor A J, BA 
   Fairweather, Professor D V I, MB ChB MD FRCOG 
   Ferguson-Smith, Professor M A, MB ChB FRCP FRCPath FRSE FRS 
   Hull, Professor D, MB ChB FRCP DCH 
   Knox, Professor E G, MB BS MD FRCP FFCM 
   Parry-Jones, Dr W, BChir MB MD 
   Stacey, Professor M, BSc 
   Turnball, Professor A C, CBE MB ChB MD FRCOG 
Service Advisers: Chant, L E J, SEN RMN CSW Cert PSW  (Personal Social Services) 
 
Elderly RLG 
Chairman:  Scott Whyte, S 
Scientific Advisers: Clarke, Professor M, MB BS MRCS LRCP FFCM DPH 
   Grimley Evans, Professor J, MA MB BChir FRCP FFCM 
   Taylor, Dr R, BA PhD 
Service Advisers: Cox, Dr J R, MD FRCP MRCGP, MRC(Psych)    (Medical) 
   Conway-Nicholls, Mrs K M, SRN SCM HV NDN FPAC   (Nursing) 
   Parker, Mrs A, BA DSA     (Personal Social Services)  
 
Forensic Psychiatry RLG    
Chairman:  Harrison, B A ChB MRC(Psych) DPM 
Scientific Advisers: Gunn, Professor J C, MD MB ChB MRC(Psych) DPM 
   MacCulloch, Dr M J, MD MB ChB 
   Trasler, Professor G, MA BSc PhD FBPsS 
   West, Professor D J, MD DPM MA PhD LittD 
Service Advisers: Bluglass, Professor R S, MD MB ChB FRCPsych DPM   (Medical) 
 
Homelessness and Addictions RLG 
Chairman:   Shaw, Mrs E A 
Scientific Advisers: Goody, Dr Esther, BA PhD 
   MacGregor, Dr Susanne, MA PhD 
   Orford, Dr J, MA PhD 
   Thorley, Dr A, MA MB FRCPsych 
Service Advisers: Hudson, Miss P, SRN       (Nursing) 
   Scerri, V J P      (Personal Social Services) 
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Local Authority Social Services RLG 
Chairman:   Scott Whyte, S 
Scientific Advisers: Gostick, C, CQSW MSc 
   Parker, Professor R, BSc PhD 
   Willmot, P, BSc 
Service Advisers: Crook, J M, MSc, BSc, MBASW    (Personal Social Services) 
 
Mental Handicap RLG 
Chairman:  Pearson, Mrs M A J 
Scientific Advisers: Dr K A Day, MA ChB FRCPsych DPM 
   Connolly, Professor K, BSc PhD FBPsS 
   Newson, Dr E, BA PhD 
   Bayley, Dr M J, MA PhD Dip Soc 
   Towell, Dr D, PhD MA 
   Wing, Dr L, MD MB BS MRCS LRCP MRCPsych DPM 
Service Advisers: Graves, R A, SRN RMN RNMS BTA      (Nursing) 
   Rodgers, Dr J S, MA MB BChir MB ChB FFCM D Obst RCOG DPH   (Medical)
   Wills, R, BA DSA DMH      (Personal Social Services) 
 
Mental Illness RLG 
Chairman:  Williamson, Mrs P M 
Scientific Advisers: Bergmann, Dr K, MD MB ChB DPM FRCPsych 
   Bulmer, Dr M, BSc 
   Kolvin, Professor I, BA MD MB BCh, FRCPsych 
   Miller, Dr E, BSc MPhil PhD 
   Paykel, Professor E S, MD MB ChB FRCP FRCPsych DPM 
   Roberts, Dr J, MSc PhD 
   Wing, Professor J K, PhD MD MB BS DPM FRCPsych 
Service Advisers: Vacancy          (Medical) 
   Charlesworth, Mrs M, RMN SRN       (Nursing) 
   Tombs, D, CSS       (Personal Social Services) 
   Kolvin, Professor I, NA MD MB BCh, FRCPsych (Child Psychiatry Sub-Group) 
   
Nursing RLG 
Chairman:  Poole, Mrs A 
Scientific Advisers: Davies, Dr C, BA MA PhD 
   Bond, Dr S, BA MSc PhD RCN FRCN 
   Reed, Dr V, BEd MA PhD RCN FRCN 
   Wallis, Professor D, BSc FBPsS 
   Wragg, Professor E C, BA MEd PhD 
Service Advisers: McNair, Miss E M, BA MEd Phd        (Medical) 
   Vacancy          (Nursing) 
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Physical Disablement RLG 
Chairman:  Orton, R M  
Scientific Advisers: Alberman, Professor Eva, MA MD 
   Hartley, Dr K, BSc PhD 
   Sellick, R J, MB BChir FRCS 
   Sinclair, Dr I, PhD 
   Tobin, Dr M J, PhD 
   Wood, Professor P H N, MB BS FRCP FFCM 
Service Advisers: Clarke, Dr A K, BSc MB BS MRCP       (Medical) 
   McEnroe, J P                        (Nursing) 
   Vacancy        (Personal Social Services)
   
Primary Health Care Research Advisory Group 
Chairman:  Firth, Mrs J  
Scientific Advisers: Crow, Professor Rosemary, PhD MA SEN SCM HV 
   Farrell, Mrs C, BSc 
   Freeling, Dr P, OBE MB BS FRCGP 
   Gravelle, H, B Comm 
   Russell, Dr I, MA MSc PhD 
   Dunnell, Ms K, BSc 
   Hemsworth, Professor B, B Pharm PhD MPS 
   Williams, Professor B, MD FFCM DPH DPM 
Service Advisers: Hewitt, P, BA DipSoc 
   Moore, Dr P, BSc MB BCh DPH DObst RCOG FFCM QHP 
   Reddington, Miss J, SRN SCM HV DNS 
   Richards, Dr Jane, MBBS DCH FRCGP 
   
Social Security Research Policy Committee 
Chairman:  Otton, Sir Geoffrey KCB  
Scientific Advisers: Bradshaw, Professor J, BSc MA DPhil 
   Holt, Professor D, BSc PhD 
   Jowell, Professor R, BA  
   Piachaud, D, BA MPA 
   Sinfield, Professor A, BA Dipl Soc Admin 
 
Supply RLG 
Chairman:  Higson, G R  
Scientific Advisers: Chamberlain, Dr Anne, BSC MB BS MRCP 
   England, Dr A G, MB ChB 
   Marks, Professor V, MA DM FRCP FRCPath 
   Melrose, Professor D, MA BM BCh FRCS MRCP 
   Wells, Dr P N T, MSc DSc PhD FIEE C Eng 
Physically Handicapped and Audiology Sub-Group 
Chairman:  Harley, J  
Scientific Advisers: Chamberlain, Dr Anne, BSC MB BS MRCP 
   Haggard, Professor M P, PhD MA FIOA FASA FI Mech E 
   McEwen, E, CBE DSc C Eng FI Mech E FASME FRSE 
  
 314 
 
 
Physics and Electrical Engineering Sub-Group 
Chairman:  Harris, M A  
Scientific Advisers: Clifton, J, MSc FInst P BSc 
   Marks, Professor V, MA DM FRCP FRCPath 
   Meire, Dr H, MB BS LRCP MRCS DMRD DObstRCOG FRCR 
   Wells, Dr P N T, MSc DSc PhD FIEE C Eng 
General Sciences and Dental Sub-Group 
Chairman:  Winterton, Miss P M C  
Scientific Advisers: England, Dr A G, MB ChB BFC 
   Melrose, Professor D, MA BM BCh FRCS MRCP 
 
Building and Engineering R&D Committee 
Chairman:  Bolton, J, CB  
Scientific Advisers: Reiners, W J, BSc 
   Weeks, J, AA Dipl RIBA 
 
Chief Scientist’s Advisers on Unemployment and Health Research 
Scientific Advisers: Holland, Professor W W, MD BS BSc FRCP 
   Layard, Professor P G, BA MSc 
   Stevenson, Professor Olive, MA 
 
National Childhood Development Study 
Scientific Advisers: Blaxter, Lady Mildred, MA 
   Taylor, Dr R, BA PhD 
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Appendix 5: principal office holders 
Chief Scientist, Department of Health and Social Security 
Dr Richard H. L. Cohen (1907-1998) October 1972 to 31 March 1973 
Sir Douglas A. K. Black (1913-2002) 1 April 1973 to April 1977  
Professor Arthur Buller (b.1923) 1 August 1978 to 31 July 1981 
Sir Desmond A. Pond (1919-1986) 1 June 1982 to 31 March 1986 
Chief Medical Officer, Ministry of Health/Department of Health and Social Security 
Sir George Godber (1908-2009) 1960 to 1973 
Sir Henry Yellowlees (1919-2006) 1973 to 1983 
Sir E. Donald Acheson (1926-2010) 1983 to 1991 
Secretary, Medical Research Council 
Sir Harold Himsworth (1905-1993) 1949 to 1968 
Sir John Gray (1918-2011) 1968 to 1977 
Sir James L. Gowans (b.1924) 1977 to 1987 
Ministers of Health/Secretaries of State for Social Services/Health and Social Security 
J. Enoch Powell (1912-1998) 1960 to 1963 
Anthony Barber (1920-2011) 1963 to 1964 
Sir Kenneth Robinson (1911-1996) 1964 to 1968 
Richard H. S. Crossman (1907-1974) 1968 to 1970 
Sir Keith Joseph (1918-1994) 1970 to 1974 
Barbara Castle (1910-2002) 1974 to 1976 
David Ennals (1922 to 1985) 1976 to 1979 
Patrick Jenkin (1926-2016) 1979 to 1981 
P. Norman Fowler (b.1938) 1981 to 1987 
Permanent Secretaries, Ministry of Health/Department of Health and Social 
Security 
Sir Bruce Fraser (1901-1993) 1960 to 1964 
Sir Arnold France (1911-1998) 1964 to 1968 
Sir Clifford George (1909-1995) 1968 to 1970 
Sir Philip Rogers (1914-1990) 1970 to 1975 
Sir Patrick Nairne (1921-2013) 1975 to 1981 
Sir Kenneth Stowe (1927-1925) 1981 to 1987 
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Sources 
Archives 
The National Archives, Kew, London:  
BN Department of Health and Social Security. 
CAB Cabinet Office (including Civil Service Department). 
FD Medical Research Council 
MH Ministry of Health/ Department of Health and Social Security. 
T HM Treasury. 
The Wellcome Archive, Douglas Black Papers. 
Official publications 
Cabinet Office. Annual Review of Government Funded R&D, HMSO, 1983. 
Cabinet Office. Annual Review of Government Funded R&D, London: HMSO, 1984. 
Cd. 9230. Report of the Machinery of Government Committee. Ministry of Reconstruction. 
London: HMSO, 1918. 
Cmd. 8876. Report of the Medical Research Council for the year 1951-52. Committee of 
Privy Council for Medical Research. London: HMSO, 1953. 
Cmd. 9663. Report of the Committee of Enquiry into the Cost of the National Health 
Services. London: HMSO, 1956. 
Cmnd. 806. Report of the Ministry of Health for the Year Ended 31st December 1958: Part 1. 
London: HMSO, 1959. 
Cmnd. 1432. Control of Public Expenditure. Chancellor of the Exchequer: HMSO, 1961. 
Cmnd. 1604. A Hospital Plan for England and Wales. Ministry of Health, HMSO, 1962. 
Cmnd. 1754. Report of the Ministry of Health for the Year Ended 31st December 1961: Part 
1. London: HMSO, 1962. 
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Cmnd. 2171. Report of the Committee of Enquiry into the Organisation of Civil Science, 
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London: HMSO, 1966. 
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Comptroller and Auditor General, “Report of the Comptroller and Auditor General,” in 
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Department of Health. Research for Health. A Research and Development Strategy for the 
NHS. London, 1991. 
Department of Health. Best Research for Best Health. A New National Health Research 
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Department of Health and Social Security. Using Computers to Improve Health Services. A 
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Department of Health and Social Security. The DHSS in Relation to the Health and Personal 
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